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For educational purposes
This episode covers the air attacks on North Vietnam by US forces during Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965-68.
This episode covers the air attacks on North Vietnam by US forces during Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965-68.
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01:00The American campaign against North Vietnam's transport system began on April 3rd, 1965.
01:11In a month-long offensive, Navy and Air Force planes hit bridges, road and rail junctions, truck parks, and supply
01:20depots.
01:28For the Americans, one of the most important targets was the Ham Rung Bridge across the Song Ma River.
01:34The bridge was a choke point for troops and supplies moving southwards.
01:45In spite of repeated attempts, the Americans failed to destroy the target.
01:50Two U.S. planes were lost to MiG fighters and more to anti-aircraft defensives.
02:01Although the bombing was meant to damage the North Vietnamese military transport system, it also had political aims.
02:08It was supposed to pressure the North to stop supporting NLF guerrillas fighting in the South.
02:25In spite of the mounting damage, Ho Chi Minh, the northern president, was defiant.
02:33In South Vietnam, the NLF were doing well on the battlefield.
02:38South Vietnamese government forces were on the defensive.
02:41Ho meant to continue supporting the war as long as his Chinese and Soviet allies provided the weapons and financial
02:47support to carry on.
03:07North Vietnam's war materials from the Soviet Union and China came overland by rail or by sea
03:15into the major ports of Haiphong, Hong Gai, and Kam Fa.
03:26Supplies and troops destined for the war in the South were then sent on to staging areas, especially Dong Hoi.
03:37From there, they traveled into Laos by truck and bicycle and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam.
03:48More troops and supplies went south by sea.
03:57American aircraft had already attacked junctions, bridges, troop staging areas, and supply depots vital to the North's supply effort.
04:10However, the Northeast quadrant, with the population centers of Hanoi and Haiphong, would be left alone for the time being,
04:19at least.
04:23So, too, would the transport links to China, around which there were now heavy concentrations of Chinese anti-aircraft guns.
04:44As the Rolling Thunder campaign continued, opposition to the bombing grew in the United States and around the world.
04:55On May 13th, 1965, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson agreed to halt the bombing for five days.
05:04As Johnson had expected, North Vietnam firmly rejected his overture.
05:21In the months that followed the bombing pause, rolling thunder attacks were steadily intensified.
05:27Transportation was still the top priority, but the list of targets approved by the White House was steadily broadened.
05:33The planes also began to range further north than before.
05:45Soon, U.S. fighters had shot down their first MiGs of the air war.
06:10By July 1965, a ring of Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile batteries surrounded key sites in North Vietnam.
06:20The SAM was 35 feet long and radar-guided.
06:23It could hit a target 20 miles away and was one of the most advanced anti-aircraft weapons in the
06:29world.
06:38If the SAM's warhead detonated anywhere within 200 feet of an aircraft, it would almost certainly bring it down in
06:45flames.
06:53The missile defenses destroyed their first U.S. aircraft in late July 1965.
07:03In the coming months, one in every 20 SAM's fired would hit its target.
07:08By the end of 1965, they had lost 171 planes.
07:13For American air commanders, the SAM's were a nightmare.
07:17The only solution was to try and stay outside their range for as long as possible.
07:35American aircraft were now attacking some carefully selected targets inside the northeastern quadrant of North Vietnam.
07:47However, they had orders to avoid prohibited zones of 10 miles around the capital, Hanoi, and 4 miles around the
07:54port of Haiphong.
08:01In bigger zones, around both cities, attacks were severely restricted,
08:05and the aircraft also had to stay out of a buffer zone along the border with China.
08:23It was in the northeastern quadrant that the North Vietnamese had built up the heaviest concentrations of fighters and anti
08:30-aircraft missiles.
08:35The Americans knew the operating ranges of the MiGs and the SAMs.
08:43Attacking aircraft took elaborate measures to avoid them until the last possible moment.
08:57SAM missile sites were hard to find and even harder to destroy.
09:12To make the problem worse, those inside prohibited zones around Hanoi and Haiphong could not be attacked at all.
09:19It would be months before the restriction was lifted.
09:33Avoiding SAMs posed its own dangers for American pilots.
09:37The missiles were most dangerous to planes flying at 20,000 feet or above.
09:42A low-flying aircraft was less at risk, but then it was inside the range of the anti-aircraft guns.
09:54Explosive
09:55Many
10:12By this time, North Vietnam's MiG fighters were being sent into battle
10:17whenever the odds seemed in their favor.
10:20Always they fought under strict control from the ground.
10:23Their tactics were to approach from behind and above the Americans
10:27and then mount a sudden ambush.
10:35To the intense frustration of U.S. air commanders,
10:38American planes were strictly forbidden to attack North Vietnamese fighter bases.
10:43The fear in the White House was that Chinese or Soviet advisers
10:47might be killed, provoking retaliation.
