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Air Crash Investigation - Season 26 - Episode 06: A Perfect Storm (Nürnberger Flugdienst Flight 108)
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TVTranscript
00:01Just minutes after taking off from Lima...
00:03We declare an emergency.
00:05The pilots of Aero Peru Flight 603 get mixed messages from their plane.
00:11I cut the engines, but the speed is increasing.
00:15Having erroneous airspeed indications now puts into your brain,
00:18am I climbing, am I not climbing?
00:20They seek assistance from the ground.
00:23Can you tell us our altitude, please?
00:24You're at 9,700 feet according to my radar.
00:27But nothing makes sense.
00:29We're in the water. Pull up!
00:34All 70 people on board are killed.
00:38Investigators compare the cockpit voice recording...
00:41We will maintain 10,000 feet.
00:43Set it.
00:4410,000 feet.
00:45...with the flight data recorder...
00:47Captain doesn't realize how close they are to the water.
00:49...and suspect a single faulty sensor prevented the crew from averting disaster.
00:54It violates the laws of physics.
00:56Airplanes just don't do that.
01:23It's nearing 1am at Jorge Chavez International Airport
01:28in Lima, Peru.
01:33Thick clouds blanket the sky as Aero Peru 603 taxis to the runway.
01:42The weather in Lima, Peru, is a very, very stable environment,
01:45especially at this time of the year.
01:49The captain is 58-year-old Eric Schreiber.
01:52He's highly experienced, having logged almost 22,000 flight hours.
01:58Aero Peru 603, authorized to Santiago, initial level 29,000 feet,
02:03and afterwards on course, transponder 5603.
02:1042-year-old First Officer David Fernandez has flown nearly 8,000 hours.
02:16Correct, Lima Tower.
02:18He will be the pilot flying the aircraft tonight.
02:21Roger.
02:24He's doing double duty by also operating the radio.
02:30Lima Tower, Aero Peru 603, runway 15.
02:35Ready for takeoff.
02:38Aero Peru 603, wind calm, clear for takeoff, runway 15.
02:46There are 61 passengers and 7 flight attendants on board.
03:00Takeoff at 41 minutes past midnight, on the dots.
03:06What precision?
03:07Like the Suez.
03:08Let's go.
03:18The crew is extremely professional.
03:21They accomplished their checklists and procedures as what would be expected.
03:24And they were basically an on-time machine.
03:44Flight 603 will fly out to the Pacific Ocean before heading south to Santiago.
03:51The aircraft is a four-year-old Boeing 757-200.
03:57The Boeing 757 is a long, narrow-bodied aircraft, twin-engine.
04:02It's simple in its design, simple in its instrumentation,
04:06and just an overall comfortable airplane to fly.
04:11The passengers settle in for the three-and-a-half-hour flight.
04:19In the cockpit, the first officer spots a potential problem.
04:25The ultimeters are stuck.
04:31Windshear, windshear, windshear, windshear.
04:35The pilots also get a windshear warning.
04:41The windshear is an alert that we're entering into an environment of undesirable winds
04:46that could be highly critical in the safety of the aircraft.
04:50Those type of winds are just very uncommon in that area.
04:53And we're not forecasted at night at all.
04:58Flight 603 climbs into the thick clouds above Lima.
05:02The pilots lose sight of the ground.
05:06The speed.
05:08They now discover another instrument isn't working.
05:13Yeah, right.
05:15Flying in the clouds at night,
05:17without knowing how fast they're going or their height above the ground,
05:22the pilots face a potentially dangerous situation.
05:26Am I climbing? Am I not climbing?
05:29Am I near mountainous terrain, which is very close to the coastal line of Peru?
05:35Tower, Aero Peru 603.
05:37Flight 603 updates the tower controller.
05:41Aero Peru 603, tower, go ahead.
05:44We have no optimeter and no airspeed.
05:47Declaring an emergency.
05:52When a pilot declares an emergency with air traffic control,
05:56the controller is going to give that aircraft priority handling.
06:00Roger, change frequency to 119.7 for further instruction from radar control.
06:05Switching to 119.7.
06:12Before contacting radar control, the captain takes over from the first officer.
06:17Okay, I have control.
06:20The captain may decide to take over the flying role
06:23and tell the first officer to talk on the radio and work procedures.
06:28Lima 603, we request vectors for ILS runway 15.
06:33The pilots request directions for a return to the airport.
06:37Roger, we suggest a right turn heading 330.
06:41It was a good call to ask air traffic control, give us vectors.
06:44We're so busy up here dealing with everything else.
06:47You can certainly help us out if you tell us which direction to turn
06:50and guide us back towards the airport.
06:53Turn right heading 330.
06:56A heading of 330 will take the plane north to a position
07:01where it can then make the turn back to Lima.
07:05But two and a half minutes later...
07:08Aero Peru 603, you're showing level 9200.
07:12What is your heading now?
07:14The radar controller notices that flight 603
07:18hasn't turned back towards the airport.
