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00:00Just moments after taking off from a remote island in Norway...
00:10Something's wrong.
00:11...the pilots of Videro Flight 839 lose control of their plane.
00:15Oh, God!
00:17...it plunges into the Norwegian Sea, killing everyone on board.
00:24In the wreckage, investigators find damage to a critical part.
00:28The upper end is broken.
00:33It didn't make a great deal of sense.
00:36And when they learn another Videro Flight nearly met the same fate at the same airport...
00:42Looks like they lost control of the plane for two minutes.
00:46We're going over!
00:51...they discover a controversial decision that put lives at risk.
00:56I wish that we had put our foot down and said no more.
01:01...they've had tricky parts.
01:07He were up in the way in.
01:09...and said no more.
01:10...nate, knee, knee, knee, knee...
01:11Videro flight 836 is heading to a remote outpost on the Lofoten archipelago.
01:41In the Norwegian sea.
01:43Lofoten is one of the most beautiful places in Norway.
01:48It's a place where a Norwegian would want to go on holiday to experience untouched nature,
01:55and especially the beautiful mountains.
02:00Tonight's flight is carrying 11 passengers.
02:05Most are Norwegians traveling to the islands from the mainland.
02:10Videro 836. Runway 25 free.
02:15Winds variable 1021 at 260 degrees. Visibility 2500 meters.
02:22Copy that. Videro 836.
02:25Videro is Norway's largest regional airline. It serves remote communities across the country.
02:38Since the 1960s and 70s, it was a push in Norway to build regional airports in rural areas.
02:45It's made people feel less isolated, and it made traveling a lot easier.
02:54The plane is heading first to the small island of Vare, and then southwest to Rust,
03:00before returning to the mainland city of Boda.
03:06Approach checklist.
03:09Twelve miles from the airport, the crew prepares for landing.
03:14The crew was experienced, but this was the first time the captain had flown into Vare.
03:20Altimeters.
03:23Set.
03:26They're flying a de Havilland Twin Otter.
03:31It's a twin turboprop utility aircraft.
03:34A workhorse for getting in and out of small remote airports.
03:40The best airplane in the world.
03:44It's an incredibly sturdy aircraft.
03:47Very pilot friendly.
03:50We have a long mountainous coast.
03:53And for that, Twin Otter was perfect.
04:00Landing lights.
04:02On.
04:04Videro flight 836 is now minutes from landing at Vare.
04:09And seatbelt.
04:11Already on.
04:14But the airport is notorious for unpredictable winds.
04:18Vare translated means the weather island.
04:23The airport was located to the north of the island, between the mountain and the sea.
04:29It's a very demanding flying environment, because the weather changes all the time,
04:35so the pilots have to adapt to that.
04:40Set flaps.
04:43Flaps set.
04:44With the runway in sight, the pilots begin to line up for landing.
04:50But just as the plane turns, it's rocked by turbulence.
04:55I have control.
04:56You have control.
04:57When flying at Vare, you will experience turbulence, and you will be tossed around.
05:01This isn't getting better.
05:02Go around.
05:03He obviously decided that the situation was not good to land.
05:04So he went around, and it was a great call on his part.
05:05Flaps up.
05:06Flaps up.
05:07And it was a great call on his part.
05:08Let's go.
05:09Flaps up.
05:10You will experience turbulence, and you will be tossed around.
05:18This isn't getting better.
05:20Go around.
05:25He obviously decided that the situation was not good to land,
05:28so he went around, and it was a great call on his part.
05:33Lapse up.
05:35As the captain powers out of the landing,
05:38the plane is hit with a powerful downdraft and extreme turbulence.
05:47You get sort of a tunnel vision when you're in a situation like that,
05:52and you pull out all your resources,
05:55and you try to counteract the situation that you're in.
06:01For two minutes, the captain struggles to level the plane.
06:04He was in extreme turbulence.
06:10You're momentarily out of control.
06:12You may or may not regain control.
06:24We're going over.
06:25The force of the wind becomes so great
06:29that the plane rolls over, speeding towards the mountains.
06:36Altitude!
06:39I can't see anything.
06:41Only 250 feet from the ground,
07:04the captain levels the plane and pulls out of the dive.
07:07I just can't believe that he recovered at such a low altitude.
