- 12 minutes ago
Category
📺
TVTranscript
00:04As Air Algerie flight 6289 lifts off from Tamanrassit, Algeria,
00:11Air traffic controllers hear an explosion.
00:22The plane crashes into the desert.
00:25102 people are killed.
00:29Investigators examine engine debris found on the runway.
00:33Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guideway.
00:36They know an engine failed, but not why the pilots couldn't recover.
00:41Pilots are expected to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine.
00:47The investigation reveals a crew that was struggling, not with the plane.
00:52Let go. Take your hand away.
00:53I let go. I let go.
00:55But with each other.
00:56Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
01:21It's early afternoon in the middle of the Sahara desert in Algeria.
01:26The crew of flight 6289 readies for its upcoming journey at the remote Tamanrassit-Aguenar airport.
01:37Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:40There are 97 passengers on board.
01:43Among them, members of the local football team headed to a tournament and military personnel.
01:50Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:52Though there are some European nationals, almost everyone on board is Algerian.
02:00Okay.
02:07Sure, long.
02:08Now the instrument transfer switches.
02:11Normal.
02:13In the cockpit, preflight checks are underway.
02:18Their damper.
02:21On.
02:23Today's flight is operated by Air Algerie, a state-owned national carrier.
02:29Air Algerie is a publicly-owned company that is owned by the country of Algeria.
02:34The country takes a lot of pride in this particular airline
02:39because it is the face name of the country as it goes all around the world.
02:51Yes, the wind is calm, temperature 23, QNH 1020, QFE 965.
02:59Copy, we'll call you back for engine start.
03:0344-year-old Fatima Yousfi is the first officer of this flight.
03:08She is Algeria's first female commercial pilot.
03:13The female first officer was one of the first women to be hired in an airline in Algeria,
03:20which would be a big deal in such a male-dominated field, especially in that country.
03:26As the first woman to pilot a Boeing 747 trans-oceanic flight,
03:31Lynn Rippelmeyer knows what it's like to blaze a trail.
03:38Aviation was then and still is in some cases a boys club.
03:45Back in the beginning of when women were initially beginning in aviation here in the States,
03:51maybe it's like it was for her, that it was unusual.
04:01Tamanrasset, 6289. We request clearance for Khardaya.
04:05Received. We will call you back.
04:11Hey, Bualam.
04:13Hey.
04:13We've got some Tamanrasset football players back there.
04:16Oh. Tell them we're rooting for them this weekend.
04:2048-year-old captain Bualem Benawicha has over 10,000 flying hours.
04:26A thousand of those hours are on the Boeing 737.
04:29The captain was highly experienced, had been flying for over 20 years
04:33and then flown all kinds of aircraft from small aircraft to large jetliners.
04:396289 Tamanrasset.
04:41Go.
04:42Start approved. Call back for taxi.
04:44Roger.
04:47At 3 p.m. the pilots get clearance to start up the engines.
04:53Okay, B4 start checklist. Fuel quantity.
04:579,800 kg.
05:00Pumps?
05:03On.
05:06Flight 6289 is a Boeing 737-200, an early generation of the popular twin-engine jetliner.
05:16The Boeing 737 is one of the most common types of commercial airliners in the world,
05:22and there are different variations of it.
05:25The Boeing 737-200 is an original version of the 737,
05:31so it's an older model, and it's not as highly sophisticated in technology as the current 737s.
05:43Flight 6289 will be departing from Tamanrasset,
05:47with a scheduled stop in Gardaia, and then on to the capital, Algiers.
05:53The total flying time is approximately three hours.
06:02That is taxi, Air Al-Jerri, 6289.
06:076289 Tamanrasset. Taxi onto runway 02 and backtrack. Wind 030 at 10 knots.
06:14Roger.
06:16As they taxi to the runway, passengers settle in for the journey.
06:40We are ready, 6289.
06:456289 Tamanrasset. Clear for takeoff runway 02. Wind 330 at 12 knots.
06:50Clear for takeoff runway 02 at SGD 6289.
07:04You have 90 knots.
07:06100 knots.
07:23B1. Rotate.
07:30But seconds after takeoff...
07:33Gear up.
07:35A loud explosion rocks the airplane.
07:44Bismillah. What's going on?
07:46The pilots assess the situation.
07:49Let go, let go.
07:50I let go, I let go.
