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Air Crash Investigation - Season 26 - Episode 08: Deadly Cover-Up (Aeroperú Flight 603)
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00:01While a passenger livestreams an approach into Pokhara Airport in Nepal...
00:06The plan is to go paragliding with my buddies!
00:13Add power!
00:16Yeti Flight 691 falls from the sky.
00:22What's happening?
00:2872 people are killed.
00:31This was the deadliest crash involving Nepali Airlines ever.
00:40Eyewitness video gives investigators their first lead.
00:44That's at least an 80-degree left bank.
00:50When they analyze the flight data...
00:53Wow.
00:54They're shocked to discover the engines weren't generating power.
00:59No power, torque indication zero!
01:01There should have been warning lights.
01:03Why didn't they figure it out?
01:05You start to question, what was going on in the cockpit?
01:09Me, me, me, me!
01:13Oh, fuck!
01:16No power!
01:18No power!
01:19No power!
01:21No power!
01:24No power!
01:24No power!
01:25No power!
01:29No power!
01:33Yeti Airlines Flight 691 flies south of the Himalayan mountains in Nepal.
01:43There are 68 passengers on board, including Sonu Jaiswal, a tourist from India, heading to Pokhara to paraglide with friends.
01:57Pokhara Tower, Yeti 691, descending through 12,500 feet.
02:03Captain Kamal Casey is the senior officer and the pilot monitoring instruments on today's flight.
02:10Roger, Yeti 691, 12,500 feet.
02:15He's also a veteran of more than 21,000 flying hours.
02:22We had absolutely the utmost respect for Captain Kamal Casey as he was a veteran in the Nepalese skies.
02:31And he was quite a humble and knowledgeable guy as well.
02:36It's very clear.
02:38We'll be good for visual landing.
02:41Flying the plane from the left-hand seat is Captain Anju Katawada.
02:45She's flown more than 6,000 hours.
02:50Captain Katawada has a very special history.
02:53Her husband, he was a pilot with the same company.
02:57He was the first officer on the twin order and it crashed and he died some years earlier.
03:03Katawada decided to take up flying to honor his spirit.
03:08So she become a pilot.
03:118,500 feet.
03:12While Captain Katawada is an experienced commercial pilot, she has only 186 hours on the ATR-72.
03:30The ATR-72 is a turboprop twin-engine aircraft.
03:35It's a high-wing aircraft.
03:38It's a very stable, predictable and logical aircraft.
03:42And it's very good to fly here in the mountains and hilly regions of Nepal.
03:51Today's flight is a short 25-minute hop from Kathmandu to the tourist city of Pokhara.
04:02Yeti 691, expect to land on 1-2.
04:06Broadway 1-2, Yeti 691.
04:1015 miles from the airport, Yeti flight 691 is cleared for the approach.
04:17Hey everyone, exciting times as we're headed to Pokhara's new airport.
04:21Sonu Jaiswal is live streaming from the cabin.
04:24The plan is to go paragliding in the Himalayan foothills with my buddies!
04:333-1-0.
04:35Captain Katawada programs a heading for the approach to runway 1-2.
04:44You are in between the runway and the mountains.
04:48So you need to be very, very precise with your handling skills of the aircraft.
04:56Okay, visual, visual.
04:58Okay, visual.
05:01The pilots monitor their position carefully, keeping the plane clear of the mountains.
05:09Yeti Airlines 691 in sight, report final, runway 1-2.
05:14Call you on final for runway 1-2.
05:16Yeti Airlines 691.
05:21Gear down.
05:25Less than two minutes from the airport, the pilots configure the plane for landing.
05:31Okay, from here you can go manual.
05:33Okay, stand by.
05:37Disconnect.
05:39Captain Katawada disconnects the autopilot, then begins the first of two crucial turns to line up with the runway.
05:55Okay, flaps 30?
05:59Flaps 30.
06:01Continue descent.
06:03Okay.
06:07One minute from touchdown, the pilots run through the pre-landing checklist.
06:13Okay, landing gear.
06:14Down three green.
06:16Flaps?
06:1630.
06:21In the cabin, Sonu Jaeswal continues live streaming.
06:26We're getting pretty close now.
06:30As the flight gets closer to the ground, the landing seems trouble-free.
06:41But seconds from the runway, Captain KC realizes there's a critical problem with the engines.
06:47There's no power.
06:49There's no power.
06:53There's no power.
06:54When there's no power, that means they have very limited time at that altitude.
06:59They need to react quickly.
07:02Add power.