07:23Put in headings for Rust.
07:25Vitero, 836 has a boarded landing.
07:34Redirecting to Rust.
07:36Copy that, Vitero 836.
07:38Stay safe.
07:39Everyone okay back there?
07:41Vitero, flight 836 escapes disaster.
07:52No one on board is injured.
07:58I'm still shaking my head at that one.
08:00That was an ace pilot.
08:02In the city of Boda,
08:07officials from Vitero Airlines cancel all flights into Vare
08:10while they try and piece together what happened with flight 836.
08:16As part of an internal investigation,
08:19the pilot is interviewed.
08:21We were lining up for approach.
08:24Turbulence was getting worse and worse.
08:26I have control.
08:32It was obvious we couldn't land.
08:35I applied power to the engines and we climbed to about 1,800 feet,
08:39where we got hit with a massive downdraft.
08:49We're going over.
08:49I battled that plane.
09:00Trying to keep it away from the mountains.
09:03Come on!
09:08Come on!
09:11Eventually, I was able to level out,
09:15climb to a safe altitude,
09:16and turn for Rust.
09:19It would be terrifying for them, I'm sure.
09:25I've heard stories about that airport.
09:30And they're true.
09:34The pilots were not very happy.
09:38We realized this had been a serious incident,
09:42and we had to tighten the operational requirement at the island
09:46to make that a safer.
09:49The first action taken by Videro officials
09:54is to reduce the maximum wind speeds
09:57for takeoff and landing at Vare Airport
10:00from 20 to 15 knots.
10:04Videro asks the Civil Aviation Authority
10:06to install anemometers,
10:08devices that monitor and transmit wind speeds.
10:11Two are installed at each end of the airstrip,
10:14and one is installed on the mountain.
10:17The mountain is its own weathermaker.
10:18It can cause winds to change in direction,
10:22change in speed,
10:23which are conducive to making some serious turbulence.
10:26It's called terrain-induced turbulence.
10:32When winds hit the mountains on Vare,
10:34they tend to accelerate over the top
10:37and drop down towards the airstrip.
10:39This creates powerful downdrafts and crosswinds.
10:43The sudden changes in wind speeds and direction
10:46can create wind shear
10:48and cause a pilot to lose control.
10:52This was a difficult place to operate
10:54when the wind was flying over the mountains
10:57and down onto the airport.
10:59And we had to tighten those restrictions
11:01quite severely and quickly.
11:05But will the restrictions at Vare be enough
11:10to ensure the safety of future flights?
11:19It's been 15 months since Videro Flight 836
11:23had their close call at Vare Airport.
11:26Videro Flight 839 has just landed at Vare
11:29and is refuelling before heading back
11:32to the mainland for Easter weekend.
11:35Anti-collision light.
11:39On.
11:40Aft and forward boost.
11:42On.
11:44Captain Ida Nils-Pearson is the pilot in command.
11:49Ida was a very level-headed fella.
11:53He was a top-rated pilot
11:55and he'd been with us for years.
11:59Start switch.
12:00Left engine.
12:01The first officer is
12:04Arnd Vidar Grunerflotter.
12:07On.
12:08Right engine.
12:09Right engine.
12:12On.
12:14The first officer was fairly new.
12:16I think he'd been with us for only about a year.
12:20Look at that windsock.
12:25It's flapping like mad.
12:28Welcome to Hooray.
12:31Buckle up, folks.
12:32It's going to be a bit bumpy getting out of here.
12:35There are three passengers on board,
12:38including a young couple.
12:39All right.
12:41Vidar 0839 ready to taxi.
12:43Vidar 0839 roger.
12:45No known traffic.
12:46Runway free.
12:47Wind variable middle direction 250
12:50at 21 max 57.
12:53QNH 988.
12:56Copy, 988.
12:57The captain, he was a local pilot.
13:02He knew the weather.
13:04He knew the limitations of the aircraft.
13:06Knew the limitations of the airport.
13:10As they line up at the end of the runway,
13:13the crew performs the before takeoff checklist.
13:18Claps set 10.
13:20Set 10.
13:22Headings set to 280.
13:23Let's make it 320.
13:28Just get clearance.
13:29It's calm now.
13:30We should get going.
13:31Copy that.
13:33Tower, Vidar 0839 requesting clearance.
13:36Vidar 0839.
13:38ODOT control clears.
13:39Vidar 0839 direct ODOT at 5,000 feet
13:42and squawk 0135.
13:45Copy.
13:46Vidar 0839.
13:48Here we go.
13:53Wind has varied 210 to 290 degrees.
14:01The gusts of 34.
14:03Yeah, roger.
14:04We are rolling.
14:0770 knots.
14:0980 knots.
14:15Rotate.
14:16At 2.43, Vidar 0839 takes off from Vare
14:22and heads for the mainland.
14:26The return flight to Boda will take less than 30 minutes.
14:34Flaps up.
14:3510 seconds after takeoff.
14:41A strange noise catches the pilot's attention.
14:46You don't want anything unusual to happen in that face of the flight
14:50since you are very close to the ground.
14:55They struggle to keep the plane level.
15:00Steady.
15:00Something's wrong.
15:16And then,
15:18the nose of the plane drops
15:19and the captain can't do anything to raise it.
15:22No.
15:24No, no, no.
15:25No.
15:25Just 63 seconds after lifting off,
15:41Vidar 0839
15:42slams into the sea.
15:52Vidar 0839.
15:53This is Vare Tower.
15:55Do you copy?
15:57Vidar 0839.
15:59Vare information on 119.4.
16:09Within hours,
16:11search and rescue teams spot debris
16:13on the ocean's surface
16:146.5 kilometers northwest of the airport.
16:17The wreckage was found
16:21three days after the accident.
16:25Harsh sea conditions
16:26made it a challenge.
16:31The bodies of the three passengers
16:33and the first officer
16:35are recovered.
16:37Captain Pearson's remains
16:38are never found.
16:41The accident caused a lot of grief.
16:43Vare is a small island
16:46where everyone
16:47know each other
16:48so everyone felt
16:49they had left someone
16:50close to them.
16:53Investigators from
16:54the Norwegian Accident Commission
16:55for Civil Aviation
16:57or HSL
16:58soon arrive
16:59on the island.
17:02The purpose
17:03of the Vidar investigation
17:05was to find out
17:07what happened
17:08during that incident.
17:09I was manager air safety
17:15for Boeing Canada
17:16to Havilland Division
17:17and I traveled to
17:19Valroy
17:20to assist
17:20with the investigation.
17:23The airfield
17:24was spectacular
17:25but I was somewhat surprised
17:27in the closeness
17:29of the mountain range
17:31which paralleled
17:32the entire runway.
17:37Investigators start
17:38by interviewing the controller
17:39who briefs pilots
17:41on the local weather.
17:42Sorry about that.
17:43That's fine.
17:43Can you walk me through
17:45what happened
17:45the day of the accident?
17:46Normal day
17:47by our standards.
17:49They landed at 14.30,
17:51refueled,
17:52changed passengers
17:53and asked to taxi out.
17:55The whole turnaround
17:56was less than 15 minutes.
17:58What were the winds
17:58when they took off?
18:00It was gusting
18:01when they were parked
18:02but eased off
18:02to 34 on the west end.
18:05The winds were coming
18:06from every direction.
18:07It's pretty common.
18:09Did the pilots
18:10have any hesitation
18:11about taking off?
18:12No, not at all.
18:14And what about the takeoff?
18:16The controller explains
18:18that after the plane
18:19passed the tower,
18:20it turned
18:23and then disappeared
18:24into the clouds.
18:26What was the cloud ceiling
18:28at the time?
18:291,000 feet.
18:31I received a distress signal
18:32and a few seconds later
18:33I heard a bang.
18:37That was fast.
18:39They were airborne
18:39for just over a minute.
18:42Did they call mayday
18:44or relay any information
18:46about mechanical issues?
18:47Nothing.
18:51That was helpful.
18:55Could there have been
18:56a structural failure
18:57or loss of power
18:59which caused
19:00Flight 839
19:00to crash so quickly
19:02into the sea?
19:09Investigators survey
19:10the wreckage
19:11of Videro Flight 839
19:12for any signs
19:13that would explain
19:14a crash so soon
19:15after takeoff?
19:17Nose and cockpit
19:18completely crushed.
19:22Both wings,
19:24engines,
19:26undercarriage,
19:27and tail section
19:28severed from the fuselage
19:31on impact
19:32and carried forward.
19:35High energy impact.
19:36With the nose
19:40buckled the way
19:40it was
19:41and the left
19:42wingtip buckled,
19:44we had a pretty
19:45good idea
19:46of how the aircraft
19:47impacted the sea.
19:52The wreckage
19:54tells investigators
19:55the plane entered
19:56the water nose first
19:57at high speed.
20:03The team considers
20:05whether engine failure
20:06caused the high speed
20:08impact.
20:09The manufacturer
20:10provides their report.
20:12No fire damage.
20:14Both engines
20:14appeared to be running
20:15at high RPM
20:16and torque
20:17at the time
20:18of impact.
20:20The engine manufacturer
20:22determined
20:22that the engines
20:23were running
20:24and they were ruled
20:25out very,
20:26very quickly.
20:28With engine failure
20:30ruled out,
20:31they wonder
20:31whether any parts
20:32that control
20:33the plane's pitch
20:34or steering failed,
20:36causing it to plunge
20:37into the sea.
20:41The right elevator
20:42sheared in half,
20:44maybe due to impact.
20:47The elevator
20:49is a control surface
20:50on the twin otter's tail
20:51that adjusts pitch.
20:57Investigators discover
20:59something unusual
21:00in the elevator
21:01connecting rod.
21:06The elevator
21:07connecting rod
21:08moves the elevators
21:09up and down
21:11on the tail.
21:12It's activated
21:13when the pilot
21:14pushes or pulls
21:15on the control column.
21:18The upper end
21:19is broken.
21:20What would cause
21:22such a vital part
21:23to break?
21:24You shouldn't have
21:25any preconceived notions
21:28as to why
21:29the part failed.
21:31Let's get this elevator
21:32rod to metallurgy.
21:34I want to know
21:34how it failed.
21:38Did the part fail
21:40because there was
21:40a manufacturing defect?
21:43Did it fail
21:44because there was
21:45a tool mark on it?
21:47You should let the part
21:49tell you the story.
21:50While investigators
21:53wait for the
21:54metallurgical results,
21:56they research
21:56the plane's history,
21:58looking for any clues
21:59into what might have
22:00caused the elevator
22:01connecting rod
22:02to fail.
22:04The twin otter
22:04DHC-6300
22:06was purchased
22:07by Vidro
22:07in 1977.
22:10The last alien
22:11inspection was carried
22:12out the day
22:12of the accident.
22:14Maintenance all in
22:14accordance with
22:15current regulations.
22:16So not a
22:16maintenance issue.
22:20The investigators
22:25went through
22:26all the maintenance
22:27documentation,
22:28all the inspections
22:29was completed
22:30and no deviations
22:32was found.
22:34With maintenance
22:36ruled out
22:37as a cause
22:37for the failure
22:38of the elevator
22:39connecting rod,
22:40investigators review
22:41the results
22:42of a metallurgical
22:43examination
22:44performed on the rod.
22:45There's no
22:47pre-existing cracks.
22:49There's banding
22:50here
22:50and here.
22:53Banding is created
22:55because you have
22:56a repeated load
22:57that is applied
22:58on and off
22:59to your part
22:59and every time
23:01the load is applied
23:02you have a crack
23:03that grows
23:04a little bit more
23:05and it creates
23:07a rainbow
23:08on the fracture surface.
23:10The report
23:11also reveals
23:12the banding
23:13occurred
23:13because of
23:14sideways bending
23:15on the rod.
23:18This was
23:19highly unusual.
23:21There's never
23:21any side loads
23:22on that rod.
23:24It just moves
23:25up and down.
23:26So it didn't
23:27make a great
23:28deal of sense.
23:31Investigators
23:32examine schematics
23:33of the tail
23:34section of the
23:35twin otter
23:35to determine
23:36what would bend
23:37the elevator
23:38connecting rod
23:39sideways
23:39causing it
23:40to break.
23:41So what if
23:42this elevator
23:43broke in flight?
23:46It was
23:47being freely
23:48and uncontrollably.
23:51That would
23:52definitely cause
23:52the rod to bend.
23:59If the right
24:00elevator
24:00separated from
24:01its mounts
24:02in flight
24:03it would swing
24:04in every direction
24:05putting sideways
24:06pressure on the rod
24:08and ultimately
24:09causing it
24:09to break.
24:12First the elevator
24:13then the rod.
24:17It's the only thing
24:18that makes sense.
24:21It's kind of like
24:22the cart
24:22before the horse.
24:24The control rod
24:25would not have
24:26seen any loads
24:27had the elevator
24:28not broken.
24:31What would cause
24:32the elevator
24:33to break in flight?
24:35The cockpit voice
24:36recorder can shed
24:37some light on that.
24:38Okay, let's start
24:47with the takeoff
24:47roll.
24:49Norwegian
24:50investigators
24:51listened to the
24:52cockpit voice
24:52recorder for clues
24:54as to how
24:54the right elevator
24:56on Videro
24:56flight 839
24:57might have come
24:58loose
24:59bending the
25:00connecting rod.
25:0170 knots
25:0280 knots
25:05rotate
25:07It was amazing
25:09that the cockpit
25:10voice recorder
25:11was in the aircraft
25:12in the first place
25:13because it was not
25:14mandatory at the time.
25:20Claps up.
25:28Did you hear that
25:29clattering noise?
25:30strange.
25:39Steady.
25:46Something's wrong.
25:49Stop.
25:51There it is again.
25:52Is that the elevator?
25:55play it back again?
25:58Play it back again.
26:00When I listened to the CVR
26:03there was nothing that I could pinpoint
26:06as being the source of the clattering sound.
26:15Could it have been the elevator breaking?
26:17It was possible but we really just don't know.
26:21Did you hear the propellers?
26:2355 seconds into the flight
26:25investigators hear the sound of propellers
26:28rotating out of sync.
26:31This occurs when there's a change in the aircraft's pitch.
26:35Turbulence?
26:36It has to be.
26:38It has to be.
26:40A sudden gust of wind
26:42or change in wind direction
26:44would cause the propellers to adjust
26:47to compensate
26:48for the changing attitude
26:50of the aircraft.
26:53Investigators discover that
26:55Videro 839
26:56was struck by severe turbulence
26:58shortly after takeoff.
27:01The crash happens just 10 seconds later.
27:06No.
27:09No, no, no, no.
27:11Oh, God.
27:12No.
27:13No.
27:24So where were they exactly
27:25when they were struck by severe turbulence?
27:27A standard operating procedure
27:29calls for a rate of ascend
27:31of 1,000 to 1,200 feet per minute.
27:33So they would have hit turbulence
27:36right after they entered clouds
27:38at about 1,000 feet.
27:42And that mountain ridge there
27:43is just over 1,000 feet.
27:46That looks like terrain-induced turbulence.
27:48It looks like terrain-induced turbulence.
27:55The quicker you could get away
27:57from the mountains,
27:59the better it was.
28:01How bad could those winds have been?
28:06Investigators learn
28:07of the near crash
28:08of the other Videro plane,
28:10Flight 836,
28:11on approach to Vare
28:1315 months earlier.
28:14Looks like they lost control
28:15of the plane for two minutes.
28:16Even when inverted.
28:17At what altitude did they lose control?
28:18About 1,800 feet.
28:19Just after he had boarded the landing
28:21on runway 25 due to winds.
28:23Both flights encountered dangerous winds
28:24at or above the mountain ridges.
28:25Were any measures put into place
28:26to prevent this from happening again?
28:27After flight 836 is missed a
28:28point of time.
28:29At what altitude did they lose control?
28:30At what altitude did they lose control?
28:32About 1,800 feet.
28:33Just after he had boarded the landing
28:35on runway 25 due to winds.
28:38Both flights encountered dangerous winds
28:43at or above the mountain ridges.
28:46Were any measures put into place
28:48to prevent this from happening again?
28:50After flight 836's missed approach,
28:53flight order 17 was put into place.
28:56So they made this change.
28:58Landings and departures must not be planned
29:01or executed with variable winds above 15 knots.
29:04So they reduced the maximum allowable wind speeds
29:07for takeoff and landing.
29:09Weedero established some very significant wind restrictions
29:16using some very experienced crew to develop them.
29:21But there was still unpredictability.
29:25Anemometers were also installed
29:28at both ends of the runway
29:30and on the mountain ridge.
29:34It's good to have an anemometer on top of a mountain.
29:39It just gives the pilot more information for the landing.
29:43So what were the mountain winds at the time of flight 839?
29:52Huh.
29:53There is no anemometer data for the mountain.
30:00If it doesn't provide data, it's absolutely no use.
30:06Investigators contact the Civil Aviation Authority
30:10to determine why there weren't any mountain anemometer wind readings
30:14at the time of the crash of Videro flight 839.
30:22The anemometer was taken down.
30:27They learned that the anemometer on the mountain
30:30wasn't reliable because of the icy conditions.
30:33A year after being installed,
30:35it was removed from the mountain for repair.
30:39It gets worse.
30:41It was never reinstalled.
30:43It was officially taken out of service
30:46three days before the accident.
30:53The removal of the anemometer is a degradation safety.
30:58It's information that a pilot would certainly require
31:01for an airport like that.
31:03Okay.
31:04So, what wind information were the pilots actually getting
31:09and when?
31:10I'm gonna bank west of the island to avoid more turbulence.
31:22I'm getting up drafts already.
31:23Copy that.
31:24Videro 839, runway free, wind east side, 270 degrees at max 23.
31:27Understood.
31:28Videro 839.
31:2923 knots.
31:30That's eight knots above the limit.
31:44They shouldn't even have landed the inbound flight in the first place.
31:48What about when they're on the ground?
32:00Look at that windsock.
32:03It's flapping like mad.
32:05Welcome to Vare.
32:06The pilot was talking a lot about the wind and they were discussing that the wind was coming from all directions.
32:19Videro 839, roger.
32:21No known traffic, runway free.
32:23Wind variable, middle direction 250.
32:26At 21, max 57.
32:29What did you say again, max 57?
32:32Yup.
32:33Max 57.
32:38Copy.
32:4357 knots.
32:4757 knots is more than 65 miles per hour.
32:51Yeah.
32:52The manual says that the twin otter must not be operated on the ground in winds above 50 knots.
33:01Well, he is sticking his neck out on the line and I'm not quite sure why he did that.
33:08Were the winds that strong when they took off?
33:14They go through their pre-takeoff checklist and then...
33:17Just get clearance.
33:20It's calm now.
33:21We should get going.
33:22Copy that.
33:24The captain says it's calm.
33:26What's he basing that on?
33:27Windsocks?
33:29The rains had stopped.
33:30Maybe it looked like the weather was clearing.
33:35If a shower was approaching, you could expect variable winds.
33:40But when the shower passed, you could expect a lull in the wind.
33:48According to the transcript, they get their next wind report as they're about to take off.
33:56Wind has varied 210 to 290 degrees with gusts of 34.
34:03Yeah, Roger, we are rolling.
34:08They took off in a 34 knot wind.
34:10That's more than double the limit.
34:14If the winds were gusting at 57 knots on the ground, then who knows how strong the winds were coming off the mountain.
34:22Strong enough to break the elevator.
34:23When he hit the lip of the mountain, I bet he encountered 60, 70, 80 knot winds.
34:38It obviously caused severe to extreme turbulence.
34:42Steady.
34:43The team concludes the winds were strong enough to break the right elevator from its mounts, causing the connecting rod to break, making both elevators unusable.
34:56Something's wrong.
34:57They ignored Vitero's wind limits on the ground.
35:02And they had no wind limits in the dangerous area around the mountain.
35:07Why were they so eager to leave?
35:12This was Easter weekend, and there is an incentive to get home.
35:17To get home.
35:21There was clearly some concern, but they went.
35:34To understand why the captain of Flight 839 took off in winds that exceeded company limits, investigators interview other Vitero pilots about wind restrictions at Vare.
35:45What has been your experience at Vare?
35:49I don't like it. None of the pilots do. The wind reports aren't reliable.
35:58You could actually sit on the tarmac, get one wind indication, move towards the runway, and get another.
36:06Even though the maximum wind speeds were reduced from 20 knots to 15?
36:11Well, they were, but they brought it back up to 20.
36:15Nine months after the incident with the first Vitero flight, the wind restrictions were reversed.
36:27How would they do that?
36:29My guess? Too many cancellations.
36:31After Vitero lowered the wind limits, cancellations increased.
36:41That led to negative press and anger from local residents.
36:44The decision to cancel flights became very unpopular. It was so unpredictable at Vare.
36:55Fairly.
36:59Did pilots feel pressure to complete the flights?
37:03Yeah, but not from the airline.
37:05I had a situation where the weather turned into a hurricane and it could not take off.
37:13And I got a real work over from some of the passengers.
37:17Investigators research the impact those wind-related cancellations had on Vitero's operations.
37:23Hmm. The pressure was piling on from the public.
37:30Cancellations tripled in the last 12 months.
37:32Compared to other airports in Europe, Vare had a lot of cancellations.
37:38And the flights were often cancelled quite early when the wind was strong.
37:44But when the flights were supposed to arrive, it could be no wind at all.
37:49Which made people question all the cancellations.
37:53Almost all the cancellations were being caused by winds.
37:56Because of that, bad press.
37:59Which gets the attention of the government.
38:05The government paid the company to fly there.
38:09The company wrote the government and said it was extremely difficult to operate there.
38:15And the reply from the government was, if you don't fly there, we will have to take the money away.
38:20Out of curiosity, how many cancellations were there on departure from Vare?
38:33None.
38:35Basically, it's get home-itis.
38:39If they're at the airport, pilots are going to tell themselves they're capable of taking off as well.
38:44You know, there's still one thing I don't get.
38:50The conditions were so treacherous.
38:53Why was this airport even built there in the first place?
39:04So, why was this location chosen for the airport?
39:07Investigators consult officials about the viability of Vare Airport, to determine if passengers and crew were placed at risk unnecessarily.
39:21Vidra had two possible locations for the airport at the island.
39:26This one was chosen despite the difficulties with wind conditions near the mountain ridge.
39:34Okay, and what testing went into the decision?
39:42Vidra had done test flights at Varey prior to the decision of building the airport there.
39:48And they had experienced very windy conditions and did not recommend building the airport there.
39:54So, if Vidra was against it, then why did it go ahead?
40:00We knew that the wind conditions at Vare would be so difficult, it would affect regularity.
40:09But that advice was ignored by the meteorology specialists that the authorities had consulted when it came to put the airport on the island.
40:22Maybe some of the decisions that were made were more politically motivated than were practical.
40:33Investigators now know the factors that led to the deaths of three passengers and two pilots on board Vidrault Flight 839.
40:43First up, you have an airport next to a mountain, resulting in dangerous winds.
40:50Lower wind limits are imposed, but the result is an increase in cancellations.
40:56Which forces the limits to change again.
40:59Limits go back up, and then finally, the unreliable wind data, which results in wind reports being ignored by pilots.
41:09By pilots.
41:15Rules are established for a reason.
41:18If you don't follow the rules, you're taking a big risk.
41:23Wind has varied 210 to 290 degrees, the gusts of 34.
41:28Yep, Roger, we are rolling.
41:29Vidrault Flight 839 enters turbulent airspace when the winds coming off the mountain were extreme.
41:44The force of the winds causes the right elevator to break free.
41:54Something's wrong.
41:56Bending the connecting rod until it fails.
42:00No.
42:04No.
42:06No, no, no.
42:10It was subject to aerodynamic loads that exceeded the structural strength of the tail.
42:18It must have been absolutely terrifying, because you would pull the control column without any reaction at all.
42:31Oh, God!
42:32The Norwegian Accident Commission for Civil Aviation recommends new regulations for the distribution of wind information to crews,
42:52and urges Vidro to ensure their pilots follow established restrictions.
42:57The captain wanted to get the job done, and he probably got away with it other times, but this time it didn't work out.
43:12Other recommendations are made for Vare Airport, but ultimately it is deemed too dangerous, and the airport never reopens to commercial traffic.
43:21Vare Airport was open only four years, which makes it one of the shortest-lived airports in the world.
43:36I wish that we had put our foot down and said no more.
43:43I wish the company had done the same.
43:45I wish the government and the experts had listened to our warnings earlier.
43:58Then we might have had our colleagues still alive.
44:00HE WON'T FALL
44:21HEW HEW HEW HEW HEW.
44:25HEW HEW HEW HEW.
44:27HEW HEW HEW.
44:29You
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