07:24Heading 205, we're heading away from the shore.
07:27Affirmative.
07:30We will maintain 10,000 feet.
07:32Set it, 10,000 feet.
07:34The captain decides to fly further out to sea
07:37before returning to Lima.
07:40They go out over the ocean,
07:42which is one of the best decisions to possibly do.
07:45They don't now have to worry about other aircraft
07:48in the Andes Mountains.
07:51In the cabin, passengers are unaware
07:54of what's happening in the cockpit.
08:01Safely away from shore.
08:03According to the radar,
08:05you're crossing radial 230 from Lima.
08:08Distance west, southwest is 37 miles.
08:12Flight 603 finally starts turning north
08:15to begin the approach to Lima
08:17and needs to begin its descent to the airport.
08:21I'll try to descend with the power cut.
08:30He was going to descend at idle thrust,
08:33which is a good way to descend.
08:34It's nice and steady in a 757
08:36and keeps the airspeed under good control.
08:46I cut the engines,
08:47but the speed is increasing.
08:50Even with power to the engines cut,
08:52the airspeed indicators show
08:54that the plane is accelerating.
08:58Can you tell us the speed, please?
09:00I have 320.
09:02We have 350.
09:06They'll need to use a different strategy to descend.
09:12Getting to the lower altitude,
09:14hopefully getting into some clearer areas
09:16to see the coastal line
09:17could give them more comfort for a safe landing.
09:21Take the speed brakes out.
09:25That is another great way of slowing the aircraft
09:28and getting better control of the airspeed.
09:34But deploying the speed brakes
09:36has the opposite effect.
09:41Overspeed.
09:42A new warning tells them
09:44they're flying far too fast.
09:47The airplane's above its maximum allowable airspeed.
09:50It's in danger of breaking apart
09:52if they don't do something right now.
09:59But I have the speed brakes out
10:01and all the power is cut.
10:02This can't be right.
10:05What more possibly can be confusing
10:07and going wrong right now?
10:11Seconds later,
10:12they get a contradictory warning
10:14that the plane's flying far too slow.
10:19The stick shaker indicates to pilots
10:22that if the airplane gets any slower,
10:24it's going to be in a stall condition.
10:28Are they going too fast or too slow?
10:31The pilots must decide which alarm to react to.
10:36We're stalling!
10:43The captain decides to increase the speed
10:46by pitching the nose down,
10:47silencing the stall warning.
10:54But they're not out of danger yet.
10:58With conflicting warnings
11:00and no reliable airspeed or altitude readings,
11:03the pilots of flight 603 urgently need help.
11:09Is there any plane that can take off to rescue us?
11:12Yes.
11:13We're coordinating immediately.
11:16At this point,
11:17it was a totally out-of-the-box thought
11:20by the first officer
11:22to ask for this type of assistance,
11:25which would have given them
11:26a visual reference
11:28right next to them
11:29with altitude, airspeed,
11:31also communications,
11:33and we have somebody alongside of us
11:35holding our hand to the airport.
11:38The plane is now 50 miles
11:40from Lima's airport.
11:43Aero-Peru 603,
11:45you are heading 270,
11:4710,000 feet.
11:49While they wait for a rescue plane,
11:51the captain attempts
11:52to join the approach path to the runway.
11:55I'll try to intercept the ILS
11:57and then descend.
11:59Lima, Aero-Peru 603,
12:01we will try to intercept the ILS.
12:03Roger, Aero-Peru 603.
12:05They think they're flying
12:06at a nice, safe altitude,
12:08and they think that they pretty much
12:10have airspeed under control.
12:11They probably thought
12:13they were in a pretty darn good position.
12:17Soon after,
12:19the radar controller
12:20provides an update
12:21on the escort flight.
12:23Aero-Peru 603,
12:25there is a 707 about to take off.
12:28It's starting to move now.
12:33It seems to be flying well.
12:38Can you tell us our altitude, please?
12:40You're at 9,700 feet,
12:42according to my radar.
12:44Terrain.
12:44Too low.
12:45Terrain.
12:49Too low.
12:49Terrain.
12:51Terrain.
12:519,700 feet,
12:52but we're getting a terrain warning.
12:55Pull up.
12:56Pull up if he's telling you to pull up.
12:58Terrain.
12:59We're hitting the water.
13:00Pull up.
13:08We're running over.
13:19We're running over.
13:2029 minutes after taking off,
13:23Flight 603 crashes
13:25into the Pacific Ocean,
13:2748 miles from Lima, Peru.
13:36Within hours,
13:38a Navy aircraft
13:39discovers debris
13:40from Flight 603.
13:44The accident occurred at night
13:46and the wave conditions
13:48were very high,
13:49so the first few ships
13:50that went out
13:51to look for the wreckage
13:52really struggled to find it.
13:55Heavy fog
13:57also hampers recovery efforts.
14:14By the end of the first day,
14:16the bodies of only 13
14:18of the 70 people on board
14:20are recovered.
