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Kim Jong Un’s New Ultra-Secured $3B Palace Shocks Donald Trump
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00:00A little tough at the beginning, remember? He said, I have a red button on my desk. I said,
00:06I have a red button also, but mine's bigger than yours and mine works.
00:09Trump used to joke about Kim's nukes, but not anymore. Kim just showed off a new nuclear
00:13invention that's got Trump seriously freaked out. And once you see what this new weapon can
00:18actually do, you'll understand why. The Hwasong 20 emerges. October 10th, 2025. Pyongyang. Rain
00:26hammers down on Kim Il-sung Square as thousands of soldiers march in perfect formation, their boots
00:31splashing through puddles that reflect the glow of spotlights cutting through the darkness. This
00:36isn't just any military parade. It's the 80th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea,
00:41and Kim Jong-un has invited some very particular guests to witness what comes next. Russian Deputy
00:46Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev sits in the viewing stand alongside Chinese Premier Li Chang. Their
00:51presence isn't coincidental. It's a calculated message about shifting global alliances.
00:56And then, rumbling through the square on an enormous 11-axle transporter-erector launcher,
01:01comes the reason they're all here, the Hwasong 20. State media immediately brands it as North
01:06Korea's most powerful nuclear strategic weapon system. And the specifications that analysts piece
01:12together in the following hours paint a troubling picture. This isn't just another missile. It's a
01:16solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile with an estimated range exceeding 15,000 kilometers,
01:22enough to strike any point on the U.S. mainland, including cities on the east coast that previous
01:27North Korean missiles couldn't reliably threaten. But range is just the beginning of what makes the
01:32Hwasong 20 different. The real game-changer lies in what it might carry. Analysts suspect the missile
01:37is designed to deploy multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, MI-ARVs. Think of it this
01:43way. Instead of one missile carrying one nuclear warhead to one target, a single Hwasong 20 could
01:48potentially release several warheads, each capable of hitting a different city or military installation.
01:53It's the difference between knocking on one door and knocking on five doors simultaneously. Except
01:58each knock is a nuclear explosion. The technology isn't new to the Nuclear Powers Club. The United
02:03States, Russia, China, Britain, they've all had MI-ARV capabilities for decades. But North Korea
02:08joining that club fundamentally changes the calculus of deterrence and defense. The U.S. ground-based
02:13mid-course defense system is designed to intercept a limited number of incoming missiles. When one missile
02:18can become five or six separate targets, mid-flight suddenly that defense system looks a lot less
02:23reassuring. The Hwasong 20's solid fuel engine makes it even more formidable. Unlike liquid-fueled
02:28missiles that require hours of preparation and fueling, time during which satellites can spot the
02:32activity, solid-fuel missiles can launch within minutes. They're mobile, harder to detect, and far
02:37more survivable in a first-strike scenario. North Korea had been working toward this for years,
02:42but successful ground tests in September 2025 of high-thrust solid-fuel engines using composite
02:48carbon fiber represented a major breakthrough. And here's where the story gets more complicated.
02:52South Korean military officials, including Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Jin Yong-sung,
02:57have speculated about Russian engineering influence in the Hwasong 20's development.
03:01It's not just speculation born from paranoia. North Korea and Russia have grown significantly closer
03:06since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty
03:11signed in June 2024 that includes provisions for cooperation in nuclear energy and space technology,
03:17terms that nuclear experts read as potential cover for weapons collaboration. Reports suggest North
03:22Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery shells and over 100 ballistic missiles for use in
03:28Ukraine, and approximately 11,000 North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia by March 2025.
03:35In exchange, North Korea appears to be receiving more than just food and fuel. The design
03:39similarities between the Hwasong 20 and Russian Miev-capable systems like the RS-24 Yars have caught the
03:45attention of defense analysts worldwide. But despite all the technological advances on display that
03:50rainy October night, there's a crucial detail that often gets lost in the alarming headlines. The Hwasong
03:5620 remains completely untested as of October 23, 2025. Analysts predict a test launch could come before
04:03year's end, but until then, much of what we think we know about its capabilities remains educated guesswork
04:09based on design analysis and North Korean claims. North Korea's nuclear program didn't appear overnight,
04:15of course. Kim Jong-un has been methodically building toward this moment since he took power in 2011.
