- 5 hours ago
Category
📺
TVTranscript
00:02Just moments after taking off from a remote island in Norway.
00:10Something's wrong.
00:11The pilots of Videro Flight 839 lose control of their plane.
00:15Oh, God!
00:17It plunges into the Norwegian Sea, killing everyone on board.
00:24In the wreckage, investigators find damage to a critical part.
00:29The upper end is broken.
00:32It didn't make a great deal of sense.
00:36And when they learn another Videro Flight nearly met the same fate at the same airport...
00:42Looks like they lost control of the plane for two minutes.
00:46We're going over.
00:51They discover a controversial decision that put lives at risk.
00:57I wish that we had put our foot down and said no more.
01:03Mayday, mayday.
01:07Pulls up.
01:09Airlines one throw to dive in.
01:11You have to bring him up.
01:11I might fly out.
01:12Only two feet wide.
01:13That's 0.
01:14Hold on, thanks.
01:30Put in the seatbelt sign on.
01:34Vidaro Flight 836 is heading to a remote outpost on the Lofoten archipelago in the Norwegian Sea.
01:43Lofoten is one of the most beautiful places in Norway.
01:48It's a place where a Norwegian would want to go on holiday to experience untouched nature, and especially the beautiful
01:57mountains.
02:01Tonight's flight is carrying 11 passengers. Most are Norwegians travelling to the islands from the mainland.
02:10Vidaro 836. Runway 25 free. Winds variable 1021 at 260 degrees. Visibility 2500 meters.
02:22Copy that. Vidaro 836.
02:29Vidaro is Norway's largest regional airline. It serves remote communities across the country.
02:38Since the 1960s and 70s, it was a push in Norway to build regional airports in rural areas.
02:46It's made people feel less isolated, and it made travelling a lot easier.
02:54The plane is heading first to the small island of Vare, and then southwest to Rust, before returning to the
03:01mainland city of Boda.
03:06Approach checklist.
03:0912 miles from the airport, the crew prepares for landing.
03:14The crew was experienced that this was the first time the captain had flown into Vare.
03:19OK.
03:20Altimeters.
03:23Set.
03:26They're flying a de Havilland Twin Otter.
03:30It's a twin turboprop utility aircraft, a workhorse for getting in and out of small remote airports.
03:40The best airplane in the world.
03:44It's an incredibly sturdy aircraft.
03:47Very pilot friendly.
03:50We have a long mountainous coast, and for that, the Twin Otter was perfect.
03:59Landing lights.
04:02On.
04:04Videro flight 836 is now minutes from landing at Vare.
04:08And seatbelt.
04:11Party on.
04:13But the airport is notorious for unpredictable winds.
04:18Vare translated means the weather island.
04:22The airport was located to the north of the island, between the mountain and the sea.
04:29It's a very demanding flying environment, because the weather changes all the time, so the pilots have to adapt to
04:37that.
04:39Set flaps.
04:43Flaps set.
04:45With the runway in sight, the pilots begin to line up for landing.
04:50But just as the plane turns, it's rocked by turbulence.
05:01I have control.
05:03You have control.
05:07When flying at Vare, you will experience turbulence, and you will be tossed around.
05:18This isn't getting better.
05:20Go around.
05:25He obviously decided that the situation was not good to land, so he went around, and it was a great
05:30call on his part.
05:35The plane is hit with a powerful downdraft, and extreme turbulence.
05:47You get sort of a tunnel vision when you're in a situation like that, and you pull out all your
05:54resources, and you try to counteract the situation that you're in.
06:01For two minutes, the captain struggles to level the plane.
06:08He was in extreme turbulence.
06:10You're momentarily out of control. You may or may not regain control.
06:24We're going over.
06:26The force of the wind becomes so great that the plane rolls over, speeding towards the mountains.
06:36Altitude!
06:39Altitude!
06:40I can't see anything!
06:51Come on!
06:54Come on!
06:55Come on!
07:01Only 250 feet from the ground, the captain levels the plane and pulls out of the dive.