14:21There are no signs of survivors.
14:27Those who haven't been found
14:28are believed to be inside
14:30the fuselage on the seabed.
14:45It's up to air crash investigators
14:48from Peru's
14:49Accident Investigation Board
14:50to find out why
14:52a plane,
14:52last observed flying
14:54nearly 10,000 feet above the sea,
14:57suddenly crashed into it.
15:04We have the military radar.
15:06With the underwater wreckage
15:08still beyond reach,
15:10investigators get their first lead
15:11from the Peruvian military.
15:15Any coastal nation
15:17will have military radar
15:18that's constantly scanning
15:20for any approaching aircraft.
15:21So by querying
15:23the Peruvian military radar,
15:25we were able to get some data
15:27about the altitude
15:28and position
15:29of the accident flight.
15:32So, after taking off,
15:33they follow the approved flight plan
15:35over the ocean
15:35and then they start heading north.
15:39Yeah, they're headed back
15:40towards Lima.
15:41Mm-hmm.
15:43The flight climbs to 13,000 feet
15:46and then it starts to descend.
15:49And now,
15:52in the last seven minutes,
15:54the flight has a series
15:55of erratic climbs and descents
15:57before it crashes.
15:59It appears they lost control.
16:06It becomes just
16:08a rollercoaster ride
16:10of altitudes
16:10because they don't have control.
16:17What could have caused
16:18the pilots to lose control?
16:21When you start
16:22putting an investigation together,
16:24you start putting
16:25the what-ifs on the table.
16:27What if this failed?
16:28What if that failed?
16:29What if this went wrong?
16:30What if the crew made a mistake?
16:33Pre-take-off seems okay.
16:35Investigators scrutinize
16:36the communications
16:37between air traffic control
16:39and the pilots.
16:40Look at this.
16:41The crew reported problems
16:43with airspeed
16:43and altitude readings
16:44only two and a half minutes
16:45into the flight.
16:47Tower, Aero Peru 603.
16:50Aero Peru 603.
16:51Tower, go ahead.
16:52We have no altimeters
16:54and no airspeed.
17:00Faulty air data.
17:03Sounds like an issue
17:04with the Pitostatic System.
17:08The Pitostatic System
17:10uses tubes and sensors
17:12mounted on the plane
17:13which measure air pressure
17:15to calculate airspeed
17:16and altitude.
17:19Wasn't there a recent crash
17:20involving the Pitostatic System?
17:22Yeah.
17:24Birken Air, flight 301.
17:28Only eight months earlier,
17:30another Boeing 757
17:32crashed soon after taking off
17:34from Puerto Plata
17:35in the Dominican Republic.
17:37The cause was a blocked Pitot tube.
17:41Some investigators
17:42were wondering
17:43if we had a similar situation
17:45to what we had in Bergen Air.
17:46Wasn't entirely the same
17:48but it still involved
17:49blockage
17:50or covering parts
17:52of the Pitostatic System.
17:54Maybe that's what happened here.
18:06Nearly two weeks
18:08since Aero Peru
18:09Flight 603
18:10crashed into the ocean.
18:12A U.S. Navy ship
18:13helps the Peruvian Navy
18:15to track the pings
18:16from the Boeing 757's
18:18two black boxes.
18:20The wreckage
18:21is finally located
18:22at a depth
18:23of 680 feet.
18:28Using remotely operated vehicles,
18:31investigators finally get
18:33their first view
18:34of the wreckage site.
18:37The wreckage
18:38was very concentrated.
18:39The plane was intact
18:40when it hit the water.
18:50The fact that all
18:51the major pieces
18:52of the airplane
18:52are in one
18:53concentrated area
18:54really gives
18:55the investigators
18:56a much clearer picture
18:58of how the airplane
18:59came down.
19:00So,
19:00they either came down
19:01in a flat spin
19:02or it came down
19:03nose first,
19:04which is a very
19:05unusual accident.
19:09Near.
19:10the black boxes
19:12are also located.
19:15It's very, very critical
19:17to get both recorders.
19:19First, you want to know
19:20how the airplane
19:21was behaving
19:21and then secondly,
19:22what was going on
19:23in the cockpit
19:24between the crew members
19:26of the airplane.
19:29They are packed
19:30in seawater
19:31and sent to Washington
19:32where the NTSB,
19:34the National Transportation
19:35Safety Board,
19:36will process
19:37their invaluable data.
19:45That's it.
19:46Keep moving that way.
19:49The team also searches
19:51for evidence
19:52of some kind
19:52of blockage
19:53of the pitot tubes
19:54and static ports.
19:56There.
19:57Keep going.
19:59They focus
20:00on a section
20:01of the left fuselage
20:02where the static ports
20:03are located.
20:04Okay, now moving.
20:10That's it.
20:12The static ports
20:13were blocked.
20:16They can see
20:17that the ports
20:18are covered.