10:54An even bigger worry was that if the North's air force were destroyed,
10:58Chinese fighter units might take over the defense themselves.
11:18By September 1965, MiGs had destroyed 11 U.S. aircraft in combat,
11:24but more than 20 MiGs had been shot down by American planes.
11:28Nearly two-thirds of the whole North Vietnamese fighter force was gone.
11:34In October 1965, General Jap, the North Vietnamese defense chief,
11:39was forced to order the 921st fighter wing to cut back combat operations.
12:02On December 24th, 1965,
12:06President Johnson announced another temporary halt to the bombing of North Vietnam
12:10and offered talks.
12:15Meanwhile, the war in the South was gathering pace.
12:19By the start of 1966,
12:21184,000 U.S. troops had arrived in-country.
12:34They were already launching big operations against the NLF guerrillas.
12:45Months before, American leaders had decided
12:47that the air war in the South would, if necessary,
12:50take priority over operations against the North.
12:52Hundreds of transport aircraft and fighter bombers
12:56supported American troops.
12:58Strike aircraft could be called in by any combat unit in the field.
13:02Time after time, their bombs, rockets, and napalm
13:06saved American units being overrun by the Viet Cong,
13:09but they also hit thousands of civilians in their homes.
13:21Against Viet Cong troops in the open,
13:24tactical fighter bombers were accurate and destructive weapons.
13:27However, against fortified guerrilla bases
13:30spread out under the forest canopy,
13:32they were almost useless.
13:39The solution suggested by the U.S. commander in Vietnam,
13:43General Westmoreland,
13:44was to carpet bomb with B-52s.
13:53The B-52 could carry 51, 750, and 500-pound bombs,
13:59a 13-and-a-half-ton payload.
14:02A modified version, the Big Belly,
14:05could carry 108, 750, and 500-pound bombs,
14:09a massive 31-and-three-quarter tons.
14:12A cell of three B-52s could obliterate an area
14:16three miles long and two miles wide.
14:23B-52 raids were codenamed Arclight.
14:33Each raid had involved a 12-hour round trip
14:36from Guam in the Pacific Ocean.
14:39The missions were possible
14:40only because for every bomber in the fleet,
14:43there was a tanker from Okinawa
14:45to refuel it in flight.
14:50The mission of the B-52 force
14:53was soon broadened to include
14:55the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos
14:56and passes feeding the trail
14:58just inside North Vietnam.
15:05The bombers were also accurate enough
15:07to support U.S. troops on the ground.
15:09radar could direct the B-52s
15:12to a target day or night
15:14up to 200 miles away
15:16and tell the crew exactly
15:17when to drop their bombs.
15:43The pause in the bombing that President Johnson had ordered in December 1965
15:48lasted 37 days.
15:50When the bombing restarted,
15:52it had coincided with appalling weather.
15:58North Vietnam was given a priceless breathing space
16:01in which to boost its defenses.
16:13The North's most important installations
16:15were now defended by 5,000 anti-aircraft guns.
16:20They included new radar-guided 85-
16:22and 100-millimeter weapons
16:24able to bring down an aircraft
16:26at nearly 20,000 feet.
16:31More SAM missile sites
16:33had also been put in place.
16:35By now, 30 new fighter pilots
16:38had come back from training
16:39in the Soviet Union and China
16:40along with more aircraft
16:41to rebuild the fighter force.
16:53American aircraft losses
16:55were now 20 a month
16:56over North Vietnam.
17:09One in 40 planes
17:11flying into the heavily defended
17:12Northeast Quadrant
17:13was lost.
17:15Pilot Morrell
17:16was beginning to suffer.
17:18Most were in combat
17:19every second day
17:20and some even more often.
17:27Realizing that dangerous problems
17:29were developing,
17:30the Americans moved
17:31to send more carrier pilots
17:33to Southeast Asia.
17:34They also overhauled
17:36the supply system.
17:44At the same time,
17:46other changes were made
17:47to help reduce American casualties
17:49and boost morale.
18:01In April 1966,
18:04Yankee Station
18:05and the carriers
18:06of Task Force 77
18:07were moved nearer
18:09to North Vietnam.
18:14At the same time,
18:16two new search
18:17and rescue stations
18:18were created
18:18called North and South.
18:23The stations were placed
18:25on the routes
18:25most used by U.S.
18:27strike aircraft.
18:34Up to now,
18:36U.S. Air Force
18:36and Navy planes
18:37had taken turns
18:38to hit different areas
18:40of North Vietnam.
18:42There were always
18:43problems of coordination.
18:48Now, the system
18:49was improved
18:50by allocating route packages.
18:54Route package one
18:55was given to military
18:56military assistance command
18:57in the South
18:58as part of the war
18:59on the demilitarized zone.
