- 2 days ago
For educational purposes
This episode Covers the US's growing invovlement from military advisors to combat troops after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.
Also covered is Operation Starlight which was the US Marines first battle against the Vietcong in 1965.
This episode Covers the US's growing invovlement from military advisors to combat troops after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.
Also covered is Operation Starlight which was the US Marines first battle against the Vietcong in 1965.
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LearningTranscript
00:28Satsang with Mooji
01:02In early 1962, the helicopters sent to Vietnam by President Kennedy flew their first combat missions against the NLF.
01:12In Operation Chopper, the aircraft flown by U.S. Army pilots ferried a thousand South Vietnamese soldiers to sweep an
01:20NLF stronghold near Saigon.
01:27It was the beginning of a whole new phase of the conflict.
01:43From the start, the American helicopters had a dramatic effect on the fighting.
01:50Government troops could take the guerrillas by surprise or cut off their line of retreat after a battle.
02:00Often, they panicked and were killed as they tried to escape.
02:04In the first months of 1962, the South Vietnamese Army won a string of victories, badly shaking the NLF's morale.
02:23Using helicopters for offensive operations called for a whole new set of tactics.
02:28It was a complex business in which helicopter forces and ground units had to be strictly coordinated.
02:36But the aim was simple.
02:38The enemy had to be found, fixed in position, and then defeated.
02:43Government troops called it spear and net.
02:47Later, it would become known as search and destroy.
02:50go to the бой.
03:07insulin
03:22A search-and-destroy operation usually began with intelligence locating an NLF unit.
03:31The task then was to place forces to cut off the enemy's retreat.
03:38If there was a river nearby, South Vietnamese gunboats were deployed in blocking positions.
03:46Infantry on foot and an armored personnel carriers were moved in over land.
03:54Meanwhile, American helicopters loaded up with government troops rendezvoused with their escort of ground attack aircraft.
04:05After bombing or artillery strikes, the airborne infantry landed and advanced towards the enemy, acting as the offensive spear.
04:18Trapped by the net of blocking forces, the Viet Cong would be forced to do battle and be destroyed by
04:24vastly superior firepower, or so the theory went.
04:37The instant success of helicopter operations seemed to prove that the approach favored by the Americans was the right one.
04:45What U.S. advisers wanted now was more and bigger offensive operations.
04:59The greatest need was for more helicopters, and the Americans quickly provided them.
05:07A series of government victories followed, and soon it looked as if the South Vietnamese Army might, in the not
05:14-too-distant future, actually defeat the guerrillas.
05:23In July 1962, General Paul D. Harkins, head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Saigon, reported to Washington
05:33that tremendous progress was being made in South Vietnam.
05:39It was just what President Kennedy wanted to hear, and in the White House, there was a deep sense of
05:45relief.
05:48They hoped they could bring home all U.S. military personnel by the end of 1965.
05:56the Pacific.
06:24To Ho Chi Minh and the leaders of North Vietnam,
06:28the big increase in American military support for the South
06:31was deeply troubling.
06:35Did the U.S. mean to put in combat troops?
06:38Or perhaps even invade the North itself?
06:49They appealed to the Chinese leader Mao Zedong for help.
06:59Mao was anxious to be seen as the champion of liberation movements around the world.
07:05He was also determined to counter the American strategy in Vietnam.
07:13In the summer of 1962, the Chinese leader promised Ho Chi Minh substantial support
07:19for the guerrilla war against the Southern government.
07:22Right away, North Vietnam would get 90,000 extra rifles for the Viet Cong.
07:39As yet, the Americans knew nothing of the Chinese decision to back the war.
07:44They were still highly optimistic.
07:51Although the NLF were not being beaten on the battlefield
07:54and had managed to hit over 2,500 hamlets in 1962 alone,
08:00pacification programs designed to increase government control over the countryside
08:05promised real progress in the villages.
08:19In a program coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency,
08:23U.S. Special Forces were working with Montagnard tribal groups
08:27in the central highlands of South Vietnam.
08:30They fortified villages and trained local volunteers
08:34to fight the Viet Cong in their own areas.
