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For educational purposes
This episode Covers the US Army's first battle against the NVA at the Ia Drang Valley in 1965 and the strategy and tactics of the US and North Vietnamese in their efforts to win the war.
This episode Covers the US Army's first battle against the NVA at the Ia Drang Valley in 1965 and the strategy and tactics of the US and North Vietnamese in their efforts to win the war.
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01:02In 1967, American forces in South Vietnam launched a series of powerful attacks on the Vietnamese Communist guerrillas.
01:11The aim was to take the war to the NLF's biggest units by attacking their bases in overwhelming strength.
01:25The Americans hoped that the guerrillas would stand and fight.
01:30They could then annihilate them with vastly superior firepower.
01:51The offensives were designed to use the tactics of search and destroy on the grandest scale yet.
01:58Some of the biggest helicopter operations of the war were mounted to try and trap entire Viet Cong regiments.
02:09More guns and aircraft were called in to support the attacks than had ever been unleashed on a Vietnam battlefield.
02:23The Americans meant to damage the Viet Cong so badly, they would be unable to carry on the war.
02:30In fact, the Americans would fail to wipe out the Viet Cong's biggest units.
02:36Despite heavy losses in men and equipment, the guerrillas would return even stronger, ready to launch their own offensive campaign.
03:07By mid-1965, the mission of American troops in South Vietnam was changing fast.
03:15They had come to secure air bases, but now they were actively looking for combat with the Viet Cong.
03:23On May 18th, 1965, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the first U.S. Army infantry unit to arrive in Vietnam, began
03:34operations.
03:42It's first task was to sweep a wide area around its base near Saigon.
03:57The 173rd met no real resistance.
04:01There were thousands of Viet Cong troops in the Saigon area, but they remained elusive.
04:17more american troops arrived as the weeks went on questions were asked about the whole policy
04:25was it wise to send a conventional army with its slow-moving heavily armed infantry its planes
04:33its tanks against guerrilla units that might be impossible the u.s. commander in vietnam general
04:50william c westmoreland insisted that the army could find and beat the enemy there were soon
04:57encouraging signs in august 1965 in operation starlight u.s. marines surrounded a vietcong
05:07regiment of 2 000 men and defeated them in a full-scale battle
05:19the next major challenge was posed by the nlf's allies the professional troops of the north
05:25vietnamese army
05:42by september 1965 two north vietnamese army regiments the 32nd and the 33rd had moved down the ho chi
05:51minh trail and infiltrated from cambodia into south vietnam
05:58the 66th regiment was following close behind
06:05the plan was to take the provincial capital ply khu and advance along highway 19 to the coast at keenan
06:12the americans were determined to block the nva's attempt to reach keenan
06:28the idea was to place in the anke valley the most mobile force they possessed the first air cavalry division
06:44the air cavalry was the first formation anywhere in the world designed around the helicopter
06:51the division was 15 000 strong and had 480 machines five times the number of a normal infantry division
07:01the whole idea had until recently been an experiment with an eye to any future war in europe
07:09no one really knew how it would work in a place like vietnam
07:25combat units of the first cavalry began to arrive at anke in mid-september 1965
07:32by october the division was fully operational
07:40its base camp radcliffe had grown into a massive complex of helicopter pads supply dumps accommodation
07:49and maintenance facilities
07:54for the officers and men of the air cavalry there was a great deal to prove and they were determined
08:00to
08:01take the battle to the enemy
08:09for their part north vietnamese army commanders were just as keen for a fight as the americans
08:16their six thousand troops already in the border area meant to keep up the pressure on south vietnamese government forces
08:23at the same time they aimed to find out how well u.s troops would fight
08:28and how their own soldiers would cope with american weapons and tactics
08:55after infiltrating into the south the 32nd and the 33rd north vietnamese regiments
09:01had established a base area on the high ground of the chu pong massif
09:09on october 20th 1965 the 33rd regiment laid siege to an american special forces camp at ply my
09:20after a siege that lasted six days the south vietnamese army backed by the u.s air cavalry secured that
09:27camp
09:28and both nva regiments withdrew to the chu pong there they meant to join with the newly arrived 66th regiment
09:36before renewing their campaign
09:43the american plan was to fly in the hole of the first battalion of the 7th cavalry to find the
09:49nva regiments
09:50it was the first time u.s troops would face nva regulars the first step was to create an
09:57artillery fire support base near the chu pong at landing zone falcon next the lead elements of the
10:03first battalion landed at lz x-ray right in front of them were nearly all the 66th and 33rd nva
10:11regiments
10:29when company b pushed towards the spur of the chu pong it was attacked immediately