20:22When we saw
20:23that those static ports
20:25were covered,
20:25it was case closed.
20:28Drop the curtains.
20:29We knew exactly
20:30what happened
20:30in this accident.
20:33How did such
20:34a critical device
20:35which determines
20:36airspeed and altitude
20:37get covered up
20:39and blocked?
20:42Make sure you tag
20:43everything.
20:45Investigators survey
20:46the recovered wreckage
20:47of Aero Peru
20:48Flight 603
20:50to find out
20:51what is covering
20:52the static ports.
20:56Look at that.
21:00Looks like silver tape.
21:02Same color
21:03as the fuselage.
21:09Flyers.
21:30Why were the ports
21:32covered with tape
21:33and by whom?
21:39It wasn't our job
21:41to assign blame
21:42or liability,
21:43but we wanted
21:43to understand
21:44the procedure
21:45to make sure
21:46that important step
21:47of removing the tape
21:48would never get
21:49overlooked again.
21:54So, let's check
21:55the last bug entry.
21:57Okay.
21:58Investigators
21:59check maintenance records
22:00to understand
22:01why the ports
22:02were taped over.
22:05Interesting.
22:06Hey.
22:08Bird strike.
22:12During the plane's
22:13last landing
22:14before the accident,
22:16the right engine
22:18was struck
22:18by birds.
22:20They replaced
22:21the turbine blades,
22:23the hydraulic pump
22:24was repaired
22:24and they polished
22:25the lower front
22:26of the 757.
22:29exactly where
22:30the static ports
22:31are located.
22:33Did maintenance
22:34personnel follow
22:35the correct procedures
22:36for polishing
22:37the 757?
22:38When you're
22:39performing work
22:40on the airplane,
22:41such as polishing
22:42or washing it,
22:43it's important
22:43not to get
22:44any debris
22:45into the ports
22:46because when you
22:47take off,
22:48temperatures go down,
22:49they may freeze
22:50in place
22:51which could cause
22:53severe instrument
22:54problems
22:54to the airplane.
22:56According to
22:57the maintenance
22:57manual,
22:58they're supposed
22:58to cover
22:58the static ports.
23:00Whoever polished
23:01the plane
23:01covered the static
23:02ports with tape
23:03and didn't remove it.
23:07So,
23:08why wasn't
23:09the tape removed
23:09after the area
23:10was polished?
23:13If you look
23:14at the maintenance
23:15process
23:15on an airplane
23:17and cleaning
23:17or polishing
23:18an airplane
23:19is maintenance,
23:20there's multiple
23:21steps,
23:22multiple people
23:22and multiple looks.
23:24The whole purpose
23:25of that is
23:26to make sure
23:27that nothing
23:28is missed.
23:30Were the static
23:31ports inspected
23:32as part of
23:34Flight 603's
23:35line check?
23:37It was a crazy night.
23:40Investigators
23:40interview the
23:41line mechanic
23:42to determine
23:42if the static
23:43ports were
23:44inspected
23:44after the work
23:45was done.
23:46The line chief
23:47usually does it
23:48but he was sick.
23:51So,
23:53I did it.
24:03So,
24:04I guess you didn't
24:05see the tape then.
24:10Aluminum tape
24:11is pretty common
24:13and if you
24:14take it
24:14and just
24:14spread it
24:15over those
24:15ports,
24:16it blends
24:16in perfectly
24:18and it makes
24:19it very easy
24:19for somebody
24:20to miss it.
24:23Was he
24:24adequately trained?
24:25I would say
24:26the answer
24:27to that
24:27is no.
24:30Did you see
24:31either pilot
24:32do a pre-flight
24:33check?
24:34Yes.
24:35The captain.
24:38Did you know
24:39if he checked
24:40them?
24:42Couldn't tell you.
24:46If I had
24:46a new person
24:47on my crew
24:48I would tell
24:49them to watch
24:49the captain
24:50see what he's
24:51doing
24:51and it becomes
24:53routine for
24:54mechanics to
24:54watch what
24:55the flight crew
24:55does.
24:56Okay.
24:58Thank you
24:59for your time.
25:01There's at least
25:02one if not
25:02two line
25:03checks that
25:03are done
25:03by supervisors
25:05of the line
25:06maintenance
25:07and then
25:08one of the
25:08crew members
25:09would do
25:09a walk around
25:10as they're
25:10obligated to
25:11do always.
25:13So,
25:13there are
25:14several levels
25:15where things
25:17should have been
25:17detected
25:18but weren't
25:19in this flight.
25:23So,
25:24both the
25:25line mechanic
25:25and the
25:26pilot
25:26missed it.
25:29Investigators
25:30now know
25:31that despite
25:32all the
25:32safety checks
25:33that were
25:33meant to be
25:34performed
25:34no one
25:35spotted the
25:36silver tape
25:37covering the
25:37static ports.
25:39So,
25:39we know
25:40what caused
25:40the fault
25:40air speeds
25:41and altitudes
25:42but fault
25:43air data
25:43alone
25:44doesn't cause
25:45a plane
25:45to crash.
