A statement published in the Atlanta Constitution by former prosecutor Frank Arthur Hooper revisited a procedural matter from the 1913 trial of Leo Frank, an issue that later became a point of contention during post-trial proceedings in 1914. His remarks addressed what had been understood at the time regarding Frank’s absence when the verdict was delivered on August 25, 1913, and whether a valid personal waiver had been secured.
Hooper Addresses the Question of Waiver
Hooper stated that during the trial, he raised a concern with Judge Roan about the necessity of the defendant personally waiving his right to be present, rather than relying solely on the consent of counsel. He emphasized that this concern was expressed during the course of the proceedings and not introduced afterward.
He recalled that Judge Roan acknowledged the issue and indicated that the requirement was understood, further stating that Frank’s personal waiver had either already been obtained or would be obtained. Based on this exchange, Hooper believed that the matter had been properly handled.
He later expressed surprise when the defense asserted in a post-trial motion that no such personal waiver had been secured. In his view, this claim conflicted with the understanding formed during the trial, when both the court and the prosecution were mindful of ensuring that the record reflected proper procedure.
Reference
Hooper, F. A. 1914, April 18. Statement regarding procedural issue in trial proceedings. Excerpt from The Atlanta Constitution.
Appendix: Excerpt from article of April 18, 1914
Attorney Frank Hooper, who was associated with the prosecution during the trial, made the following statement to a reporter for The Constitution:
“My connection with the Frank case ended when it was decided by the Supreme Court. However, regarding the matter of the defendant’s absence when the verdict was received, I can say that during a conference with Judge Roan at the time of the trial, I expressed my view that it would be best for the defendant himself to personally waive his presence, as I was not certain that consent from counsel alone would be sufficient. The judge indicated that he understood this and stated that the defendant’s personal waiver had been or would be obtained. I assumed that it had been obtained, and I was surprised to see this denied in the extraordinary motion filed yesterday. Both the solicitor and I were attempting to safeguard this point, which is why I raised the matter with the judge.”
Discover the untold details of the Leo Frank case in Mary Phagan-Kean's 2025 second revised edition of "The Murder of Little Mary Phagan," now available in the public domain.
WEBSITE: LittleMaryPhagan.com
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