10:35and a platoon was encircled company a was also pinned down by fierce fire before the rest of the first
10:42battalion was landed
10:52a and b companies then launched attacks to relieve the encircled platoon but were driven back
11:04the following morning the americans reinforced by another company were hit by waves of nva troops
11:11heavy fire support wrecked havoc on the attackers and by now another american battalion was on its way overland
11:26conceding defeat the shattered north vietnamese regiments began to pull back towards the yi trang valley
11:32in the safety of cambodia
11:44after the fight at lz x-ray the chu pong was bombed by almost a hundred b-52s each unloading
11:5117 tons of high explosives
12:04for the next 10 days the nva regiments were pursued relentlessly by the americans
12:14but although the north vietnamese were in retreat they were still capable of hitting back in one textbook
12:21ambush mounted by a rearguard battalion of the 66th regiment 155 americans were killed
12:32for u.s forces it was the most costly day of the war so far
12:43in the battle of the yi trang valley in the ply coup operation the first cavalry division lost 300 dead
12:55north vietnamese soldiers had been killed and many more wounded it was a clear-cut victory for the americans
13:02two enemy regiments were all but smashed and there was now little danger of south vietnam being cut in two
13:25the yi trang battle was a major boost for u.s commanders it seemed to prove their strategy was the
13:32right one
13:33the enemies big units could be made to stand and fight and take heavy casualties in the process
13:45if the communists could be forced into more battles like yi trang they would quickly suffer such losses
13:52they would have to abandon their whole campaign
14:16the final push to use american combat forces in south vietnam had come from president lyndon johnson himself
14:23the final push to use american combat forces in south vietnam had come from president lyndon johnson himself
14:24yet he had never wanted to fight a war in asia
14:28johnson's priority was social reform
14:31his great society program
14:33and he feared the war in vietnam
14:36might fatally damage his plans
14:43the problem for johnson was that if the war grew unpopular
14:47it could cost him the political support his program needed
14:51on the other hand if vietnam was lost to communism
14:54it would be just as damaging
15:05the only solution that johnson could see
15:08and the one agreed with his defense secretary robert mcnamara
15:11was an uneasy compromise
15:14the u.s. would carry on fighting the war
15:16but everything possible would be done to limit its impact on the american people
15:21dramatic measures like calling up the reserves
15:24or the national guard had to be avoided
15:47above all johnson was determined to keep china and the soviet union out of the conflict in vietnam
15:54by now both communist powers had nuclear weapons
15:58and china had almost unlimited manpower
16:06fighting the chinese in asia
16:08would demand millions of american troops
16:11and cost untold casualties
16:23johnson's solution was to fight a limited war
16:26he restricted the bombing campaign against north vietnam
16:29to personally approve targets
16:32he also ruled out invading the north
16:34no matter how much it backed the nlf
16:59in fact general westmoreland the u.s. commander in south vietnam
17:03had no desire yet to go into what he felt were communist sanctuaries in neighboring countries
17:09but what he did want was a much more effective bombing campaign to cut the flow of supplies and men
17:15to the guerrillas
17:23if that happened westmoreland was confident he could win
17:27he would need more troops
17:28but once he had built up his forces
17:30he was sure he could seize the initiative
17:53the leaders of the national liberation front were rarely able to meet
18:00they were forced to gather in the strictest secrecy
18:03and a remote forest area near the cambodian border
18:12the fear was that a single american bombing raid could wipe out the leadership at a stroke
18:18security was intense
18:19and avoiding enemy units meant that some members had to travel for weeks to reach the conference
18:38the central committee had fifty-two members and was led by the chairman noyan hu Tho
18:43Tho was a french educated lawyer
18:46and to many in south vietnam
18:48the acceptable moderate face of the vietcong
19:03but behind toe were life-long communists like the general secretary huentan fat
19:09an architect and the nlf's foremost thinker
19:17another hardliner was the french educated lawyer tron bu kim one of the nlf's founders
19:30by now northerners were in almost full control of the military command and through them north vietnam was making sure
19:38its policies were followed
19:43the nlf guerrilla army was even more closely controlled by the north
19:50its top commander was a north vietnamese army general noyan chiton
19:55thon was noted as a political firebrand
19:58and wanted to stay on the offensive whatever the cost or the dangers
20:02the force
20:17thon was equal in rank to the north vietnamese defense minister general jap who favored a more cautious approach in
20:24the south
20:24now that american firepower had entered the equation
20:32by the end of 1965 jap was winning the argument the result would soon be felt on the battlefields of
20:40south vietnam
21:05when american combat troops had first arrived in vietnam
21:08few U.S. officials had believed that the South could survive.
