- 4 hours ago
Category
📺
TVTranscript
00:01Just minutes after taking off from Lima...
00:03We declare an emergency.
00:05The pilots of Aero Peru Flight 603 get mixed messages from their plane.
00:11I cut the engines, but the speed is increasing.
00:15Having erroneous airspeed indications now puts into your brain,
00:18am I climbing, am I not climbing?
00:20They seek assistance from the ground.
00:23Can you tell us our altitude, please?
00:24You're at 9,700 feet according to my radar.
00:27But nothing makes sense.
00:29We're in the water. Pull up!
00:34All 70 people on board are killed.
00:38Investigators compare the cockpit voice recording...
00:41We will maintain 10,000 feet.
00:43Set it.
00:4410,000 feet.
00:45...with the flight data recorder...
00:47Captain doesn't realize how close they are to the water.
00:49...and suspect a single faulty sensor prevented the crew from averting disaster.
00:54It violates the laws of physics.
00:56Airplanes just don't do that.
00:59D-Day, D-Day.
01:03A-D-Day...
01:04lassenworld's pop...
01:24It's nearing 1 a.m. at Jorge Chavez International Airport in Lima, Peru.
01:33Thick clouds blanket the sky as Aero Peru 603 taxis to the runway.
01:42The weather in Lima, Peru is a very, very stable environment, especially this time of the year.
01:49The captain is 58-year-old Eric Schreiber. He's highly experienced, having logged almost 22,000 flight hours.
01:57Aero Peru 603, authorized to Santiago, initial level 29,000 feet, and afterwards on course, transponder 5603.
02:1042-year-old First Officer David Fernandez has flown nearly 8,000 hours.
02:16Correct Lima Tower.
02:18He will be the pilot flying the aircraft tonight.
02:21Roger.
02:24He's doing double duty by also operating the radio.
02:30Lima Tower, Aero Peru 603, runway 15.
02:35Ready for takeoff.
02:38Aero Peru 603, wind calm, clear for takeoff, runway 15.
02:46There are 61 passengers and 7 flight attendants on board.
03:00Takeoff at 41 minutes past midnight, on the dots.
03:06What precision?
03:07Like the Suez.
03:09Let's go.
03:18The crew is extremely professional.
03:21They accomplished their checklists and procedures as what would be expected.
03:24And they were basically an on-time machine.
03:44Flight 603 will fly out to the Pacific Ocean before heading south to Santiago.
03:51The aircraft is a four-year-old Boeing 757-200.
03:57The Boeing 757 is a long, narrow-bodied aircraft, twin-engine.
04:02It's simple in its design, simple in its instrumentation, and just an overall comfortable airplane to fly.
04:10The passengers settle in for the three-and-a-half-hour flight.
04:19In the cockpit, the first officer spots a potential problem.
04:25The ultimaters are stuck.
04:31Windshear.
04:32Windshear.
04:33Windshear.
04:36Windshear.
04:41The windshear is an alert that we're entering into an environment of undesirable winds that could be highly critical in
04:49the safety of the aircraft.
04:51Those type of winds are just very uncommon in that area, and we're not forecasted at night at all.
04:58Flight 603 climbs into the thick clouds above Lima.
05:02The pilots lose sight of the ground.
05:06The speed.
05:08They now discover another instrument isn't working.
05:13Yeah, right.
05:15Flying in the clouds at night, without knowing how fast they're going or their height above the ground, the pilots
05:22face a potentially dangerous situation.
05:26Am I climbing, am I not climbing, am I near mountainous terrain, which is very close to the coastal line
05:33of Peru?
05:35Tower Aero Peru 603.
05:37Flight 603 updates the tower controller.
05:41Aero Peru 603, tower, go ahead.
05:43We have no altimeter and no airspeed.
05:47Declaring an emergency.
05:52When a pilot declares an emergency with air traffic control, the controller is going to give that aircraft priority handling.
06:00Roger, change frequency to 119.7 for further instruction from radar control.
06:05Switching to 119.7.
06:12Before contacting radar control, the captain takes over from the first officer.
06:17Okay, I have control.
06:20The captain may decide to take over the flying role and tell the first officer to talk on the radio
06:26and work procedures.
