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00:00V-1, rotate.
00:03As Air Algerie Flight 6289 lifts off from Tamanrassit, Algeria,
00:09Gear up.
00:10Air traffic controllers hear an explosion.
00:21The plane crashes into the desert.
00:24102 people are killed.
00:28Investigators examine engine debris found on the runway.
00:32Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guideway.
00:35They know an engine failed, but not why the pilots couldn't recover.
00:40Pilots are expected to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine.
00:46The investigation reveals a crew that was struggling, not with the plane.
00:51Let go. Take your hand away.
00:52I let go. I let go.
00:54But with each other.
00:55Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
01:20It's early afternoon in the middle of the Sahara Desert in Algeria.
01:25The crew of Flight 6289 readies for its upcoming journey at the remote Tamanrassid-Aguenar Airport.
01:36Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:39There are 97 passengers on board.
01:43Among them, members of the local football team headed to a tournament and military personnel.
01:49Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:50Though there are some European nationals, almost everyone on board is Algerian.
02:06Now the instrument transfer switches. Normal.
02:13In the cockpit, preflight checks are underway.
02:17Your damper. On.
02:22Today's flight is operated by Air Algerie, a state-owned national carrier.
02:28Air Algerie is a publicly owned company that is owned by the country of Algeria.
02:33The country takes a lot of pride in this particular airline because it is the face name of the country
02:43as it goes all around the world.
02:486289, you're casting latest weather.
02:50Yes, the wind is calm. Temperature 23. Q&H 1020. QFE 965.
02:58Copy. We'll call you back for engine start.
03:0244-year-old Fatima Yousfi is the first officer of this flight.
03:07She is Algeria's first female commercial pilot.
03:12The female first officer was one of the first women to be hired in an airline in Algeria, which would
03:20be a big deal in such a male-dominated field, especially in that country.
03:25As the first woman to pilot a Boeing 747 trans-oceanic flight, Lynn Ripplemeyer knows what it's like to blaze
03:33a trail.
03:37Aviation was then and still is, in some cases, a boys' club.
03:44Back in the beginning of when women were initially beginning in aviation here in the States, maybe it's like it
03:52was for her, that it was unusual.
03:59Taman Rasset, 6289. We request clearance for Khardaya.
04:04Received. We will call you back.
04:10Hey, Bualam.
04:11Hey.
04:12We've got some Taman Rasset football players back there.
04:15Oh. Tell them we're rooting for them this weekend.
04:1948-year-old captain Bualem Benawicha has over 10,000 flying hours.
04:241,000 of those hours are on the Boeing 737.
04:28The captain was highly experienced, had been flying for over 20 years and then flown all kinds of aircraft from
04:34small aircraft to large jetliners.
04:386289 Taman Rasset.
04:40Go.
04:41Start approved. Call back for taxi.
04:43Roger.
04:46At 3 p.m., the pilots get clearance to start up the engines.
04:52Okay, before I start checklist. Fuel quantity.
04:569,800 kg.
04:59Pumps.
05:02On.
05:05Flight 6289 is a Boeing 737-200, an early generation of the popular twin-engine jetliner.
05:15The Boeing 737 is one of the most common types of commercial airliners in the world, and there are different
05:22variations of it.
05:24The Boeing 737-200 is an original version of the 737, so it's an older model, and it's not as
05:33highly sophisticated in technology as the current 737s.
05:42Flight 6289 will be departing from Taman Rasset, with a scheduled stop in Gardaia, and then on to the capital,
05:51Algiers.
05:51The total flying time is approximately 3 hours.
06:01That is taxi, Air Algerie, 6289.
06:066289 Taman Rasset. Taxi onto runway 02, and backtrack, wind 030 at 10 knots.
06:14Roger.
06:15Taxing for runway 02, then backtracking, 6289.
06:21As they taxi to the runway, passengers settle in for the journey.
06:39We are ready, 6289.
