- 8 months ago
A centuries-old border, a fresh flashpoint. As Cambodia and Thailand trade diplomatic barbs over Preah Vihear, what role can ASEAN truly play in preventing escalation? Join us as we unpack the dispute with geostrategist Prof. Dr. Azmi Hassan of Akademi Nusantara on ASEAN KITA.
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00:00Hi, good morning, I'm Amri Raiman and you're watching ASEAN Kita, a show where we explore
00:11the stories, challenges and opportunities that lies within the region. Cambodia has once again
00:17taken Thailand to the International Court of Justice, ICJ, reigniting tensions over historical
00:23claims near the Preah Veher Temple. This isn't just a bilateral issue, it's a test for ASEAN's
00:29ability to respond to flashpoint within its own backyard. With Malaysia holding the chair
00:35this year, the region is watching closely. Will we step up as mediators or retreat behind
00:42non-interference to unpack what this ICJ move means for Cambodia-Thailand Thais and what
00:49Malaysia can do as ASEAN Chair? I'm joined today by Professor Dr Azmi Hassan, Geostrategist
00:55at Academy Nusantara. Prof, thank you so much for joining us. Let's start with what actually
01:00triggered this latest border flare-up. We know the Cambodia-Thais border has been contested
01:07for years, but what specific conditions turned a dormant dispute to actual gunfire this time?
01:13And why do you think local commanders failed to contain the situation before it escalated?
01:19Yes, true, Amirol. This problem of border dispute between Laos, I mean, between Cambodia
01:27and Thailand has been going on for decades. If we like to blame on the occupier, well, the
01:34French left Indochina at that particular time, the late 1950s, without demarcation the border,
01:41not only between Cambodia and also Thailand, but also between Laos. These are called the Emerald
01:48Triangle where the border dispute has been there for a long time. The difference between
01:54what's happening right now, or more specifically on the 20th of May, is that one Cambodian soldiers
02:00got killed. And you mentioned it rightly, the local commanders should be more responsible because
02:07they are the first command. Whether to trigger fire or whether to retreat is up to the commander.
02:15And I think I believe that both commanders on the part of Thailand and also Cambodia, they
02:21know that it is a very sensitive area. And with this physical declaration, I think it put another
02:29burden, as you mentioned, on Malaysia as the chairman for ASEAN. And Datuk Serenoa has said that the bilateral talks within the joint border committee that has been started, I think, last Friday, but still not
02:43concluded, Malaysia as the chairman fully support that particular discussion.
02:50And Prof, if you compare this incident with the 2008 and 2011 clashes, what key lesson about underground crisis management seems to have been ignored in this case, Professor?
03:02Yes, truly enough. What's happening on the ground has been, you know, that area is very sensitive. Let me put it in this perspective, Amiro.
03:13We have problems with Indonesia, Sulawesi, East Sulawesi. No problem there. We have problems with Singapore. But we are trying to solve, even though both problems are not being solved yet, we talk to each other.
03:26And what's happening on the ground, as you mentioned, the commander, the first rank of fire, I think it is very important for them to understand the sensitivity of this issue.
03:39In 2008, I think the most casualty happens there. I think around 28 got killed and 2011 too. And now it flared up again with one Cambodian soldier got killed.
03:51I think it can be resolved. You mentioned earlier that Cambodia has put forward their inquiry to the ICJ. But the problem is that, similar to the previous ICJ decision before this, Thailand said, no, they are not interested.
04:08They will not respect the ICJ resolution. What they want is a bilateral discussion. And I think that's the way to go. But Cambodia is seen as the weaker part here compared to the military capability.
04:24I think that's the reason why Cambodia are more keen to go to ICJ compared to Thailand.
04:31Well, Prof, clearly bilateral diplomacy hasn't worked. In your view, where exactly did the two countries fall short in managing this dispute behind closed doors?
04:42And what could a more regional or perhaps ASEAN-led approach offer that bilateral talks alone simply cannot?
04:50Well, I think bilateral talks can work through the means of the Joint Border Committee. And Thailand also have a problem with Laos.
05:01The issue is that for this Cambodia-Laos problem and Thailand-Laos problem, the JBC is very active in trying to minimize the physical of the creation.
05:16So I still believe bilateral talks should be made the clear issue. For example, we in Singapore, for example, we are in Singapore.
05:28For the Batu Putih, you know, conflict. Both nations agree to go to ICJ. And we accept the ICJ decision. But the problem with Thailand is that they are not that keen.
05:42I don't know why they are not that keen to go to ICJ. So there's a reason I said let them resolve it bilaterally.
05:48Because this is a problem between the two nations and they are part of ASEAN. And when it comes to pressure from the from the chairman of ASEAN, it should come from a minimum pressure from the chairman.