07:54Passengers sense something has gone wrong.
07:59We have a small problem, 6289.
08:026289 Tamanrasset.
08:07The 737 is approaching a stall.
08:176289 Tamanrasset.
08:18Are you in an emergency?
08:27Don't sink.
08:29Don't sink.
08:30Don't sink.
08:31Don't sink.
08:32The pilots make desperate attempts to recover the aircraft...
08:37but their efforts are in vain.
08:40The plane goes into a free-fall.
08:43The passengers brace themselves.
08:55The plane bursts into flames and skids across the desert just outside Tamanrasset Airport.
09:04Emergency response is immediately activated and firefighters rush to the scene.
09:16The impact and the fire that ensued afterwards made survival very unlikely for the passengers in the aircraft.
09:25But then, against all odds, rescuers discover a survivor, not within the wreckage but lying in the distant sand, clinging
09:35to life.
09:36A gentleman seated all the way in the back that didn't have his seatbelt on, so when the airplane crashed
09:42and broke apart, he was thrown free.
09:46He shows only faint signs of life as an ambulance rushes him to hospital in critical condition.
09:54Defying all expectations, the man's condition soon stabilizes and he begins to recover.
10:00This passenger's luck cannot be overstated in what was Algeria's worst aviation accident at the time.
10:09He is the sole survivor out of 103 passengers and crew.
10:15While the country mourns the tragic loss of a football squad, Algerian and French families grieve their loved ones and
10:24soon demand answers.
10:31The investigation into the crash of Flight 6289 is conducted by a commission of inquiry established by the Algerian Ministry
10:41of Transport.
10:42They receive support from several international agencies, including the NTSB, America's National Transportation Safety Board.
10:52I was the U.S. accredited representative for this accident to assist the Algerians.
10:57Initially, I wasn't going to travel to the scene.
11:00However, the U.S. ambassador to Algeria requested our assistance.
11:07While Algerian investigators await the arrival of their American colleagues, they interview the Taman Rasset air traffic controller.
11:17Did the pilots indicate that there was an issue?
11:22The first officer called only seconds after takeoff.
11:28We have a small problem, 6289.
11:32Pilots typically are hesitant to call Mayday, Mayday, or announce some type of emergency, particularly if they really don't know
11:42what the situation and the critical nature of the situation is.
11:47And what was the problem?
11:49They didn't say.
11:51But I heard something that sounded like an explosion.
11:56Seconds later, the plane was falling out of the sky.
12:00You said an explosion?
12:03That's what it sounded like.
12:06Like a bomb?
12:11Couldn't say.
12:16So in 2003, Algeria was not the safest place.
12:19There was bombings and terrorist activities because they were coming out of 11 years of civil war.
12:28When the plane fell, was it in one piece?
12:31Yes, it was.
12:34Investigators found the airplane intact.
12:36There are no claims of responsibility by terrorists.
12:39So it pretty much ruled out that there was some type of nefarious means to bring the aircraft down.
12:46Can you describe how the plane fell?
12:49It was nose up and crashed near the threshold of runway 20.
12:59The controller and other witnesses saw that the airplane was struggling to climb,
13:04had a nose-high pitch attitude, and then impact the ground.
13:10Eyewitnesses recall that the plane struggled to gain enough lift to remain airborne,
13:15an indication it was in a stall.
13:19One week after the incident, Algerian investigators are joined by a member of the NTSB.
13:29The air traffic controller and witnesses described seeing a stall,
13:33and one witness remarked that the landing gear was down.
13:37If the landing gear is still down while the aircraft is trying to climb,
13:42it creates a lot of drag on that airplane.
13:45It takes a lot of thrust and a lot of power to maintain the climb
13:49to overcome all that drag from the landing gear.
13:54That would affect a plane's ability to climb, but that alone wouldn't cause a stall.
13:59That has to have been something else.
14:01Do you have to load sheets?
14:02Yes, right here.
14:05One of the big questions is about the aircraft weight,
14:08because if you're too heavy, you won't climb as well as if you're within the weight envelope.
14:16Investigators review the plane's load sheet to see if the plane was overweight before takeoff.
14:21Looks like the first officer made some corrections here.
14:26While reviewing the load sheet, the first officer notices the fuel weight is wrong
14:31and changes it from 8,800 kilograms to the correct amount of 9,800 kilograms.