19:06The Air Force
19:07was assigned route packages
19:085 and 6A.
19:10The Navy concentrated
19:12its efforts
19:12on the route packages
19:13nearer the coast.
19:28The route package system
19:30allowed American pilots
19:32to learn the defenses
19:33of their own target areas.
19:35Combined with the area's
19:36search and rescue operations,
19:38it did help save pilots' lives,
19:40but did little
19:41to reduce aircraft losses.
19:42In May and June 1966,
19:4618 planes were shot down.
19:51Seven pilots were picked up
19:53by the search and rescue forces.
20:00By now,
20:01every American raid
20:02included attacks
20:03to suppress
20:04anti-aircraft defenses.
20:05strikes were also supported
20:07by a vast array
20:09of sophisticated technology.
20:14Early warning radar aircraft
20:16could alert pilots
20:17to MiGs or SAM launches.
20:19Electronic warfare planes
20:21tried to jam
20:22anti-aircraft radars.
20:24Wild Weasel strike aircraft,
20:26armed with the new
20:27Shrike radar-seeking missiles,
20:29were deployed
20:29to hit the SAM sites.
20:42The Americans also had
20:44a new and formidable
20:46attack aircraft.
20:47The A-6 intruder
20:48had the world's
20:49most sophisticated
20:50electronic navigation
20:51and targeting systems.
21:00It could find
21:01and hit targets
21:02day or night
21:03in any weather
21:04and carried a six-and-a-half-ton
21:06bomb load.
21:07In poor conditions,
21:08a pair of intruders
21:09could destroy a target
21:10that a normal raid
21:12of a hundred aircraft
21:13might fail to hit.
21:36More than a year
21:37after rolling thunder
21:38had begun,
21:39North Vietnam's leaders
21:40were gaining confidence.
21:42The bombing had unified
21:43the North Vietnamese people.
21:48Damaged railway stock,
21:50trucks,
21:51and industrial equipment
21:52were being replaced
21:53by the Soviet Union
21:54and China.
21:55Almost every day,
21:56a supply ship arrived
21:57in Haiphong Harbor.
22:06The Soviet Union
22:08had also supplied
22:09new advanced fighter aircraft,
22:11bringing the number
22:12of North Vietnamese planes
22:13to 70.
22:14The MiG-21,
22:16all-weather interceptor,
22:17was able to fly
22:18at twice the speed of sound
22:19and was highly maneuverable.
22:26It was armed
22:27with two cannon
22:28and two atoll
22:29infrared homing missiles,
22:31deadly weapons
22:32at medium ranges.
22:38In spite of the American bombing,
22:41the North Vietnamese
22:41had actually increased
22:43the flow of men
22:43and supplies
22:44to the southern battlefield.
22:46Destroyed bridges
22:47were bypassed
22:48by pontoons and fords,
22:50and trucks moved
22:51mostly at night.
23:17The American Joint Chiefs
23:17For months,
23:18the American Joint Chiefs
23:19of Staff in Washington
23:20had been urging
23:21the president
23:22to launch
23:22an all-out campaign
23:23against North Vietnam.
23:25Above all,
23:26they wanted to target
23:27petroleum and oil storage,
23:29the PAL system.
23:36U.S. commanders
23:37were confident
23:37that an offensive
23:38against PAL targets
23:40would deal a crippling blow
23:41to the North Vietnamese
23:42war effort.
23:48The offensive was put off
23:49again and again.
23:52President Johnson
23:53was waiting
23:53for an answer
23:54to peace feelers
23:55sent out to Hanoi.
23:58When there was no response,
24:00the president
24:01approved the attacks.
24:02The first PAL raids
24:04on North Vietnam's
24:05fuel storage system
24:06were launched
24:07on June 29, 1966.
24:23North Vietnam
24:24had 13 major
24:26oil storage facilities.
24:29Two had already
24:30been destroyed
24:31and another badly damaged.
24:37The new American campaign
24:39was launched
24:40by U.S. Air Force planes
24:41flying from Thailand
24:42and by the Navy carriers,
24:45Ranger,
24:46Constellation,
24:47and Hancock.
24:51In the first strikes,
24:53tanks at Hanoi,
24:55Haiphong,
24:57and Dosong were hit.
25:02The following days
25:04saw attacks
25:04on yet more sites.
25:09The remaining facilities
25:10and fuel-carrying trains
25:12from China
25:13were next.
25:26The American attacks
25:27were completely devastating.
25:29The North's biggest facility
25:31at Haiphong
25:31was totally destroyed.
25:36Smoke from the burning tanks
25:38reached 20,000 feet
25:40into the sky.
25:48The PAL strikes
25:49lasted for several weeks.
25:5176% of the designated
25:54oil facility targets
25:55in North Vietnam's
25:56main storage
25:57and pumping facilities
25:58were wrecked.
