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On 11 October 1983, Air Illinois Flight 710 crashes into an open pasture area near Pinckneyville, Illinois, in poor weather while en route to Southern Illinois Airport, killing all 10 people on board. The cause of the crash was the pilots' mismanagement of an electrical problem
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00:00After losing their electric generators, the pilots of Air Illinois Flight 710 shut down
00:13one system after another to conserve their battery power.
00:17It was probably the most sickening feeling for both of them.
00:23But efforts prove futile.
00:24All the passengers and crew are killed.
00:31NTSB investigators examine the plane's electrical components for clues.
00:36There's no short circuit.
00:38What about the batteries?
00:41No signs of arcane.
00:43The cockpit voice recording raises more questions.
00:47Are you using these lights here?
00:49I'll get that one down.
00:50Well, they're doing the right thing.
00:52Turning things off to reduce the load.
00:53So, what happened?
00:56You got a flashlight?
00:57Yep.
00:58D-D-D-D-D
01:01Oh, fuck.
01:05Air Illinois Flight 710 departs from Capitol Airport in Springfield, Illinois.
01:30Gear up.
01:3632-year-old Captain Lester Smith has been with Air Illinois almost five years.
01:43He's one of its most experienced pilots.
01:46Gear is up.
01:48First Officer Frank Tudor has been with the airline for three years.
01:53He's considered one of its top First Officers.
01:561,000 feet.
02:00The pilots are flying a Hawker Sidley 748.
02:06The rugged turboprop is designed to land on shorter runways.
02:10The Hawker Sidley 748 was one of a number of aircraft built to replace the DC-3 as a commuter-slash-cargo-slash-military-type aircraft, but primarily used as a commuter aircraft.
02:25It's the ideal plane for a regional airline that connects big cities to small towns in Illinois.
02:34Illinois 710, radar identified.
02:36Continue to 3,000 feet, cleared to Carbondale.
02:39Illinois 710.
02:403,000 feet, cleared for Carbondale.
02:42Thank you and good night.
02:45Heading 175.
02:47Less than two minutes after take-off...
02:58It's the generator again.
03:00...a generator warning light comes on.
03:04The aircraft is equipped with two 9-kilowatt generators that supply power to the battery banks and electrical systems.
03:12One of the generators has failed.
03:14Isolating it now.
03:19The first officer disconnects the right generator to protect the rest of the aircraft's electrical system.
03:26When something like this happens and you have a generator failure,
03:31one of the most important steps is to disconnect that generator from the system as quickly as possible.
03:37Janine Urban is a former Air Illinois pilot who landed the plane in Springfield three hours earlier.
03:46The generators are each rated to be able to carry the entire load.
03:53So if one generator goes down, you can continue to your destination.
03:59It is not an emergency.
04:02Tonight's 40-minute flight is taking seven passengers 146 miles from Springfield to Carbondale, Illinois.
04:10The captain decides it's safe to continue the flight.
04:31I understand you are continuing to Carbondale.
04:34Roger.
04:38There's dense cloud cover this evening.
04:40The conditions at Carbondale were what is called IFR, instrument flight rules.
04:47They would have been operating in the clouds, needed their instruments to be able to fly the airplane.
04:53They were flying into deteriorating weather conditions.
04:57It's something that every airline pilot is trained to handle, but it doesn't give you much room for error.
05:06Four minutes after takeoff, the first officer checks the status of the generators.
05:12Zero voltage and amps on the left side.
05:15He discovers that the left generator is dead.
05:18The right generator is putting out 27 and a half volts.
05:21The right generator now appears to be working, but the first officer is unable to reconnect it to the electrical system.
05:29Can't get it to come online.
05:31The right generator is as good as dead.
05:35With both generators out, all the systems are feeding off the batteries instead of the generators.
05:41It's not a good situation.
05:45The aircraft has four nickel-cadmium batteries.
05:49With no generators, the batteries are now powering lights, instruments, navigational equipment, and everything in the passenger cabin.
05:59How are the bats there?
06:06We're down to 22.5 volts.
06:08So now that we're operating on only battery power, the primary problem is that the batteries are only designed to operate for about 30 minutes under the best-case scenario.
06:22Illinois 710 is now 32 minutes from its destination.
06:26If they don't reduce the drain on the batteries, it will be almost impossible to land without lights, instruments, or a radio.
06:37Okay.
06:38Beacons off.