14:43So, with those corrections, the weight at takeoff would have been 48,708 kilograms.
14:50And the maximum weight allowed at takeoff would be 49,500 kilograms.
14:56The first officer noticed that there was a 1,000 kilo difference and passenger count was a little bit off,
15:03which didn't make a whole lot of difference in the overall weight and balance,
15:06but did show that she was very attentive in her duties.
15:11The aircraft weight was right up against the maximum takeoff weight.
15:15Even though it was heavy, the aircraft weight shouldn't have affected the performance too much.
15:20What about mechanical failure?
15:23I'll get the maintenance reports.
15:27Investigators make sure that the maintenance is clean
15:30and the aircraft has a clean bill of health prior to the flight.
15:37It was up to date in its maintenance cycle.
15:40No work deferred, no technical exemptions.
15:44The maintenance reports provide no leads.
15:48Maybe there was an environmental factor at play.
15:52Take a look at this.
15:54Did the location of the airport have something to do with the stall?
16:01Temperature's 23 degrees Celsius, so it's hot.
16:05Tamarissat is in a harsh desert climate,
16:07and the high temperatures can affect the aircraft's performance and climb.
16:12And the airport sits at 4,518 feet above sea level.
16:17At this altitude, the air is already thin.
16:20If you factor in the heat, it's high-density altitude
16:25that affects the performance of the airplane,
16:27so it's generating much less lift over the wings,
16:30so it takes longer to get the airplane airborne.
16:34So just a few pounds below max takeoff weight,
16:37high-elevation airport,
16:39high temperature, landing gear extended.
16:42That could definitely cause a plane to stall.
16:45But that doesn't explain the explosion.
16:48Right.
16:48What are we missing?
16:58Investigators study the crash site of Flight 6289
17:02for evidence that could explain the explosion
17:04heard seconds after takeoff.
17:08So, the first point of impact is here.
17:145,396 feet from the takeoff point.
17:18Skidded through the airport perimeter fence,
17:21across the road, and came to rest here,
17:23less than 300 feet outside of the airport.
17:36The plane's destroyed by the fire,
17:37but the main wreckage is practically in one piece,
17:40except for the rear section.
17:42And look at this debris.
17:44This was on the runway, right about here.
17:50Engine debris.
17:53On the runway will be found a large quantity of engine debris,
17:56which is indicative of an engine shelling,
17:58when a large quantity of engine blades
18:01are thrown out the back end of an engine.
18:06It's an old adage in accident investigation,
18:09what fails first, falls first.
18:13So, if they find debris prior to finding the wreckage,
18:17then they know that happened prior to the accident.
18:20So, one of the engines blew out.
18:22That must have been the explosion the controller hurt.
18:26What caused the engine failure?
18:30We needed to get our eyes on those engines
18:32to determine which failed and why it failed.
18:36Investigators begin a visual inspection
18:38of the plane's engines, starting with the right one.
18:42Take a look at the fan blades.
18:46Heavy deformation.
18:48It was definitely rotating at the time of impact.
18:52On the right engine, we showed that it was turning at impact.
18:56We don't know exactly what level of thrust it was rotating at.
19:02If the right engine was operating on impact,
19:05then did the left engine fail?
19:12These turbine blades have far fewer deformations
19:15than the right engine.
19:15Looks like it was barely moving.
19:18The hot section is completely torn apart.
19:22In an engine's hot section,
19:24fuel is ignited in a combustion chamber,
19:27generating a powerful stream of hot air
19:30that spins the turbine blades.
19:34The damage is evidence that the left engine failed.
19:38We knew that the failure was in the hot section,
19:41so we had to follow every lead that we could
19:44to determine where the failure occurred.
19:53There's a bunch of blades missing from the hot section.
19:56The missing pieces are most likely
19:59the debris that we found on the runway.
20:01We found that the hot section
20:02was basically corn-cobbed, as we say.
20:05There was not many blades left in the hot section,
20:09and there was metal all over the place.
20:12What caused the blades to break?
20:14Let's get some of these parts out on the table.
20:18And we wanted to further tear down the engine.
20:20We wanted to look at the failures under the microscope.
20:23We wanted to look at the metallurgical aspects of the failure.
20:26We wanted to look to see if there was a bird strike.
20:29Investigators begin by examining components
20:32from the hot section
20:33in search of pre-existing defects.
