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Air Crash Investigation - Season 26 - Episode 07: Divided in Crisis (Air Algérie 6289)
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00:00V-1, rotate.
00:03As Air Algerie Flight 6289 lifts off from Tamanrassit, Algeria,
00:09Gear up.
00:10Air traffic controllers hear an explosion.
00:21The plane crashes into the desert.
00:24102 people are killed.
00:28Investigators examine engine debris found on the runway.
00:32Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guideway.
00:35They know an engine failed, but not why the pilots couldn't recover.
00:40Pilots are expected to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine.
00:46The investigation reveals a crew that was struggling, not with the plane.
00:51Let go. Take your hand away.
00:52I let go. I let go.
00:54But with each other.
00:55Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
00:59Me, me, me, me.
01:20It's early afternoon in the middle of the Sahara desert in Algeria.
01:25The crew of Flight 6289 readies for its upcoming journey at the remote Tamanrasid-Aguenar airport.
01:39There are 97 passengers on board.
01:43Among them, members of the local football team headed to a tournament and military personnel.
01:51Though there are some European nationals, almost everyone on board is Algerian.
02:06Now the instrument transfer switches, normal.
02:12In the cockpit, pre-flight checks are underway.
02:17Your damper, on.
02:22Today's flight is operated by Air Algerie, a state-owned national carrier.
02:28Air Algerie is a publicly owned company that is owned by the country of Algeria.
02:33The country takes a lot of pride in this particular airline
02:38because it is the face name of the country as it goes all around the world.
02:486289 casting latest weather.
02:50Yes, the wind is calm, temperature 23, QNH 1020, QFE 965.
02:58Copy, we'll call you back for engine start.
03:0244-year-old Fatima Yousfi is the first officer of this flight.
03:07She is Algeria's first female commercial pilot.
03:12The female first officer was one of the first women to be hired in an airline in Algeria,
03:19which would be a big deal in such a male-dominated field, especially in that country.
03:25As the first woman to pilot a Boeing 747 trans-oceanic flight,
03:31Lynn Rippelmeyer knows what it's like to blaze a trail.
03:37Aviation was then and still is in some cases a boys club.
03:44Back in the beginning of when women were initially beginning in aviation here in the States,
03:50maybe it's like it was for her, that it was unusual.
04:00Tamaracet, 6289. We request clearance for Khardaya.
04:04Received. We will call you back.
04:10Hey, Bualam.
04:11Hey.
04:12We've got some Tamaracet football players back there.
04:15Oh. Tell them we're rooting for them this weekend.
04:1948-year-old Captain Bualam Benawicha has over 10,000 flying hours.
04:24A thousand of those hours are on the Boeing 737.
04:28The captain was highly experienced, had been flying for over 20 years,
04:32and then flown all kinds of aircraft from small aircraft to large jetliners.
04:386289, Tamaracet.
04:40Go.
04:41Start approved. Call back for taxi.
04:43Roger.
04:46At 3 p.m., the pilots get clearance to start up the engines.
04:52Okay, before start checklist. Fuel quantity.
04:569,800 kg.
04:59Pumps.
05:02On.
05:05Flight 6289 is a Boeing 737-200, an early generation of the popular twin-engine jetliner.
05:15The Boeing 737 is one of the most common types of commercial airliners in the world,
05:21and there are different variations of it.
05:24The Boeing 737-200 is an original version of the 737,
05:30so it's an older model, and it's not as highly sophisticated in technology as the current 737s.
05:42Flight 6289 will be departing from Tamaracet,
05:46with a scheduled stop in Gardaia, and then on to the capital, Algiers.
05:52The total flying time is approximately three hours.
06:01That is taxi, Air Algiersi 6289.
06:066289, Tamaracet. Taxi onto runway 02, and backtrack.
06:10Wind 030 at 10 knots.
06:14Roger.
06:15Taxing for runway 02, then backtracking 6289.
06:22As they taxi to the runway, passengers settle in for the journey.
06:39We are ready.
06:40We are ready.
06:416289.
06:446289, Tamaracet cleared for takeoff runway 02, wind 330 at 12 knots.