25:59So were half the barges
26:01used to ferry oil
26:02from tankers offshore.
26:07The reaction
26:08from North Vietnam's
26:09air defenses
26:10was furious.
26:11SAMs and anti-aircraft guns
26:13were reinforced
26:13as the raids went on.
26:23The MiGs flying from airfield
26:26still off-limits
26:27to U.S. bombs
26:27could attack at will.
26:30American losses
26:31were heavy.
26:40In spite of the massive size
26:42of the Paul campaign
26:43and the heavy cost
26:45in downed aircraft,
26:46the American raids
26:47had a limited effect.
26:49The big oil tanks
26:51had been destroyed,
26:51but long before
26:53the North had dispersed
26:54its stocks
26:54in smaller tanks
26:55and bunkers.
26:57Some had been hidden
26:59in residential districts,
27:00places the Americans
27:01might avoid attacking.
27:06The Americans
27:07launched a massive effort
27:09to try and eliminate
27:10the dispersed oil stocks.
27:21after heavy losses
27:22of planes and men,
27:23they had destroyed
27:24only a fraction.
27:29North Vietnam
27:30still had more than enough
27:31to supply its own needs
27:33and the needs of the trucks
27:34supplying the southern battlefield.
27:54In October 1966,
27:57the U.S. Defense Secretary,
27:58Robert McNamara,
27:59paid a visit
28:00to the American carrier fleet
28:01off the shores
28:02of North Vietnam.
28:04With him was
28:05General Wheeler,
28:06the chairman
28:06of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
28:08and Admiral Sharp,
28:09the Pacific Fleet commander.
28:23Over the past few months,
28:25McNamara had grown more
28:26and more disillusioned
28:27with the Rolling Thunder campaign.
28:29The North Vietnamese
28:31still showed no signs
28:32of abandoning the war.
28:35The failure of the Paul offensive
28:37had been the final straw.
28:39By now,
28:41the cost of Rolling Thunder
28:42had soared
28:43to $1,247,000,000
28:46and more aircraft
28:47and crew lost
28:48every month.
28:59McNamara now favored
29:00curtailing the bombing.
29:02He argued
29:03that U.S. aircraft
29:04should concentrate
29:05on attacking
29:05the supply routes
29:06from North Vietnam
29:07to the South
29:08at a much lower cost
29:10in lives and cash.
29:13Military leaders
29:14were dismayed.
29:15Their argument was
29:17that Rolling Thunder
29:17had failed
29:18because,
29:19with all the restrictions,
29:20it had never been given
29:21a chance to succeed.
29:42During 1966,
29:45as Operation Rolling Thunder
29:46intensified,
29:47American and Australian
29:49warships joined
29:50in the campaign
29:50against North Vietnam.
29:58Operation Sea Dragon
29:59attacked more than
30:003,500 land targets,
30:03including bridges,
30:04railroad yards,
30:05and truck parks.
30:10More than 300 coastal defense
30:13and radar installations
30:14were damaged or destroyed.
30:21The attacks were fiercely resisted
30:23by North Vietnamese
30:24coastal artillery batteries.
30:33During the two years
30:34of Sea Dragon attacks,
30:35the guns would hit 19 ships.
30:38None were sunk,
30:39but several suffered
30:41serious damage.
30:45In early February 1967,
30:48President Johnson
30:48declared a six-day halt
30:50in attacks
30:51on North Vietnam.
30:53The North Vietnamese
30:54immediately raced
30:55supplies and men
30:56to the South
30:57as they had done
30:58during every pause before.
31:07Ho Chi Minh replied
31:09to Johnson's offer
31:10of negotiations
31:10with a demand
31:11that the bombing
31:12stop completely.
31:14Ho made no promise
31:15that even then
31:16he would talk.
31:24Ho's rebuff
31:25left Johnson frustrated
31:26and angry.
31:27It was now
31:28a contest of wills.
31:30To increase the pressure
31:31on North Vietnam,
31:33Johnson sanctioned attacks
31:34on a new list
31:35of bombing targets.
31:45American planes
31:46would attack
31:47the North's airfields,
31:48power plants,
31:49and industries,
31:50while the Navy's
31:51Operation Sea Dragon
31:52would be expanded.
31:53It was a major step
31:55towards an all-out campaign.
32:09The U.S. and Australian warships
32:11of Operation Sea Dragon
32:13were allowed
32:13to extend operations
32:15from 19 to 20 degrees north.
32:23Aircraft were sent
32:24to mine river mouths
32:26and later inland waterways
32:27as well,
32:28up to the same line.
32:36Haifong Harbor, however,
32:37the North's most important port,
32:39would not be mined
32:40until 1972
32:41to avoid the risk
32:42and the risk of sinking
32:43Soviet ships.
