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00:00do citizens have? I'm joined by data protection officer and AI governance
00:05consultant Rishi Maharaj as we separate fact from fiction.
00:22The reported interception and subsequent leak of audio recordings involving
00:27businesswoman Genevieve Hadid and her aunt Starr Sabga have ignited a national debate not only
00:34about what was said but about the extraordinary powers of the state and the limits of surveillance.
00:41The recordings which have been publicly reported as originating from the state security have left
00:46many Trinidad and Tobago citizens asking important questions. Under what circumstances can the state
00:52legally intercept private communications? Who authorizes those interceptions? What safeguards
00:59exist to prevent abuse? And once sensitive recordings enter the public domain, what protections exist
01:06for the privacy of those involved? Tonight we're moving beyond the politics and focusing on the
01:11bigger picture. How lawful interception works? What the law permits? What it prohibits? And how advances
01:19in technology and artificial intelligence are changing the landscape of surveillance and privacy.
01:24Joining me is data protection officer and AI governance consultant Rishi Maharaj. Rishi,
01:30thank you so much for joining us this evening. Hi, good night, Rishi. Thank you for having me on and
01:36good night to all your viewers. Let's get straight into it. So these recordings have reportedly originated
01:42from the state. What viewers, for viewers who may be unfamiliar with the process, what exactly is lawful
01:49interception? So basically lawful interception means that the state has gotten legal permission to be able
02:00to listen, read or record your conversations that you've had or that you've made a text message or a message
02:09that you may have sent to somebody. But it's important, I think, to start the ground by stating that
02:15in general, interception of somebody's private conversation is generally illegal. It's important
02:22to know that in our constitution, we do have human rights protection and provisions for the respect to
02:28privacy and family life. And when this particular law was passed, it was passed knowing that it contradicted
02:36those human rights provisions and you had to get a special majority. So generally, it's not something
02:42that is legally allowed to be done. But what the law does is that it calves out special provisions to
02:48allow the state to be able to lawfully intercept and get these kinds of recordings from citizens in the
02:55country. When can the state legally intercept someone's communications? That's a good question. So
03:03generally, there are two doors that exist. The first one that most people may be familiar with is
03:09through the courts. That's why we have the courts are there for. So the first one is when you have
03:14officials. And generally, the officials are, for example, in the commission of police, chief of defense
03:20staff, or the head of the SSA can go before a judge, a high court judge, not just a magistrate,
03:26but a high
03:27court judge. And they have to provide evidence as to exactly the necessity for wanting to have this
03:35type of information intercepted. So they need to create some groundsway. It's not just something that
03:42you can do willy-nilly. It has to have certain provisions to be able to satisfy a high court judge.
03:47And then once you get that permission, take it if I'm not mistaken, the court, the law allows for 90
03:53days.
03:54And the judge does have the ability to cancel it. So that's the first door that the state can use
04:00to
04:00be able to intercept. The second door is when national security is involved. For example, if there's a
04:07serious crime or something that could affect the national security of the country, terrorism,
04:11or something like that. In a case like that, that's where you have the Ministry of National Security
04:19or the minister will be able to give permissions. You don't go to a judge per se, but you do
04:25go to a
04:26minister. You are authorized to be able to do these things, and the minister must be told within four
04:31days after exactly what was intercepted. So this is the one where, again, there's no judge that's needed,
04:37but of course the bar for this is very high national security measures that you need to be able to
04:44have
04:46to be able to go through this particular door. Now, Rishi, you answered my next question, which was,
04:51who has the authority to approve these interceptions? So basically it would be the Minister of National
04:55Security or the courts? Correct. All right. So looking at this case and speaking generally, we learned
05:04from an attorney for the Hadid's and Ms. Sabga that when they asked for full disclosure as to what
05:14evidence they had, the Minister of National Security would have responded to the court saying that he had
05:21to contact international partners to verify, well, not verify, but to approve intelligence sharing.
05:31Can the U.S., for instance, intercept communications, can they monitor conversations?
05:39So the U.S. does have the capabilities for technological point of view to be able to monitor conversations.
05:47I think a good example of this would have been a couple of years back where there was a whistleblower
05:53coming out of the CIA where it was told, it was in public domain, that the U.S. state was
05:59actually
05:59monitoring the conversations of heads of states of different countries, from the EU, China, all those
06:06different places. So that by itself as an example shows that the U.S. does have the capability to be
06:13able to
06:13monitor any kind of conversation or messages that have been happening or transmitted electronically.