20:38Managed to remove the sediment from the nozzle vein.
20:46Nozzle guide vanes direct the hot air flow
20:49in the combustion chamber
20:50to the blades of the high-pressure turbine,
20:53causing them to spin.
21:00Interesting.
21:15Looks like there's a fatigue crack
21:17in the nozzle guide vanes.
21:20Investigators find evidence of fatigue cracks
21:23in two of the left engine's nozzle guide vanes.
21:27This type of cracking occurs over time,
21:29and as the engine ages,
21:31these cracks get slightly larger,
21:33and eventually they will fail,
21:35and it will destroy the entire engine.
21:40If this was a progressive failure,
21:42why wasn't it caught earlier?
21:46This type of cracking is typical of an older engine,
21:49and it's a progressive failure.
21:50So that gets us into the question of
21:52what was the maintenance history,
21:53what was the inspection criteria
21:55that was used by the operator?
21:58Investigators look into the engine's repair history.
22:04It looks like the left engine was completely overhauled four years ago.
22:09When would have been the last time
22:10they looked at the nozzle guide vanes?
22:12During the hot section maintenance inspection,
22:15which was last year.
22:17Any mention of cracking?
22:19Any work done on any of them?
22:23Inspections of the hot section
22:24are meant to catch fatigue cracks.
22:26So why weren't these found?
22:29Since this was an Algerian registered aircraft,
22:32it falls under the authority
22:34of the Algerian Civil Aviation Authority
22:36for oversight of the inspection,
22:39not the FAA,
22:40which typically has more stringent requirements.
22:43The crack formed at some point.
22:45It was missed during the inspection last year.
22:48It grew and grew until point of failure
22:50and then blew out at takeoff.
22:52That explains why the engine failed.
22:55Not why the plane stalled.
22:59Pilots are expected to demonstrate their ability
23:01to fly out of a situation
23:04either on takeoff or landing
23:06where they've lost an engine.
23:09Investigators examine the crew's training records
23:11to determine if they knew how to handle
23:13a single-engine failure on takeoff.
23:18The first officer's last exercise
23:20in engine failure during takeoff
23:22was four months ago.
23:23The captain's training was even more recent,
23:26only two months before the crash.
23:27They both should have known
23:28what to do in this situation.
23:33They've got the airplane veering to the left.
23:36There's no way they didn't know that engine failed.
23:40So what did they actually do?
23:48Investigators prepare to listen
23:50to the cockpit voice recorder
23:51from Air Algerie Flight 6289.
23:56It was very important for us to listen to the CVR
23:58to determine how the pilots dealt
24:00with this engine failure.
24:02Got it queued up to right before takeoff.
24:21They hear the sound of the engine failing
24:24five seconds after takeoff.
24:27Bismillah, what's going on?
24:31Let go, let go.
24:32I let go, I let go.
24:37They transferred control
24:39in the middle of an emergency.
24:41That didn't even sound like a proper transfer.
24:43He just took the controls.
24:45For another pilot to take control
24:48from the pilot who is flying,
24:50the pilot needs to say,
24:52I've got it.
24:53Taking control of the airplane
24:54without saying he was taking control
24:56made things worse for him
24:58and for the first officer.
25:00The captain is the pilot monitoring.
25:02He shouldn't be taking over.
25:03He should be diagnosing the problem.
25:06So, do either of them identify
25:08a left engine failure?
25:12After handing over control
25:13to the captain,
25:14the first officer realizes
25:16they aren't properly configured
25:18to climb with only one engine.
25:22Get up or are we okay?
25:24But there's no response from the captain.
25:28We have a small problem, 62-89.
25:3162-89, coming up.
25:35Just seconds after the engine failure,
25:38the situation deteriorates
25:40as the plane begins to stall.
25:47There are no attempts by the pilots
25:49to work together
25:50to identify or troubleshoot the problem.
25:53Let go.
25:54Take your hand away.
25:55I let go.
25:56I let go.
25:56Let go.
25:57Take your hand away.
25:58I let go.
25:59Don't think.
26:01Seconds later,
26:02the ground proximity warning activates,
26:04indicating the plane
26:05is getting dangerously close to the ground.
26:10Please.
26:10Take your hand away.
26:13Both pilots really didn't know
26:15what the other was doing,
26:16didn't know what the other expected of them,
26:18and may well have been working
26:19at cross purposes.
