00:10China's propaganda and influence operations are in the spotlight after officials in two
00:15different countries found themselves at the center of Beijing's public attacks in recent months.
00:22Our first stop is the Philippines. A Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson has found himself at
00:28the center of Beijing's latest messaging campaign. The Chinese embassy in Manila has repeatedly
00:35criticized him after he challenged Beijing's actions in the South China Sea. And he's not alone.
00:42Other Filipino officials and even journalists have been singled out. Chinese state media and
00:49pro-Beijing Voices Online quickly amplified the accusations, pushing the narrative across
00:55television and social media. So is this just diplomatic sparring or part of a messaging
01:01campaign we're seeing across the region? And what can journalists and media organizations
01:07do to respond?
01:09Joining us from Manila is Philippine journalist Regine Kabato. And also with us in the studio
01:16is Summer Chen, founder of FactLink, a Taiwan-based initiative on digital investigation and media
01:23and AI literacy. Thank you both for joining us. Regine, let me start with you. How did you and your
01:29organization, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, end up getting dragged into these online
01:35attacks from Chinese embassy in Manila?
01:39The Chinese embassy has been in a bit of a word war for a few months now with the Coast
01:44Guard spokesman
01:45for issues on the West Philippines Sea, Jay Tariela. They have constantly been on his case. And because Jay
01:52Tariela in late February had shared a story of ours that was basically analyzing pro-China narratives,
02:00the embassy threw that into their mix of statements against Tariela and in effect that also included the PCIJ.
02:09They used that statement as an opportunity to kind of point out that the PCIJ is receiving or has
02:16received funding supposedly from National Endowment for Democracy by the embassy's claim that effectively
02:23means that the PCIJ is a tool of U.S. propaganda. That was their insinuation. The PCIJ historically has
02:32been an independent media outlet, a small watchdog newsroom that has played a huge role in corruption
02:39busting in Philippine history and in explanatory and investigative journalism. And we get a bunch
02:47of funding from different places, including the UN. And none of these funders dictate what we publish.
02:53PCIJ has been quite supportive. I'm actually just a freelancer with them. I'm just a contributor.
02:59And so in our point of view, and from the analysts that we consulted, we saw that these are potential
03:05indicators of at least a semi-coordinated harassment campaign. So we responded by releasing a carousel
03:13that broke down a bit of the data around this initial attack. And since then, the embassy has
03:19released at least around three more rebuttals of the PCIJ insinuations that we are U.S. propaganda and the
03:26like. But thankfully, there have been a lot of other organizations that have come to the PCIJ's
03:32defense, including the Committee to Protect Journalists and a bunch of other local media
03:37coalitions and organizations, such as the National Union for Journalists, the Foreign Correspondents
03:44Association. I think this response is quite different from other contexts in Southeast Asia,
03:50because the Philippines is very protective of its free press, I would say. And they understand that
03:56we are one of the few places in Southeast Asia that can criticize China as openly as we can or
04:02that.
04:02And we want to protect that freedom, at least in the media industry. And that's why the response has
04:07been so much support. But I'm curious about you as a journalist when you're being attacked by a foreign
04:14entity. How does that impact you and how does it affect your reporting? It has been scary,
04:19I will admit. I think that there is maybe a bit of enlightenment in the idea that the embassy did
04:28not name me outright. However, they did post my name and face because of the screen cap that they
04:34lifted from Jay Tariela's page. Mostly, they've been attacking PCIJ as a newsroom. So I'm not sure what
04:41that means for me as an individual. However, I'd like to say that I personally have nothing against China.
04:47I'm still very happy to continue to report about China, even though it is admittedly
04:52a little scary to know that you are on their radar in this way. But I think that if you
04:58close
04:58read the article, there has been nuance in it, in that we've been careful to distinguish between
05:03what we can say are actual China state-linked operations and what are influence operations that
05:10are linked more closely to these bloggers. So the wording that we used in our story,
05:15for example, was pro-China influence. We didn't say Chinese state influence because we don't know
05:22at some points where the intervention of the state begins and at what point interference or influence
05:29can become organic. Now, Summer, we've seen China go after politicians and spokespeople. Is it common
05:36for them to go after journalists like this? We are safe in Taiwan. However, as Taiwanese fact checkers,
05:44because I always debunking the propaganda from China and the very malicious disinformation,
05:51is maybe originated from China. We can't see the throats. So I won't travel to China, even transferred
05:59in Hong Kong.
06:01Even as a fact checker, you're worried about these threats and it has changed kind of your own travel
06:07plans or your willingness to go to China. Rajin, you mentioned the connection between Chinese influence
06:13operations in the Philippines and supporters of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte.
06:19Your organization, other organizations have looked into this. What have you found?