06:28Lima 603, we request vectors for ILS runway 15.
06:33The pilots request directions for a return to the airport.
06:37Roger, we suggest a right turn heading 330.
06:41It was a good call to ask air traffic control, give us vectors.
06:44We're so busy up here dealing with everything else.
06:47You can certainly help us out if you tell us which direction to turn and guide us back towards the
06:51airport.
06:53Turn right heading 330.
06:56A heading of 330 will take the plane north to a position where it can then make the turn back
07:03to Lima.
07:05But two and a half minutes later...
07:08Aero Peru 603, you're showing level 9200.
07:12What is your heading now?
07:14The radar controller notices that flight 603 hasn't turned back towards the airport.
07:24Heading 205, we're heading away from the shore.
07:27Affirmative.
07:30We will maintain 10,000 feet.
07:32Set it, 10,000 feet.
07:34The captain decides to fly further out to sea before returning to Lima.
07:40They go out over the ocean, which is one of the best decisions to possibly do.
07:45They don't now have to worry about other aircraft in the Andes Mountains.
07:51In the cabin, passengers are unaware of what's happening in the cockpit.
08:01Safely away from shore.
08:03According to the radar, you're crossing radial 230 from Lima.
08:08Distance west, southwest is 37 miles.
08:12Flight 603 finally starts turning north to begin the approach to Lima
08:17and needs to begin its descent to the airport.
08:21I'll try to descend with the power cut.
08:30He was going to descend at idle thrust, which is a good way to descend.
08:34It's nice and steady in a 757 and keeps the airspeed under good control.
08:46I cut the engines, but the speed is increasing.
08:50Even with power to the engines cut, the airspeed indicators show that the plane is accelerating.
08:58Can you tell us the speed, please?
09:00I have 320.
09:02We have 350.
09:06They'll need to use a different strategy to descend.
09:12Getting to the lower altitude, hopefully getting into some clearer areas to see the coastal line,
09:18could give them more comfort for a safe landing.
09:21Take the speed brakes out.
09:25That is another great way of slowing the aircraft and getting better control of the airspeed.
09:34But deploying the speed brakes has the opposite effect.
09:41Overspeed.
09:42A new warning tells them they're flying far too fast.
09:47The airplane's above its maximum allowable airspeed.
09:50It's in danger of breaking apart if they don't do something right now.
09:59But I have the speed brakes out and all the power is cut.
10:02This can't be right.
10:05What more possibly can be confusing and going wrong right now?
10:11Seconds later, they get a contradictory warning that the plane's flying far too slow.
10:19The stick shaker indicates to pilots that if the airplane gets any slower,
10:24it's going to be in a stall condition.
10:28Are they going too fast or too slow?
10:31The pilots must decide which alarm to react to.
10:36We're stalling.
10:43The captain decides to increase the speed by pitching the nose down,
10:47silencing the stall warning.
10:54But they're not out of danger yet.
10:58With conflicting warnings and no reliable airspeed or altitude readings,
11:04the pilots of Flight 603 urgently need help.
11:09Is there any plane that can take off to rescue us?
11:12Yes.
11:13We're coordinating immediately.
11:16At this point, it was a totally out-of-the-box thought by the first officer
11:22to ask for this type of assistance,
11:25which would have given them a visual reference right next to them
11:29with altitude, airspeed, also communications,
11:33and we have somebody alongside of us holding our hand to the airport.
11:38The plane is now 50 miles from Lima's airport.
11:43Aero Peru 603, you are heading 270, 10,000 feet.
11:49While they wait for a rescue plane,
11:51the captain attempts to join the approach path to the runway.
11:55I'll try to intercept the ILS and then descend.
11:59Lima, Aero Peru 603, we will try to intercept the ILS.
12:03Roger, Aero Peru 603.
12:05They think they're flying at a nice, safe altitude,
12:08and they think that they pretty much have airspeed under control.
12:11They probably thought they were in a pretty darn good position.
12:17Soon after, the radar controller provides an update on the escort flight.
12:22Aero Peru 603, there is a 707 about to take off.
12:28It's starting to move now.
12:33It seems to be flying well.
12:37Can you tell us our altitude, please?
12:40You're at 9,700 feet, according to my radar.