06:446289 Taman Rasset, cleared for takeoff runway 02, wind 330 at 12 knots.
06:49Clear for takeoff on runway 02 at SGD 6289.
07:03You have 90 knots.
07:05100 knots.
07:0790 knots.
07:22B1.
07:24Rotate.
07:29but seconds after takeoff
07:31gear up
07:34a loud explosion rocks the airplane
07:43bismillah what's going on
07:45the pilots assess the situation
07:47let's go let's go
07:49I let go I let go
07:53passengers sense something has gone wrong
07:57we have a small problem 6289
08:006289
08:05the 737 is approaching a stall
08:166289 are you in emergency
08:31the pilots make desperate attempts to recover the aircraft
08:36but their efforts are in vain
08:38the plane goes into a free fall
08:43the passengers brace themselves
08:54the plane bursts into flames
08:56and skids across the desert
08:58just outside Tamanrasset airport
09:02emergency response is immediately activated
09:06and firefighters rush to the scene
09:15the impact and fire that ensued afterwards
09:19made survival very unlikely for the passengers in the aircraft
09:23but then against all odds
09:27rescuers discover a survivor
09:29not within the wreckage
09:31but lying in the distant sand
09:33clinging to life
09:35a gentleman seated all the way in the back
09:38that didn't have a seat belt on
09:40so when the airplane crashed and broke apart
09:42he was thrown free
09:45he shows only faint signs of life
09:48as an ambulance rushes him to hospital
09:50in critical condition
09:53defying all expectations
09:54the man's condition soon stabilizes
09:57and he begins to recover
09:59this passenger's luck cannot be overstated
10:02in what was Algeria's worst aviation accident at the time
10:08he is the sole survivor
10:10out of 103 passengers and crew
10:14while the country mourns the tragic loss of a football squad
10:19Algerian and French families grieve their loved ones
10:22and soon demand answers
10:29the investigation into the crash of flight 6289
10:34is conducted by a commission of inquiry
10:36established by the Algerian ministry of transport
10:40they receive support from several international agencies
10:44including the NTSB
10:47America's national transportation safety board
10:50I was the US accredited representative
10:53for this accident to assist the Algerians
10:55initially I wasn't going to travel to the scene
10:58however the US ambassador to Algeria
11:01requested our assistance
11:05while Algerian investigators await the arrival
11:08of their American colleagues
11:10they interview the Taman Rasset air traffic controller
11:16did the pilots indicate that there was an issue
11:21the first officer called only seconds after takeoff
11:26we have a small problem 6289
11:30pilots typically are hesitant to call mayday mayday
11:34or announce some type of emergency
11:37particularly if they really don't know
11:40what the situation and the critical nature of the situation is
11:45and what was the problem
11:48they didn't say
11:49but I heard something that
11:51sounded like an explosion
11:54seconds later
11:55the plane was falling out of the sky
11:59you said an explosion
12:01that's what it sounded like
12:05like a bomb
12:10couldn't say
12:14so in 2003 Algeria was not the safest place
12:18there was bombings and terrorist activities
12:20because they were coming out of 11 years of civil war
12:26when the plane fell was it in one piece
12:29yes it was
12:32investigators found the airplane intact
12:34there are no claims of responsibility by terrorists
12:37so it pretty much ruled out
12:39that there was some type of nefarious means
12:42to bring the aircraft down
12:44can you describe how the plane fell
12:48it was
12:50nose up
12:51and crashed near the threshold of runway 20
12:57the controller and other witnesses
12:59saw that the airplane was struggling to climb
13:02had a nose-high pitch attitude
13:05and then impact the ground
13:09eyewitnesses recall that the plane struggled to gain enough lift to remain airborne
13:13an indication it was in a stall
13:18one week after the incident
13:20Algerian investigators are joined by a member of the NTSB
13:27air traffic controller and witnesses described seeing a stall
13:31and one witness remarked that the landing gear was down
13:36if the landing gear is still down while the aircraft is trying to climb
13:41it creates a lot of drag on that airplane
13:44it takes a lot of thrust and a lot of power to maintain the climb
13:48to overcome all that drag from the landing gear
13:52that would affect a plane's ability to climb but
13:55that alone wouldn't cause a stall
13:57that has to mean something else
13:59to the load sheets?