07:15I just can't believe that he recovered at such a low altitude.
07:23Put in Hennings for Roast.
07:30Vitero, 836 has aborted landing. Redirecting to Roast.
07:35Copy that, Vitero, 836. Stay safe.
07:39Everyone okay back there?
07:49Vitero, 836, escapes disaster. No one on board is injured.
07:58I'm still shaking my head at that one. That was an ace pilot.
08:04In the city of Boda, officials from Vitero Airlines cancel all flights into Vare while they try and piece together
08:12what happened with Flight 836.
08:16As part of an internal investigation, the pilot is interviewed.
08:21We were lining up for approach. Turbulence was getting worse and worse.
08:28I have control.
08:32It was obvious we couldn't land.
08:35I applied power to the engines and we climbed to about 1,800 feet, where we got hit with a
08:42massive downdraft.
08:48We're going over.
08:57I battled that plane.
09:00Trying to keep it away from the mountains.
09:03Come on!
09:08Come on!
09:12Eventually, I was able to level out, climb to a safe altitude, and turn for Roast.
09:20It would be terrifying for them, I'm sure.
09:25I've heard stories about that airport.
09:30And they're true.
09:34The pilots were not very happy.
09:38We realized this had been a serious incident, and we had to tighten the operational requirement at the island to
09:47make that safer.
09:51The first action taken by Videro officials is to reduce the maximum wind speeds for take-off and landing at
09:59Vare Airport from 20 to 15 knots.
10:03Videro asks the Civil Aviation Authority to install anemometers, devices that monitor and transmit wind speeds.
10:11Two are installed at each end of the airstrip, and one is installed on the mountain.
10:17The mountain is its own weathermaker.
10:19It can cause winds to change in direction, change in speed, which are conducive to making some serious turbulence.
10:29It's called terrain-induced turbulence.
10:32When winds hit the mountains on Vare, they tend to accelerate over the top and drop down towards the airstrip.
10:39This creates powerful downdrafts and crosswinds.
10:43The sudden changes in wind speeds and direction can create wind shear and cause a pilot to lose control.
10:52This was a difficult place to operate, when the wind was flying over the mountains and down onto the airport.
10:59And we had to tighten those restrictions quite severely and quickly.
11:07But will the restrictions at Vare be enough to ensure the safety of future flights?
11:19It's been 15 months since Videro Flight 836 had their close call at Vare Airport.
11:26Videro Flight 839 has just landed at Vare and is refueling before heading back to the mainland for Easter weekend.
11:35Anti-collision light.
11:39On.
11:40Aft and forward boost.
11:43On.
11:43Captain Ida Nils Pearsson is the pilot in command.
11:49Ida was a very level-headed fellow.
11:53He was a top-rated pilot.
11:56And he'd been with us for years.
11:59Start switch.
12:00Left engine.
12:02The first officer is Arndt Vider Grunerflotter.
12:07On.
12:08Right engine.
12:09Right engine.
12:12On.
12:14The first officer was fairly new.
12:17I think he'd been with us for only about a year.
12:23Look at that windsock.
12:25It's flapping like mad.
12:28Welcome to Hooray.
12:31Buckle up, folks.
12:32It's going to be a bit bumpy getting out of here.
12:35There are three passengers on board, including a young couple.
12:40All right.
12:41Videro 839 ready to taxi.
12:43Videro 839, roger.
12:45No known traffic.
12:46Runway free.
12:47Wind variable.
12:48Middle direction 250 at 21 max 57.
12:53QNH Niner 88.
12:55Copy, Niner 88.
12:59The captain, he was a local pilot.
13:02He knew the weather.
13:03He knew the limitations of the aircraft.
13:06Knew the limitations of the airport.
13:10As they line up at the end of the runway, the crew performs the before takeoff checklist.
13:17Flaps set to 10.
13:20Set to 10.
13:22Heading set to 280.
13:24Let's make it 320.
13:27Just get clearance.
13:29It's calm now.
13:30We should get going.
13:31Copy that.
