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For educational purposes
This episode Covers the US Operations which try to seek and destroy the Vietcong and induce them into set piece battles in various areas between Saigon and Cambodia in 1966-67.
This episode Covers the US Operations which try to seek and destroy the Vietcong and induce them into set piece battles in various areas between Saigon and Cambodia in 1966-67.
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00:01The
00:01The
00:01The
01:01For the Americans in South Vietnam, 1966 was to be a year of dramatic expansion.
01:08U.S. forces were planned to double to just under 430,000 men.
01:14While the build-up was going on, the priority was to secure key parts of the country.
01:20By far the most important was the capital, Saigon.
01:31Saigon was a teeming city of 2 million people.
01:35It was the seat of the South Vietnamese government and the location of South Vietnamese and American military headquarters.
01:44Above all, Saigon was the symbol of the South's independence from the Communist North.
01:59For the commanders of the Viet Cong guerrillas, the capital was the ultimate prize.
02:04The tens of thousands of Viet Cong, based within 50 miles of Saigon, were already drawing a noose tight around
02:12the city.
02:16Powerful guerrilla units were pushing right up to Saigon's doorstep.
02:27In the countryside around the city, traditional Viet Cong base areas had all the facilities the combat forces needed to
02:34prepare their attacks.
02:39Since American infantry units had first arrived, they had been trying to disrupt the guerrillas' activities around the capital.
02:47On January 8, 1966, they launched the most ambitious sweep yet.
02:54Operation Krimp deployed 8,000 troops, making it the biggest American operation of the war so far.
03:02It's aim was to capture the Viet Cong's headquarters for the whole Saigon area.
03:26The Viet Cong headquarters for Saigon was believed to be somewhere in the Ku Chi district,
03:32the communist stronghold barely 20 miles from the capital.
03:43The attack would be launched by the American 173rd Airborne Brigade,
03:48a battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, and a brigade of the 1st Infantry Division.
04:02North of Ku Chi town was the disused Phil Hall Rubber Plantation and the forested area the Americans called the
04:10Hobo Woods.
04:20North of Ku Chi town was the
04:23North of Ku Chi, but the Americans still knew almost nothing.
04:30In the tunnels were the Viet Cong's Ku Chi military headquarters.
04:37A signals intelligence unit, two hospitals, the Saigon political office, and the Saigon regional military headquarters,
04:49the one the Americans were looking for the one the Americans were looking for.
04:57As with every American search-and-destroy sweep,
05:01Operation Krimp began with massive airstrikes and artillery bombardments.
05:17NLF agents had, long before, warned that a big American operation was coming.
05:27Guerrilla commanders had already moved several thousand troops out of the Ku Chi area.
05:33Only a thousand local guerrillas were left behind, mostly inexperienced teenagers.
05:39But with the tunnels to fight from, they were confident they could inflict serious casualties on the Americans.
05:56Right from the start, as the Americans attacked into the Hobo Woods, they faced rifle fire, grenades, and booby traps.
06:11NLF snipers opened up from hidden firing positions and within seconds vanished back into their tunnels.
06:17The Americans hardly ever saw the enemy who was firing at them.
06:27As the days went on, the Americans grew ever more frustrated and demoralized.
06:32Dozens of men were killed or injured.
06:35Every path seemed to lead to a trap.
06:41Only slowly did units begin to discover trenches and bunkers.
06:47They also found a handful of tunnel entrances.
06:54Still, no one had any idea of the sheer scale of the complex beneath their feet.
07:06Although the Ku Chi guerrillas had suffered casualties, they had achieved their main objective.
07:12The tunnel complex and headquarters had survived virtually intact,
07:17as had the whole Viet Cong organization in the area.
07:31In late January 1966, only a few days after the end of Operation Krimp,
07:37troops of the 25th Infantry Division arrived at Ku Chi.
07:44Their orders were to secure the area for the 25th's main base.
07:53The Americans succeeded in pushing out a perimeter,
07:57using every ounce of firepower they could muster.
08:05But from the first day, they faced constant harassing attacks from the Ku Chi guerrillas.
08:19For months, the 25th Infantry Division was plagued by mysterious gun and grenade incidents inside its camp.
08:28Slowly, to the horror of the Americans, it was discovered they came from tunnels dug under the base itself.
08:39They were eventually found and sealed.
08:44But the main tunnel complex, only a few miles away, would keep its secrets for years to come.