14:01yes, right here
14:04one of the big questions is about the aircraft weight
14:07because if you're too heavy
14:08you won't climb as well as if you're within the weight envelope
14:14investigators review the plane's load sheet
14:16to see if the plane was overweight before takeoff
14:19looks like the first officer made some corrections here
14:24while reviewing the load sheet
14:26the first officer notices the fuel weight is wrong
14:29and changes it from 8,800 kilograms
14:33to the correct amount of 9,800 kilograms
14:42so with those corrections the weight at takeoff would have been
14:4748,708 kilograms
14:48and the maximum weight allowed at takeoff would be 49,500 kilograms
14:54the first officer noticed that there was a thousand kilo difference
14:58and the passenger count was a little bit off
15:01which didn't make a whole lot of difference in the overall weight and balance
15:04but did show that she was very attentive in her duties
15:09the aircraft weight was right up against the maximum takeoff weight
15:13even though it was heavy
15:14the aircraft weight shouldn't have affected the performance too much
15:18what mechanical failure?
15:21I'll get the maintenance reports
15:25investigators make sure that the maintenance is clean
15:28and the aircraft has a clean bill of health prior to the flight
15:36it was up to date in its maintenance cycle
15:38no work deferred
15:40no technical exemptions
15:42the maintenance reports provide no leads
15:46maybe there was an environmental factor at play
15:51take a look at this
15:53did the location of the airport have something to do with the stall?
15:59temperature is 23 degrees Celsius
16:01so it's hot
16:03Tamarosset is in a harsh desert climate
16:05and the high temperatures can affect the aircraft's performance and climb
16:10and the airport sits at 4,518 feet above sea level
16:15at this altitude the air is already thin
16:19if you factor in the heat
16:20it's high density altitude that affects the performance of the airplane
16:26so it's generating much less lift over the wings
16:29so it takes longer to get the airplane airborne
16:32so just a few pounds below max takeoff weight
16:35high elevation airport
16:37high temperature
16:38landing gear extended
16:40that could definitely cause a plane to stall
16:43but that doesn't explain the explosion
16:47right
16:47what are we missing?
16:56investigators study the crash site of flight 6289
17:00for evidence that could explain the explosion
17:03heard seconds after takeoff
17:06so the first point of impact is here
17:135,396 feet from the takeoff point
17:17skidded through the airport perimeter fence
17:19across the road
17:20and came to rest here
17:22less than 300 feet outside of the airport
17:34planes destroyed by the fire
17:36but the main wreckage is practically in one piece
17:38except for the rear section
17:40and look at this debris
17:43this was on the runway
17:44right about here
17:48engine debris
17:52on the runway we found a large quantity of engine debris
17:54which is indicative of an engine shelling
17:56and a large quantity of engine blades
18:00are thrown out the back end of an engine
18:04it's an old adage in accident investigation
18:08what fails first falls first
18:11so if they find debris
18:13prior to finding the wreckage
18:15then they know that happened prior to the accident
18:18so one of the engines blew out
18:20that must have been the explosion the controller hurt
18:24what caused the engine failure
18:29we needed to get our eyes on those engines to determine which failed and why it failed
18:34investigators begin a visual inspection of the plane's engines
18:38starting with the right one
18:41take a look at the fan blades
18:44heavy deformation
18:47it was definitely rotating at the time of impact
18:51on the right engine we showed that it was turning at impact
18:54we don't know what exactly what level of thrust it was rotating at
19:00if the right engine was operating on impact
19:04then did the left engine fail
19:10these turbine blades have far fewer deformations than the right engine
19:14looks like it was barely moving
19:17the hot section is completely torn apart
19:20in an engine's hot section
19:23fuel is ignited in a combustion chamber
19:25generating a powerful stream of hot air
19:29that spins the turbine blades
19:33the damage is evidence that the left engine failed
19:37we knew that the failure was in the hot section
