- 7 hours ago
Air Crash Investigation - Season 26 - Episode 06: A Perfect Storm (Nürnberger Flugdienst Flight 108)
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TVTranscript
00:01Just minutes after taking off from Lima...
00:03We declare an emergency.
00:05The pilots of Aero Peru Flight 603 get mixed messages from their plane.
00:11I cut the engines, but the speed is increasing.
00:15Having erroneous airspeed indications now puts into your brain,
00:18am I climbing, am I not climbing?
00:20They seek assistance from the ground.
00:23Can you tell us our altitude, please?
00:24You're at 9,700 feet according to my radar.
00:27But nothing makes sense.
00:29We're in the water. Pull up!
00:34All 70 people on board are killed.
00:38Investigators compare the cockpit voice recording...
00:41We will maintain 10,000 feet.
00:43Set it.
00:4410,000 feet.
00:45...with the flight data recorder...
00:47Captain doesn't realize how close they are to the water.
00:49...and suspect a single faulty sensor prevented the crew from averting disaster.
00:54It violates the laws of physics.
00:57Airplanes just don't do that.
01:00D-day, D-day.
01:04D-day.
01:07D-day, 1-0, for having your arms...
01:08D-day, 0, for having your arms...
01:10D-day, 0, for having your arms...
01:12D-day, 0, for having your arms...
01:23D-day, 0, for having your arms...
01:24It's nearing 1am at Jorge Chavez International Airport in Lima, Peru.
01:33Thick clouds blanket the sky as Aero Peru 603 taxis to the runway.
01:42The weather in Lima, Peru is a very, very stable environment, especially this time of the year.
01:49The captain is 58-year-old Eric Schreiber.
01:52He's highly experienced, having logged almost 22,000 flight hours.
01:58Aero Peru 603, authorized to Santiago, initial level 29,000 feet, and afterwards on course, transponder 5603.
02:1042-year-old First Officer David Fernandez has flown nearly 8,000 hours.
02:16Correct, Lima Tower.
02:18He will be the pilot flying the aircraft tonight.
02:21Roger.
02:24He's doing double duty by also operating the radio.
02:30Lima Tower, Aero Peru 603, runway 15.
02:35Ready for takeoff.
02:38Aero Peru 603, wind calm, clear for takeoff, runway 15.
02:46There are 61 passengers and 7 flight attendants on board.
03:00Takeoff at 41 minutes past midnight, on the dots.
03:06What precision?
03:07Like the Suez.
03:09Let's go.
03:12Let's go.
03:18The crew is extremely professional.
03:21They accomplished their checklists and procedures as what would be expected.
03:24And they were basically an on-time machine.
03:44Flight 603 will fly out to the Pacific Ocean before heading south to Santiago.
03:51The aircraft is a four-year-old Boeing 757-200.
03:56The Boeing 757 is a long, narrow-bodied aircraft, twin engine.
04:02It's simple in its design, simple in its instrumentation, and just an overall comfortable airplane to fly.
04:11The passengers settle in for the three-and-a-half-and-a-half-hour flight.
04:19In the cockpit, the first officer spots a potential problem.
04:25The ultimeters are stuck.
04:31Windshear, windshear, windshear, windshear.
04:35The pilots also get a windshear warning.
04:39This is new.
04:41The windshear is an alert that we're entering into an environment of undesirable winds.
04:47They could be highly critical in the safety of the aircraft.
04:50Those type of winds are just very uncommon in that area.
04:53And we're not forecasted at night at all.
04:57Windshear.
04:58Flight 603 climbs into the thick clouds above Lima.
05:02The pilots lose sight of the ground.
05:06Speed.
05:08They now discover another instrument isn't working.
05:13Yeah, right.
05:15Flying in the clouds at night, without knowing how fast they're going or their height above the ground,
05:22the pilots face a potentially dangerous situation.
05:26Am I climbing? Am I not climbing?
05:29Am I near mountainous terrain, which is very close to the coastal line of Peru?
05:35Tower Aero Peru 603.
05:37Flight 603 updates the tower controller.
05:41Aero Peru 603, tower, go ahead.
05:44We have no altimeter and no airspeed.
05:47Declaring an emergency.
05:52When a pilot declares an emergency with air traffic control,
05:56the controller is going to give that aircraft priority handling.
06:00Roger, change frequency to 119.7 for further instruction from radar control.
06:05Switching to 119.7.
06:12Before contacting radar control, the captain takes over from the first officer.
06:17Okay, I have control.