09:07In February 1966, the American 1st Infantry Division mounted four big search-and-destroy operations just north of Saigon.
09:22The result was disappointing.
09:24There were clashes with units from two Viet Cong regiments, but there were no major battles.
09:37What the 1st's commanders wanted was a set-piece fight with the most powerful and dangerous enemy force in the
09:43region,
09:44the 9th Viet Cong Division.
09:48The 9th was made up of veteran regiments and was constantly on the move.
09:53The division was now poised to launch its spring offensive.
10:09The communist leadership had ordered the Viet Cong to avoid head-on clashes with the Americans
10:14unless the odds were very favourable.
10:21But NLF leaders still meant to fight aggressively.
10:27General Tan, the energetic commander of the NLF, strongly believed that the soldier was more important than his weapons.
10:36Tan was certain that what the troops of the 9th lacked in hardware, they would make up for in revolutionary
10:43zeal.
11:03From the 9th Division's bases in War Zone C,
11:09two regiments headed into the Viet Cong strongholds of the Iron Triangle and War Zone D.
11:19At the same time, the 2nd Brigade of the American 1st Division was pushing into War Zone C,
11:28and the 3rd Brigade was moving into the Iron Triangle.
11:35The first clash came on March 5th, 1966,
11:40when the whole 272nd Regiment attacked a battalion of the 3rd Brigade at Low Key.
11:51Intense U.S. air and artillery strikes drove off the attackers.
11:58Two days later, the American 1st Brigade, with a battalion of the 173rd Airborne, swept into War Zone D.
12:11An entire Viet Cong regiment attacked the airborne's positions.
12:16Again, devastating U.S. artillery fire turned back the assault.
12:30In the March battles in the Iron Triangle and War Zone D,
12:35skillfully directed American firepower had averted disaster.
12:43Hundreds of Viet Cong had been killed by artillery and airstrikes.
12:49However, to the intense frustration of U.S. commanders,
12:53after the fights, the Viet Cong regiments had simply melted away.
13:04During the weeks that followed,
13:06the Americans kept up the tempo of search-and-destroy operations in front of Saigon.
13:11Commanders were determined to make contact with the enemy.
13:22In late April,
13:24they launched a major operation into War Zone C
13:27to try and find the Viet Cong 9th Division.
13:37Operation Birmingham lasted for three weeks.
13:42More than 5,000 American troops of the 1st Infantry Division took part.
13:47They were backed by huge numbers of helicopters and armored vehicles.
14:02Although there were hundreds of vicious small-scale actions
14:06fought by platoons and squads on both sides,
14:09the big battles the Americans hoped for never did materialize.
14:13In three weeks, only a hundred Viet Cong were killed.
14:24Most disturbing of all for American commanders,
14:27most of the fighting that had happened
14:29had been started by the Viet Cong
14:31at the time and place they chose.
14:56From the start,
14:58the Vietnamese had followed the seven principles of guerrilla warfare
15:01laid down by the Chinese leader Mao Tse Tung.
15:10To these, General Jap had added four more steps.
15:14If the enemy advances, we retreat.
15:17If he halts, we harass.
15:21If he avoids battle, we attack.
15:25If he retreats, we follow.
15:39Almost every search-and-destroy operation
15:41the Americans had launched
15:43had been met with Jap's tactics.
15:49The places the Americans were most likely to land
15:52their helicopters were set up for ambushes.
15:58Trails were quickly booby-trapped and mined
16:00and snipers left in place.
16:04If the Americans did stumble onto a big NLF unit,
16:08the chances were it was occupying prepared fortifications
16:12with tunnels, bunkers, and trenches.
16:24It was when the Americans set up a defensive perimeter for the night
16:27or created artillery firebases as they did during every operation
16:32that the Viet Cong would attack in strength.
16:41Always, the guerrillas had a plan for breaking off the battle
16:44if the opposition got too tough.
16:57At first, American tactics had been totally unsuited
17:01to dealing with a skilled guerrilla enemy.
17:07With hard-won experience, that was changing.
17:10Commanders learned that helicopter landings
17:12had to be fast and aggressive.
17:19Sergeants taught their men not to bunch up,
17:22but to stay spread out.
17:24Otherwise, a machine gun or a mortar round
17:26could kill several men at once.
17:34When camp was made,
17:36perimeter defenses had to be strong
17:38with clear fields of fire all around.
17:43Above all, American soldiers learned
17:45they had to be vigilant at all times.