12:44Terrain. Too low. Terrain.
12:48Too low. Terrain. Terrain.
12:519,700 feet, but we're getting a terrain warning.
12:55Pull up. Pull up if he's telling you to pull up.
12:58Terrain. We're hitting the water. Pull up.
13:09We're running over.
13:10Pull up.
13:2029 minutes after taking off,
13:23Flight 603 crashes into the Pacific Ocean,
13:2748 miles from Lima, Peru.
13:36Within hours, a Navy aircraft discovers debris from Flight 603.
13:44The accident occurred at night,
13:46and the wave conditions were very high,
13:49so the first few ships that went out to look for the wreckage
13:52really struggled to find it.
13:55Heavy fog also hampers recovery efforts.
14:14By the end of the first day,
14:16the bodies of only 13 of the 70 people on board are recovered.
14:21There are no signs of survivors.
14:27Those who haven't been found are believed to be inside the fuselage on the seabed.
14:45It's up to air crash investigators from Peru's Accident Investigation Board
14:50to find out why a plane,
14:52last observed flying nearly 10,000 feet above the sea,
14:57suddenly crashed into it.
15:04We have the military radar.
15:06With the underwater wreckage still beyond reach,
15:10investigators get their first lead from the Peruvian military.
15:15Any coastal nation will have military radar
15:18that's constantly scanning for any approaching aircraft.
15:22So by querying the Peruvian military radar,
15:25we were able to get some data about the altitude and position of the accident flight.
15:32So, after taking off,
15:33they follow the approved flight plan over the ocean,
15:36and then they start heading north.
15:39Yeah, they're headed back towards Lima.
15:41Mm-hmm.
15:43The flight climbs to 13,000 feet,
15:46and then it starts to descend.
15:49And now, in the last seven minutes,
15:54the flight has a series of erratic climbs and descents before it crashes.
15:59It appears they lost control.
16:06It becomes just a rollercoaster ride of altitudes,
16:10because they don't have control.
16:17What could have caused the pilots to lose control?
16:21When you start putting an investigation together,
16:24you start putting the what-ifs on the table.
16:27What if this failed?
16:28What if that failed?
16:29What if this went wrong?
16:30What if the crew made a mistake?
16:33Pre-take-off seems okay.
16:35Investigators scrutinize the communications
16:37between air traffic control and the pilots.
16:40Look at this.
16:41The crew reported problems with airspeed and altitude readings
16:44only two and a half minutes into the flight.
16:47Tower, Aero Peru 603.
16:50Aero Peru 603, tower, go ahead.
16:52We have no altimeters and no airspeed.
17:00Faulty air data.
17:03It sounds like an issue with the pitostatic system.
17:08The pitostatic system uses tubes and sensors mounted on the plane,
17:13which measure air pressure to calculate airspeed and altitude.
17:19But wasn't there a recent crash involving the pitostatic system?
17:22Yeah.
17:24Birgonaire, flight 301.
17:28Only eight months earlier, another Boeing 757 crashed soon after taking off from Puerto Plata in the Dominican Republic.
17:37The cause was a blocked pitot tube.
17:41Some investigators were wondering if we had a similar situation to what we had in Birgonaire.
17:46It wasn't entirely the same, but it still involved blockage or covering parts of the pitostatic system.
17:54Well, maybe that's what happened here.
18:06Nearly two weeks since Aero Peru flight 603 crashed into the ocean,
18:12a U.S. Navy ship helps the Peruvian Navy to track the pings from the Boeing 757's two black boxes.
18:20The wreckage is finally located at a depth of 680 feet.
18:28Using remotely operated vehicles, investigators finally get their first view of the wreckage site.
18:37The wreckage was very concentrated.
18:39The plane was intact when it hit the water.
18:49The fact that all the major pieces of the airplane are in one concentrated area
18:54really gives the investigators a much clearer picture of how the airplane came down.
19:00So, it either came down in a flat spin or it came down nose first,
19:04which is a very unusual accident.
19:09There.
19:10The black boxes are also located.
19:15They're very, very critical to get both recorders.
19:19First, you want to know how the airplane was behaving,
19:21and then secondly, what was going on in the cockpit between the crew members of the airplane.
