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For educational purposes
This episode covers in great detail the largest battle of the war around the US Marine base at Khe Sanh, including the surrounding hill battles and the many B-52 strikes.
This episode covers in great detail the largest battle of the war around the US Marine base at Khe Sanh, including the surrounding hill battles and the many B-52 strikes.
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01:00The defense of the American combat base at Khe Sanh was given the codename Operation Scotland.
01:10Khe Sanh was one of the most remote outposts in Vietnam, but by January 1968, even the American
01:18president, Lyndon Johnson, had taken a personal interest.
01:23With the Marines facing a full-scale siege by the North Vietnamese army, the question
01:29was being asked, should the base be held or should it be quietly abandoned?
01:40Many in Washington worried that defending Khe Sanh could invite a costly and humiliating
01:46defeat.
01:48General Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, dismissed all such fears.
01:54Already, Khe Sanh was tying up nearly 20,000 North Vietnamese troops, and there might be
02:00a chance of winning a major American victory.
02:10General Rath von Tompkins, the new commander of the 3rd Marine Division, was also convinced
02:15that the base could and should be held.
02:18To boost the defenses, he had sent a 3rd Battalion of the 26th Marines as reinforcements.
02:28They were directed to Hill 558, from where they could provide fire support.
02:33There were now 5,000 American troops at Khe Sanh.
02:46The combat base at Khe Sanh was built around a 3,900-foot airstrip.
02:53Beside the strip was the Marine Air Traffic Control Unit.
02:59Nearby was the 26th Marine Command Post in the Fire Support Coordination Center.
03:08At the eastern end of the base was the main ammunition dump, with a secondary dump to the
03:14west.
03:22The base perimeter was manned by the 1st Battalion and a company of the 3rd.
03:32There was also a forward operating base run by special forces.
03:39The infantry were backed by tank and anti-tank units and an artillery battalion of the 13th
03:45Marines.
03:58Outside the Khe Sanh base, the Marines held Hill 881 South, Hill 861, and a radio relay station
04:08on Hill 950.
04:13The whole 2nd Battalion occupied Hill 558 to block the Rao Kwan River Valley.
04:24Beyond 881 South, the North Vietnamese 325C Division had secretly fortified a chain of hills.
04:35On January 20th, 1968, the Americans thwarted an attempt to take 881 South, and just after
04:43midnight the next day, 861 was partially overrun, but the attackers were also driven off.
04:52At 5.30 a.m., Khe Sanh base itself was hammered by a massive North Vietnamese artillery bombardment.
05:12The shattering barrage of shells, mortars, and rockets, which slammed into the Marine combat base
05:19at 05.30 on January 21st, signaled the start of the battle for Khe Sanh.
05:32The North Vietnamese gunners had targeted their bombardment with unerring accuracy.
05:37As Marines had dived for cover, one of the first rounds had scored a direct hit on the
05:43main ammunition store.
05:51The number one dump stored 1,500 tons of artillery and mortar rounds, 90% of the base's entire stock,
05:59or 10,000 rounds.
06:03All of it was lost.
06:0518 men were killed instantly, and 40 were wounded, as the ammunition exploded, and shells and mortar
06:12rounds flew in every direction.
06:15The explosions would go on for another 48 hours.
06:29Even at the height of the chaos, the Marines were still able to fire their mortars and guns
06:34against the enemy batteries.
06:41They also called in air support, and very quickly, fighter bombers were blasting the suspected locations
06:47of the North Vietnamese artillery, which in return scored 300 direct heavy artillery hits on the fire base.
07:01As the bombardment of the base reached a crescendo, the 26th Marines commander, Colonel David Lowndes,
07:08expected a massive North Vietnamese ground attack at any moment.
07:14But the attack didn't come.
07:16The North Vietnamese infantry had a different objective.
07:22The target was Khe Sanh Village.
07:24Three miles from the Marine combat base.
07:44At dawn on January 21st, NVA troops attacked Khe Sanh Village, where 200 Marines and South Vietnamese troops were stationed.
07:52The North Vietnamese attackers were a 400-man battalion of the 66th regiment.
08:01The battalion attacked twice, but in the face of powerful American artillery and airstrikes, failed to take the village.
08:13An attempt at reinforcement by a South Vietnamese unit went disastrously wrong, and the whole force was destroyed.