04:20In 2025 alone, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported construction of a new annex at the
04:26Kangson facility near Pyongyang, likely for additional uranium enrichment centrifuges. Estimates now suggest North
04:33Korea possesses enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium for 50 to 90 nuclear devices,
04:39with production capacity growing. The strategy Kim has pursued is what he calls exponential nuclear
04:45expansion. Not just more warheads, but more diverse delivery systems. Beyond ICBMs, North Korea is
04:51developing tactical nuclear warheads for cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and even unmanned
04:57underwater vehicles. It's a comprehensive deterrent designed to make any potential military action
05:02against North Korea unthinkably costly. North Korea has also enshrined its nuclear status in its
05:07constitution, formally rejecting any path to denuclearization. This isn't just rhetoric,
05:12it's a fundamental shift in how Pyongyang views these weapons. They're no longer bargaining chips to
05:16trade for sanctions, relief, or security guarantees. They're permanent fixtures of North Korean security
05:22policy, what Kim sees as the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. So when those 11 axles rolled that
05:27massive missile through Kim Il-sung Square, they weren't just showing off a new weapon. They were
05:32broadcasting a message. North Korea has arrived as a nuclear power, and it's not going back.
05:36The parade featured other systems too. Long-range strategic cruise missiles, drone launchers,
05:41and short-range ballistic missiles fitted with hypersonic glide vehicles, capabilities that North
05:46Korea demonstrated just days later on October 22, 2025, in what Pyongyang called a test of its
05:52hypersonic nuclear deterrent. The timing of all this isn't random either. These developments are unfolding
05:58during Donald Trump's second term as US president, and the history between Trump and Kim Jong-un
06:03adds layers of complexity that make this moment particularly fascinating. Because unlike previous
06:08US presidents who maintained careful distance from North Korean leaders, Trump actually sat down with
06:13Kim. Three times. They exchanged letters. They developed what Trump called a relationship. And that
06:18complicated personal history is about to collide with this new nuclear reality in ways that will
06:23surprise everyone who thinks they know how this story ends. Trump's nuclear diplomacy. The relationship
06:29between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un might be one of the strangest diplomatic sagas in modern American
06:34history. It started with threats that genuinely worried people about nuclear war, evolved into
06:39unprecedented face-to-face meetings, and ended with Trump claiming they fell in love through letters.
06:44And now, with the Hwasong 20 on the E, world stage and Trump back in the White House, everyone's
06:48wondering what comes next. That was Trump reflecting on the early days, 2017, when he and Kim traded
07:04increasingly alarming threats. Trump's fire and fury warning and references to his nuclear button being
07:10bigger than Kim's weren't just tough talk. North Korea was conducting nuclear tests and launching
07:15ICBMs over Japan. The situation felt genuinely dangerous in a way it hadn't since the Cold War.
07:20But then something shifted. During the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea, Kim sent his sister with
07:26overtures toward dialogue. South Korean president Moon Jae-in became a crucial intermediary, and suddenly
07:31the impossible seemed possible. A sitting US president meeting with a North Korean leader for the first
07:36time in history. Singapore, June 12, 2018. The images were extraordinary. Trump and Kim shaking hands,
07:43walking together, sitting across from each other at the negotiating table. They signed a joint statement
07:48where Kim committed to complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in exchange for security
07:54guarantees from the United States. It was vague, arguably too vague, but it represented a breakthrough
07:59simply by happening. Trump returned declaring victory, claiming North Korea was no longer a nuclear
08:05threat. A claim that looks particularly optimistic in hindsight, given what we now know about North
08:10Korea's continued weapons development. But in fairness, North Korea did halt nuclear and long-range
08:14missile tests for 17 months following Singapore, which represented real progress, even if it proved
08:20temporary. The second summit came in Hanoi, February 2019, and this is where the diplomatic momentum hit a
08:26wall. North Korea offered to dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear facility, a significant site but not their
08:32only one. In exchange for lifting major economic sanctions, Trump, pushed by advisers who saw this
08:37as insufficient, walked away without a deal. The summit ended abruptly, with both sides clearly
08:42disappointed. It could have ended there, the diplomatic window closing as quickly as it had opened,
08:46but Trump wasn't done. Four months later came the moment that really captures the unique nature of this
08:51relationship. June 30, 2019, at the demilitarized zone. Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to
09:12step into North Korean territory, crossing the military demarcation line at Panmunjom for about
09:17one minute before returning to the South Korean side with Kim. It wasn't a full summit, the meeting
09:22lasted roughly 50 minutes, but it was pure Trump, spontaneous, symbolic and designed for maximum
09:27visual impact. Trump had tweeted the invitation just a day earlier, writing,
09:31If Chairman Kim of North Korea sees this, I would meet him at the border DMZ just to shake his hand
09:36and say hello. Kim accepted and the meeting was arranged with remarkable speed. They agreed to
09:41restart working-level negotiations and kept the door open for future progress, though no concrete
09:46breakthroughs emerged. What made Trump's approach so unusual wasn't just the meetings themselves,
09:51but the personal relationship he claimed to have developed. Trump says he and Kim exchanged over
09:55two dozen letters, which he described as beautiful and love letters. He would show them at rallies,
10:00he praised Kim's leadership. He halted joint military exercises with South Korea that Kim found
10:05provocative, a significant concession that worried U.S. military planners and allies. Critics argued Trump
10:10was being played, that Kim was using the summits to buy time for weapons development,
10:14while gaining international legitimacy without making real concessions. And there's evidence
10:19supporting that view. North Korea's arsenal did continue growing during this period, particularly
10:24in short-range systems that threaten South Korea and Japan, even if they can't reach the United
10:29States. But supporters of Trump's approach point to what didn't happen. No nuclear tests, no ICBM
10:35launches, no escalating crisis spiral of the kind that had people genuinely worried about war in 2017.