06:21And then from what you just mentioned, the example of the ministers stating they need to
06:25seek permission. It gives the assumption, I'm not saying that it gives the assumption,
06:30that probably this was not guarded by local authorities, but probably by international bodies.
06:36Is that legal?
06:38So under, in Trantobago, we have, we have something called the, I can't remember correctly, but the mutual
06:45assistance law that allows us to be able to, through the office of the attorney general,
06:50to be able to work with international partners to be able to get assistance. So that is something that
06:57does exist within our jurisdiction from a legal perspective. It's possible, I'm not saying it has,
07:02but if anything was done then that, that could have probably been used to allow for the staff and
07:07this corporation.
07:08To make it legal, essentially.
07:11Exactly.
07:11That, that is very interesting. Now, you did see, um, the court, the commissioner, the minister,
07:18but then they would have to have reason to suspect person X or person Y was involved in some level
07:24of
07:24activity and therefore we need to monitor their communications, yeah?
07:29Exactly. I think former commissioner of police, Guy Griffith mentioned this, my intelligence point
07:34of view. You don't just, you know, tap or intercept communications because you want to.
07:39It has to be grounded. In fact, it has to be grounded in intelligence that you believe there's a
07:44reasonable expectation that something is going on. And then to be able to gather evidence, you know,
07:50you then take this, this other measure to be able to do that. So it's something that you need to
07:55have, probably have
07:56guarded intelligence beforehand, I would assume, to be able now to make the jump to intercept
08:01communications and get these kinds of information before you.
08:04Now, let me ask you as well, Rashi. Now, it has been suggested, you know, that all calls are quote
08:11unquote
08:11monitored, for instance, and when certain keywords come up, um, kill, bullet, maybe certain names of high
08:22profile persons, then, um, that is zeroed into. And, um, that is when it is actually recorded or brought
08:31to the attention of authorities. Is, is, is, is there any truth to this assumption?
08:35Well, for that to happen, I mean, you have to be recorded in conversations of everybody.
08:40And that's an entry that way in the world. That's a lot of conversations.
08:43So from my understanding, it doesn't work like that. They may be high priority instances of what we'll call
08:50persons of interest that you may say, okay, we just want to monitor and see what's going on.
08:55So it's not something that you'd have all conversations. I mean, at the end of the day,
08:59telecommunications services would have recordings of conversation, not recording of conversation,
09:04would have evidence of who you called, when that call was made, which IP address, which area the call
09:10was made from. So that is general information that most telecommunications service providers would have.
09:15But in order, what you're, what you're speaking today is all calls are being recorded,
09:19and then there's listening for, for trigger words that could insidiate something.
09:24I don't think that's done generally. It generally looks at, you generally have a blanket of persons of interest
09:30that you may look for, and then, you know, get all this information. And then from it,
09:35you may siphon through to be able to make a determination. But I think it's, it's a dangerous
09:40assumption that all calls are mine. I think that's, that may be very, very difficult to do, even for countries
09:46like the US.
09:48Can person, okay, so we, if this call was in fact, intercepted, let's say it's a network call,
09:58can we assume that B-mobile or Digicel would have been the ones to have that recording?
10:05I wouldn't say we could assume that Digicel or B-mobile would have the recording, but so under the inception
10:11communications act, there's the ability for the courts to work,
10:14to order on telecommunication service providers to be able to provide assistance to ministries and national securities to get certain
10:22kinds of information.
10:23Not that the calls were recorded, but if you want to, for example, tap into a phone, so that you
10:28can record the call, then they will have to provide that information.
10:31But generally, they don't actually have recordings of conversations. What they will have would be call history or logs.
10:37And those logs will provide certain kinds of what we call metadata. So I would know who you call, what
10:43frequency you call certain people, what numbers you call.
10:46But if they wanted to directly intercept a particular phone call, then that is where you will have, for example,
10:52you know, wiretapping and those things,
10:53where you will now have devices being able to be used to catch the conversation in real time.
11:00I don't think telecommunication providers, they can allow for that to happen. But again, that comes with port provisions that
11:06provide assistance to these agencies to be able to do that from the court.
11:12So the authority or the body doing the recording would be the SSE under the Act, under the law?
11:19Possibly the SSE, correct.
11:21And would it be safe for us to assume that this wasn't the only call intercepted?
11:29If you are a person of interest, then possibly all calls going in or coming out of your device would
11:35be recorded?