06:50Clear for takeoff on runway 02 at Agedi 6289.
06:53289
07:03you have 90 knots 100 knots
07:21the one rotate
07:29but seconds after takeoff
07:31gear up
07:35allowed explosion rocks the
07:37airplane
07:43so that's going on the pilots assess the
07:47situation let's go let go I let go I let
07:50go passengers sense something has gone
07:55wrong we have a small problem 60 to 89
08:05the 737 is approaching a stall
08:1560 to 89 are you in emergency
08:30the pilots make desperate attempts to
08:33recover the aircraft but their efforts are
08:37in vain the plane goes into a freefall the
08:43passengers brace themselves
08:54the plane bursts into flames and skids
08:57across the desert just outside Tamanrasset
09:00airport emergency response is immediately
09:05activated and firefighters rush to the scene
09:15the impact and fire that ensued afterwards made survival very unlikely for the passengers in the aircraft
09:24but then against all odds rescuers discover a survivor not within the
09:31wreckage but lying in the distant sand clinging to life a gentleman seated all
09:37the way in the back that didn't have a seat belt on so when the airplane crashed and
09:41broke apart he was thrown free he shows only faint signs of life as an
09:48ambulance rushes him to hospital in critical condition defying all
09:54expectations the man's condition soon stabilizes and he begins to recover
09:59this passengers luck cannot be overstated in what was Algeria's worst
10:04aviation accident at the time he is the sole survivor out of 103 passengers and crew while the country
10:15mourns the tragic loss of a football squad Algerian and French families grieve their
10:21loved ones and soon demand answers the investigation into the crash of flight
10:326289 is conducted by a commission of inquiry established by the Algerian
10:39Ministry of Transport they receive support from several international agencies
10:44including the NTSB America's National Transportation Safety Board I was the US
10:52accredited representative for this accident to assist the Algerians initially I
10:56wasn't going to travel to the scene however the US ambassador to Algeria requested
11:02our assistance while Algerian investigators await the arrival of their American colleagues they
11:10interview the Taman Rasset air traffic controller did the pilots indicate that there was an issue
11:21the first officer called only seconds after takeoff we have a small problem 60 to 89
11:30pilots typically are hesitant to call mayday mayday or announce some type of emergency particularly if
11:39they really don't know what the situation and the critical nature of the situation is
11:46and what was the problem they didn't say but I heard something that sounded like an explosion
11:54seconds later the plane was falling out of the sky you said an explosion that's what it sounded like
12:05like a bomb
12:10couldn't say
12:15so in 2003 Algeria was not the safest place there was bombings and terrorist activities because they were
12:21coming out of 11 years of civil war
12:26when the plane fell was it in one piece yes it was
12:32investigators found the airplane intact there are no claims of responsibility by terrorists
12:37so it pretty much ruled out that there was some type of nefarious means to bring the aircraft down
12:44can you describe how the plane fell it was nose up and crashed near the threshold of runway 20
12:57the controller and other witnesses saw that the airplane was struggling to climb had a nose-high pitch
13:04attitude and then impact the ground eyewitnesses recall that the plane struggled to gain enough lift to
13:13remain airborne an indication it was in a stall one week after the incident
13:20Algerian investigators are joined by a member of the NTSB
13:27air traffic controller and witnesses described seeing a stall and one witness remarked that the landing there was down
13:36if the landing gear is still down while the aircraft is trying to climb it creates a lot of drag
13:43on that airplane it takes a lot of thrust and a lot of power to maintain the climb to overcome
13:49all that drag from the landing gear
13:52that would affect a plane's ability to climb but that alone wouldn't cause a stall
13:57it has to be something else to the load sheets yes right here
14:04one of the big questions is about the aircraft weight because if you're too heavy you won't climb
14:09as well as if you're within the weight envelope investigators review the plane's load sheet
14:16to see if the plane was overweight before takeoff looks like the first officer made some corrections here
14:24while reviewing the load sheet the first officer notices the fuel weight is wrong
14:30and changes it from 8800 kilograms to the correct amount of 9800 kilograms
14:42so with those corrections the way to take off would have been
14:4748 708 kilograms and the maximum weight allowed at takeoff would be 49 500 kilograms