18:05By mid-1966, the U.S. Commander General Westmoreland
18:10was getting more and more impatient.
18:14His whole strategy depended on causing the enemy
18:17to lose men and equipment faster than they could be replaced.
18:22For that, Westmoreland needed big battles.
18:30He ordered the 1st Division
18:32to make more substantial contact with the Viet Cong.
18:40Most of the battles that did happen
18:42were started not by the Americans,
18:44but by the NLF 9th Division.
18:51Route 13, linking Saigon to the Cambodian border,
18:55was the site for major ambushes.
18:58In some, the guerrillas struck with 1,000 troops at a time.
19:14In one attack after another on Route 13,
19:18U.S. tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed.
19:24On June 30th, 1966,
19:27a major battle nearly ended in complete disaster
19:30for the Americans.
19:32It was fiercely effective air and artillery support
19:36that saved the day.
19:43Soon after the battles,
19:45the whole NLF 9th Division
19:47moved back into its most impenetrable base areas.
19:56Some crossed over into Cambodia.
19:59There, General Tan meant to rebuild the division
20:02for a new campaign in November,
20:04the start of the next dry season.
20:27The North Vietnamese regular army inside the South
20:31had risen to upwards of 60,000 men.
20:34Of these, 10,000 were concentrated in the remote central highlands.
20:45It was this area that General Jap,
20:48the North Vietnamese army commander,
20:50saw as a killing zone,
20:52a battlefield on which enormous casualties
20:54could be inflicted on the enemy.
21:05Jap believed that the forests and mountains of the central highlands
21:09were especially well-suited to big military operations.
21:17whole regiments could be hidden and the highland weather
21:21could be relied on to disrupt American air power.
21:24The troops would also be close to supplies
21:26and reinforcements across the Cambodian border.
21:39As fighting units, the NVA were tough,
21:43well-disciplined, and well-trained.
21:45For months, they had been constantly on the offensive.
21:50Their main target was the South Vietnamese Army,
21:53but isolated American Special Forces camps were also hit.
22:05Increasingly, attacks were carried out
22:07by units up to 2,000 strong.
22:23The North Vietnamese Army units
22:25in the central highlands of Vietnam
22:27were part of a strategy
22:29meant to keep the Americans off balance.
22:36There were powerful NVA divisions
22:39on the demilitarized zone,
22:41separating North and South Vietnam.
22:45And there were the NALF regiments opposite Saigon.
22:52Communist forces could present the Americans
22:54with a challenge in any of the three areas
22:56and force them to react.
23:07By the middle of 1966,
23:10North Vietnamese units crossing the demilitarized zone
23:13had successfully drawn the U.S. Marines north.
23:21In the highlands, the NVA 24th Regiment
23:25had engaged elements of the 101st Airborne Division.
23:31The 1st NVA Division
23:33had pulled a U.S. infantry brigade
23:36and the 1st Air Cavalry
23:38towards the Cambodian border.
23:49The Americans in the central highlands
23:52did succeed in inflicting thousands of casualties
23:55on the North Vietnamese Army.
23:58But in some of the most arduous fighting country
24:01in Vietnam,
24:02the Americans found it impossible
24:04to trap large enemy units.
24:12Time after time,
24:14they succeeded in slipping through the net.
24:26Although the American military
24:28were killing five North Vietnamese soldiers
24:30for every one of their own losses,
24:33Northern commanders were still confident.
24:37General Jap was sure
24:39that his forces could stay on the offensive
24:41and take heavy casualties
24:43as long as there were no dramatic defeats.
24:48The manpower potential of North Vietnam
24:51had barely been tapped.
25:11From the start of its war in Vietnam,
25:13the U.S. Army had found the conflict
25:15to be unlike any other.
25:19As Viet Cong attacks proved every day,
25:22there was no front line.
25:25Each side controlled only the territory
25:27immediately around its positions or its bases.
25:32The army was calling it area war.
25:43Area war meant that the roads
25:46linking U.S. bases to other units
25:48and to their supply depots
25:50were never completely secure.
25:56Viet Cong's strategy
25:57was to try and isolate American forces
26:00and to pin down large numbers
26:03of U.S. troops on base and road defense.
26:07That way, there would be fewer men available
26:10for offensive operations.