13:33Tower, Videro 839 requesting clearance.
13:36Videro 839.
13:38Bodot control clears.
13:39Videro 839 direct.
13:41Bodot at 5,000 feet and squawk 0135.
13:45Copy.
13:46Videro 839.
13:48Here we go.
13:55Wind has varied.
13:57210 to 290 degrees.
14:01The gusts of 34.
14:03Yeah, roger.
14:04We are rolling.
14:0670 knots.
14:0980 knots.
14:15Rotate.
14:17At 2.43, Videro flight 839 takes off from Vare and heads for the mainland.
14:26The return flight to Boda will take less than 30 minutes.
14:34Flaps up.
14:37Ten seconds after takeoff, a strange noise catches the pilot's attention.
14:46You don't want anything unusual to happen in that phase of the flight, since you are very
14:52close to the ground.
14:55They struggle to keep the plane level.
15:00Steady.
15:06Something's wrong.
15:16And then, the nose of the plane drops and the captain can't do anything to raise it.
15:22No.
15:23No, no, no, no.
15:33Oh, God!
15:35Just 63 seconds after lifting off,
15:41Videro flight 839 slams into the sea.
15:52Videro 839, this is Vare Tower.
15:55Do you copy?
15:57Videro 839, Vare information on 119.4.
16:08Videro 839, Vare information on 119.4.
16:09Within hours, search and rescue teams spot debris on the ocean's surface, 6.5 kilometers
16:16northwest of the airport.
16:19The wreckage was found three days after the accident.
16:24Harsh sea conditions made it a challenge.
16:31The bodies of the three passengers and the first officer are recovered.
16:36Captain Pearson's remains are never found.
16:41The accident caused a lot of grief.
16:45Vare is a small island where everyone know each other, so everyone felt they had lost someone
16:50close to them.
16:52Investigators from the Norwegian Accident Commission for Civil Aviation, or HSL, soon
16:59arrive on the island.
17:02The purpose of the Videro investigation was to find out what happened during that incident.
17:13I was manager air safety for Boeing Canada to have on a division, and I traveled to Vare to
17:20assist with the investigation.
17:23The airfield was spectacular, but I was somewhat surprised in the closeness of the mountain range,
17:31which paralleled the entire runway.
17:37Investigators start by interviewing the controller, who briefs pilots on the local weather.
17:42Sorry about that.
17:43That's fine.
17:43Can you walk me through what happened the day of the accident?
17:46Normal day, by our standards.
17:49They landed at 14.30, refueled, changed passengers, and asked to taxi out.
17:55The whole turnaround was less than 15 minutes.
17:57What were the winds when they took off?
18:00It was gusting when they were parked, but eased off to 34 on the west end.
18:04The winds were coming from every direction.
18:07It was pretty common.
18:09Did the pilots have any hesitation about taking off?
18:12No, not at all.
18:13And what about the takeoff?
18:16The controller explains that after the plane passed the tower,
18:22it turned and then disappeared into the clouds.
18:26What was the cloud ceiling at the time?
18:291,000 feet.
18:30I received a distress signal, and a few seconds later, I heard a bang.
18:37That was fast.
18:38They were airborne for just over a minute.
18:42Did they call Mayday or relay any information about mechanical issues?
18:48Nothing.
18:55Could there have been a structural failure or loss of power
18:59which caused Flight 839 to crash so quickly into the sea?
19:09Investigators survey the wreckage of Videro Flight 839
19:12for any signs that would explain a crash so soon after takeoff.
19:16Nose and cockpit completely crushed.
19:21Both wings, engines, undercarriage, and tail section
19:28severed from the fuselage on impact and carried forward.
19:34High energy impact.
19:38With the nose buckled the way it was, and the left wingtip buckled,
19:44we had a pretty good idea of how the aircraft impacted the sea.
19:52The wreckage tells investigators the plane entered the water nose first
19:57at high speed.
20:03The team considers whether engine failure caused the high-speed impact.
20:08The manufacturer provides their report.
20:12No fire damage.