06:04Because we don't want to be accused of interfering into a bilateral problem between Thailand and also Cambodia.
06:13Perhaps, Professor, could moving the talks onto neutral ground, say, and an ASEAN secretariat venue or even a virtual working group could lower the political temperature?
06:26Yes, I think that's a very reasonable request. For example, the top trade war between China and the United States was held in London, if I'm not mistaken.
06:37It is considered a neutral ground. Before this, it was in Geneva, I think, but moved to London after that.
06:43So neutral ground, yes, plays a very critical point here. But again, I think the chairman of ASEAN already made their voice.
06:53They put out their opinion. Let the two resolve their problem bilaterally. Because, yes, Malaysia also have problem not in terms of border with Thailand, but in terms of skirmishes in the southern Thailand.
07:08But I think we can talk to each other. So I think Malaysia is taking similar approach that let's talk between the two nations first.
07:15And I think, yes, we can go to the neutral ground. For example, Secretary ASEAN or Secretary in Jakarta is a good choice there.
07:24And it can cool down some hot temper if the discussion was held in the neutral ground.
07:32And Prof ASEAN actually has a mediation mechanism, the High Council, but it has never been activated. Why is that, Prof?
07:41What political sensitivities of procedural red tape have kept it from being used? And is that a missed opportunity in cases like this?
07:50Well, it's not a missed opportunity, Amiru. I think the sensitivity of this particular border dispute is very sensitive. And only the Thailand knew about it. Only the Cambodia really felt about it.
08:02So why the High Council was not activated? Because it doesn't want to portray that they are interfering in the local dispute. Or in this case, a member's dispute.
08:15It is the same as when Malaysia pulled a criticism on Aung San Suu Kyi government a few years back regarding the Rohingya, Myanmar felt very upset about that.
08:26Even though we have the right to say because we are the burden of taking off the Rohingyas. So in this case, similar with Cambodia and Thailand issues, it is a very sensitive local issue.
08:40When I say local, it is between Thailand and Cambodia. If the High Council of ASEAN jumped into it, maybe I think they read it differently.
08:50I think that's more the reason why the High Council of ASEAN mechanism was never used in this particular border dispute.
08:59And in practical terms, Prof, what's the first thing that should happen now to prevent a repeat?
09:05Are we talking about better military-to-military hotlines or perhaps local ceasefire protocols or something more ambitious at the diplomatic level?
09:13Well, I'm more inclined to say that last Friday was the start of the JBC between Thailand and the Second Border, the Joint Border Committee talks.
09:23Let the talks go on first so that they can really identify what are the problems right now.
09:31There are problems right now. Let not be skeptical about it. Let not put it aside. There is a problem.
09:38And the problem is a very sensitive issue that was used both by Thailand and Cambodia to prop up the nationalist feeling between the two nations.
09:52So I think that's the best way to resolve it. Let them talk first because they knew the problem.
09:59And I think when this particular issue used as to prop up their patriotism of East Thailand and so Cambodia, it became a very critical and sensitive issue and let it be the talk between the parties involved at this particular juncture.
10:16And Prof, whenever a border tension rise, we often see outside powers take interest. Do you see any signs that the US, China rivalry or other external players are starting to shape how countries like Cambodia or Thailand to react to each other on the ground, Prof?
10:33Prof. Prof. Prof. Prof. Yeah. But not on this particular case. I think, still, United States or China, yes, I think China is very close to Cambodia and Thailand somehow or other close to United States.
10:46But both of these two superpowers, I haven't seen yet, they encroached in this particular issue.
10:54But for the best of it, I think the French should take responsibility for it
11:02because they left Indochina without a pure demarcation or the border between Laos, Cambodia and also Thailand.
11:10But so far, as I've seen, there is no direct interference from these two superpowers, especially China and the United States.
11:20I don't see that happening right now. So I'm hoping that it will remain that way.
11:25Because when the superpowers jump in, then there will be a lot of other problems that will be creeping in.
11:33And that's a long-running criticism that ASEAN struggles with an identity crisis caught between non-interference
11:40and the need for collective security. Do you think that's fair?
11:44And what's exactly need to shift politically or institutionally for ASEAN to act more decisively
11:51and when land borders are involved, Prof?
11:54Yeah, when you talk about, when you mention about collective security arrangement, let's go to the EU.
12:02I think EU is a good model. ASEAN always be compared to EU.
12:07In terms of EU, the 27 nations, in terms of economy agenda, they have one voice.
12:14But in terms of their own security, each 27 nations have their own agenda.
12:21So in this case, collective security for ASEAN, I think each ASEAN nation, the 10 ASEAN nations have their own agenda in terms of security.