06:20The captain may decide to take over the flying role
06:23and tell the first officer to talk on the radio and work procedures.
06:28Lima 603, we request vectors for ILS runway 15.
06:33The pilots request directions for a return to the airport.
06:37Roger, we suggest a right turn, heading 330.
06:41It was a good call to ask air traffic control, give us vectors.
06:44We're so busy up here dealing with everything else.
06:47You can certainly help us out if you tell us which direction to turn
06:50and guide us back towards the airport.
06:53Turn right, heading 330.
06:56A heading of 330 will take the plane north
07:00to a position where it can then make the turn back to Lima.
07:05But two and a half minutes later...
07:08Aero Peru 603, you're showing level 9200.
07:12What is your heading now?
07:14The radar controller notices that flight 603
07:18hasn't turned back towards the airport.
07:24Heading 205.
07:26We're heading away from the shore.
07:27Affirmative.
07:30We will maintain 10,000 feet.
07:32I said it, 10,000 feet.
07:34The captain decides to fly further out to sea
07:37before returning to Lima.
07:40They go out over the ocean,
07:42which is one of the best decisions to possibly do.
07:45They don't now have to worry about
07:47other aircraft in the Andes Mountains.
07:51In the cabin, passengers are unaware
07:54of what's happening in the cockpit.
08:01Safely away from shore.
08:03According to the radar,
08:05you're crossing radial 230 from Lima.
08:08Distance west, southwest is 37 miles.
08:12Flight 603 finally starts turning north
08:15to begin the approach to Lima
08:17and needs to begin its descent to the airport.
08:21I'll try to descend with the power cut.
08:30He was going to descend at idle thrust,
08:33which is a good way to descend.
08:34It's nice and steady in a 757
08:36and keeps the airspeed under good control.
08:46I cut the engines, but the speed is increasing.
08:50Even with power to the engines cut,
08:52the airspeed indicators show
08:54that the plane is accelerating.
08:58Can you tell us the speed, please?
09:00I have 320.
09:02We have 350.
09:06They'll need to use a different strategy
09:08to descend.
09:12Getting to the lower altitude,
09:14hopefully getting into some clearer areas
09:16to see the coastal line
09:17could give them more comfort
09:19for a safe landing.
09:21Take the speed brakes out.
09:25That is another great way
09:27of slowing the aircraft
09:28and getting better control
09:30of the airspeed.
09:34But deploying the speed brakes
09:36has the opposite effect.
09:41Over speed.
09:42A new warning tells them
09:44they're flying far too fast.
09:47The airplane's above its maximum allowable airspeed.
09:50It's in danger of breaking apart
09:52if they don't do something right now.
09:59But I have the speed brakes out
10:01and all the power is cut.
10:02This can be right.
10:05What more possibly can be confusing
10:07and going wrong right now?
10:11Seconds later,
10:12they get a contradictory warning
10:14that the plane's flying far too slow.
10:19The stick shaker indicates to pilots
10:22that if the airplane gets any slower,
10:24it's going to be in a stall condition.
10:27Are they going too fast or too slow?
10:31The pilots must decide
10:32which alarm to react to.
10:36We're stalling!
10:43The captain decides to increase the speed
10:46by pitching the nose down,
10:47silencing the stall warning.
10:53But they're not out of danger yet.
10:58With conflicting warnings
11:00and no reliable airspeed or altitude readings,
11:04the pilots of Flight 603 urgently need help.
11:09Is there any plane that can take off
11:10to rescue us?
11:12Yes.
11:13We're coordinating immediately.
11:16At this point,
11:17it was a totally out-of-the-box thought
11:20by the first officer
11:22to ask for this type of assistance,
11:25which would have given them
11:26a visual reference right next to them
11:29with altitude, airspeed,
11:31also communications,
11:33and we have somebody alongside of us
11:35holding our hand to the airport.
11:38The plane is now 50 miles from Lima's airport.
11:43Aero Peru 603,
11:45you are heading 270, 10,000 feet.
11:49While they wait for a rescue plane,
11:51the captain attempts to join
11:52the approach path to the runway.
11:55I'll try to intercept the ILS
11:57and then descend.
11:59Lima, Aero Peru 603,
12:01we will try to intercept the ILS.
12:03Roger, Aero Peru 603.
12:05They think they're flying
12:06at a nice, safe altitude,
12:08and they think that they pretty much
12:10have airspeed under control.
12:11They probably thought
12:13they were in a pretty darn good position.