14:54the first officer noticed that there was a thousand kilo difference and uh passenger count was a little
15:01bit off which didn't make a whole lot of difference in the overall weight and balance but did show that
15:06she was very attentive in her duties the aircraft weight was right up against the maximum takeoff weight
15:13even though it was heavy the aircraft weight shouldn't have affected the performance too much
15:19what mechanical failure i'll get the maintenance reports
15:26investigators make sure that the maintenance is clean and the aircraft has a clean bill of health prior to
15:31the flight
15:36it was up to date in its maintenance cycle
15:38no work deferred no technical exemptions the maintenance reports provide no leads
15:46maybe there was an environmental factor at play
15:51take a look at this did the location of the airport have something to do with the stall
15:59temperatures 23 degrees celsius so it's hot
16:10and the airport sits at 4 518 feet above sea level at this altitude the air is already thin if
16:19you
16:19factor in the heat it's high density altitude that affects the performance of the airplane so it's
16:26generating much less lift over the wings so it takes longer to get the airplane airborne so just a few
16:33pounds below max takeoff weight high elevation airport high temperature landing gear extended
16:41that could definitely cause a plane to stall but that doesn't explain the explosion right what are we missing
16:56investigators study the crash site of flight 6289 for evidence that could explain the explosion heard seconds after takeoff
17:06so the first point of impact is here
17:145396 feet from the takeoff point skidded through the airport perimeter fence across the road and came to rest here
17:22less than 300 feet outside of the airport
17:34plane's destroyed by the fire the main wreckage is practically in one piece except for the rear section
17:41and look at this debris this was on the runway right about here
17:48engine debris
17:52on the runway we found a large quantity of engine debris which is indicative of an engine shelling
17:57when a large quantity of engine blades are thrown out the back end of an engine
18:04it's an old adage in accident investigation what fails first falls first
18:12so if they find debris prior to finding the wreckage then they know that happened prior to the accident
18:18so one of the engines blew out that must have been the explosion the controller hurt
18:24what caused the engine failure
18:29we needed to get our eyes on those engines to determine which failed and why it failed
18:34investigators begin a visual inspection of the plane's engines starting with the right one
18:41take a look at the fan blades
18:44heavy deformation it was definitely rotating at the time of impact
18:51on the right engine we showed that it was turning at impact we don't know what exactly what level of
18:56thrust it was rotating at
19:01if the right engine was operating on impact then did the left engine fail
19:10these turbine blades have far fewer deformations than the right engine looks like it was barely moving
19:17the hot section is completely torn apart
19:21in an engine's hot section fuel is ignited in a combustion chamber generating a powerful stream of
19:28hot air that spins the turbine blades
19:33the damage is evidence that the left engine failed
19:37we knew that the failure was in the hot section so we had to follow
19:41every lead that we could to determine where the failure occurred
19:51there's a bunch of blades missing from the hot section
19:55the missing pieces are most likely the debris that we found on the runway
19:59we found that the hot section was basically corn cobbed as we say there was
20:05not many blades left in the hot section and there was metal all over the place
20:10what caused the blades to break let's get some of these parts out on the table
20:16and we wanted to further tear down the engine we wanted to look at the failures under the microscope
20:21we're going to look at the metallurgical aspects of the failure we want to look to see if there was
20:26a bird strike
20:27investigators begin by examining components from the hot section
20:31in search of pre-existing defects
20:36manage to remove the sediment from the nozzle vein
20:44Nozzle guide vanes direct the hot air flow in the combustion chamber
20:49to the blades of the high-pressure turbine, causing them to spin.
20:59Interesting.
21:14Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guide vanes.
21:19Investigators find evidence of fatigue cracks in two of the left engine's nozzle guide vanes.
21:26This type of cracking occurs over time, and as the engine ages,
21:29these cracks get slightly larger, and eventually they will fail,
21:34and it will destroy the entire engine.
21:39If this was a progressive failure, why wasn't it caught earlier?
21:45This type of cracking is typical of an older engine, and it's a progressive failure.