21:18By the end of 1965, the picture had changed dramatically.
21:26The new government, led by Air Marshal Key, was growing in confidence.
21:30The arrival of American troops had given morale a huge boost,
21:34and there was no longer a danger that the communists could win quickly.
21:44For General Westmoreland, the next stage was to go on the offensive against the Viet Cong.
21:50His aim was to take on the enemy's big formations on the battlefield and eliminate them, one by one.
22:05The tactics would be those of search and destroy.
22:08Finding and trapping the enemy, then smashing his forces with massive firepower.
22:24General Westmoreland's strategy would be to wear the Viet Cong down by relentless attrition.
22:30In battle after battle, Westmoreland meant to force the Viet Cong to sacrifice troops and materials faster than they could
22:38ever be replaced.
22:46The measure of success would be the amount of supplies destroyed, the number of bases knocked out, and above all,
22:55the body count.
22:56The number of enemy soldiers actually killed in battle.
23:14For defense, four national priority areas were agreed by the Americans and the South Vietnamese.
23:24The coastal provinces around Da Nang and Quien Nang, and the central part of the Mekong Delta, and above all,
23:32Saigon, the capital.
23:35These were to be first consolidated, and then made the springboards for large-scale search-and-destroy operations against enemy
23:42units in base areas.
23:55The greatest Viet Cong concentrations in the whole of South Vietnam were known to lie between the capital and the
24:02Cambodian border.
24:05Through this area ran several strategic roads and the river routes into the capital.
24:16There were believed to be enemy bases in the Iron Triangle, War Zone C, and War Zone D.
24:27These base areas were the destination for most of the supplies and men that came down the Ho Chi Minh
24:32Trail,
24:33and it was these bases the Americans would have to attack if the Viet Cong were to be finally defeated.
24:51A key part of the American strategy was to stop the Viet Cong replacing the men and supplies they lost
24:58in battle.
24:59The Commando Hunt bombing campaign was hitting the North Vietnamese transport system
25:04and the staging areas for troops infiltrating down to the South.
25:14During 1965, U.S. aircraft had flown 55,000 individual sorties over the North.
25:32In the South itself, the Americans meant to take over most of the fighting.
25:37The U.S. forces were better armed and trained than South Vietnamese government troops.
25:48They were much more mobile and had the backing of enormous firepower.
25:57Meanwhile, to the intense frustration of many South Vietnamese Army commanders,
26:03government forces would deal mainly with local security.
26:06Only elite units would take part in offensive operations.