19:29They are packed in seawater and sent to Washington,
19:32where the NTSB, the National Transportation Safety Board,
19:36will process their invaluable data.
19:45That's it. Keep moving that way.
19:49The team also searches for evidence of some kind of blockage of the pitot tubes and static ports.
19:56There. Keep going.
19:59They focus on a section of the left fuselage where the static ports are located.
20:15They can see that the ports are covered.
20:22When we saw that those static ports were covered, it was case closed.
20:27Drop the curtains.
20:29We knew exactly what happened in this accident.
20:32How did such a critical device, which determines airspeed and altitude,
20:38get covered up and blocked?
20:42Make sure you tag everything.
20:45Investigators survey the recovered wreckage of Aero Peru Flight 603
20:50to find out what is covering the static ports.
20:56Look at that.
21:00Looks like silver tape.
21:02Same color as a fuselage.
21:09Flyers.
21:30Why were the ports covered with tape?
21:33And by whom?
21:39It wasn't our job to assign blame or liability,
21:43but we wanted to understand the procedure
21:45to make sure that important step of removing the tape
21:48would never get overlooked again.
21:54So, let's check the last bug entry.
21:57Okay.
21:58Investigators check maintenance records
22:00to understand why the ports were taped over.
22:05Interesting.
22:06Hey.
22:08Bird strike.
22:12During the plane's last landing before the accident,
22:16the right engine was struck by birds.
22:20They replaced two turbine blades,
22:23the hydraulic pump was repaired,
22:24and they polished the lower front of the 757.
22:29Exactly where the static ports are located.
22:33Did maintenance personnel follow the correct procedures
22:36for polishing the 757?
22:39When you're performing work on the airplane,
22:41such as polishing or washing it,
22:43it's important not to get any debris into the ports,
22:46because when you take off, temperatures go down,
22:49they may freeze in place,
22:52which could cause severe instrument problems to the airplane.
22:56According to the maintenance manual,
22:58they're supposed to cover the static ports.
22:59Whoever polished the plane
23:01covered the static ports with tape
23:03and didn't remove it.
23:07So why wasn't the tape removed
23:09after the area was polished?
23:13If you look at the maintenance process on an airplane,
23:17and cleaning or polishing an airplane is maintenance,
23:20there's multiple steps, multiple people,
23:22and multiple looks.
23:24The whole purpose of that is
23:26to make sure that nothing is missed.
23:30Were the static ports inspected
23:32as part of Flight 603's line check?
23:37It was a crazy night.
23:40Investigators interview the line mechanic
23:42to determine if the static ports were inspected
23:44after the work was done.
23:46The line chief usually does it,
23:48but he was sick.
24:04So, I guess you didn't see the tape then.
24:10Aluminum tape is pretty common.
24:13And if you take it
24:14and just spread it over those ports,
24:16it blends in perfectly.
24:18And it makes it very easy
24:19for somebody to miss it.
24:23Was he adequately trained?
24:25I would say the answer to that is no.
24:30Did you see either pilot do a pre-flight check?
24:34Yes.
24:35The captain.
24:38Did you know if he checked them?
24:42Couldn't tell you.
24:46If I had a new person on my crew,
24:48I would tell them to watch the captain,
24:50see what he's doing,
24:51and it becomes routine for mechanics
24:54to watch what the flight crew does.
24:57Okay.
24:58Thank you for your time.
25:01There's at least one,
25:02if not two, line checks
25:03that are done by supervisors
25:05of the line maintenance.
25:07And then one of the crew members
25:09would do a walk around
25:10as they're obligated to do always.
25:13So, there are several levels
25:15where things should have been detected
25:18but weren't in this flight.
25:24So, both the line mechanic
25:25and the pilot missed it.
25:30Investigators now know
25:31that despite all the safety checks
25:33that were meant to be performed,
25:34no one spotted
25:36the silver tape
25:37covering the static ports.
25:39So, we know what caused
25:40the fault-air speeds and altitudes.
25:42But fault-air data alone
25:44doesn't cause a plane to crash.
25:46So, what did?
25:56Investigators turned
25:57to the cockpit voice recorder
25:58from Aero Peru Flight 603.
26:01There you go. Thank you.