10:41Trump believed personal relationships could break diplomatic logjams that decades of conventional
10:46approaches had failed to resolve. Whether that belief was naive or visionary remains hotly debated.
10:51By the time Trump left office in January 2021, the diplomatic process had stalled.
10:56North Korea resumed short-range missile tests in 2020, and the COVID-19 pandemic provided convenient
11:03cover for both sides to step back from engagement. The Biden administration took a more traditional
11:08approach, offering dialogue without preconditions, but also without the personal outreach that
11:12characterized Trump's strategy. North Korea largely ignored these overtures, and by 2022,
11:17was conducting ballistic missile tests at a record pace. Which brings us to 2025 and Trump's second term.
11:24Almost immediately after his January 20, 2025 inauguration, Trump signaled his intentions. In a
11:30January 21 speech, he referred to North Korea as a nuclear power and boasted about his wonderful
11:35relationship with Kim. The phrasing drew sharp rebukes from South Korea, which saw it as implicitly
11:40legitimizing North Korea's nuclear status, something the United States had consistently refused to do.
11:46But Trump was just getting started. On January 24, he told Fox News he would
11:51reach out to Kim, emphasizing the value of maintaining rapport with a leader possessing
11:55a lot of nuclear weapons. By May 2025, Trump confirmed low-level communications were occurring
12:01between the US and North Korea, though he downplayed expectations for immediate breakthroughs.
12:06Throughout 2025, even as North Korea ramped up its weapons displays, Trump's rhetoric remained
12:12notably different from traditional presidential responses to nuclear provocations. In July,
12:17when Kim's sister Kim Yo-jong dismissed potential talks as mockery, the White House responded that
12:22Trump remains open to engaging with leader Kim to achieve a fully denuclearized North Korea,
12:28keeping the door open rather than responding with threats or condemnation. Trump has also
12:32touted US military advantages in ways designed to project confidence rather than alarm. In August
12:372025, he announced the Golden Dome Missile Defense Initiative, a satellite-based interceptor network
12:43designed to counter threats from North Korea, China, Iran and Russia. North Korea called it a
12:49dangerous initiative that would spark a nuclear arms race, but Trump framed it as essential
12:53protection for American cities. At an October 2025 rally, Trump made cryptic references to secret US
12:59weapons he claimed to have initiated during his first term, a weapon that many don't even suspect.
13:04Whether these claims refer to hypersonic missiles, directed energy systems or something else entirely
13:10remains unclear, but the message was deliberate. North Korea's advances don't frighten the United
13:15States because American military technology remains superior. And here's what makes the current
13:20moment so fascinating. Despite all the alarming coverage of the Hwasong 20 and North Korea's
13:25nuclear expansion, there are no public statements from Trump expressing fear, alarm or intimidation
13:30regarding these developments. No tweets panicking about the new missile. No speeches warning of
13:35imminent danger. Just repeated signals that he's ready to talk, confident in US capabilities,
13:40and willing to resume the personal diplomacy that defined his first-term approach. The gap between
13:45sensational headlines, suggesting Trump is scared, and the actual reality of his measured engagement
13:50focused response couldn't be wider, which raises the obvious question. If Trump isn't panicking about
13:55the Hwasong 20, what is his actual strategy for dealing with a North Korea that has fundamentally
14:00changed since their last meeting? The new nuclear reality. The North Korea that Trump is dealing with in
14:052025 is not the North Korea he left behind in 2021, and pretending otherwise would be strategic
14:11malpractice. Analysts estimate North Korea now possesses material for 50 to 90 nuclear warheads,
14:17compared to roughly 30 to 40 at the end of Trump's first term. More importantly, the delivery systems
14:22have become dramatically more sophisticated and diverse. The Hwasong 20 is just the most visible
14:28example of this evolution. North Korea tested the solid fuel Hwasong 19 in October 2024, which reached an
14:34apogee of 7,687 km, higher than any previous North Korean test. In January 2025, they launched a
14:42hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile with a glide vehicle that can maneuver unpredictably
14:47during flight, making interception far more difficult. Perhaps most significantly, North Korea
14:52conducted what it claimed was a test of MAV separation technology in June 2024. South Korean and US
14:59officials disputed the claim, saying the booster failed mid-flight, but even an unsuccessful test
15:04demonstrates North Korea is seriously pursuing this capability. Experts estimate their two to five
15:09years from operational MAV deployment, potentially accelerated by Russian technical assistance.