20:13Both engines appeared to be running at high RPM and torque
20:17at the time of impact.
20:20The engine manufacturer determined that the engines were running,
20:24and they were ruled out very, very quickly.
20:28With engine failure ruled out,
20:31they wonder whether any parts that control the plane's pitch or steering failed,
20:36causing it to plunge into the sea.
20:41The right elevator sheared in half, maybe due to impact.
20:47The elevator is a control surface on the twin otter's tail that adjusts pitch.
20:57Investigators discover something unusual in the elevator connecting rod.
21:06The elevator connecting rod moves the elevators up and down on the tail.
21:12It's activated when the pilot pushes or pulls on the control column.
21:18The upper end is broken.
21:20What would cause such a vital part to break?
21:24You shouldn't have any preconceived notions as to why the part failed.
21:31Let's get this elevator rod to metallurgy.
21:34I want to know how it failed.
21:38Did the part fail because there was a manufacturing defect?
21:43Did it fail because there was a tool mark on it?
21:47You should let the part tell you the story.
21:52While investigators wait for the metallurgical results,
21:56they research the plane's history,
21:58looking for any clues into what might have caused the elevator connecting rod to fail.
22:03So the twin otter DHC-6300 was purchased by Vidro in 1977.
22:10The last alien inspection was carried out the day of the accident.
22:13Maintenance all in accordance with current regulations.
22:16So not a maintenance issue.
22:23The investigators went through all the maintenance documentation.
22:27All the inspections was completed and no deviations was found.
22:34With maintenance ruled out as a cause for the failure of the elevator connecting rod,
22:40investigators review the results of a metallurgical examination performed on the rod.
22:53Banding is created because you have a repeated load that is applied on and off to your part.
22:59And every time the load is applied, you have a crack that grows a little bit more
23:05and it creates a rainbow on the fracture surface.
23:10The report also reveals the banding occurred because of sideways bending on the rod.
23:18This was highly unusual.
23:20There's never any side loads on that rod.
23:24It just moves up and down.
23:26So it didn't make a great deal of sense.
23:31Investigators examine schematics of the tail section of the twin otter
23:35to determine what would bend the elevator connecting rod sideways, causing it to break.
23:41So what if this elevator broke in flight?
23:46It was being freely and uncontrollably.
23:51It would definitely cause the rod to bend.
23:59If the right elevator separated from its mounts in flight,
24:03it would swing in every direction,
24:05putting sideways pressure on the rod and ultimately causing it to break.
24:12First the elevator, then the rod.
24:18It's the only thing that makes sense.
24:21It's kind of like the cart before the horse.
24:23The control rod would not have seen any loads had the elevator not broken.
24:31What would cause the elevator to break in flight?
24:35The cockpit voice recorder can shed some light on that.
24:45Okay, let's start with the take-off roll.
24:49Norwegian investigators listened to the cockpit voice recorder
24:53for clues as to how the right elevator on Videro flight 839
24:57might have come loose, bending the connecting rod.
25:0170 knots.
25:0380 knots.
25:06Rotate.
25:07It was amazing that the cockpit voice recorder
25:11was in the aircraft in the first place
25:13because it was not mandatory at the time.
25:19Claps up.
25:28Did you hear that clattering noise?
25:32Strange.
25:38Steady.
25:46Something's wrong.
25:49Stop.
25:51There it is again.
25:54Is that the elevator?
25:57Play it back again.
26:00When I listened to the CVR,
26:03there was nothing that I could pinpoint
26:06as being the source of the clattering sound.
26:15Could it have been the elevator breaking?
26:18It was possible, but we really just don't know.
26:22Did you hear the propellers?
26:2355 seconds into the flight,
26:26investigators hear the sound of propellers rotating out of sync.
26:31This occurs when there's a change in the aircraft's pitch.
26:35Turbulence?
26:38Has to be.
26:39A sudden gust of wind or change in wind direction
26:44would cause the propellers to adjust
26:47to compensate for the changing attitude of the aircraft.