06:24So a number of them have actually been found and have admitted to attending content training
06:31in Beijing. I'd like to say though, and this is something that we were very careful to mention
06:35in our article, that this by itself is not necessarily an indicator that you are co-opted
06:42or that you are a tool of the Chinese state. A more accurate indicator as to whether you produce
06:48content that's favorable of the Chinese state is to really look at narrative analysis
06:53and at the things that these influencers say once they get back to the Philippines.
06:58And for the influencers that we've monitored, and in fact, they even play a complementary role in that
07:05it was these influencers that effectively worked as attack dogs for China critics. They were
07:12constantly parroting Beijing rhetoric, Ro-Beijing arguments. That might not necessarily be bad in
07:19and of itself. I mean, there is free speech in the Philippines. However, the methodology of these
07:25influencers would very often be to bully, to gaslight, to shame, basically to use kind of mercenary
07:32disinformation tactics against people who, one, were at the forefront of the transparency initiative in
07:40the Philippines with regards to China's maritime harassment in South China Sea. And two, people
07:45who just genuinely have legitimate questions about China. Even if they completely deny that they would,
07:51say for example, explicitly be on China's payroll, that setup might not matter because effectively,
07:57they are arguing for China if you close read their content.
08:02Summer, do we see influencers in Taiwan also pushing a pro-China narrative?
08:08We think we need to be very careful because we are a democracy society. So people can have their
08:15freedom of speech. They can have their political attitude and their opinions. So that's why we say the
08:23influence is so hard to tell them if they are per-China or if they have the other context that
08:31we don't know.
08:32I think in Taiwan, there are two kinds. We can say there are two kinds of influence we need to
08:37watch out.
08:39And one kind is they are political figures and they have the connection and they have the contract with
08:47China's media. So their shorts or their talk show, they were spreading by China's media and especially
08:56of Fujian media. And the other kind is they are like celebrities and they are pretty famous and they
09:05have the social impact in Taiwan and they are invited and the treat to China and the saying China is
09:13great.
09:13And also there are a lot of young people. They are from Taiwan. They stay in China and they are
09:21making a lot of shorts.
09:23So in very crucial moments, like whenever Taiwan has military drills and we can see lots of shorts,
09:32they are indicating those young generation, young influence the saying, oh, I think PLA is great.
09:39They need to come to Taiwan. They need to come to Taiwan. I will be very welcome to them. So
09:43those kind of shorts
09:44happened in a very crucial moment. That will be very suspicious for me.
09:51Now, Rajin, you've called this the weaponization of influencer diplomacy. Can you tell us very briefly,
09:59what does that mean and what kinds of narratives they're pushing in the Philippines?
10:03So influencer diplomacy, usually it's a toolkit of diplomats, right? So China and other countries
10:10have very often deployed influencers to act as cultural ambassadors for tourism, for the Olympics.
10:18It's a fair tool for soft power. But what we're seeing in this particular case is that influencers are
10:24being recruited for political commentating, or at least China benefits from their political commentary,
10:31whether or not they're actively recruited. However, there's this move from soft power to their use
10:38for sharper power, and their content effectively serves the purpose of China's interests. The alumni of
10:45these Beijing-sponsored content training programs, we don't know what goes on when they go into these
10:50trainings. It's effectively a black box. Very often, I mentioned one argument that comes out of them,
10:55where they basically deny China's expansionist ambition. There is also very prevalent anti-US
11:02rhetoric that comes out of that as well. Painting the Philippines as a tool or as a puppet of the
11:09US is
11:09a very common narrative. However, it's different from organic criticism of the US, for example, leftist
11:17activists being able to criticize both the US and China. But pro-Duterte influencers, for example,
11:23will always criticize the US, but never level the same criticism against China. And then you have
11:30smear against people who are at the forefront of the transparency campaign. Another common narrative
11:36that's come up is a kind of economic narrative where the Philippines and Filipinos need China and
11:41need China products. If you are not for China, or if you're willing to pick a fight with them, so
11:49to
11:49speak in the West Philippine Sea, then you shouldn't be buying China products at all. And one other
11:55narrative that's quite prevalent as well is the kind of doomerism or doomsday rhetoric where they
12:01believe that, oh, you're poking the dragon pretty much. If you stand up to China, you are effectively
12:07inviting war by being pro the transparency initiative in South China Sea, which is quite an oversimplification,
12:15I would say, and analysts would say, of the Philippine diplomatic and security approach to
12:22South China Sea. We've been speaking with journalist Regine Cabado in Manila and Summer Chen, founder of
12:28Taiwan-based Factlink. You can find our full conversation on how China's playbook is targeting
12:34Taiwan and Japan on Correspondence Playlist on our website and YouTube.
12:39Thanks for watching.
13:16For more information, visit www.caption.ca.gov.au.
13:21www.caption.ca.gov
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