25:46So,
25:47what did?
25:55investigators
25:56turned to
25:57the cockpit
25:57voice recorder
25:58from Aero
25:59Peru
25:59Flight 603
26:02to determine
26:03how the
26:04pilots dealt
26:05with faulty
26:05airspeed
26:06and altitude
26:06data.
26:08pick it
26:08up from
26:09the
26:09takeoff.
26:22data.
26:26Right.
26:27E2 plus 10?
26:28Mm-hmm.
26:30The plane
26:31is barely
26:32off the ground
26:32when the
26:33pilots
26:33identify
26:34the first
26:34problem.
26:36The altimeters
26:37are stuck.
26:38The captain's
26:39altimeter,
26:40the first
26:40officer's
26:41altimeter,
26:42the standby
26:42altimeter,
26:43all three
26:44sources
26:45were different
26:46and they
26:47were all
26:47wrong.
26:50Keep
26:51V2 plus 10?
26:52V2 plus 10?
26:53It's quickly
26:54followed by
26:55a second issue.
26:56The speed.
26:58The airspeed
26:59is also
27:00stuck.
27:01Yeah,
27:02right.
27:03Hold on.
27:07They were
27:08only 200 feet
27:09above the ground
27:09and they
27:09already knew
27:10that there
27:11had problems
27:11with altitude
27:12and airspeed.
27:14In three
27:15different places
27:16in the cockpit
27:16they're seeing
27:17unreliable
27:18airspeed
27:19and altitude.
27:21According
27:21to the FDR
27:22they're still
27:23climbing.
27:24Let's see
27:24how they
27:25handle that
27:25faulty
27:26data.
27:29What's
27:29going on?
27:30We're not
27:31climbing.
27:32I'm
27:32climbing.
27:34Investigators
27:35hear the
27:35captain
27:36continue to
27:36rely on
27:37the faulty
27:38data on
27:38his
27:38altimeter.
27:39Climb,
27:40climb,
27:41climb.
27:41I am
27:42climbing.
27:43Despite
27:43what the
27:44first officer
27:45tells him.
27:46The captain
27:47is looking
27:47at his
27:48altimeter
27:48and saying
27:49what he
27:49sees
27:50right in
27:50front of
27:51him.
27:52It's
27:52very hard
27:53to ignore
27:54this false
27:55data.
27:55the
27:56airspeed
27:56and altitude
27:57readings
27:57are like
27:58a magnet
27:58drawing your
27:59eye and
27:59attention
28:00again and
28:00again.
28:01Climb,
28:02climb.
28:02I am
28:02climbing.
28:03So in
28:04this initial
28:05moments of
28:05the climb
28:06it seems
28:07like the
28:07first officer
28:08was more
28:08in touch
28:09with what
28:09the airplane
28:10was really
28:10doing.
28:10What else
28:11do the
28:12pilots do
28:12to handle
28:12the
28:13situation?
28:14Keep
28:14playing.
28:16Let's
28:17go to
28:17basic
28:17instruments.
28:19But within
28:20a minute
28:20the captain
28:21stops
28:21focusing
28:22on the
28:22faulty
28:23instruments.
28:25He decides
28:26to use
28:26the pitch
28:26and power
28:27procedure.
28:27That's
28:28good.
28:29Very
28:30quickly on
28:30the captain
28:31says basic
28:32instruments.
28:32I believe
28:33he means
28:33the pitch
28:34and power
28:34procedure.
28:39The
28:39pitch and
28:40power
28:40procedure
28:41requires
28:42reducing
28:42the pitch
28:43angle of
28:43the aircraft
28:44to 2
28:45degrees
28:45nose up
28:46and the
28:47throttles
28:47to 55%.
28:48This
28:49should result
28:50in level
28:51flight.
28:52By flying
28:53with set
28:54pitch and
28:55power and
28:55ignoring the
28:56unreliable
28:57airspeed and
28:57altitude gives
28:59the crew
28:59time to
29:00sort out
29:01what's going
29:01on and
29:02think through
29:03what might be
29:04causing the
29:04unreliable
29:05indications.
29:07Then they
29:08declare the
29:09emergency.
29:09Pick it up
29:10after that.
29:11Let's see if
29:11they did the
29:11procedure properly.
29:17Switching
29:18to
29:181
29:1919.7.
29:21Auto throttle
29:22has it
29:22connected.
29:23Auto throttle
29:24has disconnected.
29:25But instead
29:26of checking
29:27his attitude
29:28indicator
29:28and engine
29:29gauges,
29:32the captain
29:33focuses on
29:34the crew
29:34alerting
29:35screen,
29:35which is
29:36displaying
29:36more alerts.
29:39Rudder ratio
29:40and max
29:40speed trim.
29:41The rudder
29:42ratio and
29:43max speed
29:44trim warnings
29:44were just
29:45the result
29:46of the
29:46unreliable
29:47airspeed and
29:48altitude
29:48indications in
29:49the cockpit.
