00:00Looking at Xi's removal of not only Zhang Yuxia, but all these other generals and leadership of the Chinese military, what do you think this says about the relationship between the party and the PLA?
00:09This is kind of the most dramatic moment in a broader drama that's been playing out throughout the course of his third term, where you have had these corruption investigations that have taken down the Minister of National Defense, the other vice chairman of the CMC.
00:22And I think what it shows and what it demonstrates is that she has come to the realization that he needs to totally clear house when it comes to the PLA High Command, that there's rot everywhere and he's just kind of got to uproot the entire, most of that generation.
00:37I mean, notably, the only person who's left from the High Command is the actual general who oversees these anti-corruption investigations.
00:44Because he's gotten rid of all these guys at the top, he has a free hand to really not just pick new officials to go into those slots in the Central Military Commission, but to reconstitute it entirely.
00:55So you're going to have a much, much different and I think potentially more fraught dynamic, too, especially because they're all going to be living in this highly charged political environment where they know they can be metaphorically pushed out the window at any given moment.
01:10A lot of other analysis and reports have concluded that Xi's removal of Zhang delays the PLA's modernization and pushes back his ambition to take Taiwan by force by next year.
01:20But you arrive at a different conclusion. Can you elaborate a little bit more on that, please?
01:24What this most recent round of purges shows is not that he's distracted from the Taiwan issue set and from having a military that's prepared for it, but I think it actually shows quite the opposite, right?
01:36That he's so intensely focused on this mission. He's willing to make a very deep incision even into his own political network and call the entire leadership of the high command because he wants the military to be prepared for this kind of contingency.
01:50I mean, I think that moment at the end of last year where they conducted that exercise just weeks after punctuating the last round of military purges shows that there's this odd disconnect, right?
02:01You have all this turmoil at the top of the PLA that's almost operatic, right? And it's drama.
02:07But at the same time, this is a large, very capable bureaucracy that's still just weeks later able to pull off this major military operation.
02:15Is there anything you're on the lookout for in the next six to 24 months regarding impacts or fallout from this decision?
02:21Because I think from Xi's perspective and from Beijing's perspective, I think they're feeling pretty comfortable right now relatively about the overall international environment and about the cross-strait dynamic in particular.
02:32President Trump has made comments that suggest he's not as invested in this issue set.
02:38I think Xi Jinping can see that President Lai Jinta faces a challenging domestic political environment right now.
02:44And number three, the KMT has been saying more favorable things about Beijing.
02:49So I think overall, if you're Xi Jinping, you are seeing 2028 and the election in Taiwan as the next natural inflection point, not necessarily the next 24 months or so.
03:00I expect this dynamic to kind of continue in the coming year, right, that there will be these exercises.
03:06But I think barring some kind of exogenous shock, I don't anticipate a major escalation or ramp up in the coming year, just because there doesn't seem to be a strong rationale for Beijing.
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