06:40Okay.
06:43Nav lights are off.
06:45Are you using these lights here?
06:48I'll get that one down.
06:49The pilots quickly shut down non-essential systems.
06:58The sooner they start shutting things down, the longer the battery is going to last.
07:04How are the batteries?
07:06Pretty good.
07:08They're at 21 and a half.
07:10The efforts to conserve battery power seem to be paying off.
07:15Should last a carbondale.
07:17Well, yeah.
07:22Midway to their destination, the weather deteriorates.
07:28The weather that Frank and Les encountered trying to get down to Carbondale was much stormier than Springfield.
07:36There were level two and three thunderstorms.
07:41Want me to tune in to Cappy real quick?
07:43Sure.
07:44Not going to use that much power.
07:4745 miles from Carbondale, the crew tunes in to a signal that will provide a precise bearing to the airport.
07:58Meanwhile, air traffic control transfers the flight to the approach frequency for southern Illinois.
08:03Air Illinois, flight 710, contact Kansas City Center on frequency 125.3.
08:1125.3, Roger.
08:13Air Illinois, 710.
08:14They were getting close to the airport and that approach control facility would have lined them up for an instrument approach.
08:25After contacting approach control, the situation worsens.
08:33I don't know if we have enough juice to get out of this.
08:36The radios and transponder on flight 710 have shut down.
08:42The pilots are now on their own.
08:48Illinois 710, I've lost radar contact.
08:51Flight 710 has disappeared from air traffic control's radar.
08:56Illinois 710, Kansas City.
08:57They had no capability at this point to get help.
09:05It was probably the most sickening feeling for both of them that you or I could imagine.
09:14Watch my altitude.
09:15Going down to 2,400 feet.
09:19Concerned their instruments are about to fail,
09:22the captain attempts to get below the clouds.
09:25He was desperately hoping that he could see the airport beacon or some runway lights
09:33and land that airplane visually.
09:36Just eight minutes from landing.
09:40You got a flashlight?
09:41Yeah.
09:42The batteries are almost depleted.
09:45Here we go. You want to shine it up here?
09:47Trying to illuminate the instruments with a flashlight and a dark cockpit.
09:52It is very abnormal.
09:53And is he pointing out at an instrument that's functioning or one that's not?
09:58Uh, we're losing everything down to 13 volts.
10:02Watch my altitude, Frank.
10:05It would have been a total panic situation
10:08in realizing that they were out of options.
10:13Okay, 2,400.
10:21Rapidly losing electrical power
10:23and operating in total darkness,
10:26the pilots of Illinois Flight 710
10:28desperately try to land their plane.
10:30The conditions at Carbondale were such that one-mile visibility and light rain and fog.
10:38His chances of seeing anything were minimal at best.
10:42Do you have any instruments?
10:44Do you have a horizon?
10:48Uh...
10:49They're in a dark cockpit.
10:52Instruments are failing.
10:54They can't see anything outside.
10:56They were now into a critical emergency.
10:57Okay, your bank had left.
11:01Six degrees.
11:02Okay, correcting to the right.
11:08A little more.
11:09Illinois 710, Kansas City.
11:30Do you read?
11:32I would be very surprised that they knew that they were going to hit.
11:35I would be very surprised they saw the ground at all.
11:39Air Illinois Flight 710 crashes 25 miles north of Carbondale Airport.
11:47The wreckage is scattered across farmland near the town of Pinckneyville.
11:53All seven passengers and three crew members are dead.
12:01The National Transportation Safety Board, or NTSB,
12:05begins an investigation to determine what happened to Flight 710.
12:09Let's see what we got here.
12:14They begin by reviewing the debris pattern.
12:21That's a half a mile long,
12:24and...
12:25roughly 200 feet wide.
12:31Investigators get a sense of the vast impact area,
12:34which extends across two small wooded areas,
12:37a field, and a pond.
12:39They came in at a shallow angle.
12:42The wreckage pattern gave us the idea that this was a fairly high-speed,
12:47low-angle impact,
12:48to be able to spread the wreckage like this over a half a mile.
12:52The first point of impact is right here,
12:57with ground scars and debris heading north.
13:03Carbondale Airport is 25 miles to the south.
13:07Investigators determined that at the time of the crash,
13:10Flight 710 was flying in the opposite direction to its destination.
