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For educational purposes
This episode Covers the battles and US Operations that raged around the DMZ in the years before 1968.
This episode Covers the battles and US Operations that raged around the DMZ in the years before 1968.
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01:01In early 1968, United States Marines fought the North Vietnamese Army in one of the most bitterly contested battles of
01:09the Vietnam War.
01:15For 77 days, 20,000 NVA troops laid siege to the Marine Combat Base at Khe Sanh.
01:25At stake was the control of the gateway to South Vietnam.
01:44The siege of Khe Sanh was the longest single battle of the Vietnam War.
01:51It was also one of the most violent.
01:59There were savage artillery duels, mass infantry assaults, and fierce hand-to-hand combat.
02:12Khe Sanh also saw the most concentrated tactical bombing campaign in history, as the Americans used massed airpower to try
02:20and break the siege.
02:33The North Vietnamese meant their attack on Khe Sanh to deliver an historic victory that would destroy the will of
02:40the United States to carry on the war.
02:46In fact, in spite of immense sacrifice, the North Vietnamese Army would fail.
02:57After Khe Sanh, the NVA would never again take on the Americans in a set-piece battle.
03:27In March 1965, three-and-a-half-thousand U.S. Marines had been the first American soldiers in the war.
03:33American combat troops sent to South Vietnam.
03:36Their orders were to defend an air base at Da Nang, but their mission didn't stay defensive for long.
03:52In spite of years of U.S. backing, South Vietnam was close to losing its war against Communist Viet Cong
03:58guerrillas.
04:03By July 1965, Washington had decided to commit 200,000 U.S. troops to the fight, and the Marines had
04:11gone on the offensive.
04:22American commanders saw their role as taking on the Viet Cong's big units, the battalions and regiments.
04:34The units were well-trained and had been armed with modern weapons by North Vietnam.
04:42Increasingly, the NLF's war was controlled from the north, and North Vietnam had already begun to send its own troops
04:49to fight alongside the guerrillas.
04:57The first big battle between the Americans and the Viet Cong was in August 1965.
05:06In Operation Starlight, the Marines smashed a Viet Cong regiment.
05:15In November, in the Yed Rang Valley, the 1st Air Cavalry Division battled nearly 6,000 North Vietnamese Army troops.
05:23According to General Westmoreland, the Americans killed more than 1,200 in a storm of heavy fire.
05:36American commanders were buoyed up by their apparent success on the battlefield.
05:42More such victories would quickly force the Viet Cong to give up their campaign.
05:56By the close of 1965, the Americans were finding it impossible to make the Viet Cong fight pitched battles.
06:07Meantime, U.S. casualties were rising fast from ambushes, booby traps, and surprise attacks.
06:30By the start of 1966, Military Assistance Command, known as MACV, the main American headquarters in South Vietnam, deployed 184
06:40,000 U.S. troops.
06:47Army units were concentrated in the Saigon area, in a strip along the central coast and in the central highlands.
07:00The Marines of the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force were further north, in the area known as I Corps.
07:10I Corps bordered the demilitarized zone, separating North and South Vietnam.
07:25The Marines now had three main bases in I Corps, at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai, while the
07:35South Vietnamese Army had headquarters at Hue and Quang Ngai.
07:44The threat came from NLF battalions in the countryside and the border areas, the North Vietnamese Army on the demilitarized
07:52zone,
07:52and from tens of thousands of local NLF inside the heavily populated coastal belt.
08:08To the NLF, the coastal villages were a priceless asset.
08:15They produced vast quantities of rice which could feed the big guerrilla units in the remote interior.
08:26They also produced large numbers of recruits.
08:34Over the years, the NLF had gained control of thousands of villages.
08:41They had created their own local administration and village guerrilla forces.
08:51The villages also played host to the big units as they passed through on operations.
09:02All the areas in which the American Marines had built their bases were surrounded by NLF-controlled villages.
09:11Marine sweeps through the settlements rarely managed to find them.
09:20Viet Cong tactics were to pull out the main guerrilla forces and officials,
09:25leaving only snipers and booby traps behind.
09:34After the Marines had moved on, the fighters would quickly return.
09:52The Marines were forced to think again about how they could fight this new and unsettling kind of war.
10:04The Marines were forced to think again about how they could fight this new and unsettling kind of war.
10:10The idea was to fight the NLF for control of the villages and to do it around the clock.
10:22Squad and company-sized units patrolled vigorously and mounted constant ambushes.
