China’s Imagined Weakness: How Identity Shapes Strategy in the South China Sea

Public Domain Ideas

This article explores how China’s self-perception as a “peaceful riser” influences its foreign policy behavior, particularly its overcorrection in the South China Sea. Liu and Chan argue that Beijing’s fear of appearing weak has paradoxically led to more assertive actions, despite its commitment to a non-threatening international image. This nuanced study reveals how identity narratives shape strategic decisions in Asia-Pacific geopolitics.  Minran Liu, Edward Sing Yue Chan, Imagined Weakness: The peaceful riser identity and Beijing’s policy overcorrection in the South China Sea, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 25, Issue 3, 2025, lcaf006, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcaf006  https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/25/3/lcaf006/8213853  Creative Commons This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC BY license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.You are not required to obtain permission to reuse this article.  File:BRP Teresa Magbanua being rammed by China Coast Guard vessel 5205.webm https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BRP_Teresa_Magbanua_being_rammed_by_China_Coast_Guard_vessel_5205.webm  File:U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon flies over new islands in South China Sea -2 PeKnUKeVDMo.webm https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:U.S._Navy_P-8A_Poseidon_flies_over_new_islands_in_South_China_Sea_-2_PeKnUKeVDMo.webm  #ChinaForeignPolicy #SouthChinaSea #PeacefulRise #InternationalRelations #AsiaPacific #StrategicIdentity #Geopolitics  South China Sea China foreign policy peaceful rise imagined weakness identity in international relations strategic overcorrection assertiveness in Asia Minran Liu Edward Sing Yue Chan China-US relations regional security IRAP 2025 maritime disputes international relations of the Asia-Pacific  china,south china sea,china's identity,open access,China foreign policy,peaceful rise,maritime disputes,assertiveness in Asia,international relations of the Asia-Pacific,strategic overcorrection,InternationalRelations

Transcript

00:00This is the Public Domain Channel, where we delve into academic articles published in the Public Domain.

00:11Today, we're diving into the turbulent waters of the South China Sea.

00:21But we're not talking about reefs or battleships.

00:25We're talking about something less visible, yet more powerful.

00:37Identity.

00:41Why has China, under Xi Jinping, adopted a dramatically more coercive strategy in the South China Sea?

00:55And what does it have to do with how a country sees itself, and how it believes others see it?

01:08Today's episode draws from the article by scholars Minran Liu and Edward Xing Yue-Chan, titled

01:20Imagined Weakness, the Peaceful Riser Identity, and Beijing's Policy Overcorrection in the South China Sea.

01:35They argue that China's aggression in the South China Sea isn't just about oil, islands, or rival claimants.

01:50It's also about an imagined weakness, a disconnect between how China wanted to be seen

02:02and how it feared it actually appeared.

02:08In 2013, the world began to notice a sharp shift in Beijing's South China Sea policies.

02:25China intensified its island building.

02:28It ramped up patrols by maritime militias and the Coast Guard.

02:39It flatly rejected international rulings, like the 2016 Hague arbitration that went against it.

02:51This wasn't the old playbook.

02:54The charm offensive of the 2000s.

02:58Peaceful rise, joint development, mutual benefit, was giving way to a much harder edge.

03:09But here's the twist.

03:12According to Liu and Chan, this wasn't a break from the past.

03:18It was a reaction to it.

03:21They argue that China's assertiveness under Xi is a kind of overcorrection.

03:32A policy whiplash triggered by a mismatch between the identity China projected during Hu Jintao's era

03:43and the actual assertive actions it took at the time.

03:49This mismatch, they call it an identity policy discrepancy, created what they term an imagined weakness.

04:02It's perception that China had been too soft, too naive.

04:12The peaceful riser identity trope.

04:16Back in the early 2000s, Hu Jintao's China embraced the phrase,

04:22Peaceful rise, it was a carefully crafted identity meant to reassure the world that China's growing power posed no threat.

04:37But peaceful rise didn't just live on paper.

04:46It became internalised by Chinese elites and the public.

04:52There's a strong cultural current in China that views the country as inherently peaceful,

05:06even morally superior in its restraint.

05:10This idea that China doesn't seek hegemony, that it never has, became a strategic narrative.

05:27And yet, at the very same time, China was growing more assertive in practice,

05:35whose administration wasn't exactly passive.

05:38By the late 2000s, Beijing had begun fortifying its claims,

05:48expanding patrols, and even seizing features like Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines.

06:01So you had this paradox.