19:40so we had to follow every lead that we could
19:42to determine where the failure occurred
19:51there's a bunch of blades missing from the hot section
19:55the missing pieces are most likely the debris that we found on the runway
19:59we found that the hot section was basically corncobbed as we say
20:04there was not many blades left in the hot section
20:07and there was metal all over the place
20:10what caused the blades to break
20:12let's get some of these parts out on the table
20:16and we wanted to further tear down the engine
20:18we wanted to look at the failures under the microscope
20:21we wanted to look at the metallurgical aspects of the failure
20:24we wanted to look to see if there was a bird strike
20:28investigators begin by examining components from the hot section
20:31in search of pre-existing defects
20:36managed to remove the sediment from the nozzle vein
20:44nozzle guide vanes direct the hot air flow in the combustion chamber
20:49to the blades of the high-pressure turbine causing them to spin
20:59interesting
21:14looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guide vanes
21:19looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guide vanes
21:19investigators find evidence of fatigue cracks in two of the left engine's nozzle guide vanes
21:26this type of cracking occurs over time and as the engine ages
21:29these cracks get slightly larger and eventually they will fail
21:33and it will destroy the entire engine
21:38if this was a progressive failure why wasn't it caught earlier?
21:44this type of cracking is typical of an older engine and it's a progressive failure
21:49so that gets us into the question of what was the maintenance history
21:52what was the inspection criteria that was used by the operator
21:57investigators look into the engine's repair history
22:02it looks like the left engine was completely overhauled four years ago
22:07when would have been the last time they looked at the nozzle guide vanes?
22:10during the hot section maintenance inspection which was last year
22:15any mention of cracking?
22:17any work done on that either?
22:21inspections of the hot section are meant to catch fatigue cracks
22:25so why weren't these found?
22:28since this was an Algerian registered aircraft
22:31it falls under the authority of the Algerian civil aviation authority
22:35for oversight of the inspection
22:37not the FAA which typically has more stringent requirements
22:42the crack formed at some point
22:44it was missed during the inspection last year
22:47it grew and grew until point of failure
22:49and then blew out at takeoff
22:51that explains why the engine failed
22:54not why the plane stalled
22:57pilots are expected to demonstrate their ability
23:00to fly out of a situation
23:03either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine
23:07investigators examine the crew's training records
23:10to determine if they knew how to handle a single engine failure on takeoff
23:17the first officer's last exercise in engine failure during takeoff
23:21was four months ago
23:21the captain's training was even more recent
23:24only two months before the crash
23:25they both should have known what to do in this situation
23:31they've got the airplane veering to the left
23:34there's no way they didn't know that engine failed
23:39so what did they actually do?
23:46investigators prepare to listen to the cockpit voice recorder
23:49from Air Algerie flight 6289
23:54it was very important for us to listen to the CVR
23:56to determine how the pilots dealt with this engine failure
23:59got it queued up to right before takeoff
24:05V1
24:07rotate
24:15get up
24:19they hear the sound of the engine failing
24:22five seconds after takeoff
24:25bismillah
24:26what's going on
24:29let go, let go
24:30I let go, I let go
24:35they transferred control in the middle of an emergency
24:38that didn't even sound like a proper transfer
24:41he just took the controls
24:43for another pilot to take control
24:46from the pilot who is flying
24:48the pilot needs to say
24:50I've got it
24:51taking control of the airplane
24:52without saying he was taking control
24:55made things worse
24:56for him
24:56and for the first officer
24:58the captain is the pilot monitoring
25:00he shouldn't be taking over
25:01he should be diagnosing the problem
25:03so
25:04do either of them identify a left engine failure?