26:02To determine how the pilots
26:04dealt with fault-air
26:05their speed and altitude data.
26:08Pick it up from the take-off.
26:22Aero.
26:26Right.
26:27V2 plus 10.
26:30The plane is barely off the ground
26:32when the pilots identify
26:34the first problem.
26:36The altimeters are stuck.
26:38The captain's altimeter,
26:40the first officer's altimeter,
26:42the standby altimeter,
26:43all three sources
26:45were different
26:46and they were all wrong.
26:50Keep V2 plus 10.
26:52V2 plus 10.
26:53It's quickly followed
26:55by a second issue.
26:56The speed.
26:58The airspeed is also stuck.
27:01Yeah, right.
27:03Hold on.
27:07They were only at 200 feet
27:09above the ground
27:09and they already knew
27:10that there were problems
27:11with altitude and airspeed.
27:14In three different places
27:16in the cockpit,
27:17they're seeing unreliable
27:18airspeed and altitude.
27:21According to the FDR,
27:22they're still climbing.
27:24Let's see how they handle
27:25that faulty data.
27:29What's going on?
27:30We're not climbing.
27:32I'm climbing.
27:34Investigators hear the captain
27:36continue to rely on the faulty data
27:38on his altimeter.
27:39Climb, climb, climb.
27:41I am climbing.
27:43Despite what the first officer
27:45tells him.
27:46The captain is looking
27:47at his altimeter
27:48and saying what he sees
27:50right in front of him.
27:52It's very hard to ignore
27:54this false data.
27:55The airspeed and altitude readings
27:57are like a magnet
27:58drawing your eye and attention
28:00again and again.
28:01Climb, climb.
28:02I am climbing.
28:03So in this initial moments
28:05of the climb,
28:06it seems like the first officer
28:08was more in touch
28:09with what the airplane
28:10was really doing.
28:11What else do the pilots do
28:12to handle the situation?
28:14Keep playing.
28:16Let's go to basic instruments.
28:19But within a minute,
28:20the captain stops focusing
28:22on the faulty instruments.
28:25He decides to use
28:26the pitching power procedure.
28:27That's good.
28:29Very quickly on,
28:30the captain says
28:31basic instruments.
28:32I believe he means
28:33the pitch and power procedure.
28:39The pitch and power procedure
28:41requires reducing
28:42the pitch angle of the aircraft
28:44to two degrees nose up
28:46and the throttles to 55%.
28:48This should result
28:50in level flight.
28:52By flying with set pitch
28:54and power
28:55and ignoring the unreliable
28:57airspeed and altitude
28:58gives the crew time
29:00to sort out what's going on
29:02and think through
29:03what might be causing
29:04the unreliable indications.
29:07Then they declare
29:08the emergency.
29:09Pick it up after that.
29:11Let's see if they did
29:11the procedure properly.
29:17Switching to
29:181, 19.7.
29:21Auto throttle has it connected.
29:23Auto throttle has disconnected.
29:25But instead of checking
29:27his attitude indicator
29:28and engine gauges.
29:30Let's see.
29:31Read that.
29:32The captain focuses
29:34on the crew alerting screen,
29:35which is displaying
29:36more alerts.
29:39Rudder ratio
29:40and max speed trim.
29:41The rudder ratio
29:43and max speed trim warnings
29:45were just the result
29:46of the unreliable
29:47airspeed and altitude
29:48indications
29:49in the cockpit.
29:50They shouldn't have been
29:51the primary focus
29:52of the crew.
29:54They're getting distracted
29:56by false alerts.
29:57They ignore
29:58the pitching power procedure.
30:01We're flying without speed.
30:03Soon after.
30:04Speed is zero.
30:07All airspeed indicators
30:08at zero.
30:13Investigators hear
30:14the pilots turning
30:15their attention back
30:16to the erroneous
30:17airspeed and altitude readings.
30:21The tape on the static ports
30:23meant that the airspeed
30:24and altitude
30:25were always wrong
30:27and they were always changing
30:29as the airplane
30:30climbed and descended.
30:33We will maintain
30:3410,000 feet.
30:35Set it.
30:3610,000 feet.
30:37But at no point
30:39did they disregard
30:40the unreliable
30:41airspeed and altitude.