08:36The tactics involved setting ambushes, heavy night patrolling,
08:41and above all, responding fast to guerrilla incidents.
08:56The civilian irregular defense forces created by the American teams were highly effective.
09:03The NLF found it increasingly difficult to organize openly amongst the population.
09:15At its peak, the program would encompass thousands of villages
09:19and hundreds of thousands of people.
09:30While the effort in the highlands was entirely an American initiative,
09:34further south, the Saigon government had embarked on its own pacification program.
09:46Backed by the CIA, called the Strategic Hamlets Program,
09:50the idea was to create 11,000 settlements
09:53which could defend themselves from the Viet Cong
09:55and bring government authority into the countryside.
09:58The campaign was a disaster from the start.
10:08Instead of winning the voluntary cooperation of villagers,
10:12the government embarked on a crash program of forced resettlement.
10:17Families were moved, sometimes at gunpoint,
10:20from their traditional lands and the burial grounds of their ancestors.
10:27Funds promised for development were embezzled by corrupt officials.
10:39Soon, the Strategic Hamlets came to be seen by their inhabitants as little better than prisons.
10:45The result was a massive upsurge in support for the NLF,
10:49who vowed to destroy the Strategic Hamlets by every means possible.
11:10From the first introduction of American helicopters into South Vietnam,
11:15NLF tacticians had worked feverishly to develop ways of dealing with the threat.
11:21They had learned to mount ambushes with heavy machine guns near the obvious landing zones.
11:35They also practiced breaking up their larger units at high speed
11:40and melting into the forests or swamps at the first sign of an enemy sweep.
11:50One of the biggest lessons learned by the guerrillas in 1962 was to keep their attacks short.
11:56Raids or ambushes were planned to last no more than 15 minutes.
12:01The idea was that even with helicopters, government forces would have too little time to react.
12:14Slowly, by using their new tactics, the Viet Cong had recovered their confidence.
12:20So much so, that by the start of 1963, they were able to inflict a shattering defeat on a South
12:27Vietnamese Army Air Mobile operation.
12:49The hamlet of Aptan Toi in the Mekong Delta was believed by the South Vietnamese Army to be the location
12:57of a Viet Cong headquarters.
12:58A radio transmitter and a small guerrilla force.
13:07The Army's 7th Division, with American advice, decided to attack.
13:12What they didn't know is that they were walking into a trap.
13:16The South Vietnamese Army were lured in so the NLF could for the first time test their effectiveness against militia
13:24and airborne units.
13:25The operation was launched on January 2nd, 1963.
13:43The neighboring hamlets of Aptan Toi and Ap Bak were strung out along a raised dike and an irrigation canal.
13:53In the treeline was deployed the whole Viet Cong 514th Battalion, reinforced by local guerrillas, altogether nearly 350 men.
14:09The 11th Regiment of the South Vietnamese Army landed north of Aptan Toi and exchanged fire with the Viet Cong.
14:21Meanwhile, a civil guard task force pushing from the South ran straight into the Viet Cong at Apt Bak and
14:28was stopped in its tracks.
14:35Air and artillery strikes were directed at both hamlets, but the Viet Cong were well dug in.
14:46A reserve company of army troops was landed in transport helicopters to attack Aptan Toi.
14:55Fire from Apt Bak destroyed five aircraft.
15:02Next, a company of armored personnel carriers made a disorganized assault on Apt Bak, but was driven off with heavy
15:09losses.
15:15Airborne reinforcements were dropped in the wrong place by the army commander.
15:23This allowed the Viet Cong to escape and avoided further government casualties.
15:40For the Viet Cong, the Battle of Apt Bak was a stunning victory.
15:44For the first time, they had stood their ground against helicopters and armored vehicles.
15:49Almost 400 South Vietnamese troops were killed or wounded.
15:55Three American advisors were also killed, and they had lost only nine men themselves.
16:05As the news swept through the hamlets and villages of Vietnam, Viet Cong morale and recruitment soared.
16:18After Apt Bak, the guerrillas sharply accelerated the tempo of their operations.
16:23Attacks on strategic hamlets were launched almost every day, and hundreds were overrun.
