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  • 5 days ago
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00:00So just the primary of the book is America has always been ambitious.
00:03It does feel like China is now building the future at greater speed.
00:07What's the most common misconception we have about China today?
00:10I think that China is much more competitive than we give it credit,
00:14that this is not some sort of only centrally planned economy
00:17in which everything happens at the diktat of Xi Jinping.
00:20I think that there are these super competitive Chinese firms out there,
00:24companies like DeepSeek, which we just talked about,
00:26companies like Xiaomi, which are fighting for their lives in a very fiercely dynamic environment.
00:31So, I mean, do they have actually a lot more support from the government?
00:34And is that a hindrance or is that good?
00:35It is both a hindrance and it is good.
00:38It is always a yes question when it comes to China.
00:40It is full of these contradictions.
00:42Often these industrial subsidies could give a lot of benefits to Chinese firms,
00:46especially when they're looking for new land, especially when they're looking for new financing.
00:50Often it is a big hindrance because, as we know,
00:52Beijing is really able to smack around a lot of tech founders,
00:55especially ones as big as Jack Ma.
00:58You're one of the people that understand technology in China the most.
01:03Where are we right now?
01:04So there's these two superpowers wanting to become number one.
01:08When does it get decided?
01:09Is it winner takes all or can they compete for 15, 20 years?
01:14It will be competitive for a very long time.
01:16There is no race at the very end of it.
01:18There is no gold medal.
01:19There's no bronze.
01:20We don't know when someone will have won
01:22because this is a multidimensional race on many, many fronts,
01:26even on something like artificial intelligence.
01:28The U.S. right now has an absolute lead in the reasoning models.
01:32But as we can tell from all of these benchmarks,
01:33the Chinese are catching up in all sorts of ways.
01:36In addition, they're building out so much more power capacity in order to power all the AI.
01:41If AI is going to be all around us, it's going to be in our roads,
01:44it's going to be in my coffee, then we're going to need a lot more power.
01:46And so when the U.S. is not building enough power as much as the Chinese,
01:51it might be really at a disadvantage here.
01:53Dan, what you argue in the book, which is very striking,
01:56is that America is run by lawyers.
01:57China is run by engineers.
01:59Does that automatically put the U.S. at a disadvantage?
02:03No, because the lawyers have advantages themselves.
02:06I'm coming to you from the U.S. West Coast,
02:08which is the only region of the world which has created not only one company worth over a trillion dollars,
02:13but this has created a half dozen companies worth over several trillions of dollars.
02:17That is absolutely an advantage.
02:18The lawyers are able to protect intellectual property.
02:21They're able to protect wealth.
02:22The rich feel comfortable with creating businesses in America.
02:25They're not necessarily so comfortable building big businesses in China.
02:28So given all of the geopolitics and the uncertainty with fragmentation,
02:32could you see a world where actually technology,
02:35at the moment we have this idea that actually the World Wide Web is global,
02:38that everything will be global.
02:40So again, if you have a good AI model, it will be adopted globally.
02:43Could we see the reverse?
02:45Could we see two blocks with each having their own technology?
02:48We're already seeing fragmenting.
02:50So what we're seeing is that Beijing has been uninterested in the global Internet.
02:53They don't want Facebook or Twitter or any of these pesky platforms from Silicon Valley over there.
02:59The Americans are trying to de-wean themselves away from Chinese rare earth magnets.
03:03They're really trying to create their own supply chains.
03:05I think the future is going to look much more protectionist and more fragmented than the past.
03:10I mean, it was almost like 11 months ago, right, in Davos, the week after Davos,
03:15where people heard about deep-seeks.
03:16Right.
03:16No one had heard of them, and suddenly they came out of nowhere and really did incredible things.
03:23Yes.
03:24Are we going to hear more from them, or are there other companies like them in China?
03:27There's many companies like them in China.
03:28And I think what is special about the deep-seek moment was that the prediction,
03:32what was really interesting was the reaction to deep-seek.
03:34I think that the financial markets had not priced in the extent of Chinese competitive firms,
03:39Chinese entrepreneurial firms that are doing really well.
03:42There are many Chinese entrepreneurial firms like Xiaomi out there.
03:45Huawei is not listed, but still a very dynamic firm.
03:50There's all sorts of firms in industrial robotics and all sorts of firms that we're not hearing about.
03:54Maybe we're going to hear about a lot more of these.
03:56Because of the tariffs and trade complexity for China,
04:00are they doubling down on actually trying to make sure that AI is theirs?
04:04I think that they're trying to double down not just on AI, but on absolutely everything.
04:08And this is going to be the great challenge for the West,
04:10that China wants not only artificial intelligence as well as every big technology of the future,
04:15they also want electric vehicles as well as their batteries, as well as the magnets.
04:19So they really want to dominate everything.
04:21And it becomes really critical for the U.S., the U.K., other countries to figure out what sort of niches can they still,
04:27can these countries still really dominate in?
04:29Because I think it would be bad for the world if China actually makes absolutely everything that we use and consume every day.
04:35Because what, it displaces U.S. companies?
04:38Or because there's always the foreign affairs politics going into this?
04:42There is still a fair share of politics coming in, but they have the ability to displace a lot of American companies.
04:50What we're seeing is that Germany is already being pretty substantially de-industrialized by the Chinese companies,
04:56and I'm fearful that many more of these will come to the U.S. as well.
05:00I mean, there's something that struck me.
05:01I think it was like 15 days ago, Sam Altman, in an interview,
05:04and then he did walk back these comments saying,
05:06look, a lot of these AI companies are too big to fail, so they could have government support or something like that.
05:10What do you make of a comment like that?
05:13Yeah, well, I think that it is definitely a double-edged sword to ask for government support.
05:18And I think that open AI should be careful for what it wishes for.
05:22If the U.S. government decides to nationalize open AI, that's not necessarily going to be very good for open AI.
05:28And so what we're seeing is that Donald Trump has already turned Intel into a state-owned enterprise with American characteristics.
05:35I'm not sure that's going to be great for Intel over the longer term.
05:37When we talk on this show day in, day out about valuations, through your research, through your book,
05:43through your teaching at Stanford, and, of course, what you've been understanding,
05:49should we worry about valuation because of simply the competition from China?
05:53I think we should worry about valuation.
05:54The very valuations of especially AI is kind of eye-watering even before China.
06:00And as we saw with DeepSeq, China can shed valuations pretty substantially all at once.
06:04And so I think that is always something to be very concerned about, especially with AI.
06:09Dan, thank you so much for joining us.
06:10Dan Wang, author of Breaknext, Stanford University, Hoover Institution, Research Fellow.
06:15And, of course, you're up for an award this week.
06:17So good.
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