08:23Later in the day, the village was evacuated and abandoned to the NVA.
08:37Later that evening, Khe Sanh base itself was probed by a North Vietnamese assault unit.
08:45The L company of the 3rd battalion drove off the attack.
08:52The following day, the base's western flank was reinforced by the newly arrived 1st Battalion of the 9th Marines,
08:59deployed at a quarry a mile from the perimeter.
09:05A platoon was detached from the battalion to occupy the nearby Hill 64.
09:21For the Marines inside the Khe Sanh base, the days were now filled with feverish activity.
09:29There were sudden heavy bombardments from NVA guns and rockets.
09:39The massive damage done by the first barrage still had to be repaired.
09:47The biggest worry was ammunition.
09:49The first aircraft to land all carried shells.
09:53More than 130 tons were delivered in just two days.
10:06Reinforcements arrived, too.
10:08The Marines were joined by 300 South Vietnamese Army Rangers,
10:12and Colonel Lounds now had more than 6,000 men inside the compound
10:16and in seven defended positions on the surrounding hills.
10:25While the Marines at Khe Sanh braced themselves for the attack that was surely coming,
10:30General Westmoreland warned Washington that the battle could be the turning point of the whole war.
10:41In the United States, President Johnson was getting more and more worried about what might happen.
10:47The last thing he wanted was an American version of Dien Bien Phu,
10:51but he was determined to support his commander.
10:55Westmoreland would be allowed to fight the battle he wanted.
10:58There would be no U.S. withdrawal from Khe Sanh,
11:02despite the fact that the NVA were still raining between 150 and 300 shells a day on Khe Sanh.
11:19It was the awesome potential of American air power
11:22that convinced U.S. military leaders that Khe Sanh could be defended.
11:32Before the battle had started,
11:34on 5th January, Westmoreland and U.S. tacticians devised a plan for defending Khe Sanh by bombing.
11:41It was already being unleashed on the North Vietnamese divisions with devastating effect.
11:50The Americans called it Operation Niagara.
12:00The first part of Niagara was to pinpoint North Vietnamese troop concentrations.
12:06Information from air reconnaissance, special forces teams, radio interception,
12:12and every other possible source was fed into the intelligence system.
12:27Niagara also deployed the most advanced and secret surveillance technology in the world.
12:37Aircraft and helicopters scattered hundreds of electronic sensors across the enemy's main lines of approach.
12:46They could detect the movement of troops and send signals to alert the Americans.
12:55As the intelligence picture built up, Operation Niagara quickly gathered momentum.
13:04In spite of rivalry between the Air Force and the Marines over who should control operations,
13:09every available warplanes, every available warplane in the area was standing by.
13:16At the peak of the siege, American planes dropped triple the tonnage of bombs delivered on a peak day during
13:22World War II.
13:31Added to this, fighter bombers would deliver 54,500 tons of napalm alone.
13:52Although fighter bombers were flying the vast majority of Niagara missions,
13:56most of the sheer weight of bombs was being delivered by B-52s as part of an ongoing operation codenamed
14:04ArcLight.
14:05The strikes were flown around the clock.
14:09A cell of three B-52s arrived over the Khe Sanh area every 90 minutes.
14:21The giant heavy bomber was able to carry a massive 27 tons of bombs.
14:27The aircraft dropped their loads from 30,000 feet,
14:30high enough so that the planes couldn't be seen or heard from the ground.
14:35The only warning most North Vietnamese troops got of a raid
14:38was the shattering detonation of the first bombs.
14:42Over the 77 days of the siege,
14:45B-52s flew over 2,500 sorties,
14:49dropping more than 53,000 tons of bombs.
14:54The biggest ArcLight raid of the Vietnam War so far
14:58was launched as part of Operation Niagara on January 30th.
15:03American radio direction finding
15:05seemed to have discovered North Vietnamese Army headquarters
15:08for the Khe Sanh offensive.
15:10Whether it was or not, no one is sure,
15:12but the site was annihilated by two B-52 raids in a single day.
15:39Early in the morning of January 30th and 31st, 1968,
15:44the general offensive the Viet Cong had been planning
15:46for more than six months,
15:48broke with shattering force all over South Vietnam.
15:56As tens of thousands of Viet Cong attacked towns,
16:00cities, and military installations,
16:02American commanders were stunned
16:04by the sheer scale of the assault.