07:04Captain Katawada tries to power up, but the engines aren't producing any thrust.
07:11400 feet above the ground, the pilots face a critical situation.
07:20In the tower, the controller doesn't know that flight 691 is in any trouble.
07:25Yeti 691, runway 12.
07:28Clear to land.
07:30There's no power.
07:32No power.
07:33Add power.
07:37Captain Katawada pushes the throttles to the limit.
07:44There's no torque.
07:45Okay, give it to me.
07:48The more senior captain takes control.
07:588691.
08:01200.
08:04Flight 691.
08:04Flight 691 is stalling.
08:13While Sonu Jaeswal live streams the unfolding disaster.
08:22What's happening?
08:34mail.
08:41I'll be back to the Queer.
08:42That's right.
08:45I know he was on the left.
08:51Not sure.
08:53I can't help.
08:54I can't help.
08:56It's pretty.
08:58I can't help.
08:59in one of the worst possible places.
09:03The Sethi River runs near to the airport
09:06through a huge gauze.
09:08That's where the plane crashed.
09:13The plane was completely destroyed in the impact.
09:18There was a huge flame burning.
09:23There was no possibility to find any survivor.
09:30The bodies of 71 of the 72 passengers and crew
09:34are eventually found and identified,
09:38including both pilots.
09:41This was the deadliest crash
09:44involving Nepali airlines ever.
09:49What could have caused a commercial airliner
09:52to drop out of the sky just seconds before landing?
10:03When investigators arrive at the crash site
10:06of Yeti Flight 691,
10:08they face a devastating scene.
10:13The wreckage was scattered all over the place.
10:18The first impact was before the river,
10:20where the parts of the left wing was detached.
10:23Some parts were located on the bottom of the river gauze.
10:27The rest of the parts were at the saddle river.
10:35Under the supervision of Nepali investigators,
10:39the wreckage, along with the black boxes
10:41and central processing card from the plane's computer,
10:44are sent for analysis to labs in France and Singapore.
10:50It's really not uncommon in an accident investigation
10:54to have to send something out for closer investigation.
11:05Nepali investigators wonder about Flight 691's orientation
11:09when it hit the ground.
11:11Looks like this is from the first point of impact.
11:16That's a flap from the left wing
11:19and an aileron tip.
11:22So the left wing must have hit the ground first.
11:29The plane crashes winged down.
11:31What that suggests to investigators
11:33is that the plane crashed out of control.
11:36You would never intend to have it be that way.
11:38You'd always try and level it out
11:40and crash as close to a regular attitude as you can.
11:44Maybe the plane's stalled.
11:47You may be right.
11:50Check this out.
11:58It's gone viral.
12:05A witness had filmed the plane
12:07during the final moment of the flight.
12:11It appears that the left wing
12:13lost lift and dipped severely.
12:17That's at least an 80-degree left bank.
12:25It sure looks like a stall to me.
12:32When you see evidence that looks like a stall,
12:35you immediately start questioning
12:36what could have led to that
12:38and you go back to
12:39what's going on during that approach.
12:48This is not an easy approach.
12:51They'd have to fly between the runway
12:53and the mountain
12:55and make two left turns
12:57before lining up with runway 12.
12:59And this is where the plane crashed.
13:02And just before the crash,
13:04they were beginning their final left turn.
13:08Did the pilots bank too far
13:10during one of the turns
13:12and stall?
13:15They would have had to go from zero
13:17to an 80-degree bank
13:18in a few seconds.
13:20Yeah.
13:22It suggests there was a problem with the plane.
13:26Yeah.
13:29You might want to focus
13:30and see if there's any smoking guns
13:31in the maintenance records.
13:33If there was anything wrong
13:34that somebody knew about,
13:36maybe they tried to fix it
13:37and it didn't get fixed.
13:40I've got maintenance records.
13:47Investigators go through
13:49the plane's records
13:50in search of any gaps
13:51in maintenance or inspections.
13:56Not seeing anything.
13:59Everything checks out.
14:02Maybe the controller knows something.
14:06Yeah.
14:08The air traffic controller
14:09may have heard something
14:11in their conversation
14:11with the pilots
14:12picked up something
14:14that isn't really evident
14:14from the tape.
14:19Did you have visual contact
14:21with the aircraft?
14:27Did you see or hear anything
14:29suggesting a problem
14:30with the plane?
14:31No.
14:32I was flying normally
14:33when I had visuals with it.
14:34It was just out of sight
14:35right before the crash.