29:50They shouldn't
29:51have been the
29:51primary focus
29:52focus of the
29:52crew.
29:54They're getting
29:55distracted by
29:56false alerts.
29:57They ignore
29:58the pitching
29:58power procedure.
30:01We're flying
30:02without speed.
30:03Soon after.
30:04Speed is
30:05zero.
30:07All airspeed
30:08indicators at
30:09zero.
30:13Investigators
30:14hear the pilots
30:14turning their
30:15attention back to
30:16the erroneous airspeed
30:18speed and altitude
30:18readings.
30:20The tape on
30:21the static ports
30:23meant that the
30:24airspeed and
30:25altitude were
30:25always wrong
30:27and they were
30:27always changing
30:29as the airplane
30:30climbed and
30:31descended.
30:32We will maintain
30:3410,000 feet.
30:35Set it.
30:3610,000 feet.
30:37But at no point
30:39did they disregard
30:40the unreliable
30:41airspeed and
30:42altitude.
30:43They looked at
30:44them constantly.
30:4512,000 feet.
30:46The crew never
30:47switched their
30:48mindset to just
30:49using pitch and
30:50power.
30:53They climbed for
30:54several more
30:54minutes.
30:56But if they
30:57were climbing,
30:58how did the
30:59crew end up
30:59hitting the
31:00ocean?
31:01They can't keep
31:02climbing forever.
31:04We have
31:05problems reading
31:06our instruments.
31:07Investigators
31:08continue listening
31:08to the cockpit
31:09voice recorder
31:10of Aero Peru
31:11Flight 603
31:12to determine how
31:13the crew carried
31:14out the return
31:15to Lima
31:15with faulty
31:16instrument data.
31:18Set the
31:18approach, please.
31:20I did.
31:20I did.
31:21Then let's go.
31:24The captain,
31:25he knew he had
31:26to to get down
31:27to Lima
31:27airport.
31:28I'll try to
31:29descend with
31:29the power cut.
31:31And the way
31:32to do that
31:32was to reduce
31:33the power.
31:36No sooner
31:37do the pilots
31:38cut the power
31:39than they face
31:40another problem.
31:41The speed is
31:42increasing.
31:44Why is the
31:44speed so high?
31:46Is it the real
31:47speed?
31:48That's what worries
31:48me.
31:49I don't think so.
31:52They think they're
31:53speeding up.
31:54And they can only
31:55be slowing down.
32:01The pilots don't
32:02know whether to
32:03believe the faulty
32:04airspeed indicator
32:06that's showing
32:07they're going
32:07too fast
32:08after having
32:09pulled their
32:10thrust levers
32:10back to idle.
32:12That'd be totally
32:13confusing for the
32:14captain.
32:15He'd be saying
32:16this can't be
32:16happening.
32:17It's impossible.
32:18It violates the
32:19laws of physics
32:20of aircraft.
32:20aircraft.
32:21But the
32:22captain's thought
32:23process is
32:24overtaken by
32:25what happens
32:25next.
32:27Overspeed.
32:30The faulty
32:31airspeed data
32:32is now triggering
32:33the overspeed
32:34warning.
32:36An overspeed
32:37warning gets
32:37your attention
32:38very quickly.
32:39And you
32:41want to react
32:41to it.
32:42But this is
32:44the time when
32:44he should have
32:45been questioning
32:45whether that
32:46was correct.
32:49The first
32:50officer makes
32:51a split-second
32:52decision.
32:53Take the
32:54speed brakes
32:54out.
32:57And now
33:00with the
33:00power cut
33:01and the
33:01speed brakes
33:02out.
33:04Slows the
33:05plane down
33:05to the point
33:06of stalling.
33:07The erroneous
33:08overspeed data
33:09leads the pilots
33:11to reduce their
33:12speed, which
33:13puts their
33:13plane into a
33:14stall.
33:26The crew
33:27instinctively
33:28lowered the
33:28nose and
33:29increased their
33:30actual airspeed.
33:31Those are the
33:32steps that will
33:33keep you from
33:34stalling the
33:35airplane.
33:37Responding to
33:38the stall
33:38warning was
33:39the right move.
33:41But after
33:42that they hit
33:46further out
33:47to sea
33:47instead of
33:48towards Lima,
33:50why would
33:51they do
33:51that?
33:56Shortly
33:56after the
33:57stall warning
33:58ends,
34:00a new
34:01warning tells
34:02them they are
34:02dangerously close
34:03to terrain.
34:06The captain
34:06doesn't realize
34:07how close they
34:07are to the
34:08water.
34:10on the 757,
34:12a radio altimeter
34:13measures the
34:14plane's altitude
34:14when below
34:152,500 feet
34:16and sounds the
34:18ground proximity
34:19warning when the
34:20plane drops too
34:21close to the
34:21terrain.