16:14While most of South Vietnam erupted in violence,
16:18Khe Sanh was uncannily quiet.
16:20A North Vietnamese Army defector
16:22had confirmed that there was to be a major attack,
16:25but nothing had happened yet.
16:35Some U.S. commanders believed that the ArcLight raids
16:38had shattered the North Vietnamese command system.
16:42There was no way of telling.
16:52As the tide of the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive swept over South Vietnam,
16:56most of the advance was being countered
16:59by the South Vietnamese Army.
17:06The Americans had been heavily committed
17:08in only a few places,
17:10mainly around Saigon and Ninhui.
17:37Saigon and Ninhui.
17:45General Westmoreland was holding back his forces,
17:48still convinced that the main attack would come at Khe Sanh.
17:55By this time, the weather in the Khe Sanh area had deteriorated badly.
18:03Heavy cloud cover had limited American airstrikes.
18:07The battle for the combat base had settled into a straight fight
18:11between American and North Vietnamese gunners.
18:34The busiest time for the American guns was after dark,
18:38when the NVA were most active.
18:42Every night, the Marines laid down concentrated patterns of fire on the likely areas.
18:51Sometimes, in bombardments known as mini-arclights,
18:54an intense artillery barrage was combined with radar-guided airstrikes
18:59to saturate a target completely.
19:08As for the North Vietnamese artillery,
19:11most of the guns, rockets, and mortars were by now in place.
19:17Getting them into position had been a massive job.
19:23Northern troops had also sighted hundreds of ammunition dumps around Khe Sanh
19:28and across the border in Laos.
19:43The North Vietnamese had placed large numbers of their shorter-range guns and mortars
19:48within two miles of the Khe Sanh base.
19:56Most of the big rockets were fired from Hill 881 North.
20:02The heavy guns were much further away, on Hill 305,
20:06and in caves on the slopes of the Koh Rock Mountain, across the border in Laos.
20:16While they could hit the Americans, the Marine guns didn't have the range to hit back.
20:23Even the Army's big guns on the rock pile in Camp Carroll couldn't reach the NVA's heavy batteries.
20:38By now, more than two weeks into the battle,
20:42over 150 North Vietnamese artillery rounds were hitting the Khe Sanh base and its outposts every day,
20:48rising to a peak on February 23rd, of 1,300.
20:54For the Marines, building the best possible protection was a matter of life and death.
21:01Orders were that every man had to have access to a bunker able to stop an 82-millimeter mortar round.
21:10Command posts were to withstand a 120-millimeter hit.
21:16As for the heavy shells of the NVA's biggest guns, nothing could stop those.
21:29The North Vietnamese artillery hitting Khe Sanh and the Marine outposts was all indirect fire.
21:38Spotters on the hills corrected the gunners' aim by radio,
21:42but the gunners themselves could never see the targets.
21:47What NVA commanders wanted most of all was to place guns on the hills overlooking the base.
21:54From there, they could pour devastating fire straight down onto the Americans.
22:06On February 5th, 1968, the American chain of electronic sensors detected a large-scale NVA movement.
22:18The activity seemed to point to an imminent attack on Hill 881 South.
22:27The U.S. reaction was a massive Niagara raid.
22:31Whole North Vietnamese units were caught in the open
22:34as the entire area around the hill was devastated in a massive storm of bombs.
22:57Although a North Vietnamese attack on Hill 881 South had been blocked,
23:02the Americans had failed to detect a battalion closing on an outpost called 861A.
23:14There, a single Marine company drove off two determined assaults
23:18as artillery fire destroyed the follow-on waves of NVA troops.
23:33On the night of February 6th, the North Vietnamese 304th Division began to clear ground approaches
23:40to Khe Sanh from the west.
23:44The first objective was the American Special Forces camp at Lung Vy,
23:49manned by a handful of U.S. troops and a battalion of South Vietnamese local militia.
24:02The attack was launched by the 66th Regiment,
24:061,500 men backed for the first time by tanks.
24:10In less than three hours, the Lung Vy camp was overrun,
24:14and only 74 of the 400 U.S. and South Vietnamese defenders survived.
24:23The next target for the NVA was Hill 64, occupied by a single American platoon.