14:39Then I heard it.
14:42The explosion.
14:56The explosion.
15:01Did the pilots say anything
15:03suggesting a problem
15:04with the plane?
15:05Nope.
15:06Not much.
15:08Okay.
15:12So...
15:13Do you know
15:14what happened?
15:20Not yet.
15:27In the early stages,
15:29you'd want to look at
15:30anything witnesses
15:31might have to say,
15:32anybody who might have seen,
15:33heard,
15:33or otherwise noticed
15:35the crash.
15:37The controller offers
15:38little insight
15:39into why the plane stall.
15:41Then a witness
15:42to the accident
15:43comes forward.
15:44There?
15:45That's where you saw the plane?
15:49He had the credibility
15:50because he was an engineer.
15:53And you said
15:54that you saw
15:55the propeller spitting
15:56just before the crash?
16:00When you see a propeller
16:02rotating,
16:03it means it moves
16:04very slow,
16:05otherwise you cannot
16:06see it moving.
16:07Okay.
16:10The slow rotation
16:12of the propellers
16:13could indicate
16:14there was a problem
16:14with the engines
16:15that drive them.
16:19Quick update.
16:20Sounds like engine failure.
16:23We need to talk
16:25to the French
16:25about their engine analysis.
16:31Hello?
16:35Nepali investigators
16:37now join the team
16:38from France
16:39to examine the wreckage
16:40of Yeti Flight 691.
16:43Engines are badly damaged.
16:46Can't tell
16:46if they failed in flight.
16:52Most of the engines
16:52were consumed by fire
16:53so they couldn't
16:55learn definitively
16:56whether they were
16:57producing power.
17:01Look at that prop.
17:06Investigators notice
17:06something telling
17:07on a propeller hub.
17:12Looks feathered.
17:22When propellers
17:23are feathered,
17:24their edges face forward
17:26and cannot produce thrust.
17:29It's like putting
17:30your car in neutral position.
17:32You can push on the gas
17:34as much as you want,
17:35but nothing is going
17:36to happen.
17:41It's actually stuck
17:42any feathered position.
17:45Okay.
17:52This one moves freely,
17:53but it could have
17:55moved on impact.
18:01This one is stuck too.
18:05So, two of them
18:06were in the feathered position
18:07when they hit the ground.
18:12Normally, propellers
18:14are feathered
18:14on the ground
18:15after shutdown.
18:16That prevents them
18:17from spinning in the wind
18:19and damaging the engine.
18:21There is, however,
18:22one exception.
18:24An automatic feathering unit
18:25will feather that propeller
18:27immediately
18:27as soon as an engine
18:29failure is detected,
18:30perhaps faster
18:31than the pilot can do it.
18:35Were the props
18:36feathered automatically
18:37in flight
18:38due to engine failure?
18:39investigators download
18:41the data
18:41from flight 691's
18:43multifunction computer
18:44to find out.
18:46The multifunction computer
18:48stores information
18:49about the automatic feathering
18:50unit in its memory.
18:53They're going to be able
18:54to learn
18:55whether the auto feather unit
18:57feathered one engine
18:58or both engines.
19:09It never activated.
19:12If you learn
19:13that the auto feather system
19:15didn't feather
19:16the propellers,
19:17that immediately
19:18raises the question
19:19who or what did?
19:23Were the propellers
19:24feathered manually?
19:26Investigators consider
19:27a crucial piece
19:28of wreckage recovered
19:29from the scene,
19:30the central control pedestal.
19:33The central pedestal
19:35is located
19:35between the pilots
19:36and here you have
19:38the power levers,
19:40you have the flaps lever
19:41and you have the condition levers
19:42which controls
19:43the propellers.
19:46The flaps are stuck
19:47at 30.
19:48That's where they should
19:49be for landing.
19:54Condition levers
19:54are moving freely.
19:57Oh, it doesn't tell us much.
20:01Hmm.
20:02Look at this.
20:10Witness mark.
20:13You're looking for witness marks,
20:15the marks that one
20:16aircraft component
20:17makes against another
20:18at the time of impact.
20:19and those marks
20:22will suggest
20:22in the case
20:23of the central control pedestal
20:25where the controls
20:26were positioned
20:27at impact.
20:30The witness mark suggests
20:31that the pilots
20:32could have put
20:33the left lever
20:34in the feathered position.
20:37Maybe some other debris
20:38caused the witness mark.
20:40There's no witness mark
20:41for the right condition lever.