30:43They looked at them
30:44constantly.
30:4512,000 feet.
30:46The crew never
30:47switched their mindset
30:48to just using
30:49pitch and power.
30:53They climbed for
30:54several more minutes.
30:56But if they were climbing
30:58how did the crew
30:59end up hitting the ocean?
31:01They can't keep
31:02climbing forever.
31:04We have problems
31:05reading our instruments.
31:07Investigators
31:08continue listening
31:08to the cockpit
31:09voice recorder
31:10of Aero Peru
31:11Flight 603
31:12to determine
31:13how the crew
31:14carried out
31:14the return to Lima
31:15with faulty
31:16instrument data.
31:18Set the approach, please.
31:20I did.
31:20I did.
31:20Then let's go.
31:24The captain,
31:25he knew he had to
31:26to get down
31:27to Lima Airport.
31:28I'll try to descend
31:29with the power cut.
31:31And the way to do that
31:32was to reduce the power.
31:36No sooner
31:37do the pilots
31:38cut the power
31:39than they face
31:40another problem.
31:41The speed is increasing.
31:44Why is the speed
31:44so high?
31:46I see the real speed.
31:48That's what worries me.
31:48I don't think so.
31:52They think they're
31:53speeding up
31:54when they can only
31:55be slowing down.
32:01The pilots don't know
32:03whether to believe
32:04the faulty
32:04airspeed indicator
32:06that's showing
32:07they're going
32:07too fast
32:08after having
32:09pulled their
32:10thrust levers
32:10back to idle.
32:12That'd be totally
32:13confusing for the captain.
32:15He'd be saying
32:16this can't be happening.
32:17It's impossible.
32:18It violates
32:19the laws of physics
32:20of aircraft.
32:21But the captain's
32:23thought process
32:23is overtaken
32:24by what happens next.
32:27Overspeed.
32:30The faulty
32:31airspeed data
32:32is now triggering
32:33the overspeed warning.
32:35An overspeed warning
32:37gets your attention
32:38very quickly.
32:39And
32:40you want to react to it.
32:42But this is the time
32:44when he should have
32:45been questioning
32:45whether that was correct.
32:49The first officer
32:50makes a split second
32:52decision.
32:53Take the speed brakes out.
32:57And now
33:00with the power cut
33:01and the speed brakes out
33:04slows the plane down
33:05to the point of stalling.
33:07The erroneous
33:08overspeed data
33:09leads the pilots
33:11to reduce their speed
33:12which puts their plane
33:13into a stall.
33:26The crew
33:27instinctively
33:28lowered the nose
33:29and increased
33:30their actual airspeed.
33:31Those are the steps
33:32that will
33:33keep you from
33:34stalling the airplane.
33:37Responding
33:38to the stall warning
33:39was the right move.
33:41But after that
33:45they hit
33:46further out
33:47to sea
33:47instead of
33:48towards Lima
33:50why would
33:51they do that?
33:56Shortly after
33:57the stall warning
33:58ends
34:00a new warning
34:01tells them
34:02they are dangerously
34:03close to terrain.
34:05The captain
34:06doesn't realize
34:07how close
34:07they are to the water.
34:15Too low
34:16terrain.
34:16and sounds
34:18the ground
34:18proximity warning
34:19when the plane
34:20drops too close
34:21to the terrain.
34:22The ground
34:23proximity warning
34:23system is separate
34:25from the pedostatic
34:26system.
34:26It was telling
34:27them the truth.
34:29Too low terrain.
34:31Too low terrain.
34:32And now we've
34:33induced a terrifying
34:35alert of
34:36I'm about to hit
34:37a mountain.
34:39The pilots
34:40thought they
34:40were near a mountain
34:41when they were
34:42actually approaching
34:43the surface
34:44of the ocean.
34:45Too low terrain.
34:48Let's go left.
34:50Too low terrain.
34:58Radar shows
34:59you're turning left.
35:01You're heading
35:01to the west.
35:02Observative.
35:03We're heading
35:04to 5-0.
35:05We're heading
35:06out to sea
35:07because we have
35:07a low terrain
35:08warning.
35:09Too low terrain.
35:12He knew
35:13that the water,
35:14the ocean,
35:15is to the left
35:16and that's going
35:17to be my safe
35:18environment.