26:21And as a result of that,
26:23the team performance broke down.
26:27Don't think.
26:28Don't think.
26:34I don't hear a single mention
26:35of engine failure.
26:36And why was he telling her
26:38to let go so many times?
26:39Was she trying to take back
26:40control of the plane?
26:42Which one of them
26:43is actually flying the plane?
26:45When all was said and done,
26:47the pilots did not work together.
26:48Without more information
26:50from the flight data recorder,
26:51we really don't know exactly
26:53what they did
26:53to control the airplane.
26:56Investigators turned
26:57to the flight data recorder,
26:59or FDR,
27:00from flight 6289,
27:02to determine how the pilots
27:03tried to recover
27:04from the loss
27:05of the left engine.
27:07Flight data recorders
27:08are important to investigators
27:10because it gives them information
27:12on how the pilots
27:13were operating the airplane
27:15and how they were managing
27:17the critical situation
27:19they were in.
27:21Not much here.
27:23Older plane,
27:24older FDR.
27:26It doesn't actually tell us
27:28how the pilots
27:28were handling
27:29the engine failure.
27:32Because we only had
27:33five parameters
27:34on the FDR,
27:35we had to go to Boeing
27:36and ask for a detailed
27:37aircraft performance analysis
27:39to determine
27:40what happened
27:41on this accident flight.
27:45Using the FDR's
27:47limited data,
27:48Boeing's performance study
27:50includes a reconstruction
27:51of engine operations
27:53and flight controls
27:54in the final moments
27:55of the flight.
27:58So,
27:59there is the left engine
28:00losing its thrust
28:01after it blows out.
28:04That's odd.
28:05The data
28:06from the fully functioning
28:08right engine
28:08shows something unexpected.
28:11Look at the thrust
28:12from the right engine.
28:14Yes, it seems
28:15to be going up and down.
28:16But we know
28:17it was working fine.
28:18That can only mean one thing.
28:26What's going on?
28:28The team finds evidence
28:29of thrust being added
28:31to the right engine.
28:33Let's go, let's go.
28:34And then pulled back.
28:36I let go, I let go.
28:39When one engine fails,
28:41what you need
28:42is maximum power
28:43on the other engine,
28:45not reduce it.
28:46So, thrust is pulled down,
28:49then back up,
28:51then down,
28:52then back up again.
28:55We have a small problem,
28:566289.
28:586289,
28:59come at that set.
29:04Let go.
29:08It's as if they were
29:09having some sort of
29:11tug of war.
29:12It shouldn't have been.
29:14First officer did the right thing
29:16by increasing the power
29:17of the right engine.
29:19What likely happened
29:20is that the captain
29:21wasn't fully aware
29:22of which engine had failed.
29:23However,
29:24the first officer
29:25knew that the left engine
29:27had failed
29:28and was trying
29:28to push up the throttle
29:29on the right engine
29:31to keep them from stalling.
29:36Let go.
29:36Take your hand away.
29:37I let go.
29:38I let go.
29:38Let go.
29:39Take your hand away.
29:40Let go.
29:40I let go.
29:41Don't think.
29:43Don't think.
29:45The captain's basically
29:47telling the first officer
29:48to get out of his way,
29:50to leave him alone,
29:51to let him be in charge
29:54of the airplane
29:55by himself,
29:56which he was.
29:57Knowing that the left engine
29:59had failed,
29:59the first officer
30:00might have been trying
30:01to help things out
30:02by increasing the power
30:03on the right engine.
30:05Please.
30:06Take your hand away.
30:13The moment the captain
30:14reduced the thrust
30:15on the right engine
30:16and never returned it
30:17to takeoff thrust,
30:19with the gear down,
30:20it doomed the flight.
30:23Pilots should have been
30:24able to work together
30:25to recover the plane.
30:27These planes are designed
30:29to fly with a team.
30:31Pilot flying,
30:32pilot not flying,
30:33both have very specific roles
30:35that they are trained
30:36to do,
30:38but especially
30:39in emergencies.
30:41They stay in their roles,
30:42they help each other,
30:43they work as a team,
30:44and this crash
30:46could have been avoided
30:47if they would have done that.
30:50Why didn't the crew
30:51of Air Algerie
30:53Flight 6289
30:54work together
30:55to prevent the loss
30:56of 102 lives?