26:53Investigators discover that Videro 839
26:56was struck by severe turbulence shortly after takeoff.
27:00The crash happens just 10 seconds later.
27:09No.
27:10No, no, no.
27:11Oh, God!
27:13No!
27:24So, where were they exactly
27:26when they were struck by severe turbulence?
27:28A standard operating procedure
27:30calls for a rate of ascend
27:31of 1,000 to 1,200 feet per minute.
27:34So, they would have hit turbulence
27:37right after they entered clouds
27:39at about 1,000 feet.
27:43And that mountain ridge there
27:44is just over 1,000 feet.
27:47That looks like terrain-induced turbulence.
27:54The quicker you could get away
27:57from the mountains,
27:59the better it was.
28:01How bad could those winds have been?
28:07Investigators learn of the near crash
28:09crash of the other Videro plane,
28:11Flight 836,
28:12on approach to Vare 15 months earlier.
28:16Looks like they lost control
28:18of the plane for two minutes,
28:19even when inverted.
28:26At what altitude did they lose control?
28:30About 1,800 feet.
28:33Just after he had boarded the landing
28:35on runway 25 due to winds.
28:40Both flights encountered dangerous winds
28:43at or above the mountain ridges.
28:46Were any measures put into place
28:48to prevent this from happening again?
28:50After Flight 836's missed approach,
28:54Flight Order 17 was put into place.
28:57So, they made this change.
28:59Landings and departures must not be planned
29:01or executed with variable winds above 15 knots.
29:05So, they reduced the maximum allowable wind speeds
29:08for takeoff and landing.
29:12Videro established some very significant wind restrictions
29:16using some very experienced crew
29:20to develop them.
29:21But there was still unpredictability.
29:26Anemometers were also installed
29:28at both ends of the runway
29:32and on the mountain ridge.
29:37It's good to have an anemometer
29:38on top of a mountain.
29:40Just gives the pilot more information
29:42for the landing.
29:44So, what were the mountain winds
29:46at the time of Flight 839?
29:54There is no anemometer data
29:56for the mountain.
30:01If it doesn't provide data,
30:03it's absolutely no use.
30:07Investigators contact
30:08the Civil Aviation Authority
30:10to determine why there weren't
30:12any mountain anemometer wind readings
30:14at the time of the crash
30:15of Videro Flight 839.
30:22The anemometer was taken down.
30:27They learned that the anemometer
30:29on the mountain wasn't reliable
30:31because of the icy conditions.
30:33A year after being installed,
30:35it was removed from the mountain
30:37for repair.
30:39It gets worse.
30:41It was never reinstalled.
30:44It was officially taken out of service
30:46three days before the accident.
30:53The removal of the anemometer
30:55is a degradation safety.
30:58It's information that a pilot
31:00would certainly require
31:01for an airport like that.
31:02Okay, so, what wind information
31:07were the pilots actually getting
31:09and when?
31:13Investigators listened to the CVR recording
31:16of Videro Flight 839
31:17before it landed at Vare.
31:20I'm going to bank west of the island
31:22to avoid more turbulence.
31:23I'm getting up drafts already.
31:26Copy that.
31:28Videro 839, runway free,
31:31wind east side, 270 degrees
31:34at max 23.
31:35Understood.
31:37Videro 839.
31:4123 knots.
31:42That's 8 knots above the limit.
31:45They shouldn't even have landed
31:46the inbound flight in the first place.
31:49What about when they were on the ground?
32:00Look at that windsock.
32:03It's flapping like mad.
32:04But, welcome to Vare.
32:09The pilot was talking a lot about the wind
32:12and they were discussing
32:14that the wind was coming
32:16from all directions.
32:19Videro 839, roger.
32:21No known traffic, runway free.
32:23Wind variable, middle direction, 250.
32:27At 21, max 57.
32:30What did you say again?
32:31Max 57?
32:32Yep.
32:33Max 57.
32:38Copy.
32:4357 knots.
32:4757 knots is more than 65 miles per hour.
32:52Yeah.