26:33In December 1965, Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese leadership ordered a change in the leader's
26:40the way the war in the south was to be fought from now on the vietcong would avoid pitched battles
26:46with the americans unless the odds were clearly in their favor there would be more hit and run
26:52attacks and ambushes to counter the american build-up vietcong recruitment would be stepped up
27:08and more north vietnamese army troops would be infiltrated into south vietnam
27:21the vietnamese communists following the example of chinese guerrillas before them
27:26had always given the highest priority to creating safe base areas they were training grounds
27:33logistics centers and headquarters
27:42they also offered secure sanctuaries for times when the war might go badly
27:56hiding the base areas had always been a high priority for the vietcong
28:01now with american spotter planes everywhere it was more vital than ever to protect them
28:07in remote swamps or forests there were few problems but nearer the capital it was much more difficult
28:22the answer was to build enormous warrens of underground tunnels the biggest were in the iron triangle
28:29and in the koo chi district only 20 miles from saigon
28:47in the koo chi base area any facility used by the guerrillas like a conference room or training area
28:54had almost instant access to the safety of underground
29:02hidden trap doors led below past guarded chambers to long passages
29:10at regular intervals branches led back to the surface and other secret entrances
29:19some openings were even concealed beneath the waters of streams or canals
29:28at the deeper levels there were chambers carved out for arms factories and a well for the base's water supply
29:38there were store rooms for weapons and rice and there was sometimes a hospital or forward aid station
29:49long communication tunnels connected the base with other distant complexes
29:58base kitchens were always near the surface with long carved out chimneys designed to diffuse cooking smoke
30:05and release it some distance away
30:12near the kitchens were the guerrillas sleeping chambers where they could survive for weeks at a time if need be
30:23everywhere on the top level there were tunnels leading back upwards to hundreds of hidden firing posts
30:29the base area at koo chi was a vast network with 200 miles of tunnels
30:48there were other complexes too big and small scattered all over the country
30:54each villager in an nlf area had to dig a meter of tunnel a day
31:02there was even a standard handbook specifying exactly how tunnels were to be built
31:18the orders coming from nlf headquarters were absolutely clear tunnels were not to be treated as mere
31:25shelters they were to be fighting bases able to provide continuous support for troops
31:37even if the village was an enemy hands the nlf beneath should still be fully capable of offensive operations
32:09when washington had decided to send american troops to fight the vietcong the biggest question had been
32:15how many would be needed to win
32:23military planners accepted that to win a war against guerrillas an army needed to outnumber them 10
32:29or even 15 to 1. but american generals were now arguing that the vietcong was no longer a guerrilla force
32:37but a conventional army of big units
32:51because u.s commanders were confident they were not fighting a guerrilla war
32:55they saw no need for a 10 to 1 superiority in forces against a regular army three to one was
33:03usually considered enough
33:12400 000 u.s troops plus the south vietnamese army would be just sufficient to reach that target
33:22the plan was to have most of the men in vietnam the plan was to have most of the men
33:26in vietnam by the end of 1966
33:43the south vietnamese army had divided the country into four tactical zones with an army corps in each
33:54as american forces arrived military assistance command headquarters in saigon assigned them to a corps tactical zone
34:07by the end of 1965 the third marine amphibious force commanded four regiments in icorps
34:16the first air cavalry division was in two corps along with a brigade of the 101st airborne
34:25the first infantry division and the 173rd airborne were in three corps
34:37during 1966 the plan was to build up u.s strength by two marine regiments three army divisions an armored
34:46cavalry regiment and two light infantry brigades
34:54the combat strength of allied nations would also increase to two korean divisions and a marine brigade
35:02an australian task force plus new zealand and philippine units
35:17by late december 1965 almost 150 000 u.s troops had arrived in vietnam the air force had over 500
35:28aircraft at eight bases the huge scale of the build-up had placed an incredible strain on
35:35facilities and installations
35:43there was a frenzy of building as army and navy engineers along with american civilian contractors
35:49improved airfields bases and roads
36:02the most ambitious construction project of all was a gigantic port and logistics base at cameron bay
36:13the whole effort was to cost a hundred million dollars but the new facility would quickly
36:19ease the pressure on saigon's overloaded docks by now american supplies arriving in vietnam by sea
36:26were topping three hundred thousand tons a month and rising fast