12:17Soon after,
12:19the radar controller provides an update
12:21on the escort flight.
12:23Aero Peru 603,
12:25there is a 707 about to take off.
12:28Starting to move now.
12:33It seems to be flying well.
12:38Can you tell us our altitude, please?
12:40You're at 9,700 feet,
12:42according to my radar.
12:44Terrain.
12:44Too low.
12:45Terrain.
12:49Too low.
12:50Terrain.
12:51Terrain.
12:519,700 feet,
12:52but we're getting a terrain warning.
12:55Pull up.
12:56Pull up if he's telling you to pull up.
12:58Terrain.
12:59We're hitting the water.
13:00Pull up.
13:08We're running over.
13:10Pull up.
13:2029 minutes after taking off,
13:23Flight 603 crashes into the Pacific Ocean,
13:2748 miles from Lima, Peru.
13:36Within hours,
13:38a Navy aircraft discovers debris
13:40from Flight 603.
13:44The accident occurred at night
13:46and the wave conditions were very high,
13:49so the first few ships that went out
13:51to look for the wreckage
13:52really struggled to find it.
13:55Heavy fog also hampers recovery efforts.
14:14By the end of the first day,
14:16the bodies of only 13 of the 70 people on board
14:20are recovered.
14:21There are no signs of survivors.
14:27Those who haven't been found
14:28are believed to be inside the fuselage
14:31on the seabed.
14:45It's up to air crash investigators
14:48from Peru's Accident Investigation Board
14:50to find out why a plane,
14:52last observed flying nearly 10,000 feet above the sea,
14:57suddenly crashed into it.
15:04We have the military radar.
15:06With the underwater wreckage still beyond reach,
15:10investigators get their first lead
15:11from the Peruvian military.
15:15Any coastal nation will have military radar
15:18that's constantly scanning
15:20for any approaching aircraft.
15:22So by querying the Peruvian military radar,
15:25we were able to get some data
15:27about the altitude and position
15:29of the accident flight.
15:31So after taking off,
15:33they follow the approved flight plan
15:35over the ocean,
15:36and then they start heading north.
15:38Yeah, they're headed back towards Lima.
15:43The flight climbs to 13,000 feet,
15:46and then it starts to descend.
15:49And now,
15:52in the last seven minutes,
15:54the flight has a series of erratic climbs
15:56and descents before it crashes.
15:59It appears they lost control.
16:06It becomes just a rollercoaster ride of altitudes
16:10because they don't have control.
16:17What could have caused the pilots to lose control?
16:21When you start putting an investigation together,
16:24you start putting the what-ifs on the table.
16:27What if this failed?
16:28What if that failed?
16:29What if this went wrong?
16:30What if the crew made a mistake?
16:33Pre-take-off seems okay.
16:35Investigators scrutinize the communications
16:37between air traffic control and the pilots.
16:40Look at this.
16:41The crew reported problems with airspeed
16:43and altitude readings
16:44only two and a half minutes into the flight.
16:48Tower, Aero Peru 603.
16:50Aero Peru 603, tower, go ahead.
16:52We have no altimeters and no airspeed.
17:08The pitostatic system uses tubes and sensors
17:12mounted on the plane
17:13which measure air pressure
17:14to calculate airspeed and altitude.
17:19But wasn't there a recent crash
17:20involving the pitostatic system?
17:22Yeah.
17:24Birgonaire, flight 301.
17:28Only eight months earlier,
17:30another Boeing 757 crashed
17:33soon after taking off from Puerto Plata
17:35in the Dominican Republic.
17:37The cause was a blocked pitot tube.
17:42Some investigators were wondering
17:43if we had a similar situation
17:45to what we had in Birgonaire.
17:46It wasn't entirely the same,
17:48but it still involved blockage
17:50or covering parts of the pitostatic system.
17:54Well, maybe that's what happened here.
18:06Nearly two weeks
18:08since Aero Peru flight 603
18:10crashed into the ocean,
18:12a U.S. Navy ship
18:13helps the Peruvian Navy
18:15to track the pings
18:16from the Boeing 757's
18:18two black boxes.
18:20The wreckage is finally located
18:22at a depth of 680 feet.
18:28Using remotely operated vehicles,
18:31investigators finally get their first view
18:34of the wreckage site.
18:37The wreckage is very concentrated.
18:39The plane was intact
18:40when it hit the water.
18:49The fact that all the major pieces
18:52of the airplane
18:52are in one concentrated area
18:54really gives the investigators
18:56a much clearer picture
18:58of how the airplane came down.