12:29But in terms of economy, I think we can go to one voice.
12:33So basically, ASEAN and ASEAN, we have three pillars.
12:37And basically the economic pillars, the social pillars, I think can be fulfilled.
12:42But in terms of politics and defence pillars, for example, the security pillars, each nation has their own agenda.
12:50So it's very, very difficult even for the High Council, even for the Chairman of ASEAN to interfere in this particular case
12:58because they said this is our security, this is our sovereignty.
13:04So it's going to be very, very difficult for both of these entities, I mean the Chairman and also the High Council, Secretariat, to interfere.
13:13I think that's the reason why I still believe Amirol that let them two nations talk to each other, resolve to each other,
13:21and accept the decision made by their own members of this particular nation.
13:27Perhaps Prof, do we need a formal charter amendment or could leaders strike an informal understanding that still respects its sovereignty in this case?
13:39Yeah, I think the Treaty of Amity is a good example that ASEAN pursued.
13:44For example, ASEAN++, United States.
13:47United States, China, Austria, New Zealand and other++ nations accept the Treaty of Amity.
13:54I think that there's a charter that ASEAN, not the real charter but the addendum of the charter.
14:00But again, I think respect or sovereignty, I think the border dispute, I think Malaysia is a model.
14:07I like to say we are the model that we have problem with Indonesia, we have problem with Brunei some time ago and Thailand and also Singapore.
14:17But we resolve it by talking to each other, by creating a committee.
14:22So I guess do we need another specific charter?
14:25I think it is implicitly said that each nation, when they say that don't interfere into other domestic issues, meaning that you have to respect their sovereignty.
14:37But when it comes to borders, the dispute is between the two nations, it encroaches to the other nations.
14:45So it's going to be very difficult for the charter to put in paper that respects each other's sovereignty.
14:53Because it has been said in other ways, Amiro.
14:57Well, there's still a lot to unpack on the border tension between Thailand and Cambodia.
15:01And when we return, we'll ask whether Malaysia as ASEAN Chair can turn this diplomatic flashpoint into a moment of regional leadership
15:08or if the block once again stuck in neutral.
15:11We'll take a short break and we'll be right back after this.
15:14Welcome back to ASEAN Kita.
15:30We're still with Professor Azmi Hassan, Geostrategist at Academy Nusantara.
15:35As we dig deeper into what the Cambodia move means, not just for Thailand, but for ASEAN's credibility as a peace builder.
15:45Now Prof, let's broaden the lens beyond Cambodia and Thailand.
15:50What other dormant or unresolved border disputes in ASEAN worry you the most right now?
15:59And what should leaders be watching for as an early warning signs of escalation in those kind of places, Prof?
16:07Well, the most critical part of this case, Amiro, is the South China Sea.
16:12Especially the EEZ, the Exclusive Economic Zone.
16:17We have problems with Brunei, but we resolved it a few years back during the late Tun Abdullah Badawi as the Prime Minister.
16:24We have problems with Vietnam, we have issues with the Philippines and not to say we have problem, huge problem with China.
16:33So when you asked me about the flashpoint, the border dispute that we need to look after is basically the South China Sea.
16:43I think the bilateral like Cambodia, Laos or Cambodia, Thailand, it can be resolved easily because the superpowers are still not there yet.
16:52Like Malaysia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, for example.
16:56It was a very big issue a decade ago, but not right now.
17:01But again, as I see, South China Sea is a big issue right now because not only it involves China, the superpower here,
17:09but it also directly involves four ASEAN nations plus, in a way, Indonesia.
17:16So to answer your question, Amiro, the flashpoint right now is not at the Emerald Triangle.
17:22It's not between Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, border dispute, but it is in South China Sea.
17:28But Prof, some say turning to external courts like the ICJ in this case is a last resort.
17:34Others argue it can actually reduce political tension.
17:38But in your view, under what conditions can international adjudication actually strengthen ASEAN unity rather than undermine it, Prof?
17:49I use the example of Batu Putih. Both nations, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to go to ICJ.
17:55And also the Ligitan Sipadan issue with Indonesia. Both Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to go to the ICJ.
18:02But in the case of this particular border dispute, only Cambodia really want to go to ICJ.
18:11Thailand doesn't want to go to ICJ. As I mentioned before, I don't know why.
18:16But the best, I think the best method, if the two countries cannot talk to each other,
18:22then the best we go to the neutral part of it, which is the ICJ or any arbitration court.
18:30But again, it needs the engagement. It needs the pursuant of agreement within the two nations.
18:36But Thailand from day one said they are not going to ICJ. They want to talk bilateral with Cambodia in this case.