36:54as the cold war had produced one world crisis after another
36:58the u.s armed forces had been on a war footing almost continuously for five years
37:04budgets were generous and all the services were superbly well equipped and trained
37:19many american officers and ncos already had combat experience in vietnam as military advisors
37:27most of the more senior personnel had fought in world war ii and korea
37:40but for the enlisted men many of whom were draftees their training programs rarely prepared them for what was to
37:46come
37:57even to the best trained soldiers the reality of arriving in vietnam could come as a shock
38:03the climate was exhausting with extremes of heat and humidity
38:12the vietnamese people and their culture were totally unfamiliar
38:18many american soldiers were from u.s cities and the lives of southeast asian peasants were beyond anything they knew
38:36but in spite of the strangeness of the world in which they had come to fight at this stage morale
38:41was high amongst american troops in vietnam
38:45there was confidence in the army's leadership and most units had a strong sense of camaraderie
38:51there was also the knowledge that a soldier's basic tour of duty was a finite 13 months and 14 days
39:10while thousands of americans were getting their first look at vietnam
39:14the south vietnamese army was in its sixth year of war
39:18most of the army's 300 000 soldiers were reluctant conscripts
39:24many were underfed and desertions were outstripping recruitment by 2 000 a month
39:39as for the officers corruption was rife and many sold their units food and supplies
39:45the most senior commanders had nearly all been appointed for their political and family connections
40:07for years the basic infantry weapon of the american soldier had been the m14 rifle
40:13it was a dependable weapon but was unstable when fired on full automatic
40:23the m14 would stay in service with some units for a long time yet
40:32the m16 was a light compact assault rifle made of metal alloy and plastic it was effective up to 400
40:48yards
40:48and had a very high rate of fire
41:01although on paper the m16 seemed to offer the infantryman everything he could wish for in a rifle
41:06the reality was very different on the battlefield
41:13the m16 was prone to jamming a nightmare for the soldier in a firefight
41:20the problem was reduced by scrupulous cleaning
41:24and later modifications would cure the problem completely
41:28but in the meantime many men viewed the m16 with deep mistrust
41:44in an american infantry platoon the most valued weapon of all was the m60 machine gun
41:54the m60 could fire more than a hundred rounds a minute and had a range of a thousand yards
42:01the gun was usually operated by a two-man crew but it could also be fired from the hip
42:09the m60 was extremely robust and well suited to the harsh conditions of battle in vietnam
42:27as well as the weapons they took with them into the field american infantry could call on heavy fire
42:33support at any time ground attack aircraft could saturate the area with high explosives or napalm
42:40while few operations were ever mounted out of range of friendly artillery
42:52unlike aircraft guns were not affected by weather or visibility and they were extremely accurate
43:03the biggest american artillery pieces the 175 millimeter howitzers could destroy a target
43:09at a range of 20 miles
43:25by now every infantry division depended heavily on helicopters to maneuver its forces on the battlefield
43:32and to carry supplies and heavy equipment
43:37for the army the basic infantry transport helicopter was the uh-1 huey
43:45the men called it a slick because its frame was uncluttered by guns or rockets
43:55the huey was able to carry 11 soldiers and their equipment for protection each helicopter had a door gunner with
44:03an m60
44:09as well as hueys for transporting infantry and general supplies there were huey gunships for escort and assault
44:18the gunships were armed with a formidable array of rockets machine guns and grenade launchers
44:45the gunships were armed with a formidable array of rockets machine guns and grenade launchers
44:49by the end of 1965 the total strength of the nlf and north vietnamese army units in the south
44:56had grown to 206 000 men and women of these 36 000 were main force nva troops
45:08the rest were regional and local guerrillas
45:17the main force vietcong units were used to launch large-scale offensives over a wide area they were
45:25uniformed full-time soldiers
45:31regional forces were also full-time but they operated inside their own districts
45:41if necessary their units could come together to make bigger formations for a large-scale attack
45:47if enemy pressure became too great they could break again down into smaller units and scatter
45:59as for the local guerrillas based in the villages their main job was political
46:05they were a constant reminder of the armed presence of the vietcong and worked to increase local support
46:17they were also expected to defend nearby installations like bunkers and tunnel complexes
46:41the vietcong forces were commanded by the central office for south vietnam near the cambodian border
46:51the nlf deployed two divisions the ninth with three regiments and the fifth with two
46:58four more regiments were independent main force units
