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00:00I guess I want to start off with just give us a sense of what the tone and the message you're getting based on your conversations with top Chinese officials.
00:09What does it feel like currently to you?
00:13Well, good question and a pleasure to be with you.
00:15I think that I had a great opportunity to sit an hour and a half with Wang Yi last week in Beijing.
00:22He and I've had a number of conversations, mainly about geopolitics.
00:27He and his boss, Xi Jinping, have embraced the diagnosis in my book about Thucydides' trap and a Thucydidean rivalry
00:38and are deeply concerned about the ways in which history as usual would lead to a catastrophic conflict and what they can do to try to avoid that.
00:49He's an extremely talented diplomat.
00:52He knows his brief and he knows his position.
00:57He has worked very closely with Xi Jinping.
01:01And I think the bottom line is that they feel like they are in a very comfortable position.
01:06They think they're prepared for the turbulence ahead.
01:09You maybe remember a couple of years ago, Xi Jinping shocked many people in the world by saying he was expecting changes,
01:17the like of which has never not been seen in 100 years.
01:20And people make fun of that.
01:22More than two or three people reminded me of that when I was there last week, that that looks like a little bit better prediction.
01:29They think they're prepared for turbulent orders.
01:31They think they have a good helmsman.
01:33They think they have a good team.
01:34They think they have a good hand.
01:36So I think this is stay tuned.
01:39And I'm assuming based off that conversation, you felt confident enough at the World Economic Forum and Tianjin to say that we'll see an MOU soon.
01:52When exactly do you expect to see that?
01:55And what would be the contents or the rough contours of that as well?
02:01Well, that's a good question.
02:04Again, given the unpredictability of the Trump administration and the uncertainty about what's going to happen on July 9th,
02:13I mean, here we are just five days away, and we don't know whether there are going to be agreements or whether they're going to be extended,
02:21which is what Masant obviously hoped would happen, or whether they're going to send out some letters.
02:26So this all seems rather chaotic.
02:29And actually, from the Chinese perspective, again, playing in the competition with the U.S.,
02:34I'm sure a big part of the message that Wang Yi has been sending both explicitly and more just by his presence is that here's China,
02:47stable, predictable, ready to do trade deals, eager to do more trade business, and making the sharp contrasts with the U.S.
02:56So I think that's the one side of it.
02:58I suspect, though, that for the China piece, since they've already gone through two rounds of this,
03:06they will count that as one of the areas in which they've reached some level of agreement.
03:11First, in the discussions in Geneva about bringing down the extraordinary trade tariffs that Trump imposed in the first case.
03:20And then secondly, more importantly, in the control of exports, key items, including rare earth magnets.
03:27So whether there'll be another, I'm confident, the logic of the situation would say this is going to lead in short order to another release of some version of an MOU
03:42that'll be more specific about how they're limiting, on the one hand, U.S. constraints of items that China needs badly,
03:50and on the other, China's constraints of rare earth magnets, without which Ford Motor Company can't run their production line,
03:58and F-35 lines can't produce new airplanes.
04:02So this is an area where I think we've been reminded how deeply entangled the two economies and their supply chains are,
04:11and how adults are going to have to then, and I think we do have adults on both sides working the problem,
04:16better find their way to an uncomfortable accommodation in which we'll stumble forward.
04:22That'd be my bet.
04:25So this MOU that we could receive, is that going to be the same as the trade truce that Howard Lutnick said that the U.S. and China had signed,
04:34or are we expecting something, again, additional there?
04:36My impression, again, both from just the logic of the situation,
04:42but also sort of reading a little bit more into what conversations I have both with folks in Washington and Beijing,
04:50is that they've had a working group working in pursuit of the discussions that occurred both by the Secretary of the Treasury
04:59and the Secretary of Commerce, trying to spell out in a little bit more detail what the rules of the road are
05:07for both the trade and the export controls in particular.
05:11So I would suspect we'll see something, a written product on that in the not-too-distant future.
05:17Graham, maybe just to maybe dig deeper there, because it seems this has gone beyond your point
05:25more than just a framework around a trade relationship, right?
05:30You mentioned rare earths.
05:33I think you alluded to access to chip technology.
05:36And I wonder whether you get a sense that China is directly asking the U.S.
05:43to give them access to chip technology as part of a broader deal.
05:51Again, I have no information about that.