20:46were the propellers
20:48feathered by the pilots
20:49or did the witness marks
20:51occur on impact?
20:53We're going to need
20:54the flight data recorder
20:55download to settle this.
21:01The flight data recorder
21:02doesn't record
21:03the propeller blade angle,
21:05but it does record
21:07certain parameters
21:08that let investigators
21:09infer whether the propellers
21:11were feathered
21:12and if so, when.
21:21Wow.
21:24The torque and propeller speed
21:25drop at the same moment
21:28when the engine's at idle.
21:31They find evidence
21:33that the pilots
21:34feathered the props
21:35one minute before the crash.
21:38When the propellers
21:39are feathered,
21:40the torque drops
21:41and the propeller's RPM
21:42speed drops.
21:45That's what the witness
21:46was able to see
21:47when he reported
21:48spotting the individual
21:50propeller blades.
21:51How did they make
21:53that mistake?
21:59What was going on
22:00in the pilot's mind?
22:03What was going on
22:04in the cockpit?
22:05What's happening?
22:18Pick it up 24 minutes
22:20into the flight.
22:21Right before the propellers
22:23were feathered.
22:25Investigators listen
22:26to the cockpit voice recording
22:28from Yeti Airlines
22:29flight 691
22:30to understand why
22:31the pilots feathered
22:33their propellers
22:33when they did.
22:35Okay, from here
22:36you can go manual.
22:37Okay, stand by.
22:42Disconnect.
22:44Okay, flaps 30?
22:47Flaps 30?
22:49Flaps 30.
22:49Continue descent.
22:51Okay.
22:53Stop, Johnson.
22:55Where are we at here?
22:57Time is 10 56 35.
23:04According to the FDR,
23:07the flaps did not move
23:09to 30 at this point.
23:10But this is
23:11when the props were feathered.
23:16The FDR shows
23:18that when the pilot
23:19flying commanded flaps 30,
23:21the flaps didn't move.
23:22But at the same moment,
23:25the prop RPM decreased
23:26and torque went to zero.
23:29The pilot
23:30has pretty obviously
23:32feathered the engines
23:33instead of moving
23:34the flaps.
23:42They must have mixed up
23:43the flap levers
23:44with the condition levers.
23:47And Captain Casey
23:48was the pilot monitoring.
23:52How could a captain
23:53make that mistake?
24:00In most Aylan accidents,
24:02pilot error is a factor.
24:05That can be because
24:06of inadequate training,
24:08experience.
24:09It can be because
24:11of too little rest.
24:14But there can also be
24:15other factors
24:16impairing their decisions.
24:18Here you go.
24:24The team reviews results
24:26from the pilot's
24:27toxicology tests.
24:31Nothing on Captain Katawada.
24:38Same with Captain Casey.
24:43Maybe they weren't
24:44adequately rested.
24:47According to the
24:48airline's records,
24:50both pilot schedules
24:50were within guidelines,
24:52suggesting adequate rest.
24:54And their medical
24:55certificates are current.
24:58They conclude that
24:59something other
25:00than impaired judgment
25:01caused the pilots
25:02to feather the props
25:04by mistake.
25:05At this point,
25:06you'd have to wonder
25:07what might have been
25:08going on in the cockpit
25:09that would lead him
25:10to be distracted
25:11into setting
25:12the propellers to feather
25:14instead of setting
25:15the flaps for landing.
25:18Did the location
25:19of the condition levers
25:20on the pedestal
25:21play a part
25:22in the captain's error?
25:24They examine
25:25an ATR-72 pedestal.
25:29I reach over
25:30for the flaps,
25:32but I put my hand
25:34on the condition lever
25:35instead.
25:40The flap lever
25:41and the condition lever
25:42are very close together
25:44on the pedestal.
25:46I want to move
25:47the flaps to the
25:4830-degree position,
25:51but instead,
25:54I move the condition lever
25:57to feathered.
26:00The flap
26:01and condition levers
26:02have the same range
26:04of motion
26:04and stop
26:05in similar positions.
26:08It's not a stretch
26:10that they could have
26:10mixed up the levers.
26:12And,
26:13don't forget,
26:14Captain Casey
26:14was where I'm sitting.
26:17Right.
26:23Mercy memory
26:24is very important
26:25for a pilot
26:25because you can do
26:26sequences
26:27without being
26:28conscious about it.
26:30But when you move
26:31to another seat
26:32on the other side,
26:33suddenly that flow
26:35is disturbed
26:36because now you have
26:37to use the opposite hand.
26:41Oh, that feels
26:42a lot less natural.