13:14With the aircraft traveling the way it was at that speed,
13:19and in a wrong direction,
13:21it made us wonder,
13:23was the aircraft actually under control?
13:25So first ground scar here,
13:28followed by a few more,
13:30and then 200 feet in front of that,
13:33the right wing tip.
13:37Near the first impact marks,
13:39investigators discover fragments of a green navigation light
13:43from the plane's right wing tip.
13:45It was banked to the right when it hit the ground.
13:49We had the right wing tip.
13:51We knew that was the first thing that hit the ground,
13:53and we could measure approximately 30-degree right bank.
13:59Did the crew report any issues to air traffic control?
14:01Yeah, they did.
14:06Springfield, Illinois 710.
14:09We have experienced a slight electrical problem.
14:12We'll keep you advised.
14:15Investigators learned that 90 seconds after taking off from Springfield,
14:19the crew reported an electrical problem.
14:23Anything else?
14:25That's it.
14:26Just the electrical problem.
14:28We'll need to take a good look at all the electrical components.
14:34The pilot reported a slight electrical problem,
14:37and it was up to us to figure out what his problem was and why they crashed.
14:42Is this everything?
14:51Investigators examine electrical components for evidence of malfunctions.
14:57The wires are clean.
14:59There's no short circuit.
15:00Those inverters are in bad shape.
15:11Hard to tell if they were working or not.
15:15What about the batteries?
15:17Four NICAD batteries are powered by two generators.
15:24Each battery contains 18 individual battery cells.
15:29No signs of arcing or short circuit as a result of impact.
15:33We were able to recover a total of 10 cells from the batteries,
15:38and they were all in decent shape.
15:41Let's see if they can hold the charge.
15:44Under normal conditions, the batteries should be fully charged.
15:50Wow.
15:51They're dead.
15:54The batteries were able to hold the charge,
15:56but for some reason, they were run down.
15:59Did the generators malfunction
16:03and fail to charge the batteries?
16:07Is that the left generator?
16:11Aircraft engines power a generator shaft
16:13to rotate a metal core wrapped in copper coil.
16:17This is known as an armature.
16:20The armature spins rapidly between the poles of a magnet
16:23to generate electricity.
16:29Banding wires come off.
16:31Banding wire is used to hold the armature together
16:34as it spins inside the assembly.
16:37If the banding wire comes loose,
16:39the armature could jam.
16:48Soldering is melted.
16:51The motor must have overheated.
16:53Investigators discover evidence
16:57that the left generator failed.
17:00This happened before the crash.
17:04We know that there was no fire on the aircraft,
17:07so we believe that the solder melted
17:10due to internal heating,
17:11but we don't know why.
17:14They then inspect the right generator.
17:17The banding wire is intact on this one.
17:21Looks fine.
17:22We did a resistance test,
17:25checked the brushes,
17:26and we looked at all the mechanical workings
17:28of the generator.
17:29We were not able to find any reason
17:31why the right generator would not charge the batteries.
17:34How did they crash
17:36with four working batteries
17:38and one working generator?
17:40From examination of the wreckage,
17:43we were not able to find any reason
17:46for the accident.
17:46We were hoping that the voice recorder
17:49would give us clues as to what really happened.
17:55The recording starts around four minutes after takeoff.
18:02Investigators turn to Flight 710's cockpit voice recorder
18:05to determine how an aircraft with one functioning generator
18:09crashed short of its destination.
18:11Zero voltage and A-amps on the left side.
18:24Just like we suspected.
18:25The CVR recording confirms
18:29that the left generator failed
18:30shortly after takeoff.
18:34The right generator's putting out 27 and a half volts.
18:37But I can't get it to come online.
18:41Investigators can't understand
18:43why the right generator was disconnected
18:45from the electrical system
18:46if it was operational.
18:48Then they hear an astonishing statement
18:51from the first officer to the captain.
18:54When we lost the left one,
18:56I reached up and shut off the right generator
18:57because I assumed the problem was the right side.
19:01Isolating it now?
19:05There are two shut-off switches for the generators.
19:08One for the left generator
19:10and one for the right.
19:12The first officer disconnects the right one
19:15to protect the rest of the aircraft's electrical system.
19:18But he soon realizes
19:21that it's the left one that has the issue,
19:23not the right.
19:26Why doesn't he just reconnect it?
19:30He tries, but it doesn't work.
19:33The right generator was not charging the battery
19:35so that we know all they had to power the aircraft
19:38was the charge remaining on the battery
19:40shortly after takeoff.