19:00So, it either came down
19:01in a flat spin
19:02or it came down nose first,
19:04which is a very unusual accident.
19:09There.
19:10The black boxes
19:12are also located.
19:15They're very, very critical
19:17to get both recorders.
19:19First, you want to know
19:20how the airplane was behaving
19:21and then secondly,
19:22what was going on in the cockpit
19:24between the crew members
19:26of the airplane.
19:29They are packed in seawater
19:31and sent to Washington
19:32where the NTSB,
19:34the National Transportation Safety Board,
19:36will process their invaluable data.
19:45That's it.
19:46Keep moving that way.
19:49The team also searches
19:51for evidence of some kind
19:52of blockage of the pitot tubes
19:54and static ports.
19:56There.
19:57Keep going.
19:59They focus on a section
20:01of the left fuselage
20:02where the static ports
20:03are located.
20:04Okay, now moving.
20:10That's it.
20:12The static ports were blocked.
20:16They can see
20:17that the ports are covered.
20:22When we saw
20:23that those static ports
20:25were covered,
20:25it was case closed.
20:27Drop the curtains.
20:29We knew exactly
20:30what happened
20:30in this accident.
20:32How did such
20:34a critical device
20:35which determines
20:36airspeed and altitude
20:37get covered up
20:39and blocked?
20:42Make sure you tag everything.
20:45Investigators survey
20:46the recovered wreckage
20:47of Aero Peru Flight 603
20:50to find out
20:51what is covering
20:52the static ports.
20:56Look at that.
21:00looks like filler tape.
21:02Same color
21:03as a fuselage.
21:09Flyers.
21:30Why were the ports
21:32covered with tape
21:33and by whom?
21:39It wasn't our job
21:41to assign blame
21:42or liability,
21:43but we wanted
21:43to understand
21:44the procedure
21:45to make sure
21:46that important step
21:47of removing the tape
21:48would never get
21:49overlooked again.
21:54So,
21:55let's check
21:55the last bug entry.
21:57Okay.
21:58Investigators
21:59check maintenance records
22:00to understand
22:01why the ports
22:02were taped over.
22:05Interesting.
22:06Hey.
22:08Bird strike.
22:12During the plane's
22:13last landing
22:14before the accident,
22:16the right engine
22:18was struck
22:18by birds.
22:20They replaced
22:21the turbine blades,
22:23the hydraulic pump
22:24was repaired,
22:24and they polished
22:25the lower front
22:26of the 757.
22:29Exactly where
22:30the static ports
22:31are located.
22:33Did maintenance
22:34personnel follow
22:35the correct procedures
22:36for polishing
22:37the 757?
22:39When you're
22:39performing work
22:40on the airplane,
22:41such as polishing
22:42or washing it,
22:43it's important
22:43not to get
22:44any debris
22:45into the ports
22:46because when
22:47you take off,
22:48temperatures go down,
22:49they may freeze
22:50in place,
22:52which could cause
22:53severe instrument
22:54problems
22:54to the airplane.
22:56According
22:57to the maintenance
22:57manual,
22:58they're supposed
22:58to cover
22:58the static ports.
23:00Whoever polished
23:01the plane
23:01covered the static
23:02ports with tape
23:03and didn't remove it.
23:07So why
23:08wasn't the tape
23:09removed
23:09after the area
23:10was polished?
23:13If you look
23:14at the maintenance
23:15process
23:15on an airplane,
23:17and cleaning
23:18or polishing
23:18an airplane
23:19is maintenance,
23:20there's multiple
23:21steps,
23:22multiple people,
23:22and multiple looks.
23:24The whole purpose
23:25of that is
23:26to make sure
23:27that nothing
23:28is missed.
23:30were the static
23:31ports inspected
23:32as part of
23:34flight 603's
23:35line check?
23:37It was a crazy night.
23:40Investigators
23:40interview the
23:41line mechanic
23:42to determine
23:42if the static
23:43ports were
23:44inspected
23:44after the work
23:45was done.
23:46The line chief
23:47usually does it,
23:48but he was sick.
23:51So,
23:53I did it.
24:03So,
24:04I guess you didn't
24:05see the tape then.
24:10Aluminum tape
24:11is pretty common.
24:13And if you take it
24:14and just spread it
24:15over those ports,
24:16it blends in perfectly.
24:18And it makes it
24:19very easy
24:19for somebody
24:20to miss it.
24:23Was he
24:24adequately trained?