26:46I'm much easier
26:47to mix up.
26:51Okay.
26:52Flaps 30?
26:54Flaps 30.
26:57Continue descent.
27:01The pilot monitoring
27:02moved the condition levers
27:04instead of the flap lever.
27:06That should be impossible,
27:07but it has happened
27:09before.
27:10I once asked
27:12for flaps
27:13and the pilot monitoring
27:15selected the gear down.
27:16And those levers
27:18are far apart.
27:21Still,
27:22it's hard to imagine
27:23looking at these levers
27:25that you'd get them
27:26confused.
27:27True.
27:35Maybe he wasn't
27:36looking at them.
27:40why would an experienced
27:42captain not check
27:44which levers
27:45he was moving?
27:50Okay, visual, visual.
27:52Okay, visual.
27:54Investigators returned
27:55to the voice recording
27:56of Yeti Airlines
27:57Flight 691
27:59to determine
28:00if the captain's attention
28:01was elsewhere
28:02when he selected
28:03the wrong levers.
28:04Okay, make sure
28:04you stay between
28:05the mountains
28:05and the runway.
28:08They revisit the moment
28:09just before
28:10the propellers
28:10were feathered.
28:12Keep your power nose up.
28:14Keep visual with the tower.
28:16Don't go too far.
28:17Okay, copy that.
28:21Okay, stop for a second.
28:25He's giving her
28:26a lot of instructions.
28:29Maybe that's
28:30the distraction.
28:32But she's a very
28:33experienced pilot
28:34so why is he doing that?
28:38When you're giving
28:39instruction
28:39that's an added
28:40mental stress
28:41it's an added
28:42cognitive load.
28:43It's very distracting.
28:46Let's start
28:47from the top.
28:49Poker Tower
28:50Yeti Airlines
28:51691
28:53Yeti Airlines
28:54691
28:56Tower
28:57Yeti 691
28:59Descending through
29:0012,500 feet
29:01Roger
29:03Yeti 691
29:0412,500 feet
29:06Expect to land
29:08on runway 30
29:09Runway 30
29:11Yeti 691
29:15They discover
29:16that flight 691
29:18was initially
29:18cleared to land
29:19on a different runway
29:20runway 30
29:22but eight minutes
29:24later
29:24there's a change
29:25of plan.
29:26If traffic permits
29:27let's land
29:28on runway 12
29:29Then you'll be
29:31approved for runway 12
29:32without any
29:32instructor pilot
29:33supervision.
29:35Okay, runway 12
29:38Not only is he
29:39monitoring the flight
29:40he's approving her
29:42to land at
29:42Poker's new airport.
29:46Investigators discover
29:47Captain Casey
29:48was instructing pilots
29:49on how to land
29:50on both runways
29:52at the new airport.
29:54I flew with
29:56Captain Kamal Casey
29:57just two days before
29:58for my route qualification
29:59into Poker International Airport.
30:03But why runway 12?
30:08You'll be approved
30:09to land in both directions.
30:10Copy that.
30:17Okay, stop.
30:19So Captain Khatawada
30:21is cleared
30:22for runway 30
30:24and Captain Casey
30:25decides much later
30:27in the game
30:27he's approving her
30:28for runway 12.
30:31Captain Khatawada
30:32had landed
30:33on runway 30
30:34but never
30:361-2.
30:37Runway 30
30:38is a straight-in approach.
30:43In runway 12
30:45you follow
30:46a narrow track
30:47next to the mountains
30:48and you turn left
30:49twice to line up
30:50with the runway.
30:52So Captain Casey
30:53put Captain Khatawada
30:55on a more difficult landing.
31:02Runway 12
31:03was a challenging approach
31:04for a pilot
31:05with just
31:05185 hours
31:07on the air.
31:09Did Captain Casey
31:11properly prepare
31:12Captain Khatawada
31:13for the difficult approach
31:14to runway 12?
31:18The best way
31:19to prepare a pilot
31:20for such an approach
31:21would be
31:22to do
31:23a proper briefing.
31:24Maybe they have
31:25photos,
31:26videos,
31:27simulator training
31:28if available.
31:32Investigators
31:32examine Captain Khatawada's
31:34training records.
31:37She spent
31:38no time
31:39in the simulator
31:39training on runway 12.
31:41What about
31:42a formal briefing?
31:44There's no documentation
31:45related to
31:46training on 1-2.
31:48I've got
31:49Captain Casey's
31:49flight history.