34:22The ground
34:23proximity warning
34:23system is separate
34:25from the
34:25pitostatic system.
34:27It was telling
34:27them the truth.
34:29Too low terrain.
34:31Too low terrain.
34:32And now
34:33we've induced
34:34a terrifying
34:35alert of
34:36I'm about to
34:37hit a mountain.
34:39The pilots
34:40thought they
34:40were near a
34:41mountain when
34:42they were
34:42actually approaching
34:43the surface
34:44of the ocean.
34:48Let's go
34:49left.
34:58Radar shows
34:59you're turning
35:00left, you're
35:01heading to
35:01the west.
35:03We're heading
35:04250.
35:05We're heading
35:06out to sea
35:07because we
35:07have a low
35:07terrain warning.
35:12He knew
35:13that the
35:14water, the
35:15ocean, is
35:16to the left
35:16and that's
35:17going to be
35:18my safe
35:18environment.
35:23No sooner
35:24do they deal
35:24with the
35:24terrain warning
35:25than the
35:26pilots are
35:26confronted by
35:27an alert
35:28telling them
35:28they are
35:29descending
35:29too rapidly.
35:31Sink rate.
35:32Sink rate.
35:33Let's climb.
35:34Let's go
35:34up.
35:35Too low
35:36for rain.
35:40Now, going
35:40up was the
35:41right call.
35:42They were
35:42descending at
35:433,000 feet
35:43per minute.
35:44They climbed
35:45to 4,000 feet
35:46and they
35:46stayed there
35:46for approximately
35:49one minute.
35:56so what led
35:57to the final
35:58plunge into
35:58the sea.
36:00Let's go
36:00back to
36:01Lima.
36:01I'll try
36:01to intercept
36:02the ILS
36:03and then
36:03the set.
36:05After 25
36:06harrowing minutes,
36:07the captain
36:08initiates a
36:09turn back
36:09to Lima.
36:11Lima,
36:11Aero Peru
36:126-0-3.
36:13We will try
36:13to intercept
36:14the ILS.
36:16Can you tell
36:17us our altitude?
36:18Is our altitude
36:199,700 feet?
36:21Roger.
36:22Aero Peru
36:226-0-3.
36:23You're showing
36:24level at
36:249,700.
36:28But when
36:29the terrain
36:30warning activates,
36:31investigators know
36:32the plane
36:33was below
36:332,500 feet.
36:36They both
36:37had the wrong
36:38altitude.
36:41Investigators
36:42discover the
36:42controller was
36:43also providing
36:44flight 6-0-3
36:46with incorrect
36:47altitude information.
36:49The assumption
36:50was the
36:51controllers
36:51can tell
36:51us our
36:52altitude,
36:52but the
36:53flaw in that
36:54is that
36:55that altitude
36:55is actually
36:56being sent
36:56to the
36:57controller
36:57from the
36:58aircraft
36:58itself.
36:59If the
37:00information
37:01on board
37:01the aircraft
37:01is incorrect,
37:03then the
37:03information
37:04that's being
37:04sent to
37:05the radar
37:05is also
37:06going to
37:06be incorrect.
37:09Investigators
37:10speak to
37:10the controller
37:11to understand
37:12why he
37:13relayed
37:13the faulty
37:14readings
37:14back to
37:15flight 6-0-3.
37:17So it
37:18looks like
37:18you were
37:18providing
37:18the crew
37:19with altitude
37:19data.
37:21Yes,
37:21they said
37:22they didn't
37:22have any
37:22altimeters,
37:23so I told
37:24them what
37:24I was
37:24seeing on
37:25my radar
37:25screen.
37:27Were you
37:28using SSR
37:29in mode C?
37:30Yes,
37:30that's right.
37:31Your radar's
37:32altitude is
37:32coming from
37:33the plane's
37:33transponder.
37:38when the
37:39controller
37:39confirmed the
37:41altitudes for
37:41the pilots,
37:42I think it
37:43gave them a
37:43false sense
37:44of hope
37:45that at least
37:45one of our
37:46problems has
37:47been solved,
37:47the altitude
37:48problem,
37:49when in fact
37:50that was
37:50tragically
37:51incorrect.
37:57But even
37:58with the
37:58faulty
37:59altitude
37:59readings,
38:00could the
38:01pilots still
38:02have landed
38:02their planes
38:03safely?
38:11Pick it up
38:12during their
38:12final descent.
38:13To determine
38:14if the pilots
38:15had any other
38:16options to
38:16save their
38:17plane,
38:18investigators
38:19listened to
38:19the final
38:20moments of
38:20Aero Peru
38:21Flight 603.
38:24It seems
38:24to be flying
38:25well.
38:27Can you tell
38:28us our
38:28altitude?
38:29You're at
38:299,700 feet
38:31according to
38:31my radar.
38:32You're all
38:32the rain.
38:349,700 feet
38:36but we're
38:36getting a
38:37terrain warning.
38:39The crew
38:40can't understand
38:41the conflicting
38:42information.
