00:02The fall of the 19th of November of the present year determined, in first place, that all
00:10what was land until the Meridian 82 was the sovereignty of Colombia.
00:16This means that he took the Tratado Esguerra-Bárcenas and in 2007 he excluded San Andrés-Providencia-Santa Catalina,
00:26but left the other islands, islands and cayos that were not specified in the Tratado Esguerra-Bárcenas.
00:31In this sense, he precised that the Cayos of Albuquerque and the East-Sudeste were of the sovereignty of Colombia.
00:38Asimismo, the Quitasueño, Serrana, Roncador and Serranilla, Bajo Nuevo, also were of the sovereignty of Colombia.
00:47That is the first point that determines the sentence.
00:51After that, the sentence decided to trace the maritime frontera between Nicaragua and Colombia,
01:00which also had been told in 2007 that it was not been traced, that Esguerra-Bárcenas was not
01:06a Tratado of Delimitation Maritime and in that sense, he had to do it in the present fall.
01:13For this reason, he determined, as you can see here in the map, how should be traced the border,
01:19starting from the east of the Meridian 82, in the point 1, and ending from the west of the Meridian
01:2682, in the point 5.
01:29In this solution, the Corte comes with a process of taking a equidistance between the islands,
01:39which is pertinent between the territory nicaragüense and the territory colombian.
01:46Of course, this equidistance, with posteriority, for reasons of equidad and for that there is no disproportionate in the space,
01:55he had to adjust it and move it.
01:58That was what he did.
02:00In this sense, the next step was to determine what the coasts were pertinent to Nicaragua,
02:07which was 531 km, and what the coasts were pertinent to the islands, that is, 65 km.
02:17In this point, the Corte identifies a disproportionate of 1 to 8 in favor of Nicaragua,
02:25the reason for which, for having a equidad, a equitat, decide trazar these two parallels
02:36in aras of Nicaragua to Nicaragua to the 200 miles náuticas,
02:42a line that is not limited in the time that Nicaragua has been able to trace its lineas of base.
02:50Asimismo, he determined that Quitasueño and Serrano are some claves
02:58because, in this point, we are not in agreement with the Corte,
03:02in the medida in which he had to take a single line between Albuquerque and Quitasueño
03:08to our way of view.
03:10However, the argument of the Corte is that Quitasueño is a quantity of elevations
03:15of low-mar, and the majority are below the level of the mar,
03:21in the way practically continuous.
03:24The only part that emerge from the mar is of 1 m2,
03:28and is the one that the Corte called QS32.
03:33This means that it is very difficult to ejerce soberanía
03:38in the sense that the soberanía that can be exercised on an island
03:42on Quitasueño.
03:46It is important, then, to see how here the Corte determined
03:51that they could be able to exercise soberanía, that they could be susceptible
03:55of a property, and that they could be offered to Colombia.
03:59The complex thing is to have left those two enclaves
04:04separated from the rest of the Colombian waters.
04:11This is a decision that is inapelable, and in that sense, we have to look at
04:17how to administrate Quitasueño and Serrana,
04:20as it has been left as enclaves.
04:22It means that these waters,
04:24by being beyond the two semillas náuticas of the mar territorial,
04:29nicaragüenses are an exclusive zone in which there is freedom of navigation.
04:34Nicaragua, in those waters, no ejerce a plent soberanía,
04:37as it is the only one that can do with those waters is its exploitation económica.
04:45In relation to the enclaves, we see that,
04:48by being separated from Colombia,
04:50we have to pass by waters that the Corte determined that were nicaragüenses.
04:54No should be paid any kind of impuesto
04:58in the medida in which it is a exclusive zone,
05:01and this means that there is a freedom of navigation
05:04of any type of boats,
05:06to reach both to Quitasueño and Serrana,
05:11and to navigate in any point of those waters.
05:15The same in relation to the Colombian waters,
05:18in the medida in which it is about international waters.
05:21In relation to the sobrevueling of naves,
05:25there is, there, as it was reported in the days later
05:29to the court decision, the director of the Uronautica Civil,
05:35there is a payment that should be made,
05:38but today that is a payment that is made
05:40to the people who are really administrating the boats in the Caribbean,
05:45and that administration came from the airport of Panamá.
05:50It is to say that it was not a money that would cobrate Colombia
05:54in relation to that administration of vuelos,
05:56and that it would not be done, at least in the next future, Nicaragua.
06:04Colombia no puede desconocer el fallo
06:06because we are part of the United Nations.
06:10The Court International of Justicia is a main entity of this organization
06:17and in that sense, we have subscribed to all the convenios and all the tratados,
06:22including the Carta of the United Nations,
06:24that we obligate to comply with the fallo.
06:26Asimismo, the Carta establece that in case of not to comply with the fallo,
06:32the estado perjudicado can come to the Consejo of Seguridad.
06:36In this point, it is important to make a clarifying
06:40that as the case was carried out to the Corte International of Justicia
06:45in virtue of the Pacto of Bogotá,
06:47the Pacto of Bogotá would be applied to the Pacto of Bogotá
06:50before the Carta of San Francisco or the Carta of Naciones Unidas
06:54and the Pacto of Bogotá establishes in the Art. 50
06:57that before they come to the Consejo of Seguridad,
07:00they must come to a meeting of the Consejo of Ministers of Exteriores of the OEA.
07:07It is simply a procedure and they must comply first with this requirement
07:13to comply with the decision and then,
07:18if it is possible to come to the Consejo of Seguridad.
