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00:00We were just speaking to my colleague, Dana, about what we know about the potential response
00:05from Hamas. We haven't received an official response yet. How likely is it, in your view,
00:10that they will actually subscribe to that 20-point plan in its current format?
00:17Hi, Jumaan. Always good to be with you. Well, I think we have to take stock of the fact that
00:23there isn't a single Hamas here that is in question. There is Hamas's political leadership,
00:30which sits abroad in multiple countries. There are those who are based in Qatar and Turkey and
00:37elsewhere. And then there's Hamas's military leadership that is essentially based in Gaza
00:41and that is in control of military operations within the Strip. And I think these have their
00:49own different calculations. And so Hamas's leadership within the Gaza Strip, yes, perhaps it's
00:55exhausted because of a two-year war. But those who are still fighting are very much hardcore
01:01fighters. If they're still fighting despite all of the losses that Hamas has suffered in terms of
01:08personnel, in terms of capabilities, then they are unlikely to lay down their weapons and agree
01:14to the Trump plan, especially since it lacks any guarantees for a permanent ceasefire or a
01:22comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. By contrast, Hamas's leadership abroad might be more
01:28amenable to Arab and American pressure. So I think the risk here is that if Hamas's leadership abroad
01:36does agree to the plan, we may see a splintering of Hamas between those who are inside Gaza and those who
01:42are outside on the one hand. On the other hand, we could get stuck in a semantic game where Hamas,
01:49leery of provoking Trump and Hamas's Arab interlocutors outright by rejecting the plan,
01:57might instead welcome or agree to the plan in principle, but express major reservations about
02:04some of its key provisions. And so here we may be in a semantic game where Hamas is in principle
02:09accepting, but really has big reservations, which is somewhat inconsistent with the way that Trump
02:14has put forward this plan as sort of a done package deal.
02:17You know, a lot of people were asking when the 20 point plan came out, what the differences between
02:23this plan versus prior plans and not a whole lot. But I would say one major difference is that at least in
02:30this case, you do have the support of the Arab states, you have the likes of Turkey, of Qatar,
02:36of Egypt, throwing their weight behind it, saying that they endorse this 20 point plan.
02:41How significant is that? And does it really raise the likelihood of there being some form of a deal
02:48reached over the next couple of weeks? So I think there are important differences between the current
02:53plan and previous iterations that we've seen. And the plan, for example, and proposal put forward by the
02:59French and Saudis. There is a role for the Palestinian Authority to play in Gaza's governance, because
03:07the idea is that you don't want to sanctify the disconnect between Gaza and the West Bank and set
03:13a precedent there. Clearly, Trump's plan has really no provision for the Palestinian Authority playing
03:18a real role. It doesn't really incorporate the idea of a two-state solution to begin with. It imposes no
03:26time-bound commitment on Israel whatsoever. It foresees a permanent Israeli presence within a
03:32security buffer zone inside of Gaza. So I think these are serious differences with previous plans
03:38that we've seen. And they're likely to prove highly objectionable to Hamas and to other Palestinian
03:43factions. But I think I agree as far as we've seen an, in principle, Arab support for the plan.
03:52And the eight Arab and Muslim countries that are highly influential, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
03:58Egypt, Turkey, and others, have issued a statement welcoming President Trump's peace plan. But if you
04:05go beyond the statement, clearly the devil is in the details. Once the text of the plan came out of the
04:12White House, once President Trump and Netanyahu came out in a press conference and began sort of
04:17to put their own spin on the plan, the discrepancies between the Trump and Netanyahu version of the
04:22plan versus what the Arab and Muslim states thought that they were signing on to became readily apparent.
04:28And we started seeing sort of Arab and Muslim hedging and divergences. And so we've already seen
04:34the Qatari prime minister, for example, saying that while the Qataris accept the plan, there are still
04:41many important details to be hashed out. The GCC secretaries general yesterday came out and said,
04:46we don't trust Netanyahu, and we don't think he's a real partner for peace. And it's unlikely for any
04:51Arab country to dispatch military troops to Gaza at this stage, because I think the implicit message
04:58here is that if Hamas doesn't accept it, then really will the Arab and Muslim countries want to
05:03dispatch troops to Gaza to be shooting at Hamas and Palestinians? Unlikely. And so I think we're already
05:10seeing indications that the Egyptians are also unhappy and there are real reservations about
05:15this. So I think this initial statement of Arab support, I think, is now somewhat diverging and
05:21we're seeing important divergences and hedging from some of these very influential countries.
05:27Hassan, briefly though, obviously, I mean, this is, you know, a very significant question. You know,
05:33the return of Tony Blair being floated as sitting on that chair of peace board, the supervisory board,
05:41given his Iraq legacy, how's that likely to go down in the region?
05:47Probably not very well, to be quite frank. I mean, there is the question of the legacy of the Iraq war
05:53that I think probably weighs on, you know, that individual's image and legacy within the region.
06:01So there is that, obviously. But I think there is a broader principle issue about the role of
06:10Palestinians in any future governance of Gaza. And I think this is the main sort of in principle
06:15issue, irrespective of the question of who gets to chair or who gets to be involved in this board of
06:21peace. The question really is what role will Palestinians play in their own governance? So Gaza is,
06:28in principle and by international law, part of a Palestinian state. And so it should essentially,
06:35in principle, be under Palestinian control. And yet Trump's plan makes no provision whatsoever
06:41for the Palestinian authority or any real Palestinian body to be involved in the future governance of
06:47Gaza. And I think this is a dangerous precedent and a dangerous sort of in principle precedent to be
06:54setting for the future of the two-state solution.
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