35:19Tink rate.
35:21Tink rate.
35:22No sooner
35:24do they deal
35:24with the terrain
35:25warning than
35:26the pilots
35:26are confronted
35:27by an alert
35:28telling them
35:28they are descending
35:29too rapidly.
35:31Tink rate.
35:32Tink rate.
35:33Let's climb.
35:34Let's go up.
35:35Too low terrain.
35:40Now,
35:40going up
35:41was the right call.
35:42They were descending
35:42at 3,000 feet
35:43per minute.
35:44They climbed
35:45to 4,000 feet
35:46and they stayed there
35:46for
35:49approximately
35:49one minute.
35:56So what led
35:57to the final
35:58plunge
35:58into the sea?
36:00Let's go back
36:00to Lima.
36:01I'll try to intercept
36:02the ILS
36:03and then the set.
36:05After 25
36:06harrowing minutes,
36:07the captain
36:08initiates a turn
36:09back to Lima.
36:10Lima,
36:11Eropero 603.
36:13We will try
36:13to intercept
36:14the ILS.
36:16Can you tell us
36:17our altitude?
36:18Is our altitude...
36:199,700 feet.
36:21Roger.
36:22Eropero 603.
36:23You're showing
36:24level at 9,700.
36:28But when the terrain
36:30warning activates,
36:31investigators know
36:32the plane
36:33was below
36:332,500 feet.
36:36They both
36:37had the wrong
36:38altitude.
36:41Investigators
36:42discover
36:42the controller
36:43was also
36:44providing
36:44flight 603
36:46with incorrect
36:47altitude information.
36:49The assumption
36:50was the controllers
36:51can tell us
36:52our altitude,
36:53but the flaw
36:54in that is
36:54that that altitude
36:55is actually
36:56being sent
36:56to the controller
36:57from the aircraft
36:58itself.
36:59If the information
37:01on board
37:01the aircraft
37:01is incorrect,
37:03then the information
37:04that's being sent
37:05to the radar
37:05is also going
37:06to be incorrect.
37:09Investigators
37:10speak to the controller
37:11to understand
37:12why he relayed
37:13the faulty readings
37:14back to flight 603.
37:17So it looks like
37:18you were providing
37:18the crew
37:19with altitude data.
37:21Yes.
37:21They said
37:22they didn't have
37:22any altimeters,
37:23so I told them
37:24what I was seeing
37:24on my radar screen.
37:27Were you using
37:28SSR in mode C?
37:30Yes, that's right.
37:31Your radar's altitude
37:32is coming from
37:33the plane's transponder.
37:38When the controller
37:40confirmed the altitudes
37:41for the pilots,
37:42I think it gave them
37:43a false sense of hope
37:45that at least
37:45one of our problems
37:46has been solved,
37:47the altitude problem,
37:49when in fact
37:49that was tragically
37:51incorrect.
37:57But even with
37:58the faulty altitude readings,
38:00could the pilots
38:01still have landed
38:02their planes safely?
38:11Pick it up
38:12during their final descent.
38:13To determine if the pilots
38:15had any other options
38:16to save their plane,
38:18investigators listen
38:19to the final moments
38:20of Aero Peru
38:21flight 603.
38:24It seems to be flying well.
38:27Can you tell us
38:28our altitude?
38:28You're at 9,700 feet
38:31according to my radar.
38:32Terrain.
38:34Terrain.
38:35Terrain.
38:35We're at 9,700 feet,
38:36but we're getting
38:37a terrain warning.
38:39The crew can't
38:41understand
38:41the conflicting information.
38:44But there was a way
38:46for the pilots
38:47to determine
38:47their actual altitude
38:49and save the plane.
38:50If they checked
38:51the radio altimeter,
38:52they would have realized
38:53how close they are
38:54to crush them.
38:55Too low.
38:55Terrain.
38:56Too low.
38:57Terrain.
38:58When the ground
38:59proximity warning system
39:00activated in the cockpit,
39:02the crew could have referred
39:03to the radio altimeter
39:05and that would have given
39:06them the truth data
39:07about how high they were
39:08above the ground.
39:10Too low.
39:10Terrain.
39:12Too low.
39:12Terrain.