18:44So whether Thailand succeeded to submit their complaint to ICJ or whether ICJ came out with a decision,
18:51I think it will not go anywhere because Thailand say they will not accept the ICJ decision.
18:57I think that's where we stand right now.
19:00Or perhaps Prof, could an advisory opinion rather than a binding judgment give both leaders room to save face while still clarifying the law?
19:09Well, ICJ, yeah. I mean, ICJ decision is non-binding. It's just an advisory.
19:16But again, I think similarly, if I put an analogy when the United Nations asked ICJ to conduct an advisory mission,
19:26whether the occupation of Israel in the West Bank, whether legal or not legal,
19:31I think that really helps in this particular case.
19:34Since Israel do not accept, it doesn't matter, it does not accept.
19:38Like I said. But again, with ICJ, it is a non-binding. It's an advisory.
19:43And I think that's the main reason why Thailand doesn't want to go to ICJ because ICJ will conduct their investigation,
19:52their inquiry based on international law.
19:56And I think Cambodia thinks that they are on the side of the law.
19:59I think that's the reason why they are so eager to go to ICJ.
20:03But again, it's a non-binding.
20:05So whether ICJ giving out a resolution positive toward Cambodia,
20:11but Thailand will not accept it.
20:13I think it will not resolve this particular matter.
20:16And Malaysia is ASEAN Chen this year.
20:20And we've got the Year End Leaders Summit ahead.
20:23If you had to point to one deliverable, one tangible sign that shows ASEAN is improving its conflict prevention,
20:30what would it be, Professor?
20:32Well, not this particular issue.
20:35Because in this particular issue, Cambodia, Thailand, border dispute is not the job of the Chairman to interfere.
20:44I think the Chairman did give the advice,
20:47please talk together beginning last Friday during the joint border committee that Thailand and Cambodia have.
20:54I think that's the key issue here.
20:56I think to answer your question again,
20:58what are the main points for the main job of conflict resolution for ASEAN is all about Myanmar,
21:05and also about South China Sea.
21:07I think about Myanmar, Malaysia as the Chairman has given out their strategy,
21:12put out a permanent representative so that the agenda of Myanmar will be on the agenda table every time ASEAN meet,
21:21especially on the five-point consensus.
21:23And on the part of South China Sea, I think the Chairman put out in the declaration of Kuala Lumpur
21:29that ASEAN should not be siding with the superpowers.
21:34And it was mentioned that because ASEAN siding with the superpowers in the South China Sea,
21:39that's the reason why Beijing is very happy with the ongoing discussion of the Code of Conduct for 15, 16 years.
21:47I think these are the two main points, I would say, the remaining six months,
21:53Myanmar and also the South China Sea.
21:56And Prof, ultimately, what does a stable strategic end state look like here?
22:01What does the end state look like here for Cambodia and Thailand situation?
22:16Well, the end state is, I think both sides should be happy.
22:19When both sides happy, meaning that their sovereignty is intact.
22:23But how to achieve that? I think that's going to be very difficult.
22:26I don't believe that that is achievable through ICJ.
22:30I still believe that this particular end state, meaning that both sides are happy,
22:36is through JBC, the Joint Border Committee Talk.
22:39I think that's the best mean to achieve the end state.
22:43Both sides are happy. It's a win-win situation.
22:46Thailand doesn't feel that their sovereignty is being hempinged.
22:51Or in this case, Cambodia, their sovereignty or their security is being threatened in this case.
22:57I think that's the particular end state that can be achieved, again I said, through the JBC discussion.
23:04And some experts suggest that the full land border code, but some say it's too ambitious.
23:12Could defence ministers at least agree on an interim rules of engagement in this year, Prof?
23:18Yes, very true enough. I think when you mentioned the commander on the ground,
23:23they take the orders from maybe the defence minister in this particular case.
23:28And also the line of communication. If I'm not mistaken, there are a line of communication between the top defence people in Thailand
23:41and also the top defence people in Cambodia. There is an open line of communication so that they can talk to each other
23:47if something critical did happen, if the commander on the ground gave the real situation to their bosses in Thailand and also in Cambodia.
23:57So I guess this particular line of communication, I think the first step that needs to be adjusted or to be made it more clear
24:06so that both sides can talk easily when conflict arises.
24:10Well, that's all the time that we have on today's episode of ASEAN Kita.
24:13We would like to thank Professor Azmi Hassan, Geostrategist at Academy Nusantara, on his analysis on the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia.
24:21The border disputes may be about lines on a map, but what's really at stake is trust between neighbours and within ASEAN and with the world watching.
24:29Whether diplomacy can win with a day depends not just on courts, but on political will.
24:34That's all the time that we have on ASEAN Kita today.
24:37I'm Amril Aiman, thank you for watching and see you again next time.
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