32:50The new targets
32:51for U.S. bombers
32:52were the airfields,
32:54power plants,
32:54and industries
32:55of the northeastern quadrant.
33:00Some targets
33:01were inside
33:02the previously prohibited zones
33:04around Hanoi
33:05and Haifong.
33:19The American attacks
33:20on North Vietnam's airfields
33:22began on April 24, 1967.
33:25By the end of the year,
33:27all but one of the north's
33:28MiG bases
33:29had been hit.
33:30The attacks
33:31inflicted heavy damage
33:33on runways
33:33and installations.
33:35There were furious
33:36air combats
33:37over Hanoi
33:38and Haifong
33:38as every available MiG
33:40was thrown into action.
33:52After the airfield attacks
33:54came the strikes
33:55on industrial targets
33:56and power plants.
33:58Thirty-two percent
33:59of the north's
34:00electrical power
34:01generating capacity
34:02was cut,
34:03but the remaining plants
34:04were adequate
34:05to supply most
34:06of the north's
34:06small industrial plants.
34:15By now,
34:17the weather had improved
34:18and the bombers
34:19now ranged freely,
34:20hitting old
34:20and new targets
34:21again and again.
34:24In May 1967,
34:26as desperate battles
34:27raged in the skies
34:28over Hanoi
34:29and Haifong,
34:30the Americans
34:30shot down
34:3126 North Vietnamese
34:33fighters.
34:34North Vietnam's
34:35pilot strength
34:36had been halved.
34:55while the latest offensive
34:56against North Vietnam
34:58was still underway,
34:59in Washington,
35:00a bitter argument
35:01was raging
35:02about strategy
35:02in Vietnam.
35:07President Johnson's
35:09civilian and military
35:10advisers
35:10were now completely
35:11at odds.
35:12The military
35:13wanted a major escalation
35:15of the air and ground war
35:16in an all-out push
35:18for victory.
35:19The civilians,
35:21especially Robert McNamara,
35:22were calling for the war effort
35:24to be leveled off.
35:33In August 1967,
35:36the pressure
35:36on President Johnson
35:37to side with his military
35:39commanders
35:39sharply increased.
35:41A Senate subcommittee
35:42was about to call
35:43for much heavier
35:44bombing of North Vietnam.
35:49To head off criticism,
35:51Johnson approved
35:52a sharp escalation
35:53in rolling thunder.
36:01For the defense secretary,
36:03Robert McNamara,
36:04the decision to escalate
36:05was the end of the road.
36:07His advice
36:08had been ignored
36:09and plainly,
36:10he no longer had
36:11the confidence
36:11of the president.
36:13McNamara had no option
36:15but to resign.
36:25American aircraft
36:26now hit a whole list
36:28of previously banned targets,
36:29including power plants
36:31and rail yards
36:31inside the Hanoi circle.
36:34The Paul Dumers bridge
36:36linking Hanoi
36:37and Haifeng
36:37was attacked
36:38and two of its spans
36:39dropped into the Red River.
36:41However,
36:42engineers hastily
36:43carried out
36:44temporary repairs
36:45and the bridge
36:46continued to carry traffic
36:47until it was hit again
36:48in October 1967.
36:52Targets inside
36:53the Chinese border
36:54buffer zone
36:55were also hit.
36:56American planes
36:57attacked to within
36:58eight miles
36:59of the frontier.
37:00Two American aircraft
37:01strayed into China
37:02and were shot down
37:04by Chinese MiGs.
37:06The attacks
37:07of late 1967
37:09were so intense
37:10that for a time
37:11the northern air defenses
37:12ran desperately short
37:14of SAMs
37:14and anti-aircraft ammunition.
37:24Almost all important targets
37:26except Haifeng port
37:27had been hit repeatedly.
37:39The Americans
37:40were now using
37:41a new generation
37:42of smart bombs
37:43including the walleye
37:44television-guided weapon
37:45which had been operational
37:46in Vietnam
37:47since 1966.
37:49It took many fewer aircraft
37:51to destroy a target
37:52which meant in theory
37:53that precision attacks
37:55could be made
37:55even in densely populated areas.
38:00There was little
38:01the North Vietnamese air defenses
38:02could do to stop the havoc.
38:04However,
38:05northern leaders
38:06still had no intention
38:07of giving in
38:08to U.S. demands.
38:12In their view,
38:13the best way
38:14of stopping the bombing
38:15was to win the war
38:16in the South
38:17in the shortest possible time.
38:31In January 1968,
38:331868,
38:3484,000 NLF
38:36and North Vietnamese
38:37army troops
38:37launched their long-planned
38:39Tet Offensive.
38:40They attacked towns
38:42and cities
38:42all over South Vietnam
38:44and held huge tracts
38:45of Saigon,
38:46the capital,
38:47for weeks.
38:56In the end,
38:57the Tet Offensive
38:58was a military disaster
39:00for the Viet Cong.