25:10after handing over control to the captain
25:12the first officer realizes
25:14is they aren't properly configured
25:16to climb with only one engine
25:20get up or are we okay?
25:22but there's no response from the captain
25:27we have a small problem
25:2862-89
25:2962-89
25:34just seconds after the engine failure
25:36the situation deteriorates
25:38as the plane begins to stall
25:45there are no attempts by the pilots
25:47to work together
25:48to identify or troubleshoot the problem
25:51let go, take your hand away
25:53I let go, I let go
25:54let go, take your hand away
25:56I let go
25:56don't think
25:59seconds later
26:00the ground proximity warning activates
26:02indicating the plane
26:03is getting dangerously close to the ground
26:08please
26:08take your hand away
26:11both pilots really didn't know
26:13what the other was doing
26:14didn't know what the other expected of them
26:16and may well have been working
26:18at cross purposes
26:19and as a result of that
26:21the team performance broke down
26:25don't think
26:26don't think
26:32I don't hear a single mention of engine failure
26:35and why was he telling her to let go so many times?
26:37was she trying to take back control of the plane?
26:40which one of them is actually flying the plane?
26:43when all is said and done
26:44the pilots did not work together
26:46without more information from the flight data recorder
26:49we really don't know exactly
26:51what they did to control the airplane
26:54investigators turned to the flight data recorder
26:57or FDR from flight 6289
27:00to determine how the pilots tried to recover
27:02from the loss of the left engine
27:04flight data recorders are important to investigators
27:08because it gives them information
27:10on how the pilots were operating the airplane
27:13and how they were managing the critical situation they were in
27:19not much here
27:21older plane
27:22older FDR
27:25it doesn't actually tell us how the pilots were handling the engine failure
27:30because we only had five parameters on the FDR
27:33we had to go to Boeing and ask for a detailed aircraft performance analysis
27:37to determine what happened on this accident flight
27:43using the FDR's limited data
27:46Boeing's performance study includes a reconstruction of engine operations
27:51and flight controls in the final moments of the flight
27:56so there is the left engine losing its thrust after it blows out
28:02that's odd
28:03the data from the fully functioning right engine
28:07shows something unexpected
28:09look at the thrust from the right engine
28:12yes it seems to be going up and down
28:14but we know it was working fine
28:17that can only mean one thing
28:23bismillah what's going on
28:26the team finds evidence of thrust being added to the right engine
28:31let's go let's go
28:32and then pulled back
28:34I let go I let go
28:37when one engine fails
28:39what you need is maximum power on the other engine
28:42not reduce it
28:44so thrust is pulled down
28:47then back up
28:48then down
28:50then back up again
28:53we have a small problem 62-89
28:5562-89
29:02let go
29:03let go
29:06it's as if they were having some sort of a tug of war
29:10they shouldn't have been
29:12first officer did the right thing
29:14by increasing the power to the right engine
29:17what likely happened is that the captain wasn't fully aware of which engine had failed
29:21However, the first officer knew that the left engine had failed
29:26and was trying to push up the throttle on the right engine to keep them from stalling.
29:34Let go. Take your hand away. I let go. I let go.
29:36Let go. Take your hand away. Let go. I let go.
29:40Don't think. Don't think.
29:44The captain's basically telling the first officer to get out of his way,
29:48to leave him alone, to let him be in charge of the airplane by himself, which he was.
29:56Knowing that the left engine had failed, the first officer might have been trying to help things out
30:00by increasing the power on the right engine.
30:03Please. Take your hand away.
30:11The moment the captain reduced the thrust on the right engine and never returned it to takeoff thrust,
30:16with the gear down, it doomed the flight.
30:22Pilots should have been able to work together to recover the plane.
30:25These planes are designed to fly with a team.
30:29Pilot flying, pilot not flying.
30:31Both have very specific roles that they are trained to do, but especially in emergencies.
30:38They stay in their roles, they help each other, they work as a team,
30:42and this crash could have been avoided if they would have done that.