16:32The guerrillas hit isolated government forts, tempting sources of arms and radios.
16:38Usually, they set ambushes for any army troops that might be sent to the rescue.
16:53The South Vietnamese Army's attempts to find the Viet Cong's big units and make them fight seemed increasingly futile.
17:01One major sweep after another failed to find the guerrillas in any numbers.
17:14By now, many American advisers in South Vietnam, colonels and captains at the sharp end of the battle, had begun
17:22to ask questions about U.S. military doctrine.
17:30They were training the South Vietnamese to depend on big operations and very heavy firepower.
17:37As a result, large numbers of civilians were being killed, which could only increase support for the NLF.
17:44And in spite of everything, the guerrillas were usually escaping the net.
17:59What the advisers wanted were tactics more like those the Special Forces had adopted in the Central Highlands.
18:06Small unit patrolling, ambushes and night operations, all the time working closely with local people.
18:19In Washington, the suggestion met with some hostility.
18:23As far as the generals were concerned, the job was to find the enemy and destroy him with as much
18:29firepower as could be mustered.
18:50For years, President Diem had filled the ranks of South Vietnam's government officials with fellow Catholics, enraging the majority Buddhist
18:59population.
19:03From the beginning of May 1963, there were widespread protests.
19:09Diem reacted violently.
19:11The army raided temples.
19:14Monks, nuns and priests were arrested and demonstrators were shot in the streets by police.
19:26In July, students began their own mass actions in support of the Buddhist cause.
19:33By the fall of 1963, South Vietnam was sliding into political chaos.
19:42As sheer mismanagement looked set to destroy the country, army generals directed by the CIA hatched a plan to overthrow
19:51the president.
19:52American officials exasperated at Diem's failures signaled that Washington would not oppose a coup.
20:02The plotters made their move on November 1, 1963, attacking the presidential palace with armor and aircraft.
20:14The generals had promised that President Diem would be allowed a safe flight into exile.
20:22However, the day after the coup, Diem was brutally murdered along with his brother, Nu, by unidentified assassins.
20:33Three weeks later, on November 22, 1963, in the United States, President Kennedy was himself assassinated.
20:52Kennedy's place was taken by his vice president, Lyndon Baines Johnson.
21:00Johnson had always been wary of America's involvement with Vietnam.
21:05Now, he had inherited a strong U.S. commitment to the South.
21:12Whatever his private doubts, it was a commitment he was determined to honor.
21:25The chaos that had engulfed South Vietnam in the closing months of 1963 was seen in North Vietnam as a
21:33golden opportunity.
21:39Ho Chi Minh and most of his fellow leaders saw the chance of a quick victory if the war was
21:45stepped up fast.
21:52Amongst the North's communist backers, the Soviet Union was opposed to any escalation.
22:00But the Chinese leader Mao Zedong had promised his support.
22:04If the Americans reacted by invading North Vietnam, China would even deploy combat troops to help the defense.
22:22In December 1963, in Hanoi, the Central Committee of the Communist Party approved measures to intensify the war in South
22:31Vietnam.
22:37General Japp, the defense minister, had argued for caution, but most of the leadership was against him.
22:46The order was given to speed up the flow of men and weapons to the NLF in the South.
23:09In 1959, a specialized North Vietnamese Army unit, Group 559, had been formed to create a supply route from the
23:18North to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.
23:27Jungle trails inside the South had proved too vulnerable to government army sweeps, and so, helped by their allies, the
23:35Pathet Lao guerrillas in Laos, and with the tacit approval of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, Group 559 had taken over
23:43the border areas just outside South Vietnam.
23:50A primitive route was developed, soon known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, with offshoots into Vietnam along its entire
23:58length.
24:01By early 1964, the trail was being transformed into a secret jungle highway with depots, air defense, and garrisons of
24:11permanent logistics troops.
24:17Meanwhile, another unit, Group 579, controlled the infiltration of men and weapons into South Vietnam by sea.
24:36In the first months of 1964, the NLF stepped up their campaign in a concerted effort to push South Vietnam
24:44to the edge.
