00:00Welcome to an occasional op-ed of Mayank Chhaya Reports. I'm Mayank Chhaya.
00:06The preliminary report of the horrific June 12, 2025 crash of Air India's Boeing 787-8
00:14at Ahmedabad by India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau
00:19is causing quite the kerfuffle because of what it says and what it does not say.
00:24That is why it is a preliminary report. But notwithstanding that, apart from the obvious
00:31cause of the disquiet over the discovery that fuel switches were cut off within seconds of the
00:36takeoff, depriving fuel to the two engines, what jumps out at me is this observation in the 15-page
00:44report. In the section titled Progress of Investigation, the report says this, and I quote,
00:50At this stage of investigation, there are no recommended actions to B787-8 and or GENX-1B
01:01engine operators and manufacturers, end quote. That is quite an extraordinary observation,
01:08virtually granting a clean check to both aircraft and engine manufacturers. One might argue that
01:14this is a preliminary report and things could change. But it is nearly impossible for me to
01:19envision a situation where the Bureau can now make an 180-degree turn and find mechanical problems
01:27attributable to either manufacturer. Of course, the crux of the report is this finding, and I quote again,
01:35the engine 1 and engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from run to cutoff, position one after
01:42another within a time gap of 0-1 second. The engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from the
01:49takeoff values as the fuel supply to the engine was cutoff. In the cockpit voice recording,
01:56one of the pilots is heard asking the other, why did he cut off? The other pilot responded
02:03that he did not do so, unquote. Since the fuel cutoff switches have to be manually handled,
02:10the speculation now is that whether it was done by one of the two pilots, and if so, why? At the
02:17same time, though, the cockpit voice recording has an exchange between the two where one is asking the
02:22other why he switched off the fuel supply, and the other says he did not. One has to bear in mind that
02:29the two pilots, Captain Sumit Sabarwal, 56, and First Officer Clive Kundar, 32, were very familiar with the
02:37aircraft. Captain Sabarwal had logged approximately 15,600 flight hours, including 8,600 hours on the
02:47Boeing 787, and Flight Officer Kundar had around 3,400 flight hours, with over 1,100 hours on the 787.
02:56It is impossible to imagine that either of them was not fully knowledgeable that turning off and
03:03turning on fuel switches is a function that required deliberate physical action. It could not have been
03:09done accidentally. Equally importantly, both being aware that everything that they are saying is being
03:16recorded for posterity did have that exchange where one asked if the switches were cut off and the other
03:22said no. Inevitably, the report has unleashed calumny against the two pilots, attributing to them all
03:30manner of motives, including suggesting that it was a suicide mission. That is deeply disturbing because
03:37the report itself does not say anything of the sort. It is sticking to the factual chronology of events
03:43analyzed with considerable professional expertise. We do not know what the final report will be,
03:49but if the preliminary report sets any trajectory, it is clear that the final conclusions will not be
03:56any significantly different. For instance, the final report could not possibly come out with findings
04:02that are diametrically opposite to what we know now. I seriously doubt if even the final report will be
04:09able to clearly establish whether the fuel switches were deliberately turned off by one of the pilots since
04:15there is clear denial in the cockpit voice recording according to the report. Of all actions that are
04:22absolutely clear to airline pilots, not going anywhere close to the fuel switches once the aircraft is
04:28airborne is one of them unless, of course, there is an emergency that demands that fuel supply be cut off to
04:34an engine. As a rule, this is done only once the aircraft has landed and is close to the passenger disembarking point.
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