24:25I would say
24:26the answer
24:27to that is no.
24:30Did you see
24:31either pilot
24:32do a pre-flight check?
24:34Yes.
24:35The captain.
24:38Do you know
24:39if he checked them?
24:43Couldn't tell you.
24:46If I had
24:46a new person
24:47on my crew,
24:48I would tell them
24:49to watch the captain,
24:50see what he's doing,
24:52and it becomes
24:53routine for mechanics
24:54to watch
24:55what the flight crew does.
24:57Okay.
24:58Thank you for your time.
25:01There's at least
25:02one, if not two,
25:03line checks
25:03that are done
25:03by supervisors
25:05of the line maintenance,
25:07and then
25:08one of the crew members
25:09would do a walk around
25:10as they're obligated
25:11to do always.
25:13So,
25:14there are several levels
25:15where things
25:17should have been detected
25:18but weren't
25:19in this flight.
25:23So,
25:24both the line mechanic
25:25and the pilot
25:26and the pilot
25:26missed it.
25:29Investigators
25:30now know
25:31that despite
25:32all the safety checks
25:33that were meant
25:33to be performed,
25:35no one spotted
25:36the silver tape
25:37covering the static ports.
25:38so we know
25:40what caused
25:40the faulty air
25:41speeds and altitudes.
25:42But faulty air data
25:43alone
25:44doesn't cause
25:45a plane to crash.
25:46So,
25:47what did?
25:56Investigators
25:56turned to the cockpit
25:57voice recorder
25:58from Aero Peru
25:59Flight 603
26:02to determine
26:03how the pilots
26:04dealt with
26:05faulty airspeed
26:06and altitude data.
26:07Pick it up
26:08from the takeoff.
26:30The plane
26:31is barely
26:32off the ground
26:32when the pilots
26:33identify the first problem.
26:36The altimeters
26:37are stuck.
26:38The captain's
26:39altimeter
26:39the first officer's
26:41altimeter
26:41the standby altimeter
26:43all three sources
26:45were different
26:46and they were
26:47all wrong.
26:53It's quickly
26:54followed
26:55by a second issue.
26:57The speed.
26:58The airspeed
26:59is also stuck.
27:01Yeah, right.
27:03Hold on.
27:07They were only
27:08at 200 feet
27:09above the ground
27:09and they already
27:10knew that there
27:11had problems
27:11with altitude
27:11and airspeed.
27:14In three different
27:15places in the cockpit
27:16they're seeing
27:17unreliable airspeed
27:19and altitude.
27:21According to the FDR
27:22they're still climbing.
27:24Let's see how
27:25they handle
27:25that faulty data.
27:29What's going on?
27:30We're not climbing.
27:32I'm climbing.
27:34Investigators hear
27:35the captain
27:36the captain
27:36continue to rely
27:37on the faulty data
27:38on his altimeter
27:39Climb, climb, climb.
27:41I am climbing.
27:43Despite what
27:44the first officer
27:45tells him.
27:46The captain
27:47is looking at
27:47his altimeter
27:48and saying
27:49what he sees
27:50right in front of him.
27:52It's very hard
27:53to ignore
27:54this false data.
27:55The airspeed
27:56and altitude readings
27:57are like a magnet
27:58drawing your eye
27:59and attention
28:00again and again.
28:01Climb, climb.
28:02I am climbing.
28:03So in this
28:04initial moments
28:05of the climb
28:06it seems like
28:07the first officer
28:08was more in touch
28:09with what the airplane
28:10was really doing.
28:11What else do the pilots
28:12do to handle
28:12the situation?
28:14Keep playing.
28:16Let's go to
28:17basic instruments.
28:19But within a minute
28:20the captain stops
28:21focusing on
28:22the faulty instruments.
28:25He decides to use
28:26the pitching power
28:27procedure.
28:27That's good.
28:29Very quickly on
28:30the captain says
28:31basic instruments.
28:32I believe he means
28:33the pitch and power
28:34procedure.
28:39The pitch and power
28:40procedure requires
28:42reducing the pitch
28:43angle of the aircraft
28:44to two degrees
28:45nose up
28:46and the throttles
28:47to 55%.
28:48This should result
28:50in level flight.
28:52By flying with
28:53set pitch and power
28:55and ignoring
28:56the unreliable
28:57airspeed and altitude
28:58gives the crew
28:59time to sort out
29:01what's going on
29:02and think through
29:03what might be causing
29:04the unreliable
29:05indications.
29:07Then they declare
29:08the emergency.