31:52Was Captain Casey
31:53even qualified
31:54to train others
31:55for landing
31:56on runway 12?
31:58Turns out
31:58he had only
31:59landed on 1-2
32:00twice.
32:03A bit of experience
32:04but
32:05not enough.
32:09Because of his
32:10low experience
32:11and also Khatawada's
32:13low experience
32:13on the aircraft,
32:14I find that
32:16a bit strange.
32:18I wonder
32:19if it's even
32:20possible
32:20to do a
32:21stabilized visual
32:22landing
32:23using that approach.
32:32A stabilized
32:34visual approach
32:35is one
32:36that's conducted
32:36with the runway
32:37in sight
32:38at a normal
32:39rate of descent
32:40with landing flaps
32:41and landing gear
32:43down
32:43at the proper
32:44airspeed
32:45and with all
32:46checklists completed
32:47by a certain point.
32:50There's just
32:51over one mile
32:52between the
32:52completion
32:53of the last
32:54turn
32:54and the runway.
32:57That's going
32:58to give you
32:58just over
32:5930 seconds
33:00from lining
33:00up to landing.
33:01It's very tight.
33:08A visual
33:09landing can
33:10increase the workload
33:11because they
33:11have to make
33:12tiny adjustments
33:13all the way
33:14through the pattern.
33:16Let's see
33:17how they handle
33:17the workload.
33:20Okay,
33:21make sure
33:21you stay
33:21between the
33:22mountains
33:22and the
33:23runway.
33:23To understand
33:25how the pilots
33:26dealt with
33:26the final
33:27approach
33:27to runway
33:28one-two,
33:29investigators
33:29returned
33:30to the CVR.
33:31Keep your
33:32power nose
33:32up.
33:33Keep visual
33:34with the
33:35tower.
33:36Don't go
33:37too far.
33:38Okay,
33:39copy that.
33:40Remember,
33:40you need
33:41to make
33:41an early
33:41turn here.
33:44Okay,
33:45a beam
33:45tower.
33:46Gear
33:47down.
33:47Gear
33:54Can I
33:54fly it
33:55manually?
33:56Wait.
33:57Wait,
33:57not yet.
33:58Keep going
33:58straight.
34:00After
34:00flaps
34:0030,
34:01then you're
34:02good to
34:02go manual.
34:04hold on.
34:05Captain Casey
34:06is so focused
34:07on pointing out
34:08landmarks outside
34:09the cockpit,
34:10he's not paying
34:11attention to what's
34:11happening inside
34:12the cockpit.
34:16it's normal to let
34:18the less experienced
34:18pilot fly the aircraft
34:20and the most
34:21experienced pilot
34:21do the analysis.
34:24Okay,
34:25flaps 30?
34:27Flaps 30.
34:32Continue
34:32descent.
34:39He probably
34:40didn't even
34:40look down
34:40to see
34:41what lever
34:41he was
34:41by.
34:43But
34:44there was
34:44still an
34:45opportunity
34:45to catch
34:45the mistake
34:46when they
34:46do the
34:46landing
34:47checklist.
34:52The
34:53before landing
34:53checklist
34:54was an
34:55opportunity
34:55for him
34:56to look
34:56down
34:56at that
34:57control
34:57pedestal
34:58and see
34:59that he
34:59had moved
35:00the condition
35:00levers
35:01into
35:01feather.
35:02I'm
35:03almost
35:03certain
35:03they
35:04could
35:04have
35:04recovered
35:04right
35:05up
35:05until
35:05the
35:05last
35:06few
35:06seconds.
35:08Did
35:09the
35:09pilot's
35:10failure
35:10to follow
35:10their
35:11checklist
35:11ultimately
35:12determine
35:13their
35:13fate?
35:19Nepali
35:19investigators
35:20continue
35:21listening
35:21to the
35:22CVR
35:22of
35:23flight
35:23691
35:24to learn
35:25whether
35:25the
35:25pilots
35:26followed
35:26the
35:26proper
35:26procedures
35:27before
35:27landing.
35:28Before
35:29landing
35:29checklist.
35:34Okay.
35:35Landing gear.
35:37Down
35:37three green.
35:38Flaps?
35:3930.
35:40Wait.
35:42Captain
35:42Kariwata
35:43said
35:43the flaps
35:44are at
35:4430
35:44but
35:45according
35:45to the
35:45FDR
35:45they're
35:46still
35:46set
35:46at
35:4615.
35:49neither
35:50pilot
35:50checked
35:50the
35:50flap
35:51settings.