10:36The rice harvest was protected to keep it out of Viet Cong hands.
10:40The rice harvest was protected to keep it out of Viet Cong hands.
10:43In areas that stayed hostile, whole villages were moved by force to districts already pacified.
10:57The Marines' aggressive military tactics were combined with persuasion.
11:02In civic action projects, widely known as the Hearts and Minds Program,
11:07villagers were given medical aid and help with economic development.
11:11The Marines claimed the policy was highly successful and helped bring more than a million people under government control.
11:18However, in reality, it was just an illusion.
11:21And the NLF still managed to infiltrate these areas, which continued to abound with sympathizers.
11:35The change came in mid-1966.
11:40General Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, had never agreed with the Marines' methods.
11:48He believed that controlling villages was a waste of highly trained and heavily armed troops.
11:55Westmoreland argued that the Marines should instead be used to pursue the enemy's big units in the remote interior.
12:13In fact, events would soon force the Marines to reduce their whole pacification effort.
12:19Civil unrest erupted between South Vietnamese factions right across the country.
12:29The North saw its opportunity and assembled thousands of troops poised to cross into the South.
12:38It was a threat the Marines could not ignore.
13:00The North Vietnamese Army's 324B Division crossed the demilitarized zone in late May 1966 and encountered a Marine battalion.
13:11The NVA held their ground, and the largest battle of the war to date broke out near Dong Ha.
13:19General Walt moved most of the 3rd Marine Division north, 5,000 men in five battalions.
13:30In Operation Hastings, the Marines, backed by South Vietnamese Army troops, the heavy guns of U.S. warships, and the
13:39Marines' own artillery and air power, drove the NVA back over the demilitarized zone in just over three weeks.
13:52Because the Marines were forbidden to cross the demilitarized zone into North Vietnam, the 324B Division, along with elements of
14:01two more divisions, were able to regroup and return to the South almost at once.
14:12The Marines were forced to mount Operation Prairie, which tied up 11 battalions, nearly 10,000 troops, for a full
14:2010 months.
14:26To support the operations, they and Special Forces units built a string of combat bases stretching from Jiolin in the
14:34east to Kaesang in the west.
14:45Casualties on both sides were heavy in Operations Hastings and Prairie.
14:51Although over 300 Americans were dead and nearly 1,500 wounded, it was a victory for the Americans.
15:07However, the NVA divisions had not been beaten.
15:11They simply slipped back across the demilitarized zone from where they could return at any time.
15:25The Marines now had little choice but to keep strong forces in the area.
15:30As the Americans had expected, in the first months of 1967, North Vietnamese Army units once more began infiltrating into
15:39the South.
15:48The Marine reaction was to mount big operations to find them and cut them off.
16:05Both sides were determined to control the hilltops dominating the valley trails.
16:10The bloodiest battles of all were those fought for the hills surrounding the Marine combat base at Kaesang.
16:16These were 881 North and South and Hill 861, thus named for their height and feet.
16:35American bases below the demilitarized zone were strung out along Route 1 and Route 9.
16:45The command center was Dong Ha, while Camp Carroll and the Rock Pile were artillery bases with long-range heavy
16:53guns.
16:56On the western end of Route 9, Long Vy, a special forces camp, and the Marine base at Khaesang were
17:03particularly important.
17:09They dominated North Vietnamese infiltration routes into the South from the demilitarized zone and from Laos.
17:27Khaesang combat base sat astride the valley of the Rao Kwan River, with Dong Tree Mountain to the north and
17:35a series of smaller numbered hills to the northwest.
17:45In April 1967, elements of the NVA 325C Division moved onto hills 881 North and South and Hill 861, and
17:58stormed a signal relay station atop Hill 950.
18:02They built fortifications and placed artillery to support the main effort, an infantry assault by all three of the division's
18:10regiments, more than 5,000 men.
18:17The base at Khaesang had been defended by only a single company of Marines.
18:24But now, American strength was raised to two battalions with more artillery.
18:31By May 5th, after violent battles, the Marines had seized all three key hills.
18:41The battered North Vietnamese Division pulled back over the demilitarized zone and across the Laotian border.
18:56After the hill fights at Khaesang, the war on the demilitarized zone shifted to the eastern sector.
19:05North Vietnamese artillery, hidden inside the zone, hammered Marine bases causing heavy casualties.
19:1530,000 NVA troops tried to infiltrate past the American outposts.
19:27In July 1967, there was heavy fighting near Kantian, killing 1,300 NVA troops.