29:09Pick it up after that.
29:11Let's see if they
29:11did the procedure
29:12properly.
29:17Switching to
29:181, 19.7.
29:21Auto throttle
29:22has it connected.
29:23Auto throttle
29:24has disconnected.
29:24But instead of
29:26checking his
29:27attitude indicator
29:28and engine gauges.
29:30Let's see.
29:31Read that.
29:32The captain
29:33focuses on the
29:34crew alerting
29:35screen which is
29:36displaying more
29:37alerts.
29:39Rudder ratio
29:40and max speed
29:40trim.
29:41The rudder ratio
29:43and max speed
29:44trim warnings
29:45were just the result
29:46of the unreliable
29:47airspeed and altitude
29:48indications in the
29:49cockpit.
29:50They shouldn't have
29:51been the primary
29:51focus of the crew.
29:54They're getting
29:55distracted by false
29:56alerts.
29:57They ignore the
29:58pitching power
29:58procedure.
30:01We're flying
30:02without speed.
30:03Soon after.
30:04Speed is zero.
30:07All airspeed
30:08indicators at zero.
30:13Investigators hear
30:14the pilots turning
30:15their attention back
30:16to the erroneous
30:17airspeed and
30:18altitude readings.
30:20The tape on the
30:22static ports meant
30:24that the airspeed
30:24and altitude were
30:25always wrong and
30:27they were always
30:28changing as the
30:29airplane climbed
30:30and descended.
30:33We will maintain
30:3410,000 feet.
30:35Set it.
30:3610,000 feet.
30:37But at no point
30:39did they disregard
30:40the unreliable
30:41airspeed and altitude.
30:43They looked at
30:44them constantly.
30:4512,000 feet.
30:46The crew never
30:47switched their
30:48mindset to just
30:49using pitch and
30:50power.
30:53They climbed for
30:54several more
30:54minutes.
30:56But if they were
30:57climbing, how did
30:59the crew end up
30:59hitting the ocean?
31:01They can't keep
31:02climbing forever.
31:04We have problems
31:05reading our
31:06instruments.
31:07Investigators
31:08continue listening to
31:09the cockpit voice
31:09recorder of Aero
31:10Peru Flight 603
31:12to determine how the
31:14crew carried out the
31:15return to Lima with
31:16faulty instrument
31:17data.
31:18Set the approach,
31:19please.
31:19I did.
31:20I did.
31:21Then let's go.
31:24The captain, he
31:26knew he had to to
31:26get down to Lima
31:27Airport.
31:28I'll try to descend
31:29with the power cut.
31:31And the way to do
31:32that was to reduce
31:33the power.
31:36No sooner do the
31:37pilots cut the
31:38power than they face
31:40another problem.
31:41The speed is
31:42increasing.
31:44Why is the speed
31:44so high?
31:46I see the real
31:47speed.
31:47That's what worries
31:48me.
31:49I don't think so.
31:52They think they're
31:53speeding up.
31:54But they can only be
31:55slowing down.
32:01The pilots don't know
32:03whether to believe the
32:04faulty airspeed indicator
32:06that's showing they're
32:07going too fast after
32:09having pulled their
32:10thrust levers back to
32:11idle.
32:12That'd be totally
32:13confusing for the
32:14captain.
32:15He'd be saying this
32:16can't be happening.
32:17It's impossible.
32:18It violates the laws of
32:19physics of aircraft.
32:21But the captain's
32:23thought process is
32:24overtaken by what
32:25happens next.
32:27Overspeed.
32:30The faulty airspeed data
32:32is now triggering the
32:33overspeed warning.
32:35An overspeed warning
32:37gets your attention
32:38very quickly.
32:40And you want to
32:41react to it.
32:42But this is the time
32:44when he should have
32:45been questioning
32:45whether that was
32:46correct.
32:49The first officer
32:50makes a split-second
32:52decision.
32:53Take the speed
32:54brakes out.
32:57And now
33:00with the power cut
33:01and the speed
33:02brakes out
33:04slows the plane
33:05down to the point
33:06of stalling.
33:07The erroneous
33:08overspeed data
33:09leads the pilots
33:11to reduce their
33:12speed, which puts
33:13their plane into
33:14a stall.
33:26The crew
33:27instinctively lowered
33:28the nose and
33:29increased their
33:30actual airspeed.
33:31Those are the steps
33:32that will keep you
33:34from stalling the
33:35airplane.
33:37Responding to the
33:38stall warning was
33:39the right move.