21:49So that gets us into the question of what was the maintenance history,
21:52what was the inspection criteria that was used by the operator.
21:57Investigators look into the engine's repair history.
22:02It looks like the left engine was completely overhauled four years ago.
22:07When would have been the last time they looked at the nozzle guide vanes?
22:10During the hot section maintenance inspection, which was last year.
22:15Any mention of cracking?
22:17Any work done on any of them?
22:21Inspections of the hot section are meant to catch fatigue cracks.
22:25So why weren't these found?
22:28Since this was an Algerian-registered aircraft,
22:31it falls under the authority of the Algerian Civil Aviation Authority
22:35for oversight of the inspection,
22:37not the FAA, which typically has more stringent requirements.
22:42The crack formed at some point.
22:44It was missed during the inspection last year.
22:47It grew and grew until a point of failure,
22:49and then blew out at takeoff.
22:51That explains why the engine failed.
22:54Not why the plane stalled.
22:57Pilots are expected to demonstrate their ability
23:00to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing
23:05where they've lost an engine.
23:07Investigators examine the crew's training records
23:10to determine if they knew how to handle a single engine failure on takeoff.
23:17The first officer's last exercise in engine failure during takeoff
23:21was four months ago.
23:22The captain's training was even more recent,
23:24only two months before the crash.
23:26They both should have known what to do in this situation.
23:31They've got the airplane veering to the left.
23:35There's no way they didn't know that engine failed.
23:39So what did they actually do?
23:53It was very important for us to listen to the CVR
23:56to determine how the pilots dealt with this engine failure.
24:00Got it queued up to right before takeoff.
24:07V1, rotate.
24:19They hear the sound of the engine failing
24:22five seconds after takeoff.
24:25Bismillah.
24:26What's going on?
24:29Let go, let go.
24:30I let go, I let go.
24:35They transferred control in the middle of an emergency.
24:39That didn't even sound like a proper transfer.
24:41He just took the controls.
24:43For another pilot to take control
24:46from the pilot who is flying,
24:49the pilot needs to say, I've got it.
24:51Taking control of the airplane
24:53without saying he was taking control
24:55made things worse for him and for the first officer.
24:58The captain is the pilot monitoring.
25:00He shouldn't be taking over.
25:01He should be diagnosing the problem.
25:04So, do either of them identify a left engine failure?
25:10After handing over control to the captain,
25:12the first officer realizes they aren't properly configured
25:16to climb with only one engine.
25:20Get up or are we okay?
25:22But there's no response from the captain.
25:26We have a small problem, 62-89.
25:2962-89.
25:34Just seconds after the engine failure,
25:36the situation deteriorates
25:38as the plane begins to stall.
25:45There are no attempts by the pilots
25:47to work together to identify
25:49or troubleshoot the problem.
25:52Let go, take your hand away.
25:53I let go, I let go.
25:54Let go, take your hand away.
25:59Seconds later,
26:00the ground proximity warning activates,
26:02indicating the plane
26:03is getting dangerously close to the ground.
26:08Please, take your hand away.
26:11Both pilots really didn't know
26:13what the other was doing,
26:14didn't know what the other expected of them,
26:16and may well have been working at cross purposes.
26:19And as a result of that,
26:21the team performance broke down.
26:25Don't sink.
26:27Don't sink.
26:32I don't hear a single mention of engine failure.
26:35And why was he telling her
26:36to let go so many times?
26:37Was she trying to take back control of the plane?
26:40Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
26:43When all is said and done,
26:45the pilots did not work together.
26:47Without more information
26:48from the flight data recorder,
26:49we really don't know exactly
26:51what they did to control the airplane.
26:54Investigators turned to the flight data recorder,
26:57or FDR, from flight 6289,
27:00to determine how the pilots tried to recover
27:02from the loss of the left engine.
27:05Flight data recorders are important to investigators
27:08because it gives them information
27:10on how the pilots were operating the airplane
27:13and how they were managing
27:15the critical situation they were in.
27:19Not much here.
27:21Older plane, older FDR.