19:51During the last months of 1967, the Marines launched one operation after another to try and intercept infiltrating NVA forces.
20:02It was no easy task.
20:06The terrain was rough.
20:09There were never enough helicopters, and poor weather often shut down air operations.
20:19Meanwhile, powerful NVA units were once again massing in the hills and forests around the Khaesang combat base.
20:45Since the start of the conflict, North Vietnamese leaders had been arguing bitterly about how best to win the war
20:51in the south.
20:54The president, Ho Chi Minh, was by now aging and in poor health, but he still had enormous influence.
21:08Ho was revered by millions of Vietnamese, North and South, and any big decisions had to be approved by him.
21:22For the last two years, Ho had supported a cautious approach to fighting the war.
21:27But in mid-1967, he backed a new strategy, pushed by powerful figures within the Politburo, including Li Tuan, the
21:36General Secretary of the Communist Party.
21:45The plan was to mount an all-out offensive against the cities and towns of the south.
21:57The NLF guerrillas inside South Vietnam would launch most of the attacks.
22:04But General Jaap, North Vietnam's defense minister, planned to add a distinctive touch of his own.
22:11He meant to pit North Vietnamese army troops directly against the Americans at Khaesang in a major set-piece battle.
22:26He would even direct the attacking forces himself.
22:46Throughout 1967, the U.S. President Lyndon Johnson had been under pressure from his military advisers to intensify the war
22:54in Vietnam.
22:59The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the President to ease the many restrictions on the bombing campaign against the North.
23:07They also wanted ground attacks against enemy sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, perhaps even into North Vietnam itself.
23:23Without such measures, they could see no prospect of victory soon.
23:33President Johnson's fear was that expanding the ground campaign might draw China or the Soviet Union into the war.
23:43He also faced problems at home.
23:48The anti-war movement was already growing, and a wider conflict might turn the American people completely against the whole
23:55effort.
24:02The last thing the President wanted to hear was that the Communists were preparing for a major offensive.
24:10But General Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, was warning that a large-scale attack might be
24:17on the way.
24:18Westmoreland believed that the North Vietnamese Army was preparing a big push into the south, and that its first target
24:25might be the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh.
24:41Although the President and his advisers were deeply worried by the news, Westmoreland himself was optimistic.
24:49He believed he had the forces to deal with any threat, and a massive enemy offensive might be the opportunity
24:56he'd been waiting for.
25:03If the North Vietnamese Army came out into the open to fight pitched battles, there was a real chance of
25:09a decisive American victory.
25:28For the North Vietnamese Army and its commander, General Jap, attacking the Americans at Khe Sanh promised a whole series
25:35of benefits.
25:40The buildup would draw American attention away from the southern cities, the main targets of the Tet Offensive.
25:51A successful attack would also open a clear route into South Vietnam.
26:03A victory at Khe Sanh might also bring another, even more valuable prize.
26:11The U.S. Marines defending the base were an elite force, and crushing them might damage American morale beyond repair.
26:22In 1954, 13 years previously, General Jap had inflicted just such a defeat on French colonial forces at Dien Bien
26:31Phu.
26:40In selecting Khe Sanh as the site for a set-piece battle with the Americans, General Jap had chosen carefully.
26:47The jungle-covered hills and low cloud combined with heavy fog would work against American air power.
27:02And while his own troops were close to supplies and reinforcements, the Americans could be cut off from any outside
27:09help.
27:15The weakened garrison would then be overrun.
27:33From March 1967, the Americans had succeeded in sending heavily armed convoys down Route 9 to Khe Sanh.
27:45However, in July, an attempt to get long-range artillery to the combat base was blocked by North Vietnamese ambushes.
27:59Soon, the NVA had closed the road completely, and the first phase of the campaign against Khe Sanh was completed.
28:16The next stage in the North Vietnamese plan was to deploy infantry north and west of Khe Sanh.
28:26The units to the north would capture the hills overlooking the base and place artillery to bombard the Americans and
28:33destroy their airfield.
28:39They would also mount ground attacks to create a diversion.
28:43They would also mount ground attacks to create a diversion.
28:45The western units would capture Long Wei Special Forces Camp and Khe Sanh Village,
28:51and then mount a massive assault to take the Marine combat base from the south.
29:07A vital ingredient of General Japp's plan was to soften up Khe Sanh and its surrounding hill outposts with massive
29:15artillery bombardments.
29:16It was vital to prevent American aircraft from finding and destroying the guns, mortars, and rocket batteries before the attack.