33:41But after that,
33:45they head further
33:47out to sea instead
33:48of towards Lima.
33:50Why would they do
33:51that?
33:56shortly after the
33:57stall warning
33:58ends, a new
34:01warning tells them
34:02they are dangerously
34:03close to terrain.
34:05The captain doesn't
34:07realize how close
34:07they are to the
34:08water.
34:10On the 757,
34:12a radio altimeter
34:13measures the
34:14plane's altitude
34:14when below
34:152,500 feet
34:16and sounds the
34:18ground proximity
34:19warning when the
34:20plane drops too
34:20close to the
34:21terrain.
34:22The ground
34:23proximity warning
34:23system is separate
34:25from the
34:25pitostatic system.
34:27It was telling
34:27them the truth.
34:29Too low terrain.
34:31Too low terrain.
34:32And now we've
34:33induced a terrifying
34:35alert of I'm about
34:37to hit a mountain.
34:39The pilots thought
34:40they were near a
34:41mountain when they
34:42were actually
34:42approaching the
34:43surface of the
34:44ocean.
34:45Too low terrain.
34:48Let's go left.
34:58Radar shows you're
35:00turning left.
35:01You're heading to
35:01the west.
35:02Asservative, we're
35:04heading 250.
35:05We're heading out
35:06to sea because we
35:07have a low terrain
35:08warning.
35:09Too low terrain.
35:12He knew that
35:13the water, the
35:15ocean, is to the
35:16left, and that's
35:17going to be my
35:18safe environment.
35:19Tink rate.
35:21Tink rate.
35:23No sooner do
35:24they deal with the
35:24terrain warning than
35:26the pilots are
35:26confronted by an
35:27alert telling them
35:28they are descending
35:29too rapidly.
35:31Tink rate.
35:32Tink rate.
35:33Let's climb.
35:33Let's go up.
35:35Too low terrain.
35:40Now, going up was
35:41the right call.
35:42They were descending
35:42at 3,000 feet per
35:44minute.
35:44They climbed to
35:454,000 feet and
35:46they stayed there
35:46for approximately
35:49one minute.
35:56So what led to the
35:57final plunge into
35:58the sea?
36:00Let's go back to
36:01Lima.
36:01I'll try to intercept
36:02the ILS and then
36:03descend.
36:05After 25 harrowing
36:07minutes, the captain
36:08initiates a turn back
36:09to Lima.
36:10Lima, Aero Peru 603.
36:13We will try to
36:13intercept the ILS.
36:16Can you tell us
36:17our altitude?
36:18Is our altitude
36:199,700 feet?
36:21Roger.
36:22Aero Peru 603.
36:23You're showing level
36:24at 9,700.
36:27Too low terrain.
36:29But when the terrain
36:30warning activates,
36:31investigators know the
36:32plane was below 2,500
36:34feet.
36:36They both had the
36:37wrong altitude.
36:41Investigators discover
36:42the controller was also
36:44providing flight 603
36:46with incorrect altitude
36:47information.
36:49The assumption was the
36:51controllers can tell us
36:52our altitude, but the
36:53flaw in that is that
36:55that altitude is actually
36:56being sent to the
36:57controller from the
36:58aircraft itself.
36:59If the information
37:01on board the aircraft
37:01is incorrect, then the
37:03information that's being
37:04sent to the radar is also
37:06going to be incorrect.
37:09Investigators speak to
37:10the controller to
37:11understand why he relayed
37:13the faulty readings back
37:15to flight 603.
37:17So it looks like you were
37:18providing the crew with
37:19altitude data.
37:20Yes, they said they didn't
37:22have any altimeters, so I
37:24told them what I was
37:24seeing on my radar screen.
37:27Were you using SSR in
37:29mode C?
37:30Yes, that's right.
37:31Your radar's altitude is
37:32coming from the plane's
37:33transponder.
37:38When the controller
37:40confirmed the altitudes
37:41for the pilots, I think
37:43it gave them a false
37:44sense of hope that at least
37:45one of our problems has
37:47been solved, the altitude
37:48problem, when in fact
37:50that was tragically
37:51incorrect.
37:57But even with the
37:58faulty altitude readings,
38:00could the pilots still
38:01have landed their plane
38:03safely?
38:11Pick it up during their
38:12final descent.
38:13To determine if the
38:14pilots had any other
38:16options to save their
38:17plane, investigators
38:19listened to the final
38:20moments of Aero Peru
38:21flight 603.
38:24It seems to be flying
38:25well.