39:0340,000 were killed
39:05in more than a month
39:06of savage fighting.
39:08However,
39:09in a way
39:09that had never been planned,
39:11the offensive
39:11was a political triumph.
39:22In the United States,
39:23public opinion
39:24had been turning
39:25against the war
39:25for months.
39:26The sheer scale
39:28of the latest offensive
39:29now seemed to confirm
39:30that U.S. strategy
39:31had failed.
39:32The pressure
39:33on President Johnson
39:34to look for a negotiated
39:36settlement
39:36grew irresistible.
39:46on March 31, 1968,
39:49Johnson announced
39:50that as a goodwill gesture
39:51he was restricting
39:52the bombing campaign
39:53to the extreme south
39:55of North Vietnam.
39:56The American sun
39:57is in the field
39:58far away.
40:01On April 3,
40:03Hanoi Radio announced
40:04that if bombing ceased
40:05unconditionally,
40:06the talks could begin.
40:12The Paris peace process
40:14began on March 10, 1968.
40:17Almost at once,
40:18they stalled hopelessly.
40:26Meantime,
40:27U.S. aircraft
40:27and warships
40:28continued to attack
40:29transportation targets
40:31below the 20th parallel.
40:42In October 1968,
40:44after several months
40:45of wrangling
40:46and on the eve
40:47of the U.S. presidential elections,
40:49there was a breakthrough.
40:53The North Vietnamese
40:54agreed that in exchange
40:56for a complete halt
40:57to the bombing,
40:57they, for their part,
40:59would no longer
40:59infiltrate troops
41:00across the DMZ
41:02or shell
41:02major cities
41:03in the south.
41:06Johnson knew
41:07that being seen
41:08to oppose peace
41:09could damage
41:10his party's chances
41:11in the coming elections.
41:12Reluctantly,
41:13he agreed
41:14to stop the bombing.
41:20Operation Rolling Thunder
41:22came to an end
41:23on November 1, 1968,
41:26after three and a half years.
41:28The campaign
41:29had cost
41:30more than 900
41:31American aircraft.
41:34818 pilots
41:36were dead
41:37or missing
41:37and hundreds
41:38were in captivity.
41:46on the northern side,
41:47nearly 120
41:49North Vietnamese planes
41:50had been destroyed
41:51in air combat,
41:52in accidents
41:53or by friendly fire.
41:55On the ground,
41:57according to McNamara's estimates,
41:59182,000 civilians
42:00had been killed
42:01during Operation Rolling Thunder.
42:0420,000 Chinese support personnel
42:06had also been casualties
42:08of the bombing.
42:27With the end
42:28of Rolling Thunder,
42:29North Vietnam
42:30immediately set about
42:31rebuilding
42:31its shattered transport system.
42:33In spite of the talk
42:35still going on in Paris,
42:36the northern commander,
42:38General Jaap
42:38was already planning
42:40his next offensive
42:41in the south.
42:46He sharply increased
42:47the flow of supplies
42:49and men
42:49down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
42:54With thousands
42:55of U.S. aircraft
42:56and pilots
42:57no longer tied up
42:58attacking North Vietnam,
43:00U.S. commanders
43:01could concentrate
43:02massive air power
43:03on Laos.
43:04The main aim
43:05was to find
43:06and destroy
43:07the truck convoys
43:08moving south.
43:13Special forces teams
43:15had always scouted
43:16into Laos
43:17to guide attack aircraft
43:18onto targets.
43:20But by this time,
43:21the U.S.
43:22had also deployed
43:22the world's most sophisticated
43:24electronic surveillance system.
43:40Between 1966
43:42and 1971,
43:44in Operation Igloo White,
43:46American aircraft
43:47laid a sophisticated system
43:49of electronic sensors
43:50down the Ho Chi Minh Trail
43:52in Laos.
43:57The targets
43:58were the truck convoy
43:59streaming south
44:00from North Vietnam.
44:05Signals from the sensors
44:06were picked up
44:07by orbiting aircraft
44:08and relayed
44:09to a listening center
44:10in Nakhon Phanon
44:11in Thailand.
44:12Other aircraft
44:14carried instruments
44:15to detect
44:15the electrical activity
44:16of truck engines.
44:17When a convoy
44:18was detected,
44:19the Americans
44:20would launch a raid
44:21by B-52s
44:22or fighter bombers
44:23into the target area.
44:39In 1968 alone,
44:42U.S. strike aircraft
44:43flew 88,000 strikes
44:45against targets
44:46in Laos.
44:47The planes dropped
44:48high explosives,
44:49cluster bombs,
44:50and mines.
44:51They were also equipped
44:53with new,
44:53highly accurate
44:54laser-guided bombs.