26:31The supply lifelines for the 25th
26:33and the 1st U.S. Infantry Divisions
26:36were the roads linking their major bases
26:38to Saigon, Bien Hoa Air Base,
26:41and the 1st U.S. Infantry Divisions
26:41and Long Binh,
26:43the biggest supply depot in Vietnam.
26:50The roads were constantly patrolled
26:52by armored vehicles and aircraft.
26:58In August 1966,
27:01the 25th Division was tasked
27:03with clearing the way
27:04for a new American unit,
27:06the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.
27:13The 196th was to be based at Tan In
27:16to secure Route 22,
27:19running through the NLF base area
27:21of War Zone C.
27:29By October 1966,
27:32the NLF 9th Division
27:33had almost recovered
27:35from the battles of the previous July.
27:37Its losses in men and equipment
27:39had been replaced by supplies
27:41and reinforcements
27:42sent down the Ho Chi Minh Trail
27:44from North Vietnam.
27:53With the dry season coming,
27:56the 9th was busy in War Zone C
27:58preparing for its next offensive.
28:06The renewed activity
28:07of the 9th Division
28:08did not pass unnoticed
28:10by the Americans.
28:12Special Forces units
28:14mounted an intense reconnaissance effort
28:16deep inside Viet Cong territory.
28:22The reports they brought back
28:24seemed to show
28:25that the 9th's next target
28:27might be the Special Forces'
28:29own base camp
28:30northeast of Tan In City.
28:39American commanders
28:40were determined
28:41to disrupt the Viet Cong's plans.
28:46The 196th Brigade
28:48was ordered to mount aggressive,
28:49search and destroy sweeps
28:51near the Special Forces camp area.
28:53The sweeps,
28:55starting on September 14th, 1966,
28:58were codenamed
28:59Operation Attleboro.
29:19Operation Attleboro
29:21was launched by the 196th
29:23Light Infantry Brigade
29:24together with 22,000
29:26South Vietnamese soldiers
29:27and GIs
29:28from the 1st, 4th,
29:30and 25th Infantry Divisions.
29:33Almost at once,
29:35huge supply caches
29:36belonging to the NLF 9th Division
29:38were found by the Americans
29:40south of the Michelin
29:41Rubber Plantation.
29:43It was believed
29:45the NLF were somewhere
29:46between the plantation
29:47and the American Special Forces base
29:49at Suida.
29:56While one battalion
29:58made a helicopter landing,
29:59the other battalions
30:01pushed towards it on foot.
30:05When the landing zone
30:06was ambushed,
30:07both sides sent thousands
30:09of reinforcements
30:10rushing to the area.
30:14By the following day,
30:16full-scale battles
30:17were raging.
30:26In the first days
30:27of Operation Attleboro,
30:29almost every fresh
30:30American unit sent in
30:32was ambushed.
30:39Nor were the Americans
30:40safe behind the defensive
30:42perimeters of their
30:43nighttime camps.
30:45NLF units struck
30:46with thousands of men
30:47at a time
30:48and came close
30:49to wiping out
30:50whole American formations.
31:04It was intense air
31:06and artillery support
31:07that, in the end,
31:08as in so many battles,
31:10saved the Americans
31:10from disaster.
31:18Even then,
31:19many of the NLF battalions
31:21were attacking
31:22out of bunkers,
31:23trench lines,
31:24and tunnels,
31:25and were sometimes
31:26able to withstand
31:27the most punishing
31:28bombardments.
31:32The inexperience
31:34of the 196th
31:35was also telling.
31:37Tactical coordination
31:38between the brigade's
31:39units was poor.
31:47Although the situation
31:48was desperate,
31:49American commanders
31:50in Saigon
31:51also saw
31:52a major opportunity.
31:54Attleboro might be
31:55a chance to fight
31:56the kind of big battle
31:57they had been looking for.
32:04The 1st Infantry Division
32:06raced two brigades
32:08to the area
32:08and unit after unit
32:10was piled on.
32:17The 11th Armored
32:18Cavalry Regiment
32:19only just arrived
32:20in Vietnam
32:21was also thrown
32:22into the battle.
32:24Within days,
32:26there were 22,000
32:27American troops
32:28in the Attleboro area.
32:37The massive buildup
32:38of American forces
32:39was the NLF's
32:41cue to disengage.
32:46Although fierce
32:47firefights
32:48continued wherever
32:49the two sides
32:49came into contact,
32:51the 9th Division
32:52began to withdraw.