47:07the nlf also controlled more than 40 local and regional battalions
47:18further north all communist operations were run by the north vietnamese army
47:27the nva deployed three divisions and nine independent regiments
47:41in 1965 american aircraft made tens of thousands of bombing attacks against the ho chi minh supply
47:48trail and on logistics centers in north vietnam
47:58in spite of their efforts the vietcong were getting more weapons and reinforcements from the north than ever before
48:06the average vietcong unit was now better armed than at any time in the movement's history
48:20in the north vietnamese army
48:20although the guerrillas depended on the ho chi minh trail for arms ammunition and special equipment
48:2621 tons a day was enough to keep them fighting
48:30their other needs were met inside south vietnam
48:38to feed the troops rice taxes were imposed on farmers and every possible local resource was used
48:45and reused nothing was wasted even the american supplies and containers left behind on the battlefield
49:00in the last 12 months the vietcong had suffered terrible losses
49:2240 000 had been killed or captured in 1965
49:29yet the casualties had little effect on vietcong fighting strength
49:34losses in main force units were easily made up from the ranks of the local guerrillas
49:46the biggest problem was the high casualty rate among officers to replace these the vietcong depended on
49:53trained men coming down the ho chi minh trail from the north
50:04one in ten vietcong were now northern and the vietcong was increasingly run by the northerners right down to the
50:12village level
50:18by this time most vietcong main force soldiers had fought for years and were highly skilled and motivated
50:25every attack was planned down to the last detail using elaborate models and endless rehearsals
50:34the troops were well trained in infantry tactics and night operations
50:55they were also masters of camouflage
51:02while main force troops thought of themselves as professional soldiers local vietcong were far less confident
51:13mostly the recruits were young teenagers and while many were motivated by idealism others had been pressured or
51:20more shamed into joining
51:24what many had in common were real doubts about their ability to fight heavily armed and well-trained american soldiers
51:49most main force vietcong troops were now armed with a superb assault rifle
51:58the ak-47 was a russian design copied by the chinese
52:05it was comparable to the american m16 but it had fewer moving parts
52:11the stock was wood not plastic and was far more reliable in vietnam's testing conditions
52:18the ak-47 also had the advantage of a 30-round magazine compared to the 20 of the american rifle
52:29the vietcong had a range of effective soviet and chinese light and medium machine guns
52:35they also had heavy machine guns though never enough
52:43the bigger weapons were specially valued for defense against american helicopters
53:00for destroying armored vehicles or bunkers the vietcong had highly effective rocket-propelled grenades
53:06and recoilless rifles
53:10mortars were also available in large numbers and had the advantage of being very easy to transport
53:25many weapons including booby traps and mines were homemade in the villages
53:30the materials ranged from scavenged tin cans to discarded wire
53:35but the most important ingredients were provided by the enemy
53:45in a year dud american bombs could leave more than 20 000 tons of explosives scattered
53:52around the vietnamese countryside
53:54after air raids volunteers retrieved the duds and the dangerous business of creating a new weapon began
54:05in 1966 locally made devices would kill more than a thousand american soldiers
54:31for general westmoreland the close of 1965
54:34the end of the defensive stage of the american war in vietnam
54:40in the coming year he meant to complete his build-up then he would launch the full-scale
54:46offensives that would lead to final victory
54:54the key to westmoreland's strategy was that communist main force units would be destroyed in set-piece
55:00battles by concentrated american firepower
55:08westmoreland was confident the vietcong would stand and fight
55:13but there were some signs that the vietcong might be changing their tactics
55:33in the last weeks of 1965
55:36the vietcong concentrated their attacks on poorly defended targets like isolated outposts
55:42and remote towns
55:45strong south vietnamese or american forces
55:47forces were making contact with big guerrilla units less and less often
55:55at the same time there were more sniping incidents and ambushes
56:00as a result while vietcong casualties went down american and south vietnamese army losses increased dramatically
56:21there was even more disturbing news in store for american commanders as 1965 came to a close
56:30washington's defense intelligence agency reported that the rolling
56:34thunder bombing campaign against north vietnam was failing
56:45after 10 months of increasingly fierce air attacks the north showed no signs it was about to give up its
56:52support for the vietcong
56:56nor had the bombing staunched the flow of men and supplies to the guerrillas
57:03that meant only one thing the real contest was still to come on the battlefields of south vietnam
57:11are
57:17um
57:19uh
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