24:45With better equipment, leadership and training, the NLF were now attacking in big units, up to a thousand men at
24:53a time.
25:03As the guerrillas sensed victory and piled on the pressure, on January 30th, there was yet another military coup in
25:11Saigon.
25:15The U.S. Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, was dispatched to Vietnam to boost the authority of the new leader, General
25:22Nian Khan.
25:24Yet few American officials imagined Khan could soon win popular support or rally the demoralized South Vietnamese army.
25:43As the crisis in Vietnam deepened, the pressure on President Johnson to take strong action grew almost intolerable.
25:53Many of Johnson's political opponents, including the Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, were calling for North Vietnam to be bombed and
26:01for U.S. troops to be sent to fight in the South.
26:09The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also insisting that decisive military action would have to be taken to pressure Hanoi.
26:21From the start, Johnson doubted that the United States could win a war in Southeast Asia.
26:27He also believed that neither Congress nor the American people would approve of open military intervention.
26:37However, he did agree to covert actions against North Vietnam, including secret bombing of economic targets and villages along the
26:44Laotian border.
26:50With support from American warships, the South Vietnamese Navy began a series of commando raids on North Vietnamese coastal installations.
27:04It was one such operation in August 1964 that would set the stage for a dramatic clash between U.S.
27:12and North Vietnamese naval forces.
27:18In the Gulf of Tonkin, the simmering conflict between the United States and Hanoi was since spiraling towards outright war.
27:41On the night of 30th July 1964, South Vietnamese commandos attacked two small North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of
27:50Tonkin.
27:54The U.S. destroyer Maddox, an electronic spy ship, was 123 miles south with orders to electronically simulate an air
28:03attack to draw North Vietnamese boats away from the commandos.
28:14On August 2nd, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approached the Maddox at high speed, mistaking it for South Vietnamese escort
28:24vessel.
28:30In the engagement that followed, the Maddox sank one of the craft and air support planes damaged the others.
28:46Maddox continued operations reinforced by a second destroyer, the USS Turner Joy.
28:53Two nights later, still gathering intelligence and in bad weather conditions, the captain of the Maddox reported that he thought
28:59they had been fired on and were about to be attacked.
29:02As he later reported, no attack took place.
29:17The possibility that the second attack had been imagined by tense sailors in the poor weather conditions was considered and
29:24rejected in the White House.
29:35Six hours after the supposed attack, a retaliation against North Vietnam was ordered by President Johnson.
29:44American jets bombed two naval bases.
29:48A major oil facility was also destroyed.
29:52Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the raids.
29:55Two U.S. aircraft was ordered by the guns.
30:25back. Chinese air units on the Vietnam border were heavily reinforced.
30:36Frantic efforts were made to improve North Vietnam's anti-aircraft defenses.
30:42At the same time, jets of the fledgling North Vietnamese Air Force returned to
30:48Vietnam from their training base in China.
31:03The same day that North Vietnamese fighters began operations from their new home airfield,
31:09an historic step was taken in Washington.
31:15On August 7th, 1964, the U.S. Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. It gave President
31:23Johnson the freedom to take whatever actions he thought necessary to defend Southeast Asia.
31:32Johnson now had the power to use military force in Vietnam in almost any way he chose.
31:59In North Vietnam, there was a growing fear that the United States meant to deploy troops
32:05in the South and perhaps even invade the North itself.
32:16The U.S. might also decide to bomb North Vietnam into the ground. Communist leaders could only
32:23hope that fear of China would make the enemy hesitate before taking any drastic steps.
32:34Meanwhile, a bold stroke might win the war in the South before the Americans could intervene.
32:47The plan was that the North Vietnamese Army should be sent to fight in the South.
32:53Supplying them would be no easy task, but their well trained and heavily armed regiments just
32:59might tip the balance. The aim was to topple the weakened South Vietnamese state within little
33:05more than a year.
33:26The first North Vietnamese Army units to be raised and trained for combat in the South were the
33:31302nd and the 33rd regiments of the 325th division based at Dong Hoi.
33:41The 66th regiment of the 304th would follow next.