32:57Its big units
32:58broke down
32:59into smaller groups
33:00and slipped away
33:01towards Cambodia,
33:03where the Americans
33:04were forbidden
33:05to follow.
33:12In Operation Attleboro,
33:14the Americans
33:15had failed
33:15to destroy
33:16the 9th Division
33:17in an all-out battle.
33:19On the other hand,
33:20in six weeks,
33:21more than 1,000 NLF
33:23had been killed
33:23for the loss
33:24of 155 American dead
33:26and fewer than 800 wounded.
33:37U.S. troops
33:38had captured
33:39a massive amount
33:40of enemy stores
33:41and documents,
33:42and Viet Cong plans
33:43for the coming months
33:44had been badly disrupted.
34:04By the end of 1966,
34:07American forces
34:08in Vietnam
34:09had grown
34:10to 385,000 men,
34:13plus another 60,000 sailors
34:15off Vietnam's shores.
34:18As the force levels
34:19had risen,
34:20so too had the casualties.
34:26The year had seen
34:28more than 6,000 Americans killed
34:30and 30,000 wounded.
34:35The biggest problem
34:37for American commanders
34:38was that their timetable
34:40was slipping badly.
34:42By now,
34:44the Viet Cong
34:44should be losing men
34:45faster than they
34:46could be replaced.
34:48General Westmoreland
34:49had to concede
34:50that U.S. forces
34:51had come nowhere near
34:53achieving that goal.
34:54An estimated 61,000 Viet Cong
34:57had been killed
34:58in the past year,
34:59yet their troops
35:00had gone up
35:01to more than 280,000.
35:21part of the problem
35:23was that the American bombing campaign
35:25against North Vietnam
35:26and its supply routes
35:28to the south
35:29was still failing.
35:31more men and materials
35:32were reaching the guerrillas
35:34than ever before.
35:38The Viet Cong
35:39had also stepped up
35:41their recruiting.
35:47There was one cause
35:48for optimism
35:49on the American side.
35:51Operation Attleboro
35:52had seemed to show
35:54the Viet Cong
35:54would fight
35:55if their base areas
35:57were threatened.
36:02The latest plan
36:04was to go back
36:05into War Zone C
36:06with even greater forces.
36:08But first,
36:09the Americans
36:09wanted to solve
36:10an immediate problem.
36:12The districts
36:13just in front of Saigon,
36:15the Iron Triangle
36:16and Ku Chi,
36:18were still
36:18major Viet Cong
36:20strongholds.
36:30The American plan
36:32was to attack
36:33into the Iron Triangle
36:34with more than
36:35two divisions.
36:36The guerrillas
36:38would be trapped
36:39in their own base areas
36:40and annihilated.
36:42At the same time,
36:44another attempt
36:44would be made
36:45to capture
36:45the Viet Cong
36:46Saigon military headquarters.
36:48The whole area
36:50would then
36:50be systematically destroyed.
37:06Before the attack,
37:07American aircraft
37:08dropped 20,000 leaflets
37:10telling the population
37:11to leave at once.
37:27The Iron Triangle
37:29was an area
37:30of 60 square miles
37:31lying between
37:32the Saigon River
37:33and Route 13
37:34with the village
37:35of Bensuk
37:35on its western side.
37:39A major Viet Cong
37:41tunnel complex
37:41ran under
37:42the whole district.
37:47The 272nd Regiment
37:49of the NLF
37:49was operating there
37:51along with
37:51two battalions
37:52of NLF main force,
37:54two independent
37:55NLF battalions,
37:56and the Fuloi Battalion.
37:58But on the eve
38:00of the American offensive,
38:01most troops
38:02were withdrawn.
38:04Only local NLF companies
38:06were left
38:07to defend
38:07important installations.
38:12The American plan
38:14for Operation Cedar Falls
38:16was that
38:17the 25th Infantry Division
38:19and other units
38:20would occupy
38:21blocking positions
38:22on the western side
38:23of the Saigon River,
38:24forming an anvil.
38:30The 1st Division
38:31and the 173rd Airborne Brigade
38:34would assault
38:35from the north
38:36and the east
38:39with a battalion
38:40landing
38:41at the village
38:41of Bensuk.
38:45Meanwhile,
38:46the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
38:48would act
38:49as the hammer
38:49smashing through
38:50the center
38:51of the triangle.
39:03Operation Cedar Falls
39:05opened with four days
39:06of attacks
39:07by B-52 bombers.