07:20This is still happening in the case of the Corte's decision,
07:26even though the Pacto of Bogotá has been denounced.
07:30The Pacto of Bogotá also includes two things.
07:33If it comes to the case of the Consejo of Seguridad,
07:36the Consejo of Seguridad, in virtue of the chapter 7 of the Carta,
07:41can take the measures of force that he considers pertinent to comply with the fallo.
07:47This can also include sanctions economic and even of force.
08:01In this moment, what is happening in relation to the foreign interest in foreign interest?
08:07The foreign interest is looking at if they agree,
08:10whether they do not agree with the international decision,
08:11internacionales y esto podría afectar gravemente la llegada de nueva inversión
08:17extranjera al país en la medida en que se está desacatando o se está
08:20incumpliendo un fallo de un tribunal internacional
08:27jurídicamente no hay forma de recuperar algo de lo perdido ya es un tribunal que
08:34es una decisión de la corte que tiene un carácter de inapelable por ser ya la
08:40that is the last instance that there is in this jurisdiction.
08:47There were other mechanisms, as mentioned in the Pacto Bogotá,
08:51that is the diplomatic negotiations, there was the investigation,
08:55there was also the option of arbitrage,
08:57and it was decided by the International Court of Justice.
09:02What can happen now,
09:05in the sense that, juridically, there is no way to recover those maritime spaces.
09:10What can happen is, in a diplomatic negotiations with Nicaragua,
09:16that the pescadores artesanals have the option of fishing
09:23without the establishment of a quota or the solicitation of a permit
09:27to the authorities,
09:29in the sense that they have historical rights
09:34that they are inalienable and that Nicaragua should be respected?
09:41What is the option of a political conflict with Nicaragua?
09:45This is the option of a political conflict with Nicaragua.
09:46To my view, this is the worst option
09:48to which we cannot reach,
09:50in the sense that there is a judicial decision
09:53taken by a tribunal,
09:54to which we give us competition
09:56to deriving the conflict with Nicaragua.
09:59We accept that competition
10:01and, in that sense,
10:03we have to comply with that decision.
10:04Acudir to the use of the force
10:07would not lead to,
10:08at the end of that conflict,
10:11to be able to recover
10:13something that the court determined
10:17was that Nicaragua was Nicaragua.
10:18In that sense,
10:20it is very difficult
10:21to have a positive result
10:25at the end of a political conflict
10:28and, in that sense,
10:30it does not have any sense
10:31to be able to use the force.
10:37In relation to the location
10:39of the Colombian Fragatas
10:41in the zones that were
10:42offered to Nicaragua
10:43as an exclusive zone,
10:46these Fragatas
10:47can continue navigating
10:49and, in that sense,
10:51in that sense,
10:55there is a freedom
10:57of navigation
10:58of navigation.
10:59What they can do
11:00in any case,
11:01is,
11:02to do
11:03to do
11:03to do
11:03to do
11:04to do
11:04to do
11:05to do
11:05to do
11:05to do
11:07without any sort
11:08of activity
11:09military
11:10activity
11:11in that zone.
11:16What is the most important
11:19to do
11:19to do
11:19to do
11:20to do
11:21to do
11:21to do
11:23to do
11:25to do
11:25to do
11:25to do
11:25to do
11:26to do
11:29to do
11:36with
11:37and they can continue to do these activities without having a quota or an authorization
11:44for this economic exploitation,
11:46in the way that these are historical rights have been developed in that area the artesanales pescadores.
11:56I think the most complex situation in this moment is the of the artesanales pescadores.
12:03In this sense, they have some rights of pescadores that are inherent to their culture, to their tradition,
12:12and in this sense, what they should be looking for is a series of acuerdos
12:17for that the nicaragüense government continue to respect these rights
12:21that have the islands under a perspective of pescadores.
12:31Here, in relation to the Pacto of Bogotá, there are situations.
12:35On the one hand, it is true that there is a manifestation of inconformity
12:43in relation to the competencies of the court.
12:45However, you have to take into account that this is only the art. 31
12:49that offers that competencies in the Pacto of Bogotá.
12:52Is it a valid mechanism?
12:54Yes, although I personally don't agree with the retiro,
12:58but the same Tratado establishes that it can be denounced,
13:03that it is, that the estados can retire.
13:05However, we must take into account that this retiro
13:08is only effective after a year of having presented the denuncia.
13:13That is, that during a year,
13:15the court continues to be competent to know
13:18any case that is presented against Colombia.
13:21After that year, what will happen is that
13:26nobody will be able to demand in virtue of the Pacto of Bogotá,
13:29but in the same way, or in the same way,
13:32we will not be able to demand anyone.
13:34And that is to close a series of puertas
13:38in relation to regional relations
13:41that can sometimes become very complex,
13:45and in that sense,
13:46acudir to a mechanism of solution pacific,
13:48of controversies,
13:48like the International Court of Justice,
13:50could be important.
13:53On the other hand,
13:55we also have that
13:59all the relative
14:00to the decision of the 19th of November,
14:04it will continue to effect in virtue of the Pacto of Bogotá,
14:08as long as there is no retroactivity of the Tratado.
14:12Only the effect of the Retiro of the Pacto of Bogotá
14:16will be effective, as already mentioned,
14:18in a year and in the future.
14:20All that will happen
14:21until the day
14:23of the release of the Pacto of Bogotá
14:26will continue to be
14:28cobijated by the Pacto of Bogotá.
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