15:14Understanding Mervy's is crucial to understanding why this matters so much. When a missile reaches the
15:19top of its trajectory in space, the post-boost vehicle, essentially a bus carrying multiple warheads,
15:25uses its own propulsion and guidance systems to release warheads on different trajectories. Each warhead
15:30then re-enters the atmosphere independently, traveling at speeds up to Mach 25, protected by
15:35heat-resistant capsules that prevent them from burning up. The strategic implications are profound.
15:40The US ground-based mid-course defense system has 44 interceptors designed to protect against
15:45limited ICBM attacks. If North Korea achieves operational Mervys, a single missile could deploy six
15:51warheads plus decoys. Launch five Mervy-capable missiles and you're potentially looking at 30-plus
15:57objects that need to be tracked and intercepted. The math becomes very unfavorable very quickly
16:01for defenders. This is why Russia's apparent assistance to North Korea's missile program
16:06represents such a significant concern. The June 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty
16:12between Putin and Kim Jong-un includes provisions for cooperation in nuclear energy and space technology,
16:17language that non-proliferation experts recognize as potential cover for weapons collaboration.
16:23US intelligence assessments indicate Russia is expanding sharing of space,
16:28nuclear and missile applicable technology, expertise and materials to North Korea.
16:32The quid pro quo seems clear enough. North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery shells
16:37and over 100 ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine, along with approximately 11,000 troops deployed to
16:43Russian territory by March 2025. In return, North Korea receives financial support, food, energy
16:50supplies and, crucially, access to advanced military technology that could accelerate their weapons
16:55programs by years. South Korean military officials have specifically noted that the Hwasong-20's design
17:00features suggest Russian engineering influence, particularly in the transporter-erector launcher and
17:05payload capacity. Reports from September 2025 even suggest Russia may have provided nuclear submarine
17:12modules to North Korea between January and June of that year, which would significantly enhance their
17:17second-strike capabilities through submarine-launched ballistic missiles. All of this Russian assistance
17:22violates multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions that prohibit arms transfers and technical
17:28assistance to North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, resolutions that Russia itself supported from
17:332006 to 2017 but now actively undermines. Russia vetoed UN sanctions monitoring extensions in March 2024,
17:42effectively shielding North Korea from international scrutiny. So what is Trump's strategy for dealing
17:46with this fundamentally altered landscape? The evidence suggests he's pursuing a two-track approach,
17:51maintaining maximum military readiness and deterrence capability while keeping diplomatic
17:56channels open for potential negotiations. On the military side, Trump's Golden Dome initiative
18:02represents a significant investment in missile defense. The satellite-based interceptor concept would
18:07theoretically provide earlier detection and interception opportunities than ground-based systems. Trump has
18:13also repeatedly emphasized US military superiority, boasting about secret weapons and advanced capabilities
18:19that supposedly give the United States an edge even as adversaries advance their own systems. But it's the
18:24diplomatic track where Trump's approach diverges most sharply from conventional wisdom. Throughout 2025,
18:30Trump has signaled openness to re-engagement with Kim, even as critics argue this rewards North Korean weapons development.
18:36His January 2025 characterization of North Korea as a nuclear power wasn't a gaffe. It was an
18:42acknowledgement of reality that might represent the foundation for a new approach. Here's the
18:46strategic calculation that appears to be driving Trump's thinking. Complete, verifiable, irreversible
18:52denuclearization, the stated US policy goal for decades, is almost certainly unachievable. North Korea has
18:58made clear it will never willingly give up its nuclear weapons, enshrining nuclear status in its constitution,
19:04and repeatedly stating these weapons are non-negotiable. Kim Jong-un has watched what happened to leaders
19:09who gave up nuclear programs, like Libya's Gaddafi, and drawn clear lessons about the value of nuclear
19:15deterrence. So if complete denuclearization is off the table, what's achievable? Some analysts suggest
19:21Trump might pursue a more modest deal, capping North Korea's ICBM force while accepting some nuclear
19:26retention, particularly shorter-range systems. This would reduce the direct threat to the US homeland,
19:32while acknowledging that North Korea will maintain some nuclear capability. It's not an ideal
19:36outcome. But in dealing with nuclear-armed adversaries, ideal outcomes are rarely available.