38:27Can you tell us our
38:28altitude?
38:29You're at 9,700 feet
38:31according to my radar.
38:32Too low, terrain.
38:34Too low, terrain.
38:359,700 feet, but we're
38:36getting a terrain warning.
38:38Too low, terrain.
38:40The crew can't understand
38:41the conflicting information.
38:43Too low, terrain.
38:44But there was a way for
38:46the pilots to determine
38:47their actual altitude and
38:49save the plane.
38:51If they checked the
38:52radio altimeter, they
38:53would have realized how
38:54close they are to
38:54crush them.
38:55Too low, terrain.
38:57Too low, terrain.
38:58When the ground
38:59proximity warning system
39:00activated in the cockpit,
39:02the crew could have
39:03referred to the radio
39:04altimeter, and that would
39:05have given them the truth
39:06data about how high they
39:08were above the ground.
39:10Too low, terrain.
39:12Too low, terrain.
39:12But they never check
39:14their radio altimeter.
39:15Pull up.
39:17Too low, terrain.
39:19Pull up.
39:20Pull up, pull up.
39:22We're just telling you to
39:22pull up.
39:23Terrain.
39:25Pull up, terrain.
39:27We're hitting the water.
39:28Up.
39:29Pull up, terrain.
39:30When an aircraft has its
39:32wing touch the water in a
39:34bank attitude, the situation
39:38is hopeless.
39:39Pull up.
39:40Pull up.
39:41Moraine, terrain.
39:43Pull up.
39:44Moraine.
39:45Moraine, terrain.
39:46Pull up.
39:47The pilots try to get the
39:49plane back in the air.
39:51Moraine, pull up.
39:53But the plane banks left
39:55and falls back towards the sea.
39:58We're running over!
40:00Moraine, terrain.
40:01Pull up.
40:03Moraine, terrain.
40:12They really had no idea how
40:13low they were.
40:14And all those alarms fall so
40:16real just made matters worse.
40:29The situation in the cockpit was
40:31so confusing.
40:35It was hard for either crew
40:36member to understand which
40:38cautions and warnings were true
40:40and important.
40:41And there didn't seem to be a
40:43good balance between the two
40:44crew members in sorting that
40:45out.
40:48For investigators, there's one
40:50final unanswered question.
40:53Were the pilots properly
40:55prepared to handle an emergency
40:56like this?
40:58They examined the quick
41:00reference handbook, which
41:01provides guidance in emergency
41:03situations, as well as Aero
41:05Peru's training procedures.
41:10Well, there's nothing here.
41:12Anything in the training
41:13procedures?
41:14Not one single word on how
41:16to handle erroneous air data.
41:20The lack of training worked
41:22against them.
41:26A big takeaway from this
41:28accident was that flight crews
41:29need to be better trained to get
41:31to pitch and power in the event
41:33of unreliable airspeed and
41:35altitude.
41:40Investigators needed only two
41:42months to solve the mystery of
41:44flight 603.
41:46They now know that blocked static
41:48ports created faulty air data
41:53readings.
41:56And those faulty readings created so
41:59much confusion in the cockpit.
42:01But I have the speed brakes out.
42:03Another power is cut.
42:05That can't be right.
42:06That the overwhelmed crew was
42:08unable to separate the false alarms
42:10from the true ones.
42:15They really needed to develop a
42:16laser focus on just flying the
42:18airplane.
42:19But they never got there.
42:22The captain's failure to react to
42:24the ground proximity warnings in
42:26time.
42:27He's telling you to pull up.
42:30We're hitting the water.
42:31Pull up.
42:31Pull up.
42:32Pull up.
42:34Contributed to the death of 70
42:51people.
42:53There's nothing highly technical
42:55about tape.
42:56But boy, did it start a chain of
42:58events.
43:02The investigation's report outlines a
43:05number of recommendations.
43:07But chief among them is for more
43:09training to ensure crews know how to
43:12deal with inaccurate air data.
43:15And implementing the use of eye-catching
43:18static port covers while a plane is
43:20being maintained.
43:22Remember, it's the simple things that
43:27cause problems.
43:28And we need to keep that in
43:30everybody's mind.
43:32Attention to detail.
43:33If you perform that detail, whatever it
43:36is, you're not going to get problems.
43:42This accident was one of the pillars of
43:47safety procedures.
43:51Our training changed.
43:53Our pre-flight procedures changed.
43:55Our attention to details changed.
43:58And it still lives to this day.
44:41You
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