27:25And it doesn't actually tell us
27:26how the pilots were handling the engine failure.
27:30Because we only had five parameters on the FDR,
27:33we had to go to Boeing
27:34and ask for a detailed aircraft performance analysis
27:37to determine what happened on this accident flight.
27:43Using the FDR's limited data,
27:46Boeing's performance study
27:48includes a reconstruction of engine operations
27:51and flight controls
27:52in the final moments of the flight.
27:56So, there is the left engine
27:58losing its thrust after it blows out.
28:02That's odd.
28:03The data from the fully functioning right engine
28:07shows something unexpected.
28:09Look at the thrust from the right engine.
28:12Yes, it seems to be going up and down.
28:15But we know it was working fine.
28:17That can only mean one thing.
28:23Bismillah. What's going on?
28:26The team finds evidence of thrust
28:28being added to the right engine.
28:31Let's go, let's go.
28:32And then pulled back.
28:34I let go, I let go.
28:37When one engine fails,
28:39what you need is maximum power
28:41on the other engine,
28:43not reduce it.
28:45So, thrust is pulled down,
28:47then back up,
28:49then down,
28:50then back up again.
28:53We have a small problem, 62-89.
28:5562-89, come at our set.
29:02Let go.
29:06It's as if they were having
29:08some sort of a tug of war.
29:10It shouldn't have been.
29:12First officer did the right thing
29:14by increasing the power
29:15to the right engine.
29:17What likely happened
29:18is that the captain
29:19wasn't fully aware
29:20of which engine had failed.
29:22However, the first officer
29:23knew that the left engine had failed
29:26and was trying to push up
29:27the throttle on the right engine
29:28to keep them from stalling.
29:34Let go, take your hand away.
29:35I let go, I let go.
29:36Let go, take your hand away.
29:38Let's go, I let go.
29:40Don't think.
29:41Don't think.
29:44The captain's basically telling
29:45the first officer
29:46to get out of his way,
29:48to leave him alone,
29:49to let him
29:51be in charge of the airplane
29:53by himself,
29:54which he was.
29:56Knowing that the left engine
29:57had failed,
29:57the first officer
29:58might have been trying
29:59to help things out
30:00by increasing the power
30:01on the right engine.
30:03Please!
30:04Take your hand away!
30:11The moment the captain
30:12reduced the thrust
30:13on the right engine
30:14and never returned it
30:15to takeoff thrust,
30:17with the gear down,
30:18it doomed the flight.
30:21The pilots should have been able
30:23to work together
30:23to recover the plane.
30:25These planes are designed
30:27to fly with a team.
30:29Pilot flying,
30:30pilot not flying,
30:31both have very specific roles
30:33that they are trained
30:34to do,
30:36but especially in emergencies.
30:39They stay in their roles,
30:40they help each other,
30:41they work as a team,
30:42and this crash
30:44could have been avoided
30:45if they would have done that.
30:48Why didn't the crew
30:49of Air Algerie
30:51Flight 6289
30:52work together
30:53to prevent the loss
30:55of 102 lives?
30:59Okay,
31:00I'll queue it up
31:01to the pre-flight preparations.
31:05Investigators returned
31:06to the cockpit voice recording
31:08of Flight 6289
31:10to understand
31:11why there was a lack
31:12of coordination
31:13between the two pilots.
31:16Now that instrument
31:17starts for switches,
31:19normal.
31:21Yard damper,
31:23on.
31:26They listen
31:27as the first officer
31:28works through
31:29the pre-flight checklist.
31:30They're surprised
31:32by what they don't hear.
31:35Where's the captain?
31:37Is she doing
31:38the flight preparation
31:39by herself?
31:42Mysterization mode selector,
31:44auto.
31:45Okay,
31:46flight instrument.
31:48We found
31:49that the first officer
31:50was actually
31:51in the cockpit
31:52by herself,
31:53conducting most
31:53of the pre-flight work
31:55without the captain.
31:59It's unusual
32:01for the captain
32:02not to be present
32:03during the pre-flight
32:04because there are
32:04responsibilities
32:05that the captain has
32:06to get his side
32:08of the airplane ready.