19:42Maybe there was a problem with the switching unit.
19:45If the generator switching unit
19:47is not working,
19:48then the generator will not come back online.
19:50So we were quite interested in learning
19:51what we could about this component.
19:57It's in pretty rough shape.
19:59Looking for signs of a malfunction,
20:02investigators examine the right generator control switch.
20:05I can't tell a hundred percent.
20:11It's possible it failed before the crash.
20:15The switching unit was heavily damaged from the crash.
20:18We were not able to determine
20:19if that's even why the generator would not come online.
20:22Even if the switch was broken,
20:28it doesn't explain the pilot's actions.
20:33The first officer says,
20:34I assumed the problem was with the right side.
20:38Why would he assume something like that?
20:40Made us wonder if there was a problem
20:42with that generator in the past.
20:45Take a look at these maintenance reports.
20:47The team reviews the maintenance records
20:50for the Hawker Sidley's generators.
20:52Check it out.
20:53No less than eight separate pilot complaints
20:55and repairs on the right generator.
20:59There were voltage fluctuations,
21:02recurring problems at the regulator,
21:05causing the right generator to shut down.
21:10Two weeks before the crash,
21:12there were issues with the right generator
21:14almost every day.
21:16They were doing maintenance,
21:18they were troubleshooting it,
21:19they were changing parts,
21:20and they couldn't fix it.
21:23Air Illinois had one Hawker Sidley
21:25and three flight crews flying that plane.
21:29I'm sure that they all knew
21:30that the right generator
21:32had had problems in the past,
21:33and they probably all experienced it
21:35at one time or another.
21:37The first officer had been
21:39on some of those flights
21:40where the right generator
21:41had actually disconnected.
21:44Thank goodness I was not.
21:47The most I ever saw it do
21:48was flicker a time or two.
21:50That would explain
21:51why the first officer
21:53disconnected the right generator
21:54instead of the left one.
21:59Investigators suspect
22:00that on the night of the crash...
22:02It's the generator again.
22:04...the first officer
22:05made the immediate assumption
22:07that the right generator
22:08had malfunctioned.
22:09The reaction that the first officer had
22:13about taking the right generator offline
22:15probably falls into a phenomenon
22:17that's called expectation bias.
22:20He has experienced this in the past
22:22and assumed that that was going to be the problem
22:25without really looking at the indications
22:27they had available to him.
22:29Still doesn't explain the crash.
22:31Even though both generators were offline,
22:36investigators know
22:37the aircraft's batteries
22:38were in working order.
22:39How are the batteries?
22:42Pretty good.
22:44They're at 21 and a half.
22:46Should last a Carbondale.
22:49Yeah.
22:50It was really important to know
22:51did the batteries have enough endurance
22:53to get to the airport?
22:54Let's see how they manage
23:00their battery power.
23:03Investigators returned
23:04to the cockpit voice recorder
23:05to determine why Flight 710
23:08ran out of battery power
23:10before reaching Carbondale.
23:13How are the bats there?
23:16We're down to 22.5 volts.
23:19Okay.
23:20Beacons off.
23:22Okay.
23:22Okay.
23:24Now the lights are off.
23:27Just minutes after discovering
23:29both generators are down,
23:31the pilots turn off non-essential systems
23:33to save their batteries.
23:37They were doing the right thing,
23:40turning things off to reduce the load.
23:43But is it enough?
23:47According to the manufacturer,
23:48they needed to reduce their load to 70 amps.
23:51Amps measure the strength
23:54of an electrical current.
23:56The more amps drawn on a battery,
23:58the faster the battery will discharge.
24:01If the crew would have reduced the load
24:03to 70 amps,
24:04that would have given them
24:05a minimum of 30 minutes of endurance.
24:07That might have been enough time
24:09to get them to the Carbondale airport.
24:10Let's see if they got their load
24:13down to 70 amps.
24:16Well,
24:17we know they turned off the beacons,
24:20navigation lights.
24:23Investigators make an inventory
24:24of the instruments the crew turned off
24:26and what they left on
24:28in order to calculate the load
24:30on the batteries.
24:30What else?
24:35Are you using these lights here?
24:38I'll get that one down.
24:40We were not able to determine
24:42what was powered up
24:44or on or off
24:45based on the flight recorder.
24:47Should last the Carbondale.