05:54But again, the logic of the situation would suggest that they would be doing so,
05:59since that's been one of the constraints that we've imposed that they don't like.
06:03And they have demonstrated that they control a dozen items, maybe 60 or 70,
06:09which they can squeeze at their own discretion.
06:12And which we find difficulty living without.
06:15So if you just take that as a game theory perspective, and you play A and I play B,
06:21and we say, how does this play out?
06:23I would say we're likely to see some erosion on the chip constraints.
06:30Graham, maybe just to rewind a little bit.
06:33One of the sticking points, and I want to use past tense here,
06:38and I wonder if you could give us insights on this.
06:41One of the sticking points going into the trade talks was China felt slighted,
06:45disrespected, and not knowing what the U.S. wanted.
06:48Are those still sticking points you feel based on your conversations with officials?
06:53Or in other words, are negotiations now on much equal footing as the Chinese had wanted?
07:01Again, a great question, and it's got multi-levels.
07:06I think you have the Chinese-like stability, predictability, chaos is kind of their nightmare.
07:20And it's hard to deny that the Trump administration seems chaotic, because I think it is.
07:27And on the other hand, in the relationship between President Trump and Xi, there's a great deal of mutual respect.
07:36They've exchanged a number of communications, including not just their phone calls, but letters and otherwise.
07:43And Trump has said over and over that he greatly respects Xi Jinping, that he actually admires him.
07:48So I think among American political leadership, the most positive person in the whole system about Xi Jinping and his China happens to be the president of the U.S.
08:02I think they appreciate that.
08:04So, again, my impression is that this should lead over time and not too long in advance
08:11to some meeting between the two presidents in which they, in effect, offer their view of what the relationship ought to look more like.
08:20Now, go one level below that to the current leadership in the U.S. government and go two layers below to the departments and then three layers below to the politics.
08:31Most all of that is quite negative about China.
08:33But the least hawkish person about China in the American government just happens to be the president of the United States.
08:42So, again, this is you couldn't make this up.
08:45It's going to be too interesting to watch going forward.
08:47Graham, we were just speaking about how you had a 90-minute sit-down with the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi.
08:53And I want to talk about this need, perhaps, that we have now for a Henry Kissinger-style go-between the two administrations.
09:02I mean, you once studied with him.
09:04You've also served in both the Clinton and Reagan administrations.
09:08I wonder what you think about the need for that type of role and who you think could be the one to fill it as well.
09:17Well, that's a good question.
09:19I think certainly Henry played a unique role, and I don't think it's likely that anybody will be able to play an equivalent role.
09:28I mean, he was able, you know, when talking to somebody like Xi Jinping, to remind them, or they were reminded, that actually he was there at the beginning.
09:38So, he was there with Zhou Enlai and in the opening to China and the original conversations with Mao and ultimately the Shanghai Communique.
09:48And then Henry was Henry.
09:50I was a student, and he was my mentor.
09:52I loved him, learned a lot from him, but nobody's going to replace Henry.
09:58On the other hand, the Chinese have a great deal of both cultural and historical respect for people that are old.
10:06So, I at least qualify his agent, who may be professors, and Harvard, they have a, whatever, a favorable view towards Stu.
10:18So, I've been privileged to be part of conversations with him about basically the geostrategic situation.
10:27And since the book that I wrote that was published back in 2017 called Destined for War, Can the U.S. and China Escape Thucydides Trap, is a favorite of Xi Jinping.
10:40It's obviously a favorite of all the people that work for him.
10:43So, they've been fascinated to want to discuss Thucydides, whom they had to learn much about earlier, but now they have, and his analysis of the ways in which when a seriously rising power threatens a major ruling power, most often that leads to war.
11:01And they like to understand patterns in history.
11:04And then, in particular, the question of how war can be prevented.
11:08So, the basic bottom line in the book, the Thucydides Trap book, is that if all we can manage is business as usual, or diplomacy as usual, or statecraft as usual, then we should expect history as usual.
11:25But that defines for us the challenge.
11:28Thucydides was not fatalistic, and I certainly am not fatalistic.
11:32I think, left to its own devices, this is most likely, this relationship, most likely to go the way of history, even to a tragic war.
11:42But I don't think that's necessary.
11:44And I think, I'm hopeful, that under Xi and under President Trump, we're going to make a turn towards a