11:37That is probably a fair assumption to make, that they may have gathered calls over a period of time.
11:43And then from those calls, probably look for patterns of things that may be happening.
11:47I'm not saying exactly what has happened. But generally, when you look at an intelligence gathering, you don't just get
11:52one piece of information.
11:53You have to cooperate with that information with other pieces. It's like a jigsaw.
11:58And you're trying to put these jigsaw together to create the puzzle and to create the final picture.
12:02So it could be a fair assumption to assume that maybe calls were recorded for a period of time.
12:08And then from that, certain kinds of information may have been gathered for them to make a determination to be
12:14taken.
12:14Now, I noticed that you didn't restrict the information being intercepted to calls alone.
12:22You also said messages.
12:24Yes. I mean, you have text messages and stuff like that that you could intercept.
12:28Of course, messages like WhatsApp and, you know, Telegram signal, those you can't really intercept in transit.
12:36Because, you know, WhatsApp uses encryption method called end-to-end encryption.
12:40So when those messages are sent from one phone to another, it's in the sending of the message over, you
12:47know, networks.
12:47If you were to intercept that message, you would not be able to decrypt it.
12:50I mean, there's good examples in the US.
12:53Many years ago, Apple was asked by the FBI to decrypt certain kinds of information to get a backdoor to
13:00be able to decrypt messages.
13:01And even in the EU, there have been questions about security providers to WhatsApp to give them backdoor message ability
13:08to get these messages.
13:10So WhatsApp messages of those things cannot be encrypted directly in transit.
13:15But once it's on your phone, and then, for example, they may have installed certain kinds of spyware because we
13:21know that there exist certain kinds of apps that exist out there, especially from the Israeli security services.
13:27It's well documented in the international media.
13:31Those kind of apps could be used once it's on your phone for them to be able to get direct
13:35messages on your phone.
13:36Then the possibility does exist.
13:38Now, Rishi, we do have to take a quick break to our viewers.
13:41After the break, who watches? The watchers will examine the oversight mechanisms governing state surveillance,
13:47whether TNT's laws have kept pace with modern technology, and what these developments mean for every citizen's right to privacy.
13:55Stay with us.
14:18Thanks for staying with us.
14:19Of course, we are joined by Rishi Maharaj, Data Protection Officer and AI Governance Consultant.
14:26So, Rishi, before we went to the break, you were talking about WhatsApp messages.
14:30I didn't hear you mention WhatsApp calls. Can they also be intercepted?
14:36So, WhatsApp calls like WhatsApp messages are also encrypted and then encryption.
14:41So, generally, I'm not saying technology doesn't exist.
14:45It possibly could be intercepted, but you need to have very sophisticated technology to be able to do that.
14:50Now, you did mention the Israelis.
14:53Of course, there's this software called Pegasus and it is ranked across the world as one of the best pieces
15:01of software that could intercept data.
15:03There was a rumor that it had been used in Trinidad and Tobago.
15:07How likely is it that now, 2026, it's very widespread?
15:13So, I think from an international perspective, I know a lot of intelligence agencies have been and been reported internationally,
15:21have embarked with and used Pegasus as part of their security software to be able to monitor different things.
15:29I know in Trinidad, this has been a discussion that's gone past at least 10, 12 years.
15:35Even down to when, I think, Prime Minister Manil was Prime Minister and having this Israeli security technology.
15:41So, possibly, there may be a possibility that this technology was existing there in Trinidad.
15:47But obviously, you know, to get that information from the SSA, they're going to claim national security.
15:52But definitely, I wouldn't say it's not impossible for that technology to be existing here in Trinidad, for sure.
15:57But how does Pegasus work?
15:59So, basically, it's a malware. It's an app. It's a spyware that they can actually send it to your phone.
16:06You don't even have to be physically near your phone. It can be sent electronically.
16:09And then once it gets into the person's device, they have control.
16:14So, they have control over the actual device. They can clone it.
16:17They have to see messages that have been happening. They can actually see what you're doing in real time.
16:21They can control your camera, put it on to be able to record certain things or get certain audios.
16:27So, it's a very sophisticated kind of software and technology that basically allows, once it's installed on your phone,
16:35So, total, you know, you have no control of email. You don't know it's there, but it gives the person
16:39total control over everything on your device.
16:42So, they can't decrypt WhatsApp or audio calls, but they can literally see exactly what is on your screen on
16:49your phone.