24:49So we had to rely on the conversations
24:51between the two pilots,
24:52what to leave on
24:53and what to turn off.
24:56Want me to tune in to Cavy real quick?
24:58Sure.
24:59How can you use that much power?
25:00DME instruments,
25:05weather radar,
25:07main cabin lights,
25:09one of the main radios,
25:13cooling fan,
25:14and the transponder.
25:17The weather radar
25:19and the radios
25:20draw a lot of power
25:21and so shedding those
25:22if you can
25:23is a prudent thing to do.
25:26Looks like they kept
25:26the rest of the flight instruments on
25:28and that's it.
25:30They used 110 amps.
25:37Investigators discover
25:39the crew did not properly
25:40reduce the draw
25:41on their batteries.
25:44No wonder they didn't make it to Carbondale.
25:45This importance with load shedding
25:49and getting down to 70 amps
25:51seems to be lost on the crew
25:53as there seems to be
25:54no discussion whatsoever
25:55about amperage
25:57to determine
25:57if their changes
25:59in the electrical system
26:00were actually making a difference
26:02in the longevity of the batteries.
26:04So why did the pilots believe
26:07they had enough power
26:09to reach their destination?
26:12The team checks
26:13to see how the pilots
26:14monitored the state
26:15of their batteries.
26:17It says here
26:18fully charged.
26:18The batteries are 24 volts.
26:21Let's see how they did.
26:22How are the bats there?
26:30Ah, we're down to 22.5 volts.
26:35Eight minutes into the flight
26:37they used up 1.5 volts.
26:39Seven minutes later
26:44How are the batteries?
26:47Pretty good.
26:49They're at 21.5.
26:51The battery charge
26:52drops another volt
26:53to 21.5.
26:59The first officer says
27:01the battery should last
27:02to Carbondale.
27:04They're halfway through the flight
27:06he's feeling good.
27:07And then nine minutes later
27:09he checks again.
27:10It's 20 volts.
27:18So they think
27:19they're doing all right.
27:20And then minutes later
27:21the radios go dead.
27:26Uh, we're losing everything
27:28down to 13 volts.
27:31They're talking about
27:32having 20 volts
27:33and then they all of a sudden
27:35they have 13 volts.
27:37So they're monitoring
27:38the volts
27:39but it's as if
27:40the sudden drop
27:40caught them by surprise.
27:42The reason this is significant
27:44is because
27:44NICAD batteries
27:46will maintain their voltage
27:48almost right until the end
27:50that the batteries are dead.
27:52Much different
27:53than lead acid type batteries
27:54which is where you see
27:56a gradual decline in voltage.
27:58That characteristic of NICAD batteries
28:03may explain why there was
28:04such a sudden drop
28:06in the battery voltage.
28:08I don't know if we have
28:09enough juice to get out of this.
28:12If they would have known
28:13the characteristic
28:14of a NICAD battery
28:15it might have sent them
28:16a message saying
28:17we better get on this
28:18right away
28:18and get this load reduced.
28:20Investigators find
28:23another reason
28:23why the crew
28:24may have missed
28:25how fast
28:26their batteries
28:26were discharging.
28:28They never mentioned
28:29their amps.
28:31Looks like the only thing
28:32they monitored
28:33were the volts.
28:35Volts measure
28:36the potential output
28:37of a battery
28:38not how long
28:39it will last.
28:41Amps tell you
28:41how much electricity
28:42is being drawn.
28:44It was very surprising
28:45that they weren't
28:46monitoring the amperage
28:47because that was going
28:48to tell them
28:49how much longer
28:49they had on the batteries.
28:52Did the crew
28:53have the proper training
28:54to monitor
28:55the endurance
28:56of the batteries?
29:02Investigators interview
29:03other Air Illinois pilots
29:05to determine
29:07their ability
29:08to monitor
29:09and calculate
29:09battery endurance.
29:13Well
29:14we know
29:15that they're all trained
29:16on battery management
29:16for a dual generator problem
29:18but
29:19when I asked them
29:21how long
29:22they thought
29:22the batteries
29:22would have lasted
29:23on the flight
29:23some calculated
29:2530 minutes
29:26others
29:27less than an hour.
29:30Five pilots
29:31gave us five
29:32different answers
29:33and they were
29:34not all correct.
29:36It became obvious
29:37to us
29:37there was definitely
29:38a training issue
29:39involved here.