24:32A two-pronged infantry attack was launched against the hill,
24:36but a relief platoon, supported by fierce air and artillery fire,
24:40drove the North Vietnamese to the west.
24:47There, they were again hammered by a massive American bombardment.
24:58Even though the NVA had again failed to take any more American Hill outposts
25:03and had lost hundreds of men in the attempt,
25:06they had at least captured Lung Vy.
25:08A thorn in their side had been eliminated,
25:11and they had cleared Route 9 for their own use.
25:23Artillery reinforcements, including 130-millimeter guns,
25:27could now be brought much closer to the Kaysan base.
25:36The Americans were sure the NVA had finished building up their forces at Kaysan
25:41and were ready for the main attack.
25:46But to their surprise, the expected assault still didn't come.
25:57Instead, the siege settled down to a deadly daily duel fought by artillery and aircraft.
26:07At the same time, the North Vietnamese began to launch frequent small-scale probes
26:13against the base perimeter.
26:31In Washington, anxiety about the fate of the Marines at Kaysan was mounting.
26:37A relief operation was being planned,
26:40but it would demand powerful forces and couldn't be mounted for weeks.
26:50The weather was still too poor.
26:55Meantime, if the base's air bridge was cut,
26:58it would be all over for Kaysan.
27:04The troops manning the base needed ammunition, food, and medicines.
27:19Casualties had to be evacuated.
27:21Men finishing their tours of duty had to be flown out and replacements brought in.
27:29The main base alone needed 160 tons of supplies a day just to keep on fighting.
27:45The supply effort depended above all on the huge load-carrying ability
27:49of the C-130 Hercules transport.
27:53The aircraft was able to carry up to 20 tons of cargo,
27:57but for that very reason, it needed most of the strip to land
28:01and took time to turn around.
28:12Every plane met a storm of anti-aircraft fire, mortars, and artillery.
28:26On February 11th, 1968,
28:30the North Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners scored their first major success
28:34against a Marine KC-130 Hercules landing at Kaysan.
28:40The plane was carrying a cargo of helicopter fuel and burst into flames.
28:45Six of her crew were burned to death.
28:50The loss of the C-130 marked the end of attempts to land very large aircraft at Kaysan.
29:01Smaller, more nimble planes like the C-123 provider,
29:05as well as Marine helicopters, would still come in.
29:09But without the big loads of the Hercules, the base would never survive.
29:16Other methods would have to be tried.
29:21The most successful new method was called LAPES,
29:24the low-altitude parachute extraction system.
29:30The Hercules flew only five feet above the runway
29:33while a parachute snatched the cargo pallets out of the hold.
29:42Another technique used a hook and arrestor cable
29:45to drag the load from the aircraft.
29:56In February 1968, appalling weather with ground fog and low cloud
30:02stopped all low-altitude deliveries.
30:06The only option was to parachute supplies into a drop zone
30:10just outside the perimeter.
30:13Several thousand tons would arrive this way,
30:16but still, for the Marines,
30:18bad weather invariably meant tight rations.
30:26Although the battle to supply the main base was being won,
30:30the hill outposts were a much bigger problem.
30:33A fifth of Kaysan's manpower was stationed on the hills.
30:36The men were suffering almost 50% casualties,
30:40and the posts depended completely on helicopters for supply.
30:54For the crews of helicopters supplying the hill outposts,
30:58every mission was a gamble with death.
31:00North Vietnamese gunners were quick to target the approaches
31:04and the landing zones.
31:12Anti-aircraft fire followed the helicopters in,
31:15and as soon as they landed,
31:17mortar crews and machine gunners opened up.
31:28As the slopes of the hills became a graveyard
31:31for American helicopters,
31:32the Marines realized that the survival of the hill outposts
31:36was under serious threat.
31:38And if they fell,
31:40the main base couldn't last for long.
31:49Air commanders worked frantically
31:51to devise new tactics for getting helicopters
31:54in and out of the hilltop bases safely.
32:13The tactics the Americans devised
32:15depended on swamping the enemy anti-aircraft guns
32:18and mortars around a landing zone
32:20with a high-speed assault.
32:27Twelve Skyhawk fighter bombers,
32:30four Huey gunships,
32:32up to 16 supply helicopters,
32:34and an airborne command and control aircraft
32:37all acted together.
