00:00I sat down with the EU's special representative to the Sahel, Shuao Cravinho, and I started by
00:05asking him what the most recent uptick in violence in Mali could mean for the EU's strategy towards
00:12the region. Well, firstly, it means very clearly that the situation is extremely unstable. It is
00:18a situation of very precarious stability, meaning that what happened on the weekend
00:26can happen again. So this is really a terrible situation above all for the Malian population.
00:33What it means is very simply that it has become clear that there is no military solution to the
00:41situation in the Sahel as a whole, including Burkina Faso and Niger. This comes following years of
00:48instability, including successive military coups in many countries in the central Sahel. We also know
00:55that the EU has lost real clout and influence in the region. Do you see the possibility now to
01:03claw back some of this influence? And is it possible to do that while Moscow, but also Beijing, Tehran,
01:09has such a visible presence? Well, firstly, I think it is absolutely correct and normal
01:15for us to acknowledge that we have no monopoly in the region. This is a region that must be respected
01:22for what it is. And it is perfectly legitimate for other countries to have partnerships with other parts
01:30of the world. However, having said that, I don't think any other part of the world has the same level
01:36of direct
01:37interest as Europe does. What is clear is that over the past few years, we have had a series of
01:46monologues
01:46between us rather than a dialogue. We have not been, and it's a mea culpa here, we have not been
01:53capable
01:53of listening and understanding properly as we should. We have not really been capable also of explaining
01:59what our interests are in the region. And by the same measure, I think there has been a failure in
02:07terms
02:07of dialogue on the other side. So the idea of deepening and making a lot and improving our dialogue
02:15is fundamental. That's a starting point. And we're on the road. We've been doing that over the last
02:20year, year and a half. And I think there's quite a lot of recognition. Our relations with those regimes
02:27now have bridges which did not exist some time ago. Would you say that the incidents in Mali could have
02:35undermined maybe the reputation or the image of Russia as a security partner? And could that lead
02:42to maybe efforts to diversify security ties from Mali? Well, firstly, I think, of course, the Malians
02:49are going to have to do some reassessments. It's theirs to do. And I can't tell them what to do.
02:56But I
02:57think that it's obvious due to the tremendous security failures of the past week that they need
03:04to do some reassessment. Secondly, it's very clear that there is no solution through military means
03:11alone. The Russians only offer military support. They offer nothing else. Do you fear that the Sahel
03:16is being neglected? And what could be the cost of that for Europe? Well, I think it is very evident
03:23that
03:24there is limited bandwidth from our political deciders. I have had an interesting experience as a
03:30special representative of the European Union. I've been visiting most European capitals and speaking
03:36with the ministers. All the ministers tell me the Sahel is geopolitically strategic. And yet,
03:43they don't have time. They don't have time because of everything else that is happening.
03:47And the cost of that for Europe? The cost of that is that the situation is getting worse. But what
03:54I do
03:55believe is that we are developing the instruments to be able to take advantage of opportunities when
04:01they arise. And I think the opportunities will arise when it becomes evident that Europe is still
04:07the best possible partner for those countries.
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