30:48Why didn't the crew of Air Algerie Flight 6289 work together to prevent the loss of 102 lives?
30:59Okay, I'll cue it up to the pre-flight preparations.
31:05Investigators returned to the cockpit voice recording of Flight 6289
31:09to understand why there was a lack of coordination between the two pilots.
31:16Now that instrument transfer switches, normal.
31:21Your damper, on.
31:26They listen as the first officer works through the pre-flight checklist.
31:30They're surprised by what they don't hear.
31:35Where's the captain?
31:37Is she doing the flight preparation by herself?
31:42Stabilization mode selector.
31:44Auto.
31:45Okay, flight instruments.
31:48We found that the first officer was actually in the cockpit by herself conducting most of the pre-flight work
31:55without the captain.
31:59It's unusual for the captain not to be present during the pre-flight because there are responsibilities that the captain
32:06has to get his side of the airplane ready.
32:09It's just inappropriate for the captain not to be in the cockpit during the pre-flight, and it's actually kind
32:17of rude.
32:18It's only after the first officer completes the pre-flight preparations that the captain enters the cockpit.
32:25The last Q&H, 1019.
32:281019, Roger.
32:30Good afternoon, Captain.
32:31How are we looking?
32:33Good.
32:34I completed the pre-flight checklist.
32:36I tested your oxygen, and everything is set to go.
32:40Good, good.
32:43Captain Benwisha is late, leaving his responsibilities to the first officer.
32:48When the captain showed up, he was not in the mindset of getting brought up to speed or being part
32:54of the team of setting the cockpit up for the flight.
33:01Heading.
33:02Zero, two, zero.
33:05Altitude.
33:06Investigators then hear the pilots performing their before-start checklist.
33:11Two, eight, zero.
33:13You know, I could have been on the team with those boys back there.
33:16Give me a break.
33:18Who's the third voice?
33:20Flight attendant.
33:23The only male flight attendant is the chief flight attendant.
33:28Okay, takeoff speeds.
33:31As part of the checklist, the first officer reviews the takeoff speeds.
33:37V1, 144 knots.
33:41V1, 146 knots.
33:43You're saying you were good enough to turn pro?
33:46Yeah.
33:47I was a good footy player.
33:49You wanted a scout come watch me play.
33:50Yeah, they were scouting you to mow the pitch.
33:56V2, 150 knots.
33:57Okay, that's enough.
33:58I understand.
33:59Can we go?
34:01I got it.
34:01I got it.
34:02Let's go.
34:08So the captain is just carrying on a conversation with his friend while they're doing their before-start checklist.
34:12What is even worse is he cuts her off before they could even finish it.
34:18One of the most important parts of the information that she was trying to give were the takeoff speeds and
34:25then there should have been a briefing of an engine failure departure.
34:31At this airport, that was a special departure that needed to be briefed.
34:36It was ignored.
34:39Did the captain become more focused once they began to taxi?
34:44Roger.
34:45Taxi for runway is zero two.
34:48What investigators find most shocking is what they hear next.
35:16During critical phases of flight, extraneous conversations and non-essential conversations
35:21between the crew members are prohibited.
35:23Not only is the captain dismissing the first officer, he has this casual attitude about basic safety practices.
35:31It's possible he was more interested in talking to the flight attendant than reviewing the briefing with the first officer.
35:38It's possible that he had been through so many pre-flight takeoff briefings that at that time he felt it
35:44was unnecessary.
35:49Bismillah.
35:50What's going on?
35:55Let's go, let's go, let's go, let's go.
35:56I let go, I let go.
35:57As a result of his dismissive attitude, the captain is unprepared to properly respond when the crisis occurs shortly after
36:05takeoff.
36:10Had the pilots completed their pre-flight safety briefing, their response to the engine failure might have been very different.
36:38Once the plane was stabilized, the pilots could have returned safely to the airport.
36:52So instead of letting the first officer fly the plane while he diagnoses the issue, he tries to do everything
36:58himself.