29:40Are you using
29:41these lights here?
29:43I'll get that one down.
29:44The lack of training
29:47explains why
29:48the pilots
29:48thought they had
29:49enough power
29:50to reach Carbondale.
29:52But that doesn't
29:53solve a bigger mystery.
29:57This is their flight path.
29:59Why didn't the pilots
30:00land the plane
30:01at another airport
30:02before completely
30:03running out
30:04of battery power?
30:06One, two, three,
30:08four,
30:09five different airports.
30:10They were only
30:12five minutes away
30:13from Streamingfield
30:13yet they elected
30:14to go 40 minutes
30:15to Carbondale
30:16and there were
30:17several airports
30:18in between
30:18that they missed.
30:20They could have
30:21landed any time
30:21along the way.
30:23Their decision
30:24not to land
30:25calls the pilots'
30:26judgment into question.
30:29It's time to look
30:30into their backgrounds.
30:31Here's the captain's file.
30:41Investigators
30:41dig into the
30:42backgrounds
30:42of Flight 710's
30:44pilots
30:44for clues
30:45that explain
30:46their unusual reaction
30:47to an electrical failure.
30:51The captain
30:52was perfectly qualified.
30:54Same with the F.O.
30:58Gear up.
30:58The two pilots
31:01were among
31:01the most experienced
31:02flight crew
31:03on the roster.
31:04Gear is up.
31:05With a combined
31:055,000 flying hours
31:07between them
31:08on the Hawker Sidley.
31:11Here's something.
31:13The captain
31:14lived in Carbondale.
31:17Maybe he wanted
31:17to get home?
31:19In aviation,
31:20what we describe
31:21as get-home-itis
31:22is when we try
31:24to make it
31:25to the destination
31:26because of our
31:27strong desire
31:28to do so.
31:29And it plays
31:30a significant role
31:31in our decision-making.
31:34Investigators
31:35talk to other pilots
31:36at the company,
31:37including
31:38First Officer
31:39Janine Urban.
31:40How well did you
31:41know the pilots?
31:43I flew with the captain
31:45and I was good friends
31:46with the First Officer.
31:49I thought very highly
31:51of the First Officer,
31:53Frank.
31:53I knew the flight
31:56attendant Barbie
31:57and liked her a lot.
32:00It was a very emotional
32:02thing to hear
32:03that both of them
32:04had been killed.
32:07What sort of pilot
32:08was the captain?
32:10I'd say average.
32:13In the aviation community,
32:15when someone is characterized
32:16as an average pilot,
32:17that usually means
32:18he's not too good.
32:19Why's that?
32:22The captain really
32:23prided himself
32:24on getting there
32:25on time.
32:26It was not uncommon
32:28for him
32:29to take risks.
32:33Looks like we've
32:34got some weather.
32:35Shall I call
32:35for deviation?
32:37Doesn't look too bad.
32:39We'll be fine.
32:40According to
32:44Air Illinois pilots,
32:45the captain would
32:46often fly too close
32:47or through
32:48dangerous storms
32:49to save flight time.
32:53If I made
32:54any comments
32:55or suggestions
32:57about a safety issue
33:00like the thunderstorms
33:02or anything else,
33:03he would do
33:04something spiteful
33:05just to prove
33:07that he was
33:08the captain.
33:08In order to
33:10keep the schedule,
33:11he'd also speed up,
33:12which would set off
33:13the overspeed alarm.
33:18Pull the circuit breaker,
33:19would you?
33:20What?
33:21Really?
33:24Pilots said
33:24he would order them
33:25to disable
33:26the overspeed warning
33:27so that they could
33:28fly faster.
33:31It was always
33:32about getting there
33:33faster.
33:35The captain's
33:36behavior
33:37is troublesome.
33:38We wanted to know
33:41if the company,
33:43the airline,
33:43was putting undue
33:44pressure on the pilots
33:46to make the schedule.
33:48This pressure
33:49to get there on time,
33:50was it from management?
33:52No.
33:53It was all
33:53the captain.
33:55The interviews
33:55with the other pilots
33:56indicated that there
33:57was no undue pressure
33:59to skirt the rules.
34:00In the case of
34:01the captain,
34:02that pressure
34:02was self-imposed.
34:03investigators conclude
34:06that Captain Smith
34:07often stretched
34:08the rules.
34:09What about
34:10the first officer?
34:14Frank
34:15was the best.