32:09It's just inappropriate
32:11for the captain
32:12not to be
32:13in the cockpit
32:14during the pre-flight
32:15and it's actually
32:16kind of rude.
32:18It's only after
32:19the first officer
32:20completes the pre-flight
32:22preparations
32:22that the captain
32:24enters the cockpit.
32:25The last Q&H,
32:261019.
32:281019, Roger.
32:30Good afternoon, Captain.
32:31How are we looking?
32:33Good.
32:34I completed
32:35the pre-flight checklist.
32:36I tested your oxygen
32:37and everything
32:39is set to go.
32:40Good, good.
32:43Captain Benwisha
32:44is late,
32:45leaving his responsibilities
32:47to the first officer.
32:48When the captain
32:49showed up,
32:50he was not
32:51in the mindset
32:51of getting
32:53brought up to speed
32:54or being part
32:54of the team
32:55of setting the cockpit
32:56up for the flight.
33:01Heading.
33:02Zero, two, zero.
33:04Altitude.
33:06Investigators
33:07then hear the pilots
33:08performing their
33:09before-start checklist.
33:11Two, eight, zero.
33:13You know,
33:13I could have been
33:14on the team
33:15with those boys
33:16back there.
33:16Give me a break.
33:18Who's the third voice?
33:20Flight attendant.
33:23The only male
33:24flight attendant
33:24is the chief
33:25flight attendant.
33:28Okay, takeoff speeds.
33:31As part of the checklist,
33:33the first officer
33:33reviews the takeoff speeds.
33:38V1, 144 knots.
33:41VR, 146 knots.
33:43You're saying
33:43you were good enough
33:44to turn pro?
33:46Yeah.
33:46Yeah, I was a good
33:47footy blair.
33:49You wanted a scout
33:50come and watch me blair.
33:50Yeah, they were
33:51scouting you
33:51to mow the pitch.
33:56V2, 150 knots.
33:57Okay, that's enough.
33:58I understand.
33:59Can we go?
34:01I got it, I got it.
34:02Let's go.
34:08So the captain
34:09is just carrying on
34:09a conversation
34:10with his friend
34:10while they're doing
34:11their before-start checklist.
34:12What is even worse
34:14is he cuts her off
34:14before they could
34:15even finish it.
34:18One of the most
34:19important parts
34:20of the information
34:21that she was trying
34:22to give
34:23were the takeoff speeds
34:24and then there
34:26should have been
34:26a briefing
34:28of an engine failure
34:29departure
34:31at this airport
34:32that was a special
34:34departure
34:34that needed
34:34to be briefed.
34:35It was ignored.
34:39Did the captain
34:40become more focused
34:42once they began
34:43to taxi?
34:44Roger.
34:45Taxi for runway
34:46at zero two.
34:48What investigators
34:49find most shocking
34:50is what they hear next.
34:57Where are we eating tonight?
34:59That place
34:59across from the hotel.
35:01Oh, you always go back
35:03to the same place.
35:04I like what I like.
35:05We are now cheers.
35:07Plenty of good spots
35:09to eat.
35:10They are completely
35:11distracted.
35:12They're violating
35:13every sterile cockpit rule.
35:16During critical phases
35:18of flight
35:18extraneous conversations
35:19and non-essential
35:20conversations
35:21between the crew members
35:22are prohibited.
35:23Not only is the captain
35:24dismissing the first officer
35:26he has this
35:27casual attitude
35:28about basic
35:29safety practices.
35:31It's possible
35:32he was more interested
35:33in talking
35:33to the flight attendant
35:35than reviewing
35:36the briefing
35:36with the first officer.
35:38It's possible
35:39that he had been
35:40through so many
35:40pre-flight
35:42take-off briefings
35:42that at that time
35:43he felt
35:44it was unnecessary.
35:56As a result
35:58of his
35:58dismissive attitude
35:59the captain
36:00is unprepared
36:01to properly respond
36:03when the crisis
36:03occurs shortly
36:04after take-off.
36:09Had the pilots
36:11completed
36:11their pre-flight
36:12safety briefing
36:13their response
36:14to the engine failure
36:15might have been
36:16very different.