39:13But they never check
39:14their radio altimeter.
39:16Pull up.
39:17Too low.
39:18Terrain.
39:19Pull up.
39:20Pull up.
39:21Pull up.
39:22We're just telling you to pull up.
39:23Terrain.
39:25Too low.
39:26Terrain.
39:27We're hitting the water.
39:28Up.
39:29Too low.
39:29Terrain.
39:30When an aircraft
39:31has its wing
39:32touched the water
39:33in a bank attitude,
39:37the situation is hopeless.
39:39Pull up.
39:40Terrain.
39:40Pull up.
39:41Terrain.
39:42Terrain.
39:43Pull up.
39:44Terrain.
39:45Terrain.
39:46Terrain.
39:46Terrain.
39:46Terrain.
39:47Pull up.
39:47Terrain.
39:48The pilots try to get
39:49the plane back in the air,
39:53but the plane banks left
39:55and falls back towards the sea.
39:58We're running over.
40:00Terrain.
40:01Pull up.
40:03Marine.
40:03Marine.
40:04Ah!
40:12They really had no idea
40:13how low they were.
40:14And all those alarms
40:16fall so real
40:16just made matters worse.
40:29The situation in the cockpit
40:30was so confusing.
40:35It was hard for either crew member
40:37to understand which cautions
40:38and warnings were true
40:40and important.
40:41And there didn't seem
40:42to be a good balance
40:43between the two crew members
40:45in sorting that out.
40:48For investigators,
40:50there's one final
40:51unanswered question.
40:54Were the pilots
40:55properly prepared
40:55to handle an emergency
40:56like this?
40:58They examined
40:59the quick reference handbook,
41:01which provides guidance
41:02in emergency situations,
41:04as well as
41:05Aero Peru's
41:06training procedures.
41:10Well, there's nothing here.
41:12Anything in the training procedures?
41:15Not one single word
41:16on how to handle
41:16erroneous air data.
41:21The lack of training
41:22worked against them.
41:26A big takeaway
41:27from this accident
41:28was that flight crews
41:29need to be better trained
41:31to get to pitch
41:32and power
41:33in the event
41:33of unreliable airspeed
41:35and altitude.
41:40Investigators
41:41needed only two months
41:42to solve the mystery
41:44of Flight 603.
41:46They now know
41:47that blocked static ports
41:51created faulty
41:52air data readings.
41:56And those faulty readings
41:58created so much confusion
42:00in the cockpit
42:01that the overwhelmed crew
42:08was unable to separate
42:09the false alarms
42:10from the true ones.
42:15They really needed
42:16to develop
42:16a laser focus
42:17on just flying
42:18the airplane,
42:19but they never got there.
42:22The captain's failure
42:23to react
42:24to the ground proximity
42:25warnings in time
42:27He's telling you
42:28to pull up!
42:30We're hitting the water!
42:31Pull up!
42:31Pull up!
42:34Contributed
42:34to the death
42:35of 70 people.
42:53There's nothing
42:54highly technical
42:55about tape,
42:56but boy,
42:57did it start
42:57a chain of events.
43:02The investigation's report
43:04outlines a number
43:05of recommendations,
43:07but chief among them
43:08is for more training
43:09to ensure crews
43:11know how to deal
43:12with inaccurate air data
43:15and implementing
43:16the use of
43:17eye-catching
43:18static port covers
43:19while a plane
43:20is being maintained.
43:22Remember,
43:24it's the simple things
43:25that cause problems,
43:28and we need to keep
43:30that in everybody's mind.
43:32Attention to detail,
43:33if you perform
43:35that detail,
43:35whatever it is,
43:37you're not going
43:38to get problems.
43:42This accident
43:44was one of the pillars
43:46of safety procedures.
43:51Our training changed,
43:53our pre-flight procedures
43:54changed,
43:56our attention
43:56to details changed,
43:58and it still lives
44:00to this day.
44:00recovery today.
44:06CLAIMANISM
44:07just
44:15of the
44:16eventual
44:16invasion
44:16and
44:16you
44:17like
44:17to
44:18you
44:18can
44:21play
44:28out
44:29or
44:29keep
44:29these점
44:29up
44:30continue
44:30to
Comments