39:12Artillery
39:13and airstrikes
39:14followed,
39:16and a wall
39:17of fire
39:18was laid down
39:18to cut off
39:19the NLF's retreat.
39:25On January 8th,
39:271967,
39:2816,000 U.S.
39:30and 14,000
39:31South Vietnamese
39:32Army troops
39:33moved out
39:34of their bases
39:35in fleets
39:36of helicopters,
39:38armored personnel carriers,
39:41trucks,
39:41and boats.
39:47In the first hours
39:48of Operation Cedar Falls,
39:50the village
39:51of Bensuk
39:52had been captured
39:52with barely a shot fired.
39:55The local company
39:57of 100 NLF fighters
39:58had been taken
39:59completely by surprise.
40:06As the village's
40:086,000 inhabitants
40:09were rounded up
40:10for interrogation,
40:11bulldozers
40:12began to level
40:13every building
40:14in sight.
40:23The American operation
40:25to smash the Iron Triangle
40:27lasted 19 days.
40:29With only local
40:31Viet Cong left
40:32to defend the area
40:33and most of those
40:34hidden in tunnels,
40:35there was almost
40:36no heavy fighting.
40:38American losses
40:39were 72 killed
40:41and 337 wounded,
40:44mostly to snipers
40:45and booby traps.
40:52In Bensuk
40:54and in the Tandine Forest,
40:56the Americans
40:56uncovered dozens
40:58of tunnel entrances.
41:00By now,
41:01they were better prepared.
41:04Specialists,
41:05known as tunnel rats,
41:07had trained
41:07to go down tunnels
41:09and explore.
41:19In the cramped spaces
41:20underground,
41:21they faced gunfire,
41:23booby traps,
41:24and mines.
41:27The problem was
41:28there were only
41:29a handful of tunnel rats
41:31and the complexes
41:32were enormous.
41:37Whenever tunnels
41:39were found,
41:40the Americans
41:40made determined efforts
41:42to destroy them.
41:44Demolition charges,
41:45explosive gas,
41:47and flooding
41:48were all tried.
41:50Riot control agents
41:52were pumped in
41:53to try and force
41:54the Viet Cong
41:54to come out.
42:01Nothing really worked.
42:03The tunnels
42:04were designed
42:04so that neither gas
42:06nor water
42:07could penetrate far.
42:14The Americans
42:16had discovered
42:16only a small number
42:18of the Viet Cong
42:19installations
42:19hidden in the
42:20Iron Triangle.
42:24But those
42:25they did find
42:26yielded astonishing
42:27quantities of material.
42:31There was enough rice
42:33to feed 13,000 gorillas
42:35for a year,
42:37along with over 7,000
42:39uniforms,
42:41a huge underground
42:42hospital,
42:44and over a ton
42:45of medicine.
42:49Half a million documents
42:50were discovered,
42:51including detailed maps
42:53of air bases
42:54and the private addresses
42:56of Americans
42:57in Saigon.
43:03some U.S. commanders
43:05immediately hailed
43:06Cedar Falls
43:07as a major success.
43:13Westmoreland
43:14was much more cautious.
43:16The main NLF military
43:18headquarters
43:19had not been found.
43:21Neither had any
43:22sizable enemy unit
43:23been brought to battle
43:24and destroyed.
43:26In the end,
43:28720 Viet Cong
43:30had been killed
43:30for the loss
43:31of 72 Americans.
43:41One aim of Operation
43:42Cedar Falls
43:43was achieved.
43:45The Iron Triangle
43:46was completely
43:47and utterly destroyed.
43:50After its inhabitants
43:52were moved out
43:53to refugee camps,
43:54the district
43:54was turned
43:55into an uninhabitable
43:56wasteland.
43:57Huge Rome plows
43:59cut 20-foot-wide avenues
44:01crisscrossing the forest
44:02to make any movement
44:04instantly visible
44:05from the air.
44:07These massive machines
44:08could plow
44:09the tallest trees
44:10into the ground.
44:1260 square miles
44:13of forest near Saigon
44:15were plowed under
44:16in the Iron Triangle.
44:18Afterwards,
44:19Operation Ranch Hand
44:20aircraft
44:21sprayed lethal
44:22defoliance
44:22to destroy
44:23the jungle cover
44:24and make it
44:25impossible
44:25to grow crops.
44:32After the Americans
44:33had pulled out,
44:34almost the whole
44:35of the Iron Triangle
44:36was designated
44:37a free fire zone.