29:34The troops made enormous efforts to protect the artillery by hiding it in caves or specially dug pits.
29:45They cited huge numbers of anti-aircraft guns to drive away inquisitive reconnaissance planes while everything was hidden by elaborate
29:54camouflage.
30:11From the start of the war in Vietnam, U.S. military commanders had believed that the best form of defense
30:18was to attack in strength.
30:23When reconnaissance detected a large enemy force, U.S. troops would be helicoptered in to surround and destroy it.
30:31Although they often flew straight into an ambush, in the main the strategy worked.
30:44The problem with the American tactics was that they needed ever increasing numbers of troops and helicopters.
30:57In Washington, Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, worried that the constant demand for more men would eventually destroy public
31:05support for the war.
31:08Throughout 1967, McNamara had pushed for a strategy that would reduce the need for manpower.
31:19One proposal in particular, McNamara adopted enthusiastically.
31:25The idea was to clear a line along the demilitarized zone and build an electronic barrier to stop enemy infiltration
31:33from north to south.
31:34The plan, called the Strongpoint Obstacle System, was expected to cost a billion dollars.
31:43To U.S. troops on the ground, it made no sense.
31:47They christened it McNamara's Line.
32:01Because the eastern part of the demilitarized zone was flat ground, the area was given the first priority for defense.
32:12The plan was for nine strong points, including Kan Tien and Geolin, linked by fencing, minefields, and electronic detectors.
32:27West to Quezon, U.S. bases would act as anchors for short strips of line, blocking all the likely approaches.
32:37Artillery would cover the whole area.
32:48By the end of 1967, the eastern part of the Strongpoint Obstacle System was almost complete.
33:02American planners hoped the new defense would at least channel the North Vietnamese into the more difficult hilly terrain guarded
33:09by the rock pile and Quezon.
33:14In the future, when those bases too were part of the system, military commanders saw them playing a particularly important
33:21role.
33:23If full-scale ground operations were ever launched into Laos, the barrier would protect the Americans from flank attacks.
33:40The Strongpoint Obstacle System was deeply unwelcome to U.S. commanders in the area.
33:49Building just the eastern part imposed a heavy burden on the Marines.
33:58The line was soaking up vast amounts of material and manpower, restricting offensive operations.
34:08Worst of all, the construction work and the transport supplying it were sitting targets for North Vietnamese gunners.
34:34All together, the North Vietnamese Army numbered just under 470,000 troops in 12 divisions and 100 independent regiments.
34:49There was also a small navy for coastal patrol and an air force to defend against American bombing raids together
34:56with an air defense missile force.
35:07China had also committed 50,000 advisors and engineers to repair damage done by American bombing and so free North
35:15Vietnamese troops for combat operations.
35:25By now, the NVA had taken over all military activity in the northernmost parts of South Vietnam, and 102,000
35:34NVA troops were available to fight in the south.
35:42All the same, the planned Tet Offensive was not meant to depend heavily on the northern army.
35:48The southern guerrillas, the Viet Cong, would do most of the fighting, and just over a quarter of NVA units
35:54in the south were to be committed to Tet.
35:57The rest would either be held back as a reserve or thrown into the battle against the Americans at Que
36:03San.
36:26By the start of 1968, the North Vietnamese Army had more than 40,000 men.
36:33They were then positioned near the border with South Vietnam.
36:38One division was to launch attacks down the east coast to take Da Nang and other important centers.
36:48Four divisions and two regiments were massed for the assault on Que San and for follow-up operations to seize
36:56the northern provinces.
37:11North of Que San was the 325C division with three regiments and a battalion.
37:19The elite 304th division was south of the base.
37:27The besieging forces were supported by three artillery formations and anti-aircraft units, while a regiment handled resupply from the
37:36north.
37:41Further east, another division was placed to threaten the American artillery base at the rock pile to keep Route 9
37:48cut and to act as reinforcements.
37:56A small number of tanks were also positioned west of L'Anvay.
38:09If the battle for Que San was to end in victory, General Jap and his planners knew that an uninterrupted
38:16flow of supplies would be the key.
38:19The experience in 1954 of fighting the French at Dien Bien Phu had taught him the value of ensuring continuous
38:26supply long before the final storming of the enemy base.
38:31He was determined to repeat his achievement at Que San.
38:43To get ammunition, food and materials to the forces attacking Que San, Jap ordered the building of two new roads.
39:02They were soon detected by the Americans, who named them the Santa Fe Trail.