33:48The plan was that starting in October, the troops would march for six weeks down the Ho Chi Minh
33:54trail and enter South Vietnam's Central Highlands in early 1965.
34:09The first step would be to seize territory in the border area. At the same time, the Viet Cong
34:15would take over the coastal provinces of Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh. The NVA would then advance
34:22along the line of Highway 19 between Pleiku and Quang Ngai, splitting South Vietnam in two.
34:32Meanwhile, the Viet Cong would mount big attacks in the Mekong Delta and around Saigon.
34:40Victories there would open the way for a general offensive and trigger the popular uprising which
34:46would sweep away the Saigon government.
34:57While the North Vietnamese Army prepared its divisions for infiltration into the South,
35:01the NLF stepped up their campaign.
35:08One of their main aims now was to deter the United States from getting more deeply involved
35:14in the war.
35:17With the U.S. presidential election coming up, reminding Americans that intervention had a
35:23price just might pay dividends.
35:36On November 1st, 1964, only two days before the election, Ben Hoa Air Base near Saigon was
35:43blasted by Viet Cong mortars. Four Americans were killed and 76 wounded. Five B-57 bombers were
35:52destroyed and 15 damaged.
35:59Although the attack seemed a blatant provocation, President Johnson was determined not to react
36:04in a way that might endanger his election chances.
36:11His restraint seemed to have paid off handsomely when, on November 3rd, 1964, he resoundingly defeated
36:19his rival, Barry Goldwater.
36:27By now, Johnson's advisers feared that South Vietnam could be on the brink of collapse.
36:36From January 1st, 1965 through to February 7th, 1965, the Viet Cong mounted a series of coordinated
36:44attacks across the country. They took and held the village of Binh Gia, only 40 miles from
36:51Saigon, severely mauling government army units sent to the rescue.
37:01Altogether, 200 government troops were killed near Binh Gia, along with five American advisors.
37:08The battle culminated in a devastating ambush that almost wiped out a relief column of elite
37:14South Vietnamese Army Rangers.
37:26In Washington, the pressure to do something to save South Vietnam was now intense.
37:44In Washington, the pressure to do something to save South Vietnam was now intense.
37:47Meanwhile, a series of strikes would be launched as reprisals if there was any major attack by the Viet Cong.
38:04The provocation came on February 7th, 1965.
38:08A U.S. helicopter base and advisory compound in the central highlands of South Vietnam was attacked by NLF commandos.
38:20Nine Americans were killed and more than 76 were wounded.
38:26Johnson ordered immediate retaliation and U.S. Navy fighter bombers were launched to attack military targets just inside North Vietnam.
38:44Only three days after the U.S. raids, there was another attack by the Viet Cong on Americans.
38:53This time, it was a bomb in a hotel at Quannon, which killed 23 U.S. servicemen.
39:01More retaliation strikes were launched, and on February 13th, 1965, President Johnson authorized a bigger campaign codenamed Operation Rolling Thunder.
39:19Rolling Thunder was to be a limited but long-lasting offensive.
39:23Its aim was to force North Vietnam to stop supporting the guerrillas in the south.
39:47As Operation Rolling Thunder got underway, the chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Saigon, General William C.
39:55Westmoreland,
39:56grew increasingly worried about the security of bases involved in the campaign.
40:05Don Ang, sighted in a largely hostile area and guarded by a small Vietnamese army unit,
40:11was particularly vulnerable to Viet Cong attack.
40:18Westmoreland asked for two battalions of U.S. Marines, 3,500 men, to be deployed around the base.
40:32On March 8th, 1965, a battalion of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade went ashore at Da Nang.
40:42The 2nd Battalion would arrive later by air.
40:45The Marines' mission was to be strictly confined to defending the Da Nang base.
40:58However, even as the troops were landing, General Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff,
41:04was already in Saigon to talk about much bigger deployments.
41:16General Johnson had been appointed by the president, his special representative.
41:23His mission was to prompt General Westmoreland and U.S. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor
41:28to say what troops they needed to win the war.
41:38In fact, General Johnson and his fellow commanders on the Joint Chiefs of Staff
41:43already had a clear idea of the forces they wanted for Vietnam.