32:53The manual says that the twin otter
32:55must not be operated on the ground
32:57in winds above 50 knots.
33:01Well, he is sticking his neck out in the line
33:04and I'm not quite sure why he did that.
33:08Were the winds that strong when they took off?
33:13They go through their pre-takeoff checklist and then...
33:19Just get clearance.
33:20It's calm now.
33:21We should get going.
33:23Copy that.
33:24The captain says it's calm.
33:26The captain says it's calm.
33:26What's he basing that on?
33:27Wind socks?
33:29The rains had stopped.
33:30Maybe it looked like the weather was clearing.
33:35If a shower was approaching, you could expect variable winds.
33:39But when the shower passed, you could expect a lull in the wind.
33:48According to the transcript,
33:51they get their next wind report
33:53as they're about to take off.
33:56Wind has varied 210 to 290 degrees
34:01with gusts of 34.
34:02Yeah, Roger.
34:04We are rolling.
34:08They took off in a 34-knot wind.
34:11That's more than double the limit.
34:14If the winds were gusting at 57 knots on the ground,
34:17then who knows how strong the winds were coming off the mountain.
34:22Strong enough to break the elevator.
34:29When he hit the lip of the mountain,
34:31I bet he encountered 60, 70, 80-knot winds.
34:38It obviously caused severe to extreme turbulence.
34:42Steady.
34:44The team concludes the winds were strong enough
34:47to break the right elevator from its mounts,
34:50causing the connecting rod to break,
34:52making both elevators unusable.
34:56Something's wrong.
34:58They ignored Vitero's wind limits on the ground.
35:02And they had no wind limits
35:04in the dangerous area around the mountain.
35:08Why were they so eager to leave?
35:12This was Easter weekend,
35:14and there is an incentive to get home.
35:21There was clearly some concern,
35:23but they went.
35:33To understand why the captain of Flight 839
35:37took off in winds that exceeded company limits,
35:40investigators interview other Vitero pilots
35:43about wind restrictions at Vare.
35:46What has been your experience at Vare?
35:50I don't like it.
35:51None of the pilots do.
35:53The wind reports aren't reliable.
35:58You could actually sit on the tarmac,
36:00get one wind indication,
36:03move towards the runway,
36:05and get another.
36:07Even though the maximum wind speeds
36:09were reduced from 20 knots to 15?
36:11Well, they were,
36:12but they brought it back up to 20.
36:17Nine months after the incident
36:19with the first Vitero flight,
36:21the wind restrictions were reversed.
36:26How would they do that?
36:28My guess?
36:30Too many cancellations.
36:36After Vitero lowered the wind limits,
36:39cancellations increased.
36:41That led to negative press
36:42and anger from local residents.
36:45The decision to cancel flights
36:48became very unpopular.
36:52It was so unpredictable at Vare.
36:58Did pilots feel pressure
37:00to complete the flights?
37:03Yeah, but not from the airline.
37:07I had a situation
37:08where the weather turned into a hurricane
37:10and it could not take off.
37:13And I got a real workover
37:14from some of the passengers.
37:18Investigators research the impact
37:20those wind-related cancellations
37:22had on Vitero's operations.
37:27The pressure was piling on from the public.
37:30Cancellations tripled
37:31in the last 12 months.
37:35Compared to other airports in Europe,
37:38Vare had a lot of cancellations
37:39and the flights were often cancelled
37:42quite early when the wind was strong.
37:44But when the flights
37:45were supposed to arrive,
37:47it could be no wind at all,
37:50which made people question
37:51all the cancellations.
37:54Almost all the cancellations
37:55were being caused by winds.
37:57Because of that, bad press.
37:59Which gets the attention
38:01of the government.
38:05The government paid the company
38:07to fly there.
38:09The company wrote the government
38:11and said it was extremely difficult
38:14to operate there.
38:15And the reply from the government was,
38:17if you don't fly there,
38:18we will have to take the money away.
38:22Out of curiosity,
38:23how many cancellations
38:25were there on departure from Vare?
38:33None.
38:36Basically, it's get-home-itis.