44:39Artillery
44:40or bombs
44:40could be rained down
44:42at will
44:42and anyone
44:43that moved
44:44could be attacked
44:45from the air.
44:52yet to the astonishment
44:54of the Americans,
44:55within weeks
44:56of Operation Cedar Falls,
44:58the Viet Cong
44:59were active again
45:00in the Iron Triangle.
45:19by mid-February 1967,
45:22American commanders
45:23had again turned
45:24their attention
45:24to War Zone C
45:26and the NLF's
45:279th Division.
45:29The new offensive
45:30was codenamed
45:31Junction City.
45:37Westmoreland
45:38had ordered
45:39his commanders
45:39to think big
45:40and they had planned
45:41the most ambitious
45:42search-and-destroy
45:43operation
45:44of the war
45:45so far.
45:4630,000 American troops
45:48would take part
45:49together with
45:505,000 men
45:51from the South
45:51Vietnamese army.
46:02The main targets
46:03of Operation Junction City
46:04were the Viet Cong's
46:06biggest base areas
46:07and their main military
46:09headquarters
46:09for South Vietnam.
46:11This was known
46:12as the central office
46:13for South Vietnam
46:14or Kha Svin.
46:16However,
46:17Kha Svin
46:17never existed
46:18as a place.
46:22In reality,
46:23the military
46:24and political leadership
46:25of the Viet Cong
46:26were always mobile.
46:42The Viet Cong base areas
46:44of War Zone C
46:45held the 9th Division's
46:47three regiments.
46:49A regiment
46:50of the NLF's
46:51new 5th Division
46:53and two North
46:54Vietnamese army regiments.
46:57Altogether,
46:58more than 10,000 troops.
47:03There were also
47:04thousands more
47:05local Viet Cong
47:06scattered throughout
47:07the region.
47:14Operation Junction City
47:16called for two
47:17American brigades
47:18to block the Viet Cong's
47:19escape to the west
47:20over the Cambodian border.
47:25Two more
47:25would block to the east.
47:31Infantry and airborne forces
47:33would close off the north
47:36by helicopter
47:37and parachute landing,
47:39forming a giant horseshoe.
47:45Armored cavalry
47:46and infantry brigades
47:47would then sweep northwards,
47:49overrunning all enemy units
47:50in their path.
47:57In the second phase
47:59of Junction City,
48:00a series of special forces
48:02camps would be built,
48:04along with a bridge
48:05over the Saigon River
48:07and operations
48:09would shift to the east.
48:17By February 21st, 1967,
48:20the Americans were ready
48:21to launch Junction City.
48:23The blocking forces
48:25to the west
48:25and the east
48:26were in place.
48:32all that remained
48:33was to insert
48:34the northern force.
48:41In one of the largest
48:42air mobile assaults ever,
48:45240 helicopters
48:46swept over Tanin province.
48:51Fighter bombers
48:52and helicopter gunships
48:53hammered the landing zones.
49:04within hours,
49:062,000 troops
49:07were deep
49:07inside Viet Cong territory.
49:13At the same time,
49:15in the first parachute drop
49:17of the Vietnam War,
49:18nearly 800 men
49:19of the 173rd Airborne
49:21completed the American horseshoe.
49:29The day after
49:30the massed
49:31air mobile landings,
49:32infantry and mechanized units
49:34began pushing north
49:35into the horseshoe.
49:39The terrain
49:40was dense forest.
49:44The whole area
49:45was riddled
49:46with Viet Cong
49:47fortifications,
49:48tunnels,
49:48and bunkers.
49:55Although there were
49:56scattered firefights
49:57and the Americans
49:59lost men
49:59to snipers
50:00and booby traps,
50:01there were few
50:02big actions.
50:08Often,
50:09guerrilla installations
50:10were found abandoned.
50:18The battles
50:19that did happen
50:20were started
50:21by the Viet Cong.
50:23Powerful units
50:24twice attacked
50:24elements
50:25of the 1st Infantry Division
50:26at Prec Locke.
50:33Furious American bombing
50:34and artillery fire
50:35drove off the assaults.
50:47Because the Viet Cong
50:48had begun the battles,
50:49they were also able
50:51to break off the fight
50:52whenever they chose.
50:57Nor were the American
50:58blocking forces
50:59able to trap them
51:01and make them fight.