16:49Exactly, because WhatsApp, it's encrypted in transit. But once it's on your phone, your phone has a key to be
16:56able to decrypt it.
16:57So, once you're able to see it, and if that spyware is on your phone, then they can actually see
17:01your messages happening in real time and see what's going on.
17:03How can we know if our phone has Pegasus on it?
17:07That's a very difficult thing to do. You know, it's one of the most sophisticated kind of software that exists
17:13out there.
17:14So, it's a very difficult thing to know, you know, if this exists on your phone totally.
17:21I have some information to share, but I will keep that to myself.
17:24But I believe that, you know, if this has been in existence for decades, we would be very backward if
17:30we didn't have it.
17:31But even if we had it, and it is being used, to use the information gained from Pegasus, that would
17:40have to be authorized, as you said, according to the law by the court or the minister.
17:46Right. So, remember, it's data that you're collecting.
17:49So, once it's collecting data, if you now want to move forward from data collection to now charging somebody a
17:56persecution, that's where you know how to have a higher standard.
17:59So, to be able to use it now, you're going to need to have judicial oversight, or you're going to
18:03need to have some accountability measures in place to be able to utilize that data.
18:08You're going to have to do text to verify.
18:10Because people can say anything in conversations and text, you know, people speak off the cuff many times.
18:16But that is now when your intelligence comes in to be able to verify everything that's happening and what's going
18:24on to be able to make, you know, substance of this and actually create a credible trust.
18:28So, Rishi, I do have to ask you, right? Now, we would like to know how this recording could have
18:36ended up in the public domain.
18:38We noted that the Attorney General would have said to media that there exists technology by non-state actors that
18:49could have allowed them to intercept audio.
18:52It doesn't necessarily have to be a state leak. How plausible is this?
18:58So, based on what we know, it's in the public domain, especially what was said, I think, at the news
19:04conference yesterday by one of the attorneys, is that they went to court and they asked for evidence and they
19:09were given snippets, little snippets of recordings.
19:12So, at least that leads to the assumption that this information was in the possession of the state.
19:18Because to be able to give these snippets of the recordings that are out there. So, it gives the impression
19:23that one, it was resident within the state apparatus.
19:26Whether it be the TTPS or whether the SSA, I'm not sure, but definitely it shows that it proves that
19:33at least the state had a record of this.
19:36So, definitely, if this information was now leaked and put out into the public domain, under the Inception and Communication
19:43Act, there is provisions for protecting the information.
19:45It's one thing to gather the information. It's one thing to analyze the information.
19:49Another thing, though, to protect the information, because this now becomes very important if you want to move forward in
19:55creating a case to go before the court.
19:58Because, obviously, when you go before the court, there's a higher threshold of evidence.
20:01We have to prove a chain of evidence and all these different things.
20:05So, definitely, if it's leaked into the public domain, that is definitely an offense under the Inception and Communication Act
20:12that's liable for a charge or somebody to be charging an offense for leaking the information.
20:17So, that's something that needs to be investigated very, very seriously.
20:21I think we saw the Commissioner of Police indicating that an investigation would be launched into it.
20:26So, it definitely is an offense for some plaintiffs to be able to be leaked into the public domain.
20:30As we close, could a private citizen or could a private entity have intercepted that call?
20:36Very, very, I must say, it's very difficult, right?
20:41It's not unlikely, nothing is impossible, but it's very unlikely that the court could have been intercepted by a private
20:46citizen.
20:46Rajima Raj, I feel like we just scratched the surface.
20:50Tonight's discussion reminds us that surveillance powers can play an important role in protecting national security and investigating serious crime.
20:59But with those powers comes an equally important responsibility to ensure they are exercised lawfully, proportionately, and with robust safeguards
21:08against misuse.
21:09As technology evolves and digital communications become an ever greater part of our daily lives, the conversation about privacy, accountability,
21:18and public trust is one that will only grow more important.
21:22My thanks to Data Protection Officer and AI Governance Consultant, Brishi Maharaj, for helping us unpack these complex issues.
21:30I'm Urvashi Tamari Rabnarai, and thank you for joining Beyond the Headlines.
21:34It's back to D-Shop.
21:35D-Shop.
21:36D-Shop.
21:36I'm Urvashi Tamari Rabnarai.
21:37I'm Urvashi Tamari futurist, Brishi Tamari and Juha Tamari.
21:37speziement to the shield and helvashi Tamari.
21:39Fulshop.
21:39And, let's move on to the throne.
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