38:44But there was
38:45a way for the
38:46pilots to
38:47determine their
38:48actual altitude
38:49and save the
38:50plane.
38:50If they checked
38:51the radio
38:52altimeter,
38:52they would have
38:53realized how
38:54close they are
38:54to crushing.
38:54too low,
38:55terrain.
38:56Too low,
38:57terrain.
38:58When the
38:59ground proximity
38:59warning system
39:00activated in
39:01the cockpit,
39:02the crew could
39:03have referred to
39:03the radio
39:04altimeter and
39:05that would have
39:05given them the
39:06truth data about
39:07how high they
39:08were above the
39:09ground.
39:10Too low,
39:10terrain.
39:12Too low,
39:13But they never
39:13check their
39:14radio altimeter.
39:16Pull up.
39:17Too low,
39:18terrain.
39:19Pull up.
39:20Pull up.
39:21Pull up.
39:22Pull up.
39:23terrain.
39:26We're hitting
39:27the water.
39:29When an
39:30aircraft has
39:32its wing touch
39:33the water in
39:34a bank
39:35attitude, the
39:36situation is
39:38hopeless.
39:39Pull up.
39:40Pull up.
39:42Pull up.
39:43Pull up.
39:43Pull up.
39:47The pilots try
39:49to get the
39:49plane back in
39:50the air.
39:53But the
39:54plane banks
39:54left and
39:55falls back
39:56towards the
39:57sea.
39:58We're running
39:58on it!
40:02Marine.
40:03Marine.
40:04Ah!
40:12They really
40:12had no idea
40:13how low they
40:13were.
40:14And all those
40:15alarms fall so
40:16real just made
40:17matters worse.
40:29The situation
40:30in the cockpit
40:30was so confusing.
40:35It was hard
40:36for either crew
40:36member to
40:37understand which
40:38cautions and
40:39warnings were
40:40true and
40:40important.
40:41And there
40:42didn't seem to
40:42be a good
40:43balance between
40:44the two crew
40:44members in
40:45sorting that
40:45out.
40:48For
40:49investigators
40:49there's one
40:50final unanswered
40:52question.
40:54Were the pilots
40:55properly prepared
40:55to handle an
40:56emergency like
40:56this?
40:58They examined
40:59the quick
41:00reference handbook
41:01which provides
41:02guidance in
41:02emergency situations
41:04as well as
41:05Aero Peru's
41:06training procedures.
41:10Well, there's
41:11nothing here.
41:12Anything in the
41:13training procedures?
41:15Not one
41:15single word on
41:16how to handle
41:16erroneous air
41:17data.
41:21The lack of
41:21training worked
41:22against them.
41:26A big takeaway
41:27from this accident
41:28was that flight
41:29crews need to be
41:30better trained to
41:31get to pitch and
41:32power in the event
41:33of unreliable air
41:35speed and altitude.
41:35do.
41:40Investigators
41:41needed only two
41:42months to solve
41:43the mystery of
41:44flight 603.
41:46They now know
41:47that blocked
41:48static ports
41:49created faulty
41:52air data
41:53readings.
41:56And those faulty
41:58readings created
41:59so much confusion
42:00in the cockpit.
42:01that the
42:07overwhelmed crew
42:08was unable to
42:09separate the
42:09false alarms
42:10from the true
42:11ones.
42:14They really
42:15needed to develop
42:16a laser focus
42:17on just flying
42:18the airplane.
42:19But they never
42:20got there.
42:22the captain's
42:23failure to react
42:24to the ground
42:24proximity warnings
42:25in time.
42:27He's telling you
42:28to pull up.
42:30We're hitting the
42:30water.
42:31Pull up.
42:31Pull up.
42:34Contributed to
42:35the death of 70
42:51people.
42:53There's nothing
42:54highly technical
42:55about tape.
42:56But boy,
42:57did it start a
42:57chain of events.
43:02The
43:03investigation's
43:04report outlines
43:05a number of
43:06recommendations.
43:07But chief among
43:08them is for more
43:09training to ensure
43:10crews know how to
43:12deal with inaccurate
43:13air data.
43:15And implementing
43:16the use of
43:17eye-catching
43:18static port covers
43:19while a plane is
43:20being maintained.
43:22Remember,
43:23it's the simple
43:25things that cause
43:27problems.
43:28And we need to
43:30keep that in
43:30everybody's mind.
43:32Attention to
43:33detail.
43:33If you perform
43:35that detail,
43:35whatever it is,
43:37you're not going
43:38to get problems.
43:42This accident
43:44was one of the
43:46pillars of
43:47safety procedures.
43:51Our training
43:52changed.
43:53Our pre-flight
43:54procedures changed.
43:55Our attention to
43:56details changed.
43:58And it still
43:59lives to this
44:00day.
44:01And it still
44:38was the first
44:39thing that
44:39again.
44:39We're going to
44:41do it.
44:41We'll see you
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