39:08U.S. fighter bombers made furious attacks, but the roads were impossible to destroy or even damage seriously.
39:22The Santa Fe Trail was heavily camouflaged and fully equipped with bunkers, storage depots and weigh stations.
39:32The roads were protected by heavy anti-aircraft cover.
39:38Already, supplies had been built up near Que San for between 60 and 90 days of sustained combat.
40:01For more than a decade, the North Vietnamese Army had been getting military equipment from China and the Soviet Union.
40:14The best NVA divisions were extremely well armed.
40:21The rugged and effective AK-47 assault rifle was perfect for the harsh battlefield conditions of Vietnam.
40:35Infantry units had large numbers of machine guns and RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers.
40:48The main defense against American air power for the troops around Que San was the Soviet K-38 heavy machine
40:55gun.
40:55Near special installations, the NVA anti-aircraft units were armed with 37mm anti-aircraft cannons, a menace even to the
41:04fastest American jets.
41:19The heavy artillery which NVA gunners would use to try and overwhelm the defenses of the Que San base was
41:25also Soviet and Chinese.
41:30The 130mm field gun had a range of 19 miles, further than any comparable American gun.
41:37U.S. troops rated it the best all-round artillery piece on the Vietnam battlefield.
41:54The guns would be reinforced by huge numbers of rockets and heavy mortars.
42:15The troops of the North Vietnamese Army were recognized even by their American enemies as first-class soldiers.
42:21They were extremely well trained and disciplined.
42:31They were skilled in tactics and their morale and determination often seemed to the Americans to border on the fanatical.
42:46In fact, during 1967, as losses soared, North Vietnamese Army morale had slumped badly.
42:56Desertion threatened to become a real problem.
43:02The grueling trek from home bases to distant Que San had also taken its toll.
43:13American bombing was a constant danger and diseases, particularly malaria, were rife.
43:20Most of the NVA soldiers who were massing to attack Que San were from the coastal lowlands of North Vietnam
43:26and found life a misery in the sodden, insect-infested jungles, as did their enemy.
43:44In preparation for the Que San battle, NVA commanders went to enormous lengths to restore their troops' morale.
43:52Cultural groups were sent on the long and arduous journey to the front to entertain the troops.
44:03The message was simple and reinforced at every opportunity by political officers.
44:10The coming campaign would deliver the victory they had hoped for for so many years.
44:21The propaganda effort worked well.
44:25In the final weeks before the offensive, desertions from the North Vietnamese Army fell dramatically.
44:48In late 1967, 73,000 of the almost half a million American troops in South Vietnam were United States Marines.
45:00They were under the command of the U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet Headquarters in Honolulu.
45:05But operational control was with General Westmoreland's Military Assistance Command in Saigon.
45:17From the start, the independent status of the Marines had led to friction.
45:21Often they were accused by the Army and the Air Force of fighting their own private war.
45:35Since Lieutenant General Robert Cushman had taken over as Marine commander in June 1967,
45:41he and Westmoreland had argued continuously over how the Marines should best be used.
45:49The latest issue was the McNamara Line.
45:57The idea was strongly opposed by the Marines, but Westmoreland had become a strong supporter.
46:09There was also a major disagreement brewing over who should control Marine air power.
46:15On the eve of a major battle, inter-service rivalry was threatening to grow into a serious problem.
46:36All American units in I-Corps were commanded by the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force with its headquarters at Da Nang.
46:46The force controlled the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions and elements of the 5th, along with the 23rd Army Division,
46:56two army brigades and a squadron of armoured cavalry.
47:04The South Vietnamese Army deployed two divisions and an infantry regiment in I-Corps,
47:12and there was also a brigade of Korean Marines.
47:20Air support for operations in I-Corps was provided by a U.S. Air Force tactical fighter wing,
47:26the 1st Marine Air Wing, and a South Vietnamese Air Force squadron.
47:36U.S. Navy aircraft were stationed on the carriers of Task Force 77,
47:42while three wings of B-52 bombers were also on call from Thailand and Guam in the Pacific Ocean.
47:53Air supply was carried out by Marine and Air Force transport and helicopter squadrons.
48:10As more than 100,000 men, half of all U.S. combat units in South Vietnam, had been concentrated in
48:17I-Corps,
48:18the supply system had been strained to the limit.
48:23On the DMZ alone, ammunition consumption was running at 25,000 artillery shells a month.