32:44The first stage was for four Skyhawks
32:47to hit North Vietnamese positions
32:49with bombs and napalm.
32:55Two more laid tear gas.
33:00Next, two Skyhawks dropped smoke bombs
33:03to create a corridor,
33:05and 30 seconds later,
33:06the transport helicopters swooped in,
33:09covered by the Huey gunships.
33:14Meanwhile, four more Skyhawks
33:17with rockets, bombs, and guns
33:18made close-in attacks.
33:23The whole operation was over
33:26in less than five minutes.
33:36The new tactics quickly earned the title
33:39Super Gaggle
33:40because the helicopters
33:41looked like an oversized flock of geese.
33:44With the fighters and gunships in the air too,
33:48the method took incredible timing
33:50to pull off successfully.
33:57But it worked.
34:00Only two more helicopters
34:02would be shot down
34:03supplying the hill outposts.
34:09By now, the strain of the long siege
34:12was beginning to tell
34:13on the troops at Khe Sanh.
34:18Being under shellfire
34:19every day
34:20meant a steady drain
34:22of casualties
34:23and constant tension.
34:28Food was often down
34:30to two sea ration meals daily.
34:33Conditions were appalling.
34:34The bunkers were knee-deep
34:36in filth and mud
34:37and overrun by rats.
34:40In addition,
34:41it was impossible to forget
34:43that up to 20,000 enemy soldiers
34:45were waiting for the signal
34:47to storm the base.
35:04To stop the men brooding
35:06about their possible fate,
35:07officers and NCOs
35:09kept the troops
35:10as busy as possible.
35:11Digging trenches,
35:12filling sandbags,
35:13and improving bunkers
35:15was a big part of every day.
35:26There was some patrolling too,
35:28although not more than 500 yards
35:30from friendly lines.
35:32Colonel Lounds
35:33had no intention
35:34of sending his men
35:35into certain ambushes,
35:37and in any case,
35:38they had to be kept clear
35:39of the Niagara bombing raids.
35:52On the base perimeter,
35:54the watchword
35:54was constant vigilance.
35:56The North Vietnamese
35:58were probing the defenses
35:59with infantry and sapper teams.
36:05The Americans were facing assaults
36:07of up to 200 men at a time
36:09as the enemy tested
36:10for weaknesses in the line.
36:12The Marines were also plagued
36:14by hidden machine gun nests,
36:16which could open up
36:17at any moment,
36:17day or night.
36:38By now,
36:39the attention of the American public
36:41was riveted by the Battle of Khe San.
36:43The story was being covered
36:45by dozens of journalists
36:46and was featured
36:47on network television every day.
36:50Stories about Khe San
36:52accounted for 25%
36:53of all film news reports
36:55about the war
36:56on U.S. networks
36:57and up to 50% on CBS.
37:01Arguments raged
37:02over the rights and wrongs
37:03of trying to hold the base.
37:09In Washington,
37:11President Johnson
37:11was deeply worried
37:12about the fate
37:13of the Marines at Khe San.
37:19He was constantly demanding
37:20the latest information
37:22on the battle.
37:23A model of the base
37:24had even been brought
37:25into the White House
37:26Situation Room.
37:28For the first time
37:29in the Vietnam War,
37:30the room was on full alert
37:3224 hours a day.
37:41A multitude of doubts
37:42and fears
37:43haunted the president
37:44and his advisers.
37:49Should nuclear weapons
37:50be used to save the base
37:52as some had suggested?
37:57What if the enemy
37:58diverted or poisoned
37:59the base's water supply?
38:01Most worrying of all,
38:03what if enemy jets
38:04mounted a sudden
38:05bombing attack
38:06on Khe San?
38:11It would be a massive
38:12propaganda victory
38:13for the North.
38:20Although North Vietnamese
38:21aircraft did penetrate
38:23to within striking distance
38:24of Khe San,
38:25they made no attempt
38:26to attack the Marine base.
38:32American air defenses
38:33forces over the DMZ
38:34were far too strong.
38:43The biggest threat
38:44to the Marines
38:45at Khe San
38:46did not come
38:47from modern fighter aircraft.
38:51It came from one
38:52of the most primitive
38:53weapons in warfare.
38:58The North Vietnamese
38:59besieging Khe San
39:01were digging mile
39:02upon mile
39:03of trenches
39:03and bunkers
39:04just as they had
39:05at Dien Bien Phu.