45:03In the front line
45:05of the war
45:05against the trucks,
45:06the formidable gunships,
45:08known as Spooky,
45:09played a vital part.
45:17The gunships carried
45:18three mini-guns,
45:19each able to fire
45:206,000 rounds a minute.
45:22Flying in a circular pattern
45:24over the target,
45:25the gunship would rain down
45:27an awesome weight of fire.
45:36the gunships and gunships
45:36in 1969.
45:36In 1969,
45:38the gunships alone
45:39claimed more than
45:4010,000 trucks destroyed.
45:45However,
45:46the North Vietnamese
45:47had built 400 miles
45:48of new roads in Laos,
45:50and not even American
45:51electronics and computers
45:52could cover it all.
46:01Still,
46:02U.S. aircraft
46:03would drop
46:04three-quarters
46:04of a million tons
46:05of bombs on Laos,
46:0710 times the weight
46:08dropped on Japan
46:09in World War II.
46:26In January 1969,
46:29Richard Nixon
46:30took office
46:30as the new president
46:31of the United States.
46:33Nixon had promised
46:34to achieve
46:35what he called
46:35peace with honor.
46:42The aim
46:43was to negotiate
46:43a settlement
46:44that would allow
46:45the half million
46:46U.S. troops
46:46in Vietnam
46:47to be withdrawn
46:48while still allowing
46:49South Vietnam
46:50to survive.
46:56The American plan
46:57was to prepare
46:58the South Vietnamese
46:59to take over
47:00their own defense.
47:02Officials called it
47:03Vietnamization.
47:04The regular armed forces
47:06would be built up
47:07to over 420,000 men.
47:09They would get
47:10modern weapons
47:11including large numbers
47:12of tanks, guns,
47:14and aircraft.
47:26The North's strategy
47:28for 1969
47:29was to keep up
47:30the pressure
47:30in South Vietnam.
47:32While negotiations
47:33were going on,
47:34they meant to improve
47:35their position
47:36on the battlefield.
47:45On the 22nd of February,
47:471969,
47:49in a major offensive,
47:50assault teams
47:51and artillery
47:51attacked American bases
47:52all over South Vietnam,
47:54killing 1,140 Americans.
47:57At the same time,
47:59in an echo
48:00of Tet a year earlier,
48:01a hundred towns
48:02and cities were hit.
48:04The American reaction
48:05was swift.
48:06Arclight strikes
48:07by B-52s
48:08were launched
48:09on guerrilla base areas.
48:11Armor-piercing bombs
48:12dropped from 30,000 feet
48:13annihilated bunker
48:14and tunnel complexes.
48:20On the ground,
48:22American units
48:23launched spoiling attacks
48:24on guerrilla staging areas
48:25and captured
48:26enormous quantities
48:27of supplies.
48:42The heaviest fighting
48:43was around the capital,
48:44Saigon,
48:45but fights raged
48:46all over South Vietnam.
48:48In the first three weeks
48:50of battles,
48:50the Americans
48:51lost 1,100 men.
48:55However,
48:56American artillery
48:57and air power
48:58overwhelmed
48:59the Viet Cong offensive.
49:19In the White House,
49:20there was anger
49:21and deep frustration
49:22at the latest campaign
49:23against South Vietnam.
49:29President Nixon
49:30and his advisers
49:31were determined
49:32to retaliate
49:33to show that the U.S.
49:34was serious
49:34about defending its ally.
49:36The problem was
49:37that going back
49:38to bombing North Vietnam
49:40would cause an outcry
49:41in the United States.
49:49Nixon's plan
49:50was to bomb
49:50Viet Cong staging areas
49:52in Cambodia.
49:58For years,
49:59they had been
49:59the springboards
50:00for attacks
50:01against Saigon.
50:02These jungle areas
50:03held tens of thousands
50:05of troops
50:05and vast stores
50:06of supplies
50:07and weapons.
50:18But Washington
50:19had forbidden U.S. forces
50:20to attack the Cambodian bases.
50:23Legally,
50:24Cambodia was a neutral state
50:26and there was a risk
50:27that American action
50:28could draw Cambodia
50:29into the war.
50:31However,
50:31Nixon did not mean
50:32to hold back.
50:34Operation Menu,
50:35the bombing of Cambodia,
50:36was to be kept
50:37a strictly guarded secret.
50:40It was dubbed Menu
50:41because the first attack
50:43on base area 354
50:45had been decided
50:46at a breakfast briefing
50:46at the Pentagon.
50:49The operation
50:50was to continue
50:51for 14 months.
51:09as well as
51:10the Ho Chi Minh Trail
51:11running from
51:12North Vietnam,
51:13NVA forces
51:14were also supplied
51:15by North Vietnamese
51:17and Soviet ships
51:18which were allowed
51:19to dock
51:20at Sihanoukville.
51:25From here,
51:27they fed war materials
51:28to the main base areas.