31:00OK, I'll cue it up
31:03to the pre-flight preparations.
31:07Investigators returned
31:08to the cockpit voice recording
31:09of Flight 6289
31:11to understand
31:12why there was
31:13a lack of coordination
31:14between the two pilots.
31:18Now the instrument
31:19starts for switches.
31:21Normal.
31:22Yard damper.
31:25On.
31:28They listen
31:29as the first officer
31:30works through
31:30the pre-flight checklist.
31:32They're surprised
31:33by what they don't hear.
31:37Where's the captain?
31:39Is she doing
31:40the flight preparation
31:40by herself?
31:43Stratization mode selector.
31:46Auto.
31:47OK, flight instruments.
31:50We found that
31:51the first officer
31:52was actually in the cockpit
31:53by herself,
31:54conducting most of the
31:55the pre-flight work
31:57without the captain.
32:01It's unusual
32:02for the captain
32:04not to be present
32:05during the pre-flight
32:06because there are
32:06responsibilities
32:07that the captain has
32:08to get his side
32:09of the airplane ready.
32:11It's just inappropriate
32:13for the captain
32:13not to be in the cockpit
32:16during the pre-flight,
32:17and it's actually
32:18kind of rude.
32:20It's only after
32:21the first officer
32:22completes the pre-flight
32:24preparations
32:24that the captain
32:25enters the cockpit.
32:27The last Q&H,
32:281019.
32:291019, Roger.
32:31Good afternoon, Captain.
32:33How are we looking?
32:35Good.
32:36I completed
32:37the pre-flight checklist.
32:38I tested your oxygen,
32:39and everything is set to go.
32:42Good, good.
32:45Captain Benwisha is late,
32:47leaving his responsibilities
32:48to the first officer.
32:50When the captain showed up,
32:52he was not in the mindset
32:53of getting brought up
32:55to speed
32:56or being part of the team
32:57of setting the cockpit
32:58up for the flight.
33:02Heading.
33:04020.
33:06Altitude.
33:08Investigators then hear
33:09the pilots performing
33:10their before-start checklist.
33:13280.
33:14You know,
33:15I could have been on the team
33:16with those boys back there.
33:18Give me a break.
33:19Who's the third voice?
33:21Flight attendant?
33:25The only male flight attendant
33:26is the chief flight attendant.
33:30Okay, takeoff speeds.
33:33As part of the checklist,
33:34the first officer reviews
33:36the takeoff speeds.
33:40V1, 144 knots.
33:44VR, 146 knots.
33:45You're saying you were good enough
33:46to turn pro?
33:48Yeah.
33:48I was a good footy player.
33:51You wanted a scout
33:51to come watch me play.
33:52Yeah, they were scouting you
33:53to mow the pitch.
33:57V2, 150 knots.
33:59Okay, that's enough.
34:00I understand.
34:01Can we go?
34:03I got it.
34:03I got it.
34:04Let's go.
34:10So the captain
34:10is just carrying on
34:11a conversation with his friend
34:12while they're doing
34:13their before-start checklist.
34:15What is even worse
34:15is he cuts her off
34:16before they could even finish it.
34:20One of the most important parts
34:22of the information
34:23that she was trying to give
34:24were the takeoff speeds
34:26and then there should have been
34:28a briefing
34:29of an engine failure departure
34:33at this airport
34:34that was a special departure
34:36that needed to be briefed.
34:38It was ignored.
34:41Did the captain become more focused
34:43once they began to taxi?
34:46Roger.
34:47Taxi for runway is 0-2.
34:49What investigators find most shocking
34:52is what they hear next.
34:58Where are we eating tonight?
35:01That place across from the hotel.
35:03Oh, you always go back
35:05to that same place.
35:06I like what I like.
35:08We are now cheers.
35:09Plenty of good spots to eat.
35:12They are completely distracted.
35:14They're violating
35:15every sterile cockpit rule.
35:18During critical phases of flight,
35:20extraneous conversations
35:21and non-essential conversations
35:23between the crew members
35:24are prohibited.
35:25Not only is the captain
35:26dismissing the first officer,
35:28he has this casual attitude
35:30about basic safety practices.
35:33It's possible he was more interested
35:35in talking to the flight attendant
35:36than reviewing the briefing
35:38with the first officer.
35:39It's possible that he had been
35:42through so many pre-flight
35:43takeoff briefings
35:44that at that time
35:45he felt it was unnecessary.