35:54If
35:54Captain
35:55KC
35:55saw
35:56that
35:56the
35:56flaps
35:57were
35:57not
35:57at
35:5730
35:57he
35:58may
35:58have
35:58realized
35:59he
35:59had
35:59moved
36:00the
36:00wrong
36:00lever.
36:01Power
36:02management?
36:02Takeoff.
36:03TLU?
36:05Low
36:05speed.
36:06Icing.
36:06AOA?
36:08Check.
36:09External
36:09lights on?
36:10On.
36:11Complete.
36:13They
36:14rushed
36:14it.
36:17The
36:17before
36:17landing
36:18checklist
36:18was
36:18done
36:18very
36:19fast
36:19like
36:20bam bam bam
36:21bam bam
36:21bam
36:21and I
36:22don't
36:22any of
36:23them
36:23looked
36:23at
36:23the
36:24flap
36:24setting.
36:25They
36:25just
36:26answered
36:26by
36:26memory.
36:28Oh.
36:28And with the
36:29props
36:29feathered
36:31there should
36:31have been
36:32warning lights.
36:33Why
36:34didn't they
36:34figure it
36:35out?
36:45when the
36:46propellers are
36:46feathered
36:47they're no
36:48longer
36:48providing
36:48power to
36:49the
36:49generators.
36:51An
36:52oral
36:52and
36:53visual
36:53ELEC
36:54warning
36:54alerts
36:55the
36:55pilots
36:55that
36:55they're
36:56losing
36:56electrical
36:56power.
36:58What is
36:58this?
36:58Huh?
37:00ELEC
37:00is on
37:01cap.
37:04The
37:04ELEC
37:04light
37:05comes on
37:05to warn
37:05the
37:05pilots
37:06hey
37:06you've
37:06got
37:06a
37:06big
37:06electrical
37:07problem.
37:10Checked.
37:11Checked.
37:12Someone
37:12clicked off
37:13the
37:13warning.
37:14They
37:14clicked off
37:15the
37:15warning
37:15without
37:15figuring
37:15out
37:16why
37:16it
37:16even
37:16came
37:17on.
37:20It's
37:21hard to
37:21tell
37:21why
37:22Captain
37:22Kamal
37:23KC
37:23responded
37:24checked
37:24to
37:25the
37:25electrical
37:25light.
37:26Checked.
37:28Would
37:28you pull
37:28out a
37:29quick
37:29reference
37:29handbook
37:30and start
37:30working
37:30along
37:31electrical
37:31failure
37:32procedure
37:32or
37:33would
37:33you
37:33recognize
37:34hey
37:35I'm
37:35landing
37:35in
37:35less
37:36than
37:3660
37:36seconds
37:36let's
37:37just
37:37bring
37:37the
37:38plane
37:38in
37:38and
37:38deal
37:38with
37:39the
37:39problem
37:39on
37:39the
37:39ground.
37:41We
37:41just
37:41continue
37:42right?
37:43Yes
37:43continue
37:44turn.
37:49What's
37:49that click
37:50about?
37:55FDR data
37:56shows
37:57this is
37:57where
37:57the
37:57flaps
37:57goes
37:58to
37:5830.
37:59So
38:00he
38:00notices
38:00the
38:00flap
38:01is
38:01not
38:01set
38:01at
38:0130
38:02and
38:02corrects
38:02it.
38:10And
38:10with
38:10so
38:10much
38:10workload
38:11all he
38:12sees
38:12is
38:12the
38:12flap
38:12leader
38:13and
38:13doesn't
38:13notice
38:14that
38:14the
38:14propellers
38:14are
38:14feathered.
38:17when
38:18your
38:18workload
38:18increases
38:19you
38:19get
38:20tunnel
38:20ratio
38:20and
38:21you
38:21see
38:22less.
38:23That
38:23makes it
38:24very
38:24difficult
38:24because
38:25now
38:25you
38:25only
38:25focus
38:26on
38:26one
38:26thing.
38:29Okay
38:29but
38:29why
38:30doesn't
38:30he
38:30figure
38:30it
38:30out
38:31when
38:31the
38:31engines
38:31have
38:32dropped
38:32to
38:32idle?
38:39Seconds
38:40from the
38:40runway
38:40Captain
38:41Casey
38:41realizes
38:42there's
38:42an issue
38:43with
38:43the
38:43engines.
38:44There's
38:44no
38:44power.
38:45There's
38:46no
38:46power.
38:48Add
38:49power.