51:36The biggest
51:37Viet Cong strongholds
51:38were west
51:39and north of Saigon
51:40in the areas
51:41known as
51:42the Parrot's Beak
51:43and the Fish Hook.
51:46The bases were run
51:48by North Vietnamese troops
51:49and the NLF.
52:01Starting in February 1969,
52:04American B-52 bombers
52:06from Thailand
52:07launched devastating strikes
52:09against each
52:09of the base areas
52:10in turn.
52:31Operation Menu
52:32saw more than
52:334,000 B-52 missions
52:35dropping
52:36120,000 tons
52:37of bombs.
52:47In later campaigns,
52:49B-52s supported
52:50American and South Vietnamese
52:52ground incursions
52:53into Cambodia
52:54and backed
52:55Cambodian government
52:56forces against
52:57the Khmer Rouge guerrillas.
53:00Altogether,
53:00in four years
53:01of bombing,
53:02U.S. aircraft
53:03would unload
53:04more than half a million
53:05tons of bombs
53:06on Cambodia.
53:15On orders
53:16from the White House,
53:17extraordinary measures
53:18were taken
53:18to keep
53:19the Cambodian bombing
53:20a secret.
53:21Defense Department
53:22officials
53:23always claimed
53:23the raids
53:24were over
53:24South Vietnam
53:25because the planes
53:26were guided
53:27to their target
53:28by radar
53:28at the Ben Hoa
53:29airbases
53:30and orders
53:31to drop the bombs
53:31were also issued
53:32from there.
53:33Often,
53:34the pilots
53:34themselves
53:34did not know
53:35they were bombing
53:36Cambodia.
53:37Those that did
53:38were ordered
53:39to falsify
53:40their flight logs
53:41upon returning
53:42to base
53:42to maintain
53:43the secrecy.
53:54In spite of
53:56the elaborate
53:56precautions,
53:57in May 1969,
53:59reports of the
54:00secret bombing
54:01were published
54:01in the American press.
54:03Nixon was furious.
54:08only recently,
54:10the American public
54:11had learned
54:11of the My Lai Massacre
54:13in which over 200
54:14South Vietnamese villagers
54:15had been killed
54:16by U.S. troops
54:17back in 1968.
54:27Anti-war feeling
54:28had also been fueled
54:29by news
54:30of the bloody battle
54:31of Hamburger Hill.
54:34American troops
54:35had suffered
54:36heavy casualties
54:37capturing the hill
54:38only for it
54:39to be abandoned
54:40later.
54:58On June 8th, 1969,
55:01President Nixon
55:01met with
55:02South Vietnamese
55:03President Nian Van Thieu
55:04on Midway Island
55:05in the Pacific.
55:11Nixon announced
55:12that 25,000 U.S. troops
55:14would be withdrawn
55:15from Vietnam
55:16immediately.
55:19The 9th Marines
55:20would be the first
55:21to head for home.
55:23It was the first
55:24U.S. troop reduction
55:26in the history
55:27of the war
55:27in Vietnam.
55:35By the fall of 1969,
55:38Nixon's initiatives
55:39had succeeded
55:39in quietening
55:40public opposition
55:41to the war.
55:42To keep up
55:43the momentum,
55:44the President announced
55:45a second batch
55:46of troop withdrawals
55:47and promised
55:48to reduce
55:49the draft call.
55:58In October 1969,
56:00an opinion poll
56:01gave Nixon
56:02an approval rating
56:02of 71%,
56:04an almost
56:05unprecedented figure.
56:12Although Nixon
56:13was preparing
56:14to pull out
56:14American troops,
56:15he had no intention
56:16of giving up
56:17on Vietnam.
56:18His plan
56:19was that even
56:20when most
56:21American troops
56:21had been withdrawn,
56:23Americans would
56:23continue to supply,
56:25train,
56:25and arm
56:26the South Vietnamese.
56:28Most important
56:29of all,
56:29a formidable shield
56:31of American air power
56:32would remain
56:33to deter
56:33communist attacks.
56:44As ground combat
56:45in South Vietnam
56:46fell to its lowest
56:47level in six years,
56:49the prospects
56:50for success
56:50looked increasingly
56:51good in Washington.
56:57What U.S. officials
56:58did not know
56:59was that in North Vietnam,
57:01the greatest offensive
57:02of the whole war
57:03was being prepared.
57:05The plan
57:06was to use
57:07nearly 200,000 troops
57:09and hundreds of tanks
57:10in a full-scale invasion
57:12of South Vietnam.
57:13above the castle
57:13and a half compounds
57:17The moon
57:17was to shoot
57:18as free
57:19should have
57:19read
57:19as well.
57:20All
57:34away
57:35was that
57:35by the
57:36wereilen
57:36smelt
57:42and her
57:42girl
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