38:39If they're at the airport,
38:40pilots are going to tell themselves
38:42they're capable of taking off as well.
38:45You know, there's still one thing
38:47I don't get.
38:50The conditions were so treacherous.
38:54Why was this airport
38:55even built there in the first place?
39:04So, why was this location
39:06chosen for the airport?
39:09Investigators consult officials
39:11about the viability of Vare Airport
39:14to determine if passengers and crew
39:16were placed at risk unnecessarily.
39:21Vidre had two possible locations
39:24for the airport at the island.
39:26This one was chosen
39:28despite the difficulties
39:31with wind conditions
39:32near a mountain ridge.
39:37Okay, and what testing
39:39went into the decision?
39:42Vidre had done test flights
39:44at Vareøy
39:45prior to the decision
39:46of building the airport there.
39:47and they had experienced
39:50very windy conditions
39:52and did not recommend
39:53building the airport there.
39:59So, if Vidre was against it,
40:01then why did it go ahead?
40:03We knew that the wind conditions
40:06at Vare would be so difficult
40:08it would affect regularity.
40:11But that advice was ignored
40:14by the meteorology specialists
40:17that the authorities had consulted
40:20when it came to put the airport
40:22on the island.
40:24Maybe some of the decisions
40:26that were made
40:28were more politically motivated
40:30than were practical.
40:36Investigators now know
40:37the factors that led
40:38to the deaths of three passengers
40:40and two pilots
40:41on board
40:42Vidreau Flight 839.
40:45First up,
40:46you have an airport
40:47next to a mountain
40:48resulting in dangerous winds.
40:51Lower wind limits are imposed,
40:53but the result
40:54is an increase in cancellations.
40:56Which forces the limits
40:58to change again.
40:59Limits go back up
41:01and then finally
41:02the unreliable wind data
41:03which results
41:05in wind reports
41:06being ignored
41:08by pilots.
41:15Rules are established
41:16for a reason.
41:18If you don't follow the rules,
41:20you're taking a big risk.
41:23Wind has varied
41:25210 to 290 degrees
41:28the gusts of 34.
41:30Yeah, Roger,
41:31we are rolling.
41:38Vidreau Flight 839
41:40enters turbulent airspace
41:42when the winds
41:43coming off the mountain
41:44were extreme.
41:46The force of the winds
41:48causes the right elevator
41:49to break free.
41:54Something's wrong.
41:57Bending the connecting rod
41:59until it fails.
42:10It was subject to
42:12aerodynamic loads
42:14that exceeded
42:15the structural strength
42:17of the tail.
42:22It must have been
42:23absolutely terrifying
42:24because you would pull
42:26the control column
42:28without any reaction
42:30at all.
42:30Oh, God!
42:43The Norwegian Accident
42:45Commission for Civil Aviation
42:46recommends new regulations
42:48for the distribution
42:49of wind information
42:51to crews
42:52and urges Vidreau
42:54to ensure their pilots
42:55follow established restrictions.
42:58The captain wanted
42:59to get the job done
43:00and he probably
43:01got away with it
43:03other times,
43:04but this time
43:06it didn't work out.
43:11other recommendations
43:13are made for Vare Airport
43:14but ultimately
43:16it is deemed
43:17too dangerous
43:18and the airport
43:19never reopens
43:20to commercial traffic.
43:24Vare Airport
43:25was open
43:26only four years
43:27which makes it
43:28one of the shortest
43:29lived airports
43:30in the world.
43:35I wish
43:37that we had
43:38put our foot down
43:39and said no more.
43:43I wish
43:44the company
43:44had done the same.
43:48I wish
43:49the government
43:50and the experts
43:52had listened
43:53to our warnings
43:54earlier.
43:57then we might
43:58have had
43:59our colleagues
44:00still alive.
44:29and have had
44:29We would
44:30leave the company
44:30have
44:30that we
44:30the
44:31are
44:31we
44:32have
44:32our
44:32our
44:38to
44:39our
44:39our
44:39our
Comments