41:55The Joint Chiefs' wish was for three divisions, around 70,000 men.
42:00That was the number called for in their defense plan for Southeast Asia, Operation Plan 32.
42:09The plan had been designed to meet an invasion of South Vietnam from the north or China,
42:14something that no one now expected to happen.
42:24However, as part of the plan, airfields, communications, and other facilities
42:29had already been put in place.
42:31Now, large numbers of troops could be deployed as soon as the president gave the order.
42:59It was American public opinion that most worried President Johnson.
43:03He was determined to move slowly on sending more men to Vietnam.
43:08He agreed to another 3,000 Marines and 20,000 logistics and support troops
43:14to prepare for further deployments.
43:17But for the moment, that was as far as he would go.
43:30On April 7, 1965, at Johns Hopkins University, President Johnson offered economic aid to
43:38North Vietnam in exchange for peace.
43:41His offer was brusquely rejected by the North Vietnamese government.
43:52Two weeks later, Johnson agreed to raise U.S. combat strength in Vietnam to more than 60,000 troops.
44:01Allied forces from Korea and Australia would be added as a sign of international support.
44:16There were restrictions on how the U.S. commander in Vietnam, General Westmoreland,
44:21would be able to use the troops he had been given.
44:27They were to operate only inside clearly defined enclaves around their bases.
44:36To Westmoreland's dismay, all operations were to be strictly defensive.
44:48The American policy of defending enclaves would soon be severely tested by the Viet Cong.
44:55The guerrillas were planning to unleash a massive offensive.
44:59The campaign was designed to inflict the final blows on the tottering South Vietnamese state.
45:17The storm broke on May 11, with a full-scale assault by two and a half thousand Viet Cong troops
45:23on Song Bay, a provincial capital.
45:26After fierce battles in and around the town, the Viet Cong withdrew,
45:31but only after holding Song Bay for nearly two days.
45:52The Viet Cong assault on Song Bay was followed by a series of attacks to within a few miles of
45:58Saigon.
46:02Meanwhile, in the central highlands, U.S. intelligence had detected all the elements
46:07of the North Vietnamese Army's 325th Division
46:12and signs that the 304th was on its way.
46:20There was intense Viet Cong activity in all the central provinces, with a big Viet Cong victory near Bajia.
46:31On June 10, 1965, at Dong Shua, a South Vietnamese Army District headquarters and U.S. Special Forces camp
46:39was overrun by a full regiment.
46:44It was abandoned only after frantic American air attacks.
47:03The sheer scale of the Viet Cong's new offensive had far surpassed anything that either the South Vietnamese Army
47:09or the Americans had anticipated.
47:12The government's best and most mobile battalions had been shattered.
47:21The disaster was followed by political upheaval.
47:24A faction of young military officers installed Air Vice Marshal Key as Prime Minister
47:30and General Nian Van Thieu as President, openly restoring military government.
47:41After the Viet Cong's May offensive, it was plain to the Americans
47:45that enemy numbers were much higher than they had thought.
47:49That meant far more U.S. troops would be needed to hold the line.
47:58Estimates of just how many kept rising until on June 7, 1965,
48:04General Westmoreland asked Washington for 200,000 men.
48:16While Westmoreland was waiting for the president's decision,
48:19he was given new powers to use the troops he already had more aggressively.
48:25He would no longer have to confine his men to defensive enclaves,
48:29but could go out and attack the enemy.
48:38On June 27, 1965,
48:42General Westmoreland launched the first purely offensive operation
48:45by American ground forces in Vietnam.
48:48It was a sweep into NLF territory just northwest of Saigon.
49:03A month after the start of offensive operations,
49:06President Johnson announced that more troops would be sent to Vietnam.
49:15He was still playing down the scale of the commitment,
49:18but had already decided to deploy the 200,000 men he had been asked for.
49:30The following day, the first troops of the big build-up arrived in Vietnam.
49:36The men were a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division.
49:43By this time, there was no longer any doubt about just what their mission would be.
49:48They were to find the Viet Cong's main force military units
49:51and destroy them on the battlefield.