38:51Even
38:52though
38:52the
38:52pilots
38:53see
38:53the
38:53engines
38:54are
38:54at
38:54idle
38:54they
38:55are
38:55still
38:55unaware
38:56that
38:56the
38:56propellers
38:57are
38:57feathered.
38:58There's
38:58no
38:58power.
38:59No
38:59power.
38:59Add
39:00power.
39:03There's
39:03no
39:03torque.
39:04Okay
39:04give
39:05it
39:05to
39:05me.
39:07In
39:08desperation
39:08Captain
39:09Casey
39:09takes
39:10control
39:10of
39:11the
39:11plane.
39:11You're
39:11landing
39:12sir.
39:12No
39:13power
39:13torque
39:14indication
39:14zero.
39:16200.
39:198691.
39:21What's
39:22happening?
39:35He
39:36decided
39:36to fly
39:37the
39:37plane
39:37rather
39:38than
39:39try
39:39to
39:39diagnose
39:39the
39:40problem.
39:49one
39:50seeing
39:50a
39:50glance
39:50around
39:51the
39:51cockpit
39:51could
39:52have
39:52told
39:53him
39:53that
39:54he
39:54had
39:54feathered
39:54the
39:54propellers.
40:01the
40:02final
40:02report
40:03of the
40:03napole
40:04accident
40:04investigation
40:05commission
40:05concludes
40:06that
40:06the
40:07most
40:07probable
40:07cause
40:08of
40:08the
40:08accident
40:08was
40:09the
40:09inadvertent
40:10movement
40:10of
40:11both
40:11condition
40:12levers
40:12to
40:13the
40:13feathered
40:13position
40:14in
40:14flight.
40:17What strikes
40:17me about
40:18this is that
40:19it was a
40:19very normal
40:20situation.
40:21The only
40:22thing that
40:23went between
40:23success and
40:25failure was
40:26the slip
40:26of a
40:27hand.
40:30the
40:31proximity to
40:32terrain
40:33and
40:33sharp
40:34turn
40:34required
40:34to
40:35land
40:35on
40:35runway
40:3512
40:37combined
40:38with a
40:39high
40:40workload
40:40and
40:41a
40:41lack
40:41of
40:41appropriate
40:42training
40:42all
40:43contributed
40:44to
40:44the
40:44crash.
40:47After
40:48the
40:48accident
40:49Yeti
40:49Airlines
40:50tests
40:50the
40:51approach
40:51in
40:51the
40:51simulator
40:52with
40:52their
40:52pilots.
40:54Most
40:55of our
40:55pilots
40:55were not
40:56able to
40:56land
40:57on
40:57runway
40:5712.
40:58Either
40:59they
40:59were
41:00high
41:00on
41:00approach
41:01or
41:01they
41:01were
41:02fast
41:02on
41:03speed.
41:06Yeti
41:06Airlines
41:07stops
41:07flying
41:08into
41:08runway
41:0812
41:09until
41:10they
41:10are
41:10able
41:10to
41:11establish
41:11a
41:11safe
41:12visual
41:12procedure
41:13and
41:13retrain
41:14their
41:14pilots.
41:16The
41:16commission
41:17recommends
41:17that
41:18the
41:18Civil
41:18Aviation
41:19Authority
41:19of
41:19Nepal
41:20ensures
41:20that
41:21a
41:21stabilised
41:22flight
41:22path
41:22is
41:23approved
41:23before
41:24allowing
41:24commercial
41:25operations
41:25at a
41:26new
41:26airport.
41:30After
41:31the
41:31accident
41:31the
41:32victims
41:32of
41:33Yeti
41:33Air
41:33Flight
41:34691
41:34are
41:35mourned
41:35by a
41:36nation
41:36and
41:37fellow
41:37pilots
41:38remember
41:38their
41:39colleagues.
41:42captain
41:43Kamal
41:43Casey
41:43I
41:44just
41:44want
41:45to
41:45remember
41:45him
41:46when
41:47he
41:47was
41:47alive
41:47and
41:48he
41:49was
41:50there
41:50with
41:50us.
41:53Captain
41:54Khatiboda
41:54I
41:55respected
41:56her
41:56a lot.
41:58She
41:59will be
41:59remembered
42:00as an
42:00elder
42:01sister
42:02and
42:02there
42:03is
42:03going
42:03to
42:03be
42:03always
42:04a
42:04void
42:05in
42:05the
42:06airlines
42:07that
42:08she
42:08is
42:08not
42:08there
42:09anymore.
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