39:08They were fast
39:09approaching the perimeter
39:11of the combat base
39:12itself.
39:24Already there was
39:25a major system
39:26of North Vietnamese
39:27fortifications
39:28on Hill 471
39:30less than two miles
39:31to the south
39:32of the Khe San base.
39:40Now, at incredible speed,
39:42the trench lines
39:43were being extended
39:44northwards
39:45until they reached
39:46to within 25 yards
39:47of the American perimeter.
39:53Another line
39:54of trenches
39:55and bunkers
39:55was creeping across
39:57from the southeast.
40:01The NVA plan
40:03was for the infantry
40:04to mass under cover
40:05of the trenches
40:06before launching
40:07their final assault.
40:15By the last week
40:16of February 1968,
40:18few Americans
40:19inside Khe San
40:20doubted that the big
40:22North Vietnamese
40:23ground assault
40:23would have to come soon.
40:28The moon
40:29was in its darkest phase
40:30and a night
40:32infantry attack
40:32would have a good chance
40:34of overwhelming
40:34the perimeter defenses.
40:36Smashing the enemy
40:38trench lines
40:38was an absolute priority.
40:49The Americans
40:50tried every conceivable
40:52method to destroy
40:53the trenches.
40:54Napalm and bombs
40:55were rained down
40:56in huge quantities.
40:58the Marines
40:59fired countless
40:59artillery barrages.
41:16But the Americans
41:18had little success.
41:24The discouraging fact
41:26learned from other wars
41:28was that it could take
41:29a thousand hits
41:30to destroy
41:31a hundred yards
41:32of trenches.
41:49In the end,
41:50the answer lay
41:51with the B-52s.
41:55Up to now,
41:56arc light raids
41:57had been kept
41:58more than two miles
41:59away from the base perimeter.
42:04On February 27th,
42:071968,
42:08the restriction
42:09was lifted.
42:17For the first time,
42:19the B-52s,
42:20under close radar guidance,
42:21dropped their bombs
42:22to within 1,200 yards
42:24of the Kaysan base.
42:34The effect
42:35was shattering.
42:38There was massive damage
42:40to the North Vietnamese
42:41trenches and bunkers.
42:49It was a turning point
42:50in the battle
42:51for Kaysan.
42:53From now on,
42:55close-in bombing
42:56by B-52s
42:57would play a major part
42:58in the defense.
43:14The sudden increase
43:16in North Vietnamese activity
43:18around Kaysan
43:19had left no one
43:20in any doubt
43:21that the climax
43:21of the battle
43:22was near.
43:23A few days before,
43:25a Marine patrol
43:26trying to get information
43:28had been almost wiped out.
43:30North Vietnamese traffic
43:32along Route 9
43:32from Laos
43:33had also risen
43:34to a new peak.
43:36Enormous quantities
43:37of supplies
43:38were being rushed
43:39to the Kaysan divisions
43:40for the final assault.
44:00The 66th Regiment
44:02of the North Vietnamese
44:03304th Division
44:04was assembling
44:05near a plantation
44:06to the south
44:07of the Kaysan base.
44:09Units were also massing
44:11near an old French fort.
44:12On the night
44:13of February 29th,
44:15a battalion
44:15of the 304th NVA Division
44:17assaulted the 37th Arvin Rangers
44:20at the eastern edge
44:21of the camp,
44:22a diversion
44:22to cover the unexpected
44:24and imminent withdrawal
44:25of all NLF troops
44:26from Kaysan.
44:30The American defense
44:32was to coordinate strikes
44:33by artillery,
44:34fighter bombers,
44:35and B-52s
44:36on three main areas
44:38through which
44:38the attacking NVA
44:39had to pass.
44:45Then,
44:46as the final assault waves
44:47approached the base,
44:48Kaysan's own defensive
44:49fire plan
44:50was unleashed.
45:01The base perimeter
45:02at the point of attack
45:03was manned
45:04by the 37th South Vietnamese
45:06Ranger Battalion.
45:10As the lead NVA units
45:13advanced,
45:13the base fired
45:14an artillery pattern
45:15forming the sides
45:16of an open box.
45:22A creeping barrage
45:24was then walked
45:24up and down inside.