50:16As the build-up of American forces in Vietnam went on,
50:20the chances they would be attacked grew by the day.
50:27On August 5, NLF sappers penetrated an oil storage depot near Da Nang
50:33and blew up 2 million gallons of fuel.
50:38There had been sniping and mortar attacks, too,
50:41but the real fear was of a large-scale infantry assault
50:45overrunning an American installation.
50:54What the Americans needed was accurate and timely intelligence
50:57about what the enemy intended to do.
51:05It came when a deserter from the 1st Viet Cong Regiment,
51:08a force nearly 2,000 strong,
51:11told his captors that his unit was planning to hit the Marine base at Chu Lai.
51:24The Marines quickly planned a full-scale operation
51:27to trap the Viet Cong Regiment in its assembly area.
51:31The operation was planned in the strictest secrecy.
51:35Codenamed Operation Starlight and deploying 4,000 troops,
51:39it would be the first American regimental-sized battle
51:42since the war in Korea.
52:01The Marine base at Chu Lai
52:04was 15 miles from the village complex of Van Tuong.
52:09Between the Tra Bong River,
52:11the elevation known as Hill 43,
52:14and the Phuoc Thuan Peninsula
52:16was a fortified Viet Cong base area.
52:23There, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment,
52:25made up of the 60th and 80th battalions
52:29had assembled for the attack on Chu Lai.
52:35On August 17, 1965,
52:39Company M of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines,
52:42took up a blocking position on the Tra Bong River.
52:48Next morning,
52:50the rest of the battalion made an amphibious landing,
52:52while three more companies
52:54were inserted at landing zones red,
52:57white, and blue.
53:00The Marines pushed on from LZ's red and white,
53:06but around Hill 43, near LZ Blue,
53:09the entire Viet Cong 60th Battalion was dug in,
53:13and there was a fierce battle before the hill was taken.
53:23There was also heavy Viet Cong resistance
53:25near the hamlet the Americans called A Chuang Tu.
53:31But after reinforcement,
53:33the Marines succeeded in squeezing the Viet Cong
53:36from three sides,
53:37trapping them with their backs to the sea.
53:52In Operation Starlight,
53:54it was the early battles that proved the heaviest.
53:57The first two companies in action
54:00took almost one-third casualties.
54:0329 were dead and many wounded,
54:06but the Marines had claimed
54:07nearly 300 Viet Cong killed.
54:15The next five days involved
54:17only small-scale actions.
54:19As the Marines advanced,
54:21the Viet Cong,
54:22numbed by the shattering naval,
54:24artillery, and air bombardments,
54:26fought delaying actions
54:27as they tried to disengage.
54:39In support of the attacking infantry,
54:42Marine guns at the Chulai base alone
54:44fired over 3,000 rounds.
54:52The ships fired another 1,500.
54:57Marine air support was so effective
55:00that at times aircraft were dropping their bombs
55:03within 200 feet of their own troops.
55:13At the end of the operation,
55:15nearly 700 Viet Cong were claimed as dead.
55:22The Marines had lost 45 dead
55:25and more than 200 wounded in the battle.
55:44For the United States Marines,
55:47Operation Starlight had been a resounding victory.
55:50In the first major battle of the war,
55:52the guerrillas had been defeated
55:54on their own territory
55:55and by inexperienced troops.
56:07The classic U.S. military doctrine
56:09had worked exactly as it was supposed to.
56:12The enemy had been found,
56:13fixed in position,
56:15and then destroyed with massive firepower.
56:29The Marines moved fast
56:31to take advantage of their victory
56:32in Operation Starlight.
56:34They launched a series of attacks
56:37against NLF concentrations
56:38along the coast.
56:45Meanwhile, General Westmoreland's attention
56:47shifted to the central highlands.
56:50There, the threat was posed
56:52not by the Viet Cong guerrillas,
56:53but by the newly arrived troops
56:55of the North Vietnamese Army.
57:07It was against these professional
57:09and highly trained regiments
57:10that the Americans would fight
57:12their next major battle.
57:27were five huge players
57:44Are the clubs
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