48:33The Marine supply lines stretched from the United States to Okinawa in the Pacific and on into Vietnam.
48:45The U.S. forces required 21,000 tons of food, ammunition, fuel, and general supplies daily.
48:52As a result, there was a constant stream of ships and air freight into Da Nang.
49:04Getting the supplies to where they were needed was a massive job.
49:08Vietnam was the first war to see computers used to control supplies.
49:17The requisitioning system handled over 80,000 different items from boots for the men to spares for helicopters.
49:41Just like their North Vietnamese enemies, the Marine infantry would depend on the coming battles on supporting firepower.
49:52They had large numbers of medium and heavy mortars.
50:00The Marines would also make good use of 106-millimeter recoilless rifles.
50:06The M40 had been designed as an anti-tank weapon, but it was also highly effective against bunkers and trenches.
50:21Marine bases always had their own standard 105-millimeter artillery pieces.
50:26The guns had a range of seven miles.
50:33Some bases, including Quezon, also had powerful 155-millimeter howitzers.
50:39They could lob a heavy shell over nine miles at a rate of four rounds a minute.
50:49The base could also call in supporting fire from the Army's huge 175-millimeter self-propelled guns.
50:56These weapons could fire a 170-pound shell 23 miles, just enough to reach the Quezon area from the Rock
51:04Pile or Camp Carroll.
51:14Support from aircraft was much less reliable than artillery.
51:18Air operations could be shut down completely by bad weather.
51:26But in the right conditions, fighter bombers could bring devastating firepower to the battlefield.
51:34A-4 Skyhawks operating from carriers in the Tonkin Gulf or from Marine airfields could be over the Quezon area
51:41in less than 30 minutes with a ton and a half of bombs.
51:53Navy, Marine, and Air Force Phantoms were also on call.
51:57Although designed as an interceptor, the F-4 was a powerful bomber.
52:02It could carry 18 750-pound bombs or 11 canisters of the devastating flammable gel, napalm.
52:32As an elite formation which could attract recruits of the highest quality,
52:37the United States Marines had for years been an all-volunteer force.
52:41Vietnam had forced a change.
52:49Restricting tours of duty to 13 months and the steady accumulation of casualties meant the Marine Corps had to take
52:56in draftees.
52:59Around 20,000 men had been drafted in by the end of 1967.
53:10Basic training had been cut too, down from 12 to 8 weeks.
53:16There was also a severe shortage of skilled personnel, particularly helicopter pilots.
53:25In spite of the sometimes appalling conditions of cold, wet, and dirt in which the Marines in Vietnam had to
53:32live and fight,
53:33their morale had stood up well.
53:35Marine discipline and the sense of being part of an elite helped.
53:41So did the knowledge that support from artillery, helicopter gunships, or strike aircraft was not far away.
53:59But nothing helped the morale of the men as much as the superb medical evacuation and treatment system.
54:09After emergency treatment by a medic on the spot,
54:12a wounded man could expect to be picked up by medevac helicopter in less than half an hour.
54:28The crews of evacuation helicopters were among the most admired troops serving in Vietnam.
54:38The pilots would go to extraordinary lengths to get wounded men away, even under heavy fire.
54:51In I-Corps, evacuation was to one of three field hospitals or to the main hospital at Da Nang.
55:01There were also two fully equipped Navy hospital ships, each with more than 500 beds.
55:09So effective was the Marine medevac system that 99% of evacuated Marines survived their wounds.
55:36As evidence had mounted that the North Vietnamese were going to attack Khe Sanh, the Americans took a quick decision
55:43to reinforce the base.
55:44By the close of 1967, the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Marines had arrived to boost the garrison.
56:03New bunkers, quarters, and perimeter defenses had to be built fast.
56:08Building materials that were meant for the McNamara line were quickly diverted to Khe Sanh.
56:17Only days after the new Marine unit had arrived at Khe Sanh, it launched a major search and destroy operation
56:24towards the border with Laos.
56:27The Marines discovered North Vietnamese weapons caches and fresh trails, but not a single enemy soldier opened fire.
56:40Unknown to the Americans, the 30,000 NVA troops all around were under strict orders to avoid all contact.
56:54Christmas 1967 came and went on the demilitarized zone, but the North Vietnamese stayed uncannily quiet.
57:07However, there were signs of intense NVA reconnaissance around Khe Sanh.
57:13Most Marines now believe the question was not whether the North Vietnamese meant to storm Khe Sanh, but when.
57:47adviser of Khe Sanh is Jude's
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