45:31At the same time,
45:33two NVA battalions
45:35cut off behind the box
45:36were hit by
45:37fighter bomber strikes,
45:42while long-range artillery
45:44from the rock pile
45:45and Camp Carroll
45:46created a moving
45:47outer cordon.
45:53The North Vietnamese troops
45:55who survived
45:56to emerge
45:57from the open end
45:57of the box
45:58then faced
45:59the direct fire
46:00of the South Vietnamese
46:01Rangers.
46:06Over the next week,
46:07despite continued
46:08aerial bombardment
46:09and the barrage
46:10of artillery fire,
46:12the trenches
46:12came even closer.
46:14Then,
46:15for no apparent reason,
46:16they stopped.
46:18on March 6th,
46:20with the Marines
46:21still waiting
46:22for the final assault,
46:23many of Jap's troops
46:25stumbled away
46:26through what was left
46:27of the jungle,
46:28an area of land
46:29that had received
46:30100,000 tons of bombs,
46:33the heaviest aerial
46:34bombardment
46:35on a single piece of land
46:36in the history of warfare.
46:41The next three weeks
46:42were relatively quiet
46:44around Khaisan.
46:46American air activity
46:47increased steadily
46:48as the weather improved
46:50and more NVA units
46:52began to withdraw
46:53into Laos.
46:56But the battle
46:57for Khaisan
46:58was not yet over.
47:02On March 22nd, 1968,
47:05there was a sudden
47:06explosion of violence.
47:11without warning,
47:13a massive
47:13North Vietnamese
47:14bombardment,
47:15including huge numbers
47:16of heavy shells
47:17from the Kho Rock Mountain,
47:19slammed into Khaisan.
47:24More than 1,000 rounds
47:26hit the base
47:27at the rate
47:27of 100 every hour.
47:32At the same time,
47:33the electronic sensors
47:35around Khaisan
47:35again indicated
47:37NVA movements
47:38and the Americans
47:39replied with heavy bombing.
47:47As the weather
47:48steadily improved,
47:49U.S. air attacks
47:50around the Khaisan base
47:52grew fiercer
47:52by the day.
47:57Further afield,
47:58over the North Vietnamese
48:00rear areas,
48:01fighter bombers roamed
48:02with orders
48:02to pounce
48:03on any movement.
48:13For the North Vietnamese,
48:15the situation
48:16could only get worse.
48:21General Jap
48:22was forced
48:23to concede
48:23that Khaisan
48:24could not now
48:25be taken.
48:26By this time,
48:27the Marines
48:28were mounting
48:28small but aggressive
48:29attacks out of the base.
48:39General Jap
48:40now ordered
48:41the remainder
48:41of his units
48:42to pull back
48:43from Khaisan.
48:46One by one,
48:48the NVA regiments
48:49around the base
48:50melted away.
48:52Only 6,000 troops
48:54were left behind
48:55to continue
48:56the siege
48:56of the Marine
48:57Combat Base.
49:04Although fighting
49:05would go on,
49:06the worst
49:07of Khaisan's
49:07ordeal
49:08was over.
49:23On April 1st, 1968,
49:25the Americans
49:26formally ended
49:27Operation Scotland,
49:29the defense
49:29of Khaisan,
49:30and seven days
49:31later began
49:32Operation Pegasus.
49:38April 9th
49:39was the first time
49:40in 45 days
49:41that no shells
49:42fell on Khaisan.
49:51The aim
49:51of Pegasus
49:52was to reopen
49:53Route 9,
49:54the road
49:55linking Khaisan
49:55to the other
49:56American bases
49:57along the
49:57demilitarized zone.
50:03As well
50:03as the Marines,
50:04Pegasus deployed
50:06the 1st Air Cavalry
50:07Division,
50:07the most mobile
50:08American unit
50:09in Vietnam.
50:16The Air Cavalry
50:17had more helicopters
50:18and airborne firepower
50:19than any other
50:20U.S. unit.
50:25It was perfectly suited
50:26to the rugged
50:27and demanding terrain
50:28near Khaisan.
50:35For Pegasus,
50:36the division's commander,
50:38Major General John
50:38Tolson,
50:39was also given
50:40the 1st Marine Regiment,
50:42a South Vietnamese
50:43Airborne Task Force,
50:44and the 26th Marines
50:46in Khaisan.