36:24Gear up.
36:28Engine failure
36:29left engine
36:30fly V2 plus 25.
36:33Lowering the nose
36:34to 12 degrees.
36:35V2
36:37gear up.
36:39Once the plane
36:40was stabilized
36:41the pilots
36:42could have returned
36:43safely to the airport.
36:45Engine failure
36:46is actually
36:46a relatively common occurrence.
36:49Every pilot
36:49needs to be prepared
36:50and trained.
36:52So instead of letting
36:53the first officer
36:54fly the plane
36:55while he diagnoses
36:56the issue
36:56he tries to do
36:57everything himself.
36:58And transferring control
36:59during an emergency situation.
37:02There was never
37:03a positive transfer
37:05of control.
37:05The captain
37:06just took
37:07the control yoke
37:08away from
37:09the first officer
37:11so he injected
37:13himself in the emergency.
37:18Let go, let go.
37:20I let go, I let go.
37:22The captain
37:23took control
37:24at the worst possible time
37:26when he was out
37:27of the loop
37:27and by not assigning
37:29responsibility to her
37:30he gave himself
37:31the responsibility
37:32of doing two things
37:33at once
37:33diagnosing
37:34the nature
37:35of the engine problem
37:36and then flying
37:37in the airplane.
37:39Please!
37:40By trying to fly
37:42the plane
37:43and diagnose
37:44the problem
37:44on his own
37:45the captain
37:46took on too much.
37:49It put the first officer
37:50in a very difficult position.
37:53She's now
37:54in the supportive role
37:56the non-flying role
37:57waiting to be told
37:58what to do
37:59and he's not giving
38:01any helpful orders
38:03other than let go.
38:07Why would an experienced
38:09captain
38:09so brazenly
38:11dismiss his first officer's help
38:13risking the lives
38:14of everyone on board?
38:21Investigators look
38:22into the pilot's backgrounds
38:23in an attempt
38:24to understand
38:25why the captain
38:26took over
38:27from his first officer
38:28in the midst
38:29of an emergency.
38:30So the captain
38:32actually had twice
38:33as many flying hours
38:34as the first officer.
38:36The captain
38:37was both qualified
38:38as a captain
38:39on a 737
38:40but also
38:40as a first officer
38:41on a 767.
38:43Perhaps his attitude
38:45was that
38:46flying the 737
38:47was not that big
38:48of a deal
38:49because I fly
38:50a 767
38:51which is much more
38:52sophisticated
38:53and highly technical.
38:55But she
38:56had more hours
38:57on the 737.
38:58Not only did she
38:59have more experience
39:00flying the 737
39:01that's the only plane
39:02that she was flying.
39:05I think there's
39:05a good chance
39:06that had she been
39:07left alone
39:08she would have flown
39:09the airplane
39:10out of the scenario
39:11that we saw
39:12in this accident.
39:13The question is
39:14would he have reacted
39:16the same way
39:16if the first officer
39:17was a man?
39:20In 2003
39:21at the time
39:22of this crash
39:24here in the States
39:25female airline pilots
39:26only constituted
39:27less than 6%
39:28of the pilot population.
39:30and it really
39:31hasn't changed
39:31that much
39:32in the 20 years
39:34since then.
39:35The first officer
39:37was Algeria's
39:38first female
39:39commercial airline pilot.
39:41My friend
39:42male pilots
39:44in this part
39:44of the world
39:46aren't used
39:47to sharing
39:48a cockpit
39:48with women.
39:50I think Algeria
39:52is becoming
39:52fairly westernized
39:53but in some cultures
39:55there is the feeling
39:56that a man
39:56has to be up
39:57in the cockpit
39:57in case anything
39:58goes wrong.
40:00Why did this captain
40:02take control
40:02from the first officer
40:03when she was doing
40:04an okay job
40:05at that point?
40:06And I think
40:07you can't rule out
40:08the possibility
40:09that there may have been
40:10some gender stereotyping
40:12on his part
40:13that played a role
40:14in it.
40:16Sadly this accident
40:17was totally preventable.