19:41The personal relationship Trump claims to have built with Kim becomes potentially valuable in
19:45this context. Traditional diplomatic approaches through formal channels have consistently failed
19:50with North Korea for decades. The country's extreme isolation and the Kim regime's paranoia make
19:55conventional negotiations extraordinarily difficult. But Trump's willingness to engage directly,
20:00to treat Kim with respect on the world stage, and to pursue unconventional diplomatic methods might,
20:05might, open possibilities that wouldn't exist otherwise. Kim Jong-un has conditioned any future talks on
20:11the United States, dropping denuclearization demands, and accepting North Korea as a nuclear state.
20:17His sister Kim Yo-jong has been explicit about this, stating that any engagement must accept North
20:22Korea's new nuclear reality. This puts Trump in a difficult position. Accepting these preconditions would
20:27enrage hawks in Washington, and allies in Seoul, and Tokyo who see it as capitulation. But the
20:32alternative might be worse. Without any diplomatic engagement, North Korea will continue expanding
20:38its arsenal unchecked. More warheads, more delivery systems, more sophisticated technology potentially
20:44aided by Russia and China. The threat grows regardless of whether the US acknowledges it. At least
20:48engagement offers some possibility of establishing guardrails, communication channels to prevent
20:53miscalculation, potential limits on testing or deployment, mechanisms to reduce tension during
20:59crises. Trump's discussions about potentially meeting Kim during his October 2025 visit to South
21:05Korea for the APEX summit suggest he's actively considering another direct meeting. Whether one actually
21:11occurs depends on numerous factors, including what North Korea might be willing to put on the table,
21:15and what concessions the US would need to make to get Kim to the negotiating table.
21:20The Hwasong-20 unveiling itself might be viewed as part of North Korea's negotiating strategy,
21:25a demonstration of capability designed to strengthen their position before talks,
21:29rather than a rejection of talks altogether. North Korea tested short-range ballistic missiles
21:34on October 22, 2025, just days before Trump's Asia visit. This follows a familiar pattern where
21:41North Korea conducts provocative tests to gain leverage and attention before potential negotiations.
21:47What's notably absent from Trump's response to all these developments is panic or fear,
21:51the very emotions that sensationalized headlines tried to project onto him. His actual statements
21:56and policy signals suggest a leader who believes North Korea's advances while serious don't
22:01fundamentally alter his approach. He maintains that US military capabilities remain superior,
22:06that deterrence is credible, and that personal diplomacy offers the best path forward even if it
22:11produces imperfect outcomes. This confidence, whether justified or overconfident, stems partly from
22:17the massive disparity in nuclear arsenals. The United States maintains over 1,470 deployed nuclear
22:23warheads on sophisticated delivery systems, backed by the world's most advanced conventional military.
22:28North Korea's arsenal, even with 50-90 warheads and improving missiles, represents a fraction of US
22:34capability. The risk North Korea poses is less about winning a nuclear war,
22:39and more about the catastrophic humanitarian cost even a limited nuclear exchange would cause,
22:44which means managing North Korea isn't about defeating them militarily. Any conflict would
22:48be devastating regardless of who won. It's about preventing conflict through deterrence,
22:53and if possible, reducing the threat through negotiation. Trump's bet is that his personal
22:57approach to Kim, combined with demonstrated US strength, creates the best chance of achieving that
23:02goal even if it means accepting uncomfortable realities about North Korea's nuclear status.
23:07Whether this strategy will succeed remains to be seen. The variables are complex. Russia's ongoing
23:12support for North Korea, China's calculations about regional stability, South Korean and Japanese
23:17concerns about being left vulnerable, the technical progress of North Korea's weapons programs, and Kim
23:23Jong-un's own strategic calculations about what he needs for regime security. But one thing is clear as
23:28we navigate this fraught moment. The relationship between Trump and Kim, forged through those unprecedented
23:34meetings in Singapore, Hanoi and the DMZ, creates diplomatic possibilities that wouldn't exist with any
23:39other American president. Whether those possibilities lead somewhere productive, or prove to be an illusion
23:45masking continued North Korean weapons development, is the question that will define this chapter of
23:50nuclear diplomacy.
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