51:13The entire length
51:14of Route 9
51:15was still dominated
51:16by North Vietnamese
51:17Army units,
51:19especially elements
51:20of the 66th
51:21and 29th Regiments.
51:25For Operation Pegasus,
51:28the Americans
51:28built a main base
51:29for the Air Cavalry
51:31at Landing Zone Stud.
51:34The Marines
51:35would operate
51:36out of Kha Lu.
51:38The plan
51:39was for air assaults
51:41to seize landing zones
51:42and fire bases
51:43north and south
51:44of Route 9
51:45while other forces
51:46pushed down the road.
51:57Although the weather
51:59was poor
51:59for fighter-bombers,
52:00the weight
52:01of American firepower
52:02supporting Pegasus
52:03was still enormous.
52:11In a single day,
52:13the Americans fired
52:14more than 10,000
52:15artillery rounds.
52:21Before the operation
52:22was over,
52:23B-52s launched
52:2545 arc-light strikes.
52:31The American offensive
52:32was unstoppable.
52:38By April 5th, 1968,
52:41the Air Cavalry
52:42had forged past Khaisan
52:43and established
52:44landing zones
52:45west and south
52:46of the combat base.
52:53While the cavalry
52:54consolidated
52:55their new positions,
52:56the Marines in Khaisan
52:58mounted their own
52:58breakout assaults.
53:02There was strong
53:03resistance from
53:04battalions of the
53:05North Vietnamese
53:0566th Regiment,
53:07which mounted
53:08fierce counterattacks,
53:09but the Marines
53:10succeeded in taking
53:11Hill 471.
53:18It was the first
53:19of a string of NVA hills
53:21recaptured over
53:22the next few days.
53:30On April 8th, 1968,
53:32the Air Cavalry
53:33and the 26th Marines
53:35at the combat base
53:36linked up,
53:37formally ending
53:38the siege of Khaisan.
53:44In fact,
53:45the Marines
53:46were less than pleased
53:47to be seen
53:48as being rescued
53:49by the Army.
53:50In their view,
53:51they had long
53:51since guaranteed
53:52their own survival.
54:13The 77-day siege
54:15of Khaisan
54:16had turned
54:17into the biggest
54:17single battle
54:18of the Vietnam War.
54:19The official assessment
54:21of the North Vietnamese
54:22Army dead
54:23was just over 1,600,
54:25with two divisions
54:26all but shattered.
54:28But thousands more
54:30were probably killed
54:31by bombs
54:31and left no trace
54:32of ever having existed.
54:38By the end
54:39of Operation Pegasus,
54:40American and South
54:42Vietnamese units
54:42had suffered 1,000 dead
54:44dead and 4,500 wounded.
54:47But official figures
54:49state that under 250
54:51had been killed
54:51at the Khaisan combat base
54:53and its outposts.
54:55In the aftermath
54:56of the battle,
54:57General Westmoreland
54:59had high hopes
54:59that the next phase
55:00would be the thrust
55:01into Laos
55:02he had long advocated.
55:08He now had the forces
55:10he needed.
55:15But Westmoreland's hopes
55:17for a great campaign
55:18to follow up
55:19his victory at Khaisan
55:20were soon dashed.
55:25In the United States,
55:26by the spring of 1968,
55:29American public opinion
55:30had turned sharply
55:31against the war in Vietnam.
55:45The shock of the Tet Offensive
55:47had led many to believe
55:48that the U.S.
55:49would have to withdraw
55:50sooner or later.
55:55Under severe pressure,
55:57President Johnson
55:57had promised to search
55:59for a negotiated peace.
56:00He ruled out
56:02any big troop increases
56:03and any widening
56:05of the conflict.
56:17In June 1968,
56:20General Westmoreland
56:21approved the destruction
56:22of the Khaisan combat base.
56:24The president's decision
56:26not to widen the war
56:27had meant there could be
56:28no offensive into Laos.
56:42Nor was the base
56:43needed for defense
56:44as there were now strong
56:45and highly mobile
56:46American forces
56:47in the area.
56:56In any case,
56:58as both sides
56:59were slowly beginning
57:00to realize,
57:01even as the battle
57:02had raged at Khaisan,
57:04the war had changed
57:06out of all recognition.
57:07war had changed
57:37to say,
57:37to realize how
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