06:03A China that told the world and itself it was peaceful while acting increasingly assertive.

06:16This, Leo and Chan argue,

06:22created a kind of strategic schizophrenia and set the stage for an identity crisis,

06:32which resulted in a feedback loop and elite discontent.

06:39And as this identity policy gap widened,

06:44criticisms began to emerge,

06:47not just abroad, but at home.

06:50Chinese scholars,

06:53generals,

06:55and policy elites

06:57began to argue

07:00that the peaceful rise narrative

07:03was being exploited by others.

07:07that it had made China appear weak,

07:13indecisive,

07:15vulnerable.

07:19Some even mocked the strategy.

07:24One general compared it

07:26to playing the zither

07:27to a cow.

07:32Music wasted on those

07:34who wouldn't appreciate it.

07:37So by the time Xi Jinping came to power,

07:40there was a growing elite consensus

07:45that the Hu-era approach

07:49had failed.

07:54That it had allowed China to be encircled,

07:58mocked,

07:59and challenged.

08:00And though Xi was not seen as a hardliner

08:05before taking office,

08:08he quickly positioned himself

08:11as the man

08:13to correct

08:14course.

08:16Not because Hu's policies

08:18had failed in substance,

08:21but because they had failed

08:23in

08:24appearance.

08:25So what did that overcorrection look like?

08:44Four main shifts.

08:45One.

08:46Rejection of international law.

08:55Aging doubled down

08:57on the idea

08:59that its sovereign rights

09:01predated

09:04modern legal frameworks

09:06like United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS.

09:162. Domestication of the South China Sea using law enforcement vessels like the China Coast

09:30Guard. China turned contested waters into de facto controlled zones.

09:443. Island militarisation. Building runways, radars and missile systems on artificial islands.

10:004. Military-civil fusion. Expanding the role of fishing militias as unofficial enforcers

10:11of maritime claims. All of this marked a shift from assertiveness to coercion, from ambiguity

10:24to clarity. From singling restraint to singling dominance.

10:35And it wasn't random.

10:365. It was driven by a desire to erase the perception of weakness.

10:466. To make sure no one ever again mistook China's soft words for soft resolve.

11:01What followed was temporal othering and identity repair. Here's one of the most fascinating insights

11:13from Leo and Chan. They argue that Xi's administration didn't just reject the Hu-era identity.

11:28It allered it.

11:31That is, it treated the previous China, not some foreign country, as the mistaken one.

11:46And by distancing itself from that past, it built a new identity.

11:537. Confident.

12:007. Unapologetic.

12:047. Coercive when necessary.

12:068. This is what scholars call temporal differentiation.

12:118. A strategy where states define who they are,

12:219. In Xi's narrative, the old peaceful riser identity had been naive.

12:409. The new China, strong, smart and in control.

12:489. But there is a danger here.

12:519. It created the new discrepancy.

12:5610. The irony, Leo and Chan suggest.

13:0110. Is that in trying to resolve the old identity.

13:0910. Policy gap.

13:1210. China may have created a new one.

13:1611. Today, official rhetoric still talks of peaceful development, joint cooperation,

13:27and maritime harmony.

13:2911. But actions tell a different story.

13:3311. Of ramming fishing vessels, blocking resupply missions,

13:3911. And rejecting legal rulings.

13:4611. This could again create friction.

13:4911. Not just with neighbours, but within China's own strategic identity.

13:5812. Will the world believe the peaceful rhetoric?

14:0312. Will China itself?

14:0612. In conclusion, what does it mean?

14:0912. So what have we learned?

14:1212. This isn't just a story of China getting stronger.

14:1613. It's a story of China trying to align who it says it is

14:2513. With what it actually does.

14:3013. It's all about the power of narratives.

14:3413. How they can comfort, constrain,

14:4313. And ultimately reshape foreign policy.

14:4814. And it's a warning.

14:5314. That when a state feels it must correct

14:5514. For how it is seen.

14:5814. It may swing harder than it needs to.

15:0414. In the South China Sea,

15:1114. That overcorrection has left us

15:1714. With a region on edge.

15:1814. Where every reef, every fishing boat could become a flashpoint.

15:3214. All because of an identity that was meant to signal peace.

15:3915. Will Xi Jinping himself fall victim to yet another further overcorrection?

16:1015. In the back hours?!

16:1214. In the permanent,

16:1314. In theen

16:2514. First of text,

16:2715. First of note,

16:2815. Been telling you about this rule.

16:3215. Were Balkika

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