35:51Bismillah.
35:52What's going on?
35:56Let go, let go, let go.
35:58I let go, I let go.
35:59As a result of his
36:00dismissive attitude,
36:02the captain is unprepared
36:03to properly respond
36:04when the crisis occurs
36:06shortly after takeoff.
36:11Had the pilots completed
36:13their pre-flight safety briefing,
36:15their response
36:16to the engine failure
36:17might have been very different.
36:25Gear up.
36:30Engine failure,
36:31left engine.
36:32Fly V2 plus 25.
36:34Lowering the nose to 12 degrees.
36:37V2.
36:39Gear up.
36:41Once the plane was stabilized,
36:43the pilots could have returned
36:44safely to the airport.
36:46Engine failure is actually
36:48a relatively common occurrence.
36:50Every pilot needs to be prepared
36:52and trained.
36:54So instead of letting
36:55the first officer fly the plane
36:57while he diagnoses the issue,
36:58he tries to do everything himself.
37:00And transferring control
37:01during an emergency situation.
37:04There was never a positive
37:06transfer of control.
37:07The captain just took
37:09the control yoke
37:10away from the first officer.
37:13So he injected himself
37:15in the emergency.
37:20Let go, let go.
37:22I let go, I let go.
37:24The captain took control
37:26at the worst possible time
37:27when he was out of the loop.
37:29And by not assigning
37:31responsibility to her,
37:32he gave himself
37:33the responsibility
37:34of doing two things at once,
37:35diagnosing the nature
37:36of the engine problem
37:37and then flying the airplane.
37:41Please!
37:42By trying to fly the plane
37:44and diagnose the problem
37:46on his own,
37:47the captain took on too much.
37:51It put the first officer
37:52in a very difficult position.
37:55She's now in the supportive role,
37:58the non-flying role,
37:59waiting to be told
38:00what to do.
38:01And he's not giving
38:03any helpful orders
38:04other than let go.
38:09Why would an experienced captain
38:11so brazenly dismiss
38:13his first officer's help,
38:15risking the lives
38:16of everyone on board?
38:24Investigators look
38:24into the pilot's backgrounds
38:26in an attempt
38:27to understand
38:28why the captain
38:28took over
38:29from his first officer
38:30in the midst
38:31of an emergency.
38:33So the captain
38:34actually had twice
38:35as many flying hours
38:36as the first officer.
38:39The captain
38:40was both qualified
38:41as a captain
38:41on a 737,
38:43but also as a first officer
38:44on a 767.
38:46Perhaps his attitude
38:47was that flying
38:49the 737
38:50was not that big
38:51of a deal
38:51because I fly a 767,
38:54which is much more
38:55sophisticated
38:55and highly technical.
38:57But she had more hours
38:59on the 737.
39:01Not only did she have
39:02more experience
39:02flying the 737,
39:04that's the only plane
39:05that she was flying.
39:07I think there's
39:08a good chance
39:09that had she been
39:10left alone,
39:10she would have flown
39:11the airplane
39:12out of the scenario
39:13that we saw
39:14in this accident.
39:16The question is,
39:17would he have reacted
39:18the same way
39:19if the first officer
39:20was a man?
39:23In 2003,
39:24at the time
39:25of this crash,
39:26here in the States,
39:27female airline pilots
39:28only constituted
39:29less than 6%
39:31of the pilot population.
39:33And it really
39:33hasn't changed
39:34that much
39:35in the 20 years
39:36since then.
39:38The first officer
39:39was Algeria's
39:40first female
39:41commercial airline pilot.
39:44My friend,
39:45male pilots
39:46in this part
39:47of the world
39:49aren't used
39:49to sharing
39:50a cockpit
39:51with women.
39:53I think Algeria
39:54is becoming
39:55fairly westernized,
39:56but in some cultures
39:58there is the feeling
39:58that a man
39:59has to be up
39:59in the cockpit
40:00in case anything
40:01goes wrong.
40:03Why did this captain
40:04take control
40:05from the first officer
40:06when she was doing
40:07an okay job
40:08at that point?
40:08And I think
40:10you can't rule out
40:10the possibility
40:11that there may have
40:12been some gender
40:13stereotyping on his part
40:15that played a role
40:16in it.
40:19Sadly,
40:19this accident
40:20was totally preventable.