34:18And he knew
34:18the plane
34:19and its systems
34:20really well.
34:22So why didn't
34:23the first officer
34:24speak up
34:25when Captain Smith
34:26made the decision
34:27to carry on?
34:28O-9-7-10,
34:30do you intend
34:30to return to Springfield?
34:32Negative.
34:33Continuing to Carbondale,
34:343,000 feet.
34:37And at no time
34:38did we hear
34:38the first officer
34:39challenge the captain's
34:40decision to go on
34:41to Carbondale.
34:42We found this
34:42very perplexing.
34:44I asked how he could
34:44fly with the captain
34:45because he took
34:46so many chances.
34:47And he said,
34:49oh, I just
34:50try to keep
34:52an eye on
34:52the situation
34:53and not let him
34:54get us into anything
34:55that I can't
34:56get us out of.
34:58We're losing
34:58everything down
34:59to 13 volts.
35:00Watch my altitude,
35:02Frank.
35:03Boy, that didn't
35:04work out very well
35:05at all.
35:06The captain
35:07should have made
35:08the decision
35:08to return
35:09to the Springfield
35:10airport.
35:11And if so,
35:12none of this
35:12would have happened.
35:17Investigators conclude
35:19that the risk-taking
35:20captain and an
35:22unassertive first
35:23officer was a
35:24dangerous combination.
35:27Let's pick it up
35:28from where they
35:29realize they don't
35:29have enough power
35:30to make it to
35:31Carbondale.
35:32The team returns
35:33to the cockpit
35:34voice recording
35:35to see if they
35:37can uncover
35:37why the plane
35:38ended up so far
35:39off course.
35:42Watch my altitude.
35:43I'm going down
35:44to 2,400 feet.
35:46Okay.
35:47Stop the tape.
35:52Why would the
35:52captain decide
35:53to drop down
35:53to 2,400 feet?
35:58The cloud ceiling
36:00near Carbondale
36:01was almost 2,000 feet.
36:03So maybe he was
36:04popping in and
36:04out of the clouds
36:05to see something
36:06on the ground.
36:08Play on.
36:13You got a flashlight?
36:14Yeah.
36:17Here we go.
36:18You want to shine
36:19it up here?
36:20Just as the
36:21captain tries to
36:22see the ground,
36:23the cockpit lights
36:24go out and plunge
36:26them into total
36:27darkness.
36:29We're losing
36:29everything down
36:30to 13 volts.
36:31watch my altitude,
36:34Frank.
36:38Okay.
36:392,400.
36:43They make it
36:44to 2,400 feet.
36:46The captain plans
36:47to level off,
36:48spot the runway,
36:49and continue
36:50his descent.
36:50But that's not
36:52what happens.
36:55Okay.
36:55You're banking
36:56left.
36:57Six degrees.
36:59Okay.
36:59Correcting to the
37:00right.
37:01Just minutes later,
37:02they ended up
37:03crashing in
37:03completely the
37:04opposite direction.
37:05A little more.
37:07So the question
37:07is, what happened?
37:08How do you go
37:16from leveling
37:16off at 2,400 feet
37:18to then hitting
37:19the ground
37:19in the opposite
37:20direction?
37:22Investigators
37:23examine the final
37:24moments of
37:25Flight 710
37:26to determine
37:27what ultimately
37:28brought the
37:29plane down.
37:30How does
37:30the recording
37:31end?
37:36Do you have
37:37any issues
37:38your words?
37:40The recording
37:41eerily slows
37:42down.
37:43Do you have
37:44a rule?
37:46And then
37:47silence.
37:50Their batteries
37:51just died.
37:56The captain
37:57is asking
37:58for a horizon
37:59reading on
37:59the attitude
38:00directional
38:01indicator,
38:02or ADI.
38:04The ADI
38:05uses an
38:06electrically
38:06powered gyroscope
38:08to indicate
38:08the aircraft's
38:09pitch and
38:09roll relative
38:10to the
38:11Earth's
38:11horizon.
38:14It's
38:14nighttime,
38:15no discernible
38:16horizon,
38:17low visibility.
38:19Your ADI
38:20is everything
38:20that you need
38:21to be able
38:22to keep
38:22the airplane
38:23wings level.
38:25They've lost
38:26the lights
38:26on their
38:27instruments.
38:29Some of them
38:30are starting
38:30to fail.
38:31will.