36:58And transferring control during an emergency situation.
37:02There was never a positive transfer of control. The captain just took the control yoke away from the first officer,
37:11so he injected himself in the emergency.
37:19Let's go, let's go, let's go.
38:29Let's go, let's go.
38:29Let's go.
38:35Let's go.
38:59Let's go, let's go.
39:05I think there's a good chance that had she been left alone, she would have flown the airplane out of
39:10the scenario that we saw in this accident.
39:13The question is, would he have reacted the same way if the first officer was a man?
39:20In 2003, at the time of this crash, here in the States, female airline pilots only constituted less than 6
39:28% of the pilot population.
39:30And it really hasn't changed that much in the 20 years since then.
39:35The first officer was Algeria's first female commercial airline pilot.
39:41My friend, male pilots in this part of the world aren't used to sharing a cockpit with women.
39:51I think Algeria is becoming fairly westernized, but in some cultures there is the feeling that a man has to
39:57be up in the cockpit in case anything goes wrong.
40:00Why did this captain take control from the first officer when she was doing an okay job at that point?
40:06And I think you can't rule out the possibility that there may have been some gender stereotyping on his part
40:13that played a role in it.
40:16Sadly, this accident was totally preventable.
40:24Investigators now have a clear picture of what led to the crash of Flight 6289.
40:32V1, 144 knots.
40:36You're saying you were good enough to turn pro?
40:39After arriving late and allowing the flight attendant into the cockpit, the captain interrupted a crucial pre-flight safety briefing.
40:49V2, 150 knots.
40:51Okay, that's enough. I understand.
40:54Can we go?
40:55I got it, I got it. Let's go.
40:57The captain demonstrated a lax attitude towards cockpit protocols.
41:04Fatigue cracks in a nozzle guide vane in the plane's left engine were reaching their braking point.
41:10And when the guide vane failed, it set off a chain reaction.
41:16High-speed metal fragments ripped the engine apart.
41:20Let go, let go.
41:22I let go, I let go.
41:23When crisis struck, the captain decided he needed to be the one to handle the controls and took over flying
41:31from his first officer before even identifying the problem.
41:35The engine failure alone was not the cause of this accident.
41:39Engines fail and pilots are trained to handle those emergencies.
41:46Failing to retract the landing gear after the engine failure made recovery more difficult.
41:52Let go, take your hand away.
41:54I let go, I let go.
41:55Let go, take your hand away.
41:56I let go.
42:05It was the captain's assumption of control of the aircraft without properly identifying the nature of the emergency,
42:11his failure to raise the landing gear and his lack of adherence to standard operating procedures that eventually doomed the
42:21flight.
42:23As a result of this accident, Algeria's Commission of Inquiry makes several recommendations.
42:31They recommend that Air Algerie, along with other operators, ensure that their crew resource management training programs emphasize the importance
42:40of handover procedures and task sharing in the cockpit.
42:45But in the 1980s, they had captains who were trying to fly a team airplane solo.
42:53So a lot of training went into it to teach that your best resource is your team.
42:59You support each other and work together as a team for the safety of the airplane.
43:05The fact that the captain insisted on taking over control of the airplane at that critical moment cost everybody on
43:13that airplane their lives.
43:17I felt particularly affected when I saw that the accident was preventable.
43:23And I think the investigators did the best job they could trying to discover why the crew made the errors
43:28that they did.
43:29The next time that happens, people won't die as a result of that.
43:33For Lynn Rippelmeyer, it's one more example of why the industry needs to continue evolving.
43:41The airlines now are much more open to hiring women, to not having gender bias, realizing that women do have
43:51a lot to contribute to the industry.
43:55And I think it's up to women now to step up to the plate and take the opportunities that the
44:00career offers.
44:01They're amazing.
44:02They're amazing.
44:02They're amazing.
44:02They're amazing.
44:03They're amazing.
44:03They're amazing.
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