40:27Investigators
40:27now have a clear picture
40:29of what led
40:30to the crash
40:31of Flight 6289.
40:34V1,
40:35144 knots.
40:38VR,
40:39146 knots.
40:40You're saying
40:40you were good enough
40:41to turn pro?
40:42After arriving late
40:43and allowing
40:44the flight attendant
40:45into the cockpit,
40:46the captain
40:47interrupted
40:48a crucial
40:49pre-flight
40:49safety briefing.
40:51V2,
40:52150 knots.
40:54Okay,
40:54that's enough.
40:55I understand.
40:56Can we go?
40:57I got it,
40:58I got it.
40:59Let's go.
40:59The captain
41:00demonstrated
41:01a lax attitude
41:02towards cockpit
41:03protocols.
41:06Fatigue cracks
41:08in a nozzle
41:08guide vane
41:09in the plane's
41:10left engine
41:10were reaching
41:11their braking point.
41:13And when the
41:13guide vane
41:14failed,
41:16it set off
41:17a chain reaction.
41:18High-speed
41:19metal fragments
41:20ripped the engine
41:21apart.
41:23Let go,
41:24let go.
41:24I let go,
41:25I let go.
41:26When crisis
41:27struck,
41:28the captain
41:28decided he
41:29needed to be
41:30the one
41:30to handle
41:31the controls
41:31and took
41:33over flying
41:33from his
41:34first officer
41:35before even
41:35identifying the
41:36problem.
41:38The engine
41:39failure alone
41:39was not the
41:40cause of this
41:41accident.
41:42Engines fail
41:42and pilots
41:44are trained
41:44to handle
41:45those emergencies.
41:48Failing
41:49to retract
41:50the landing gear
41:51after the engine
41:52failure
41:52made recovery
41:53more difficult.
41:55Let go,
41:55take your hand
41:56away.
41:56I let go,
41:57I let go.
41:57let go,
41:58take your hand
41:59away.
41:59I let go.
42:07It was the
42:08captain's
42:09assumption of
42:10control of the
42:10aircraft without
42:11properly identifying
42:12the nature of the
42:13emergency,
42:14his failure to
42:15raise the landing
42:16gear and his
42:18lack of adherence
42:19to standard
42:20operating procedures
42:21that eventually
42:22doomed the flight.
42:26As a result of
42:27this accident,
42:28Algeria's
42:29commission of
42:30inquiry makes
42:31several
42:31recommendations.
42:34They recommend
42:35that Air
42:35Algerie,
42:36along with other
42:37operators,
42:38ensure that their
42:39crew resource
42:39management training
42:40programs emphasize
42:42the importance of
42:43handover procedures
42:44and task sharing
42:45in the cockpit.
42:48But in the
42:481980s,
42:49they had captains
42:50who were trying
42:51to fly a
42:52team airplane
42:53solo.
42:55So a lot of
42:56training went
42:57into it to
42:58teach that
42:58your best
42:59resource is
43:00your team.
43:01You support
43:02each other
43:02and work
43:03together as
43:04a team for
43:05the safety
43:06of the
43:06airplane.
43:07The fact
43:08that the
43:08captain insisted
43:09on taking over
43:10control of the
43:10airplane at
43:11that critical
43:12moment
43:14cost everybody
43:15on that airplane
43:16their lives.
43:19I felt
43:20particularly
43:21affected when
43:22I saw that
43:24the accident
43:24was preventable.
43:25And I think
43:26the investigators
43:27did the best
43:28job they could
43:28trying to discover
43:29why the crew
43:30made the errors
43:31that they did.
43:31The next time
43:32that happens,
43:33people won't die
43:33as a result of that.
43:36For Lynn
43:37Ripplemeyer,
43:38it's one more
43:39example of why
43:40the industry
43:41needs to continue
43:42evolving.
43:44The airlines
43:45now are
43:45much more
43:46open to
43:47hiring women,
43:49to not having
43:50gender bias,
43:51realizing that
43:52women do have
43:53a lot to
43:54contribute to
43:55the industry.
43:57And I think
43:58it's up to
43:58women now
43:59to step up
44:00to the plate
44:00and take
44:01the opportunities
44:02that the
44:03career offers.
44:03They're amazing.
44:31They're amazing.
44:34to be continued...
44:41Take care.
Comments