40:24investigators now
40:25have a clear picture
40:26of what led
40:28to the crash
40:28of flight 6289.
40:32V1
40:32144 knots
40:35VR
40:36146 knots
40:37You're saying
40:38you were good enough
40:39to turn pro?
40:39After arriving late
40:41and allowing
40:42the flight attendant
40:43into the cockpit
40:43the captain
40:44interrupted
40:45a crucial
40:46pre-flight
40:47safety briefing.
40:49V2
40:50150 knots
40:51Okay
40:51that's enough
40:52I understand
40:53Can we go?
40:55I got it
40:56I got it
40:56let's go
40:56The captain
40:58demonstrated
40:59a lax attitude
41:00towards cockpit
41:01protocols
41:04Fatigue cracks
41:05in a nozzle
41:06guide vane
41:06in the plane's
41:07left engine
41:08were reaching
41:09their braking point
41:10and when the
41:11guide vane
41:12failed
41:13it set off
41:14a chain reaction
41:15High speed
41:17metal fragments
41:18ripped the engine
41:19apart
41:20Let's go
41:21let's go
41:22I let go
41:22I let go
41:23When crisis
41:24struck
41:25the captain
41:26decided he
41:27needed to be
41:27the one
41:28to handle
41:28the controls
41:29and took over
41:30flying from
41:31his first officer
41:32before even
41:33identifying the
41:34problem
41:35The engine
41:36failure alone
41:37was not the
41:38cause of this
41:38accident
41:39engines fail
41:40and pilots
41:41are trained
41:42to handle
41:43those emergencies
41:46Failing to
41:47retract the
41:47landing gear
41:48after the engine
41:49failure
41:49made recovery
41:51more difficult
41:51Let go
41:53take your hand
41:53away
41:53I let go
41:54I let go
41:55let go
41:55take your hand
41:56away
41:56I let go
42:05It was the captain's
42:06assumption of
42:07patrol of the
42:08aircraft without
42:09properly identifying
42:10the nature of the
42:11emergency
42:11his failure to
42:13raise the landing
42:14gear and his
42:15lack of adherence
42:16to standard
42:17operating procedures
42:18that eventually
42:20doomed the flight
42:23As a result of
42:25this accident
42:25Algeria's
42:26commission of
42:27inquiry makes
42:28several
42:29recommendations
42:31They recommend
42:32that Air
42:33Algerie along
42:34with other
42:34operators ensure
42:36that their
42:36crew resource
42:37management training
42:38programs emphasize
42:39the importance of
42:40handover procedures
42:42and task sharing
42:43in the cockpit
42:45But in the 1980s
42:47they had captains
42:48who were trying
42:49to fly a team
42:50airplane
42:50solo
42:52So a lot of
42:54training went
42:54into it to teach
42:55that your best
42:57resource is
42:58your team
42:58You support each
42:59other and work
43:00together as a
43:02team for the
43:03safety of the
43:03airplane
43:05The fact that
43:06the captain
43:06insisted on
43:07taking over
43:07control of the
43:08airplane at that
43:09critical moment
43:12cost everybody on
43:13that airplane
43:13their lives
43:17I felt
43:18particularly
43:18affected when
43:20I saw that
43:21the accident
43:22was preventable
43:22And I think
43:24the investigators
43:24did the best
43:25job they could
43:26trying to discover
43:27why the crew
43:27made the errors
43:28that they did
43:29The next time
43:30that happens
43:30people won't
43:31die as a result
43:31of that
43:34For Lynn
43:34Ripplemeyer
43:35it's one more
43:36example of why
43:38the industry
43:38needs to continue
43:39evolving
43:41The airlines
43:42now are much
43:44more open
43:44to hiring
43:46women
43:46to not having
43:47gender bias
43:49realizing that
43:50women do have
43:51a lot to
43:51contribute
43:52to the industry
43:55And I think
43:56it's up to
43:56women now
43:56to step up
43:57to the plate
43:58and take the
43:59opportunities
43:59that the career
44:00offers
44:01They're amazing
44:02They're amazing
44:02They're amazing
44:03They're amazing
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