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  • 17 hours ago
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00:00I think we can obviously talk about what's top of mind for you today, but I think, is it going to be the bond market and what we're seeing there?
00:07Well, hi. Thanks, Annabelle. Thanks for having me.
00:10Yeah, I think I'm in the business of risk mitigation, risk protection.
00:15I'm not in the punting business or the predicting business.
00:19And I think structurally everybody's well aware, and I've been writing and talking about it for years, maybe even decades,
00:25about the structural imbalances and the global holdings of fixed income.
00:30This sort of myth that was constructed through the regulatory application of bad financial mathematics that bonds,
00:39particularly sovereign bonds, sit somewhere in the regulated financial industry between riskless, 0% risk-weighted asset on banks,
00:48to risk reducing in liability-driven investment schemes where levering bonds is meant to reduce the risk of the portfolio.
00:55Or most simply in a 60-40 balanced portfolio where the bonds are considered as risk mitigating, risk reducing.
01:03But what we've learned, certainly in the last four or five years, is the bonds are the risk.
01:09And what we're seeing again and again is the bonds driving the risk cycle and driving the policy cycle as people try to cope with that.
01:17Obviously, Japan and U.S. Treasuries last week.
01:20Well, exactly. That's what I was going to bring up is that auction, for instance, we had with the 40-year bonds in Japan this week.
01:26And investors really seem to want more of a premium now.
01:29Well, I think the problem is a structural imbalance in the existing holdings, what I've dubbed as the hunger games of bond issuance.
01:37As the traditional buyers of bonds, which in the last 15 years have been predominantly central banks buying their own bonds,
01:47foreign central banks buying bonds for their FX reserves,
01:50and regulated financial institutions, banks, insurance, pension, loading up on bonds at terrible, terrible prices,
01:58extraordinarily artificially manipulated low yields, with tons and tons of leverage saying that that's not risk-taking.
02:05And now those people are full.
02:07They've had enough.
02:08And yet the supply of issuance keeps growing and growing and growing.
02:11And the examples last week, certainly with the long-dated bonds in Japan and around the world,
02:17the noise we had a few weeks ago in Taiwan,
02:21get down to this structural problem in the asset-liability mix of these financial institutions.
02:26So insurance companies who loaded with favorable accounting treatment on duration
02:32to accommodate the massive expansion of their liabilities as interest rates got forced to zero and below,
02:38now as interest rates rise, they need less duration.
02:42But the hidden implicit leverage in how they owned callable note structures or levered gilts,
02:48in the case of the UK LDI structures,
02:51they're actually growing in their duration exposures just as they need to buy fewer bonds.
02:55And that's creating a bottleneck in the bond issuance.
02:58But something else that also can play into it is the moves of government as well.
03:03Because, for instance, in the UK, and you just bring it up there,
03:06but there's the plans for Treasury to gain backstop powers.
03:10Yeah.
03:11So I wrote a note.
03:12I write notes every month that go up on our website for our investors.
03:15And I wrote one back in 2022 called, Is Sharp World Closing?
03:19Sharp World is what I call the whole mythical fantasy land of financial mathematics
03:24that gets overlaid in regulation to financial institutions.
03:28And I said, because of this dynamic, that people won't want to own the bonds.
03:32And the guys who do own the bonds have been fiduciaries doing it with somebody else's money
03:37regulated to do so with bad financial math.
03:40And exactly what you said, I hinted in that note that we're looking at a future of financial repression
03:45and even, in a sense, capital controls.
03:48And so when the UK says we're going to force UK pensions to own UK assets,
03:53well, that's a form of capital controls.
03:55When Scott Besson says he's going to permanently exempt the SLR for U.S. Treasuries for U.S. banks,
04:03well, that's a form of capital controls.
04:05Now you can apply leverage in the banking system to your domestic sovereign bond
04:09at a preferential rate relative to other zero-risk-weighted assets.
04:13So why wouldn't Japan do the same and exempt JGBs
04:16to incentivize Japanese banks to own JGBs over owning other zero-risk-weighted asset bonds?
04:23So all of that feeds this same problem, who's going to buy the bonds.
04:28I want to talk about capital control maybe in a different market
04:31because China, of course, is another market that has those kinds of measures in place.
04:35The bond market there has looked pretty different, though.
04:38So how does that also factor into your thinking?
04:42And also, I know you've got a view that they've been the sole contributor of credit impulse
04:45in the world for a decade now.
04:47How does it stack up exactly?
04:49Yeah, China's such a critical player and obviously critical in the current.
04:53Tariff trade imbalance correction issue.
04:56So China, again, has its own structural imbalances,
04:59really driven by its explosion of credit post-GFC,
05:04as I said, being sort of the sole credit impulse for a decade post-GFC,
05:08all the while maintaining extremely high capital controls
05:12and essentially a pegged currency, even in the last three years,
05:16going away from their own basket methodology of how they fix the currency
05:20and essentially just holding it against the dollar, give or take 7.2.
05:25Well, that allows these imbalances to build up and not correct as the market mechanism
05:29of all the borrowers and savers and investors and hedgers and importers and exporters
05:35deciding amongst themselves what they think the fair currency value is
05:38and where investment should go.
05:40And so China obviously is going through a large deflation pressure
05:43at the tail end of that credit buildup, unsustainable that it was.
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