51:03The dense vegetation
51:05meant the guerrilla battalions
51:07could break down
51:07into platoons
51:08and filter through
51:10American lines.
51:12By now,
51:13the Viet Cong military leadership
51:15the Americans
51:15were searching for
51:16had also slipped away
51:18across the border
51:20into neutral Cambodia.
51:42The second phase
51:44of Operation Junction City
51:45centered around
51:46the building
51:47of the Saigon River Bridge
51:48and the special forces camp
51:51at An Lakh.
51:57Convoys of trucks
51:58shuttled up and down
52:00Route 13
52:00with building materials.
52:04For defense,
52:05artillery fire bases
52:06including Fire Support Base 20
52:08were scattered along the road.
52:14Fire Base Gold
52:15and Landing Zone George
52:17were created for search
52:18and destroy sweeps.
52:26starting on the night
52:27of March 18, 1967
52:29each of the three regiments
52:32of the NLF
52:329th Division
52:33attacked in full strength
52:35a thousand men
52:36at a time.
52:44Each attack
52:45was driven off
52:46by overwhelming
52:46American air
52:47and artillery fire.
52:53Viet Cong losses
52:54were heavy
52:55but the regiments
52:56escaped complete destruction.
53:04Operation Junction City
53:06lasted 72 days.
53:08By its end
53:09in May 1967
53:10this operation
53:12coupled with
53:13the Cedar Falls Offensive
53:14had cost 282
53:16American lives
53:17and 1,500 wounded.
53:23Nearly 3,000
53:25Viet Cong
53:26had been killed.
53:27Guerrilla bases
53:29had also been overrun
53:30and installations destroyed.
53:33American troops
53:34had captured
53:35large quantities
53:35of stores,
53:37equipment
53:38and weapons.
53:46Although some American
53:48commanders
53:48hailed Junction City
53:50as a turning point
53:51in the war
53:51the operation
53:53was barely over
53:54before doubts
53:55began to surface.
53:57Like Attleboro
53:58and Cedar Falls
53:59before it
54:00Junction City
54:01had inflicted casualties
54:03but there had been
54:04no great battles
54:05of annihilation.
54:07the Viet Cong's
54:08regiments
54:08were bruised
54:09but still intact.
54:11Nor did the Americans
54:13or the South Vietnamese
54:14army
54:15have the forces
54:16to occupy
54:16the area indefinitely.
54:24As soon as they had gone
54:26the Viet Cong regiments
54:28returned
54:28to rebuild
54:29their base areas
54:30and reclaim
54:31War Zone C.
54:54In July 1967
54:56the U.S. Defense Secretary
54:58Robert McNamara
54:59flew to Saigon
55:00to discuss strategy
55:02with American
55:02and South Vietnamese
55:03leaders and officials.
55:13By now
55:14the Viet Cong's
55:15big units
55:16were supposed
55:16to be smashed.
55:18Instead
55:19Viet Cong numbers
55:20were still growing
55:21and there was no sign
55:23the enemy
55:23was about to give up
55:24the fight.
55:26The Viet Cong
55:28was about to give up
55:28the fight.
55:30The Viet Cong
55:30was about to give up
55:31to the U.S.
55:32McNamara
55:32McNamara had already
55:33recommended an increase
55:34in U.S. troop strength
55:35to more than
55:36half a million men
55:37but now
55:39he doubted
55:40even that
55:40would produce
55:41victory soon.
55:48Back in Washington
55:50McNamara advised
55:51President Johnson
55:52to plan for a long war
55:54in Vietnam.
55:56There should be
55:57less emphasis
55:57on battlefield victories.
55:59more attention
56:00should be paid
56:01to long-term measures
56:02like helping
56:03the South Vietnamese
56:04government
56:04win control
56:05of the villages.
56:17Meanwhile
56:18the cost of the war
56:19in casualties
56:20and dollars
56:21should be kept down
56:23in case the American
56:24public lost patience.
56:35in the summer of 1967
56:37just as the Americans
56:39resigned themselves
56:40to a long war
56:42the Vietnamese
56:43communists changed
56:45their strategy.
56:47For two years
56:49the Viet Cong
56:49had been patient
56:50content to inflict
56:52casualties
56:52and keep on fighting.
56:57Now
56:58they're meant to risk
56:59an all-out offensive.
57:03In 1968
57:04they planned to leave
57:06their tunnels
57:06and bunkers
57:07and win the war
57:08in open battle.
57:09a couple
57:39in the book
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