38:33He asks
38:34the first
38:34officer to
38:35shine a
38:36light on
38:36their
38:36ADI.
38:40Okay,
38:41you're
38:41banking
38:41left,
38:42six degrees.
38:44Okay,
38:45correcting to
38:45the right.
38:47Investigators
38:47can only
38:48surmise what
38:49happened next.
38:50Even if all
38:51the instruments
38:52had failed,
38:53the ADI
38:53would still
38:54look like
38:55it's working.
38:55The ADI
38:58gyroscope
38:59spins at
38:59about 15,000
39:01RPM.
39:02Even after
39:03the power
39:03shuts down,
39:04it will
39:05continue
39:05rotating
39:06for several
39:06minutes.
39:08So it
39:08looks like
39:09it's working,
39:09but it
39:09really is
39:10not.
39:11As the
39:12ADI
39:13winds down,
39:14it slowly
39:15tilts to
39:15one side.
39:17Imagine
39:17that ADI
39:19starts
39:20slowly
39:21falling to
39:21the left.
39:24Hey,
39:24correct,
39:25by rolling
39:25to the
39:25right.
39:28Okay,
39:30you're
39:30banking
39:30left,
39:31six degrees.
39:32Okay,
39:33correcting
39:33to the
39:34right.
39:37A little
39:37more.
39:40It may
39:40have appeared
39:40to them
39:41that the
39:41ADI
39:41was working
39:42correctly,
39:43but they're
39:43really banking
39:44to the right
39:44and losing
39:45altitude.
39:47They probably
39:48followed that
39:49failing ADI
39:50right into
39:51the ground.
39:55they couldn't
39:55see where
39:56they were
39:56or they
39:56couldn't
39:56see any
39:57lights and
39:58it would
39:58be over
39:59in an
39:59instant.
39:59In their
40:14final report,
40:15investigators
40:16conclude that
40:17the fatal
40:17accident was
40:18a consequence
40:19of the
40:19captain's
40:20decision to
40:20continue the
40:21flight towards
40:22Carbondale,
40:23instead of
40:23returning to
40:24the nearby
40:24departure airport
40:26after the
40:26loss of power.
40:27The cause
40:28of this
40:29accident was
40:29not a
40:30catastrophic
40:30failure that
40:32suddenly caused
40:33the airplane
40:33to crash.
40:34It was the
40:35decision by
40:36the captain
40:36to continue
40:37flight on
40:38battery power
40:39after they
40:40lost the
40:41generators.
40:42Also adding
40:43to the problem
40:44was a lack
40:45of crew
40:45resource management
40:46or CRM.
40:49Now part
40:50of crew
40:51resource
40:51management
40:52training is
40:53that crews
40:54are trained
40:55to act as
40:56a team
40:57and first
40:57officers are
40:58taught and
40:59encouraged to
41:00question the
41:01captain's
41:02decision making
41:03and actions
41:03if they do
41:04not agree.
41:06Speak up.
41:07Don't worry
41:07about if it
41:08upsets
41:09somebody's
41:09ego.
41:10It's not
41:10worth dying
41:11over.
41:13Investigators
41:14cite inadequate
41:15crew training
41:16to assess
41:16battery endurance
41:17as another
41:18contributing factor.
41:20It should have
41:21been discussed
41:22in their
41:22training.
41:23It should have
41:23been in their
41:24training materials
41:25and in the
41:26flight manual.
41:28As a result
41:28of this accident
41:29the NTSB
41:31also recommends
41:32independently
41:32powered ADIs
41:34on all
41:34transport airplanes.
41:36So that if
41:37all power was
41:38lost they still
41:39had the ability
41:39to keep the
41:40airplane straight
41:40and level
41:41for at least
41:4130 minutes.
41:43This recommendation
41:44was implemented
41:45in 1997.
41:49Flight 710
41:51brought national
41:52attention and
41:52increased scrutiny
41:53of small
41:54commuter
41:55airlines.
41:56Six months
41:58after the
41:58accident Air
41:59Illinois filed
42:00for bankruptcy
42:01and ceased
42:02operations.
42:03It's something
42:04where we learn
42:05by our mistakes.
42:07The first
42:07priority is the
42:08safety of the
42:08passengers.
42:09It's got to be
42:10the most important
42:11factor.
42:12good
42:21So
42:22let's
42:24go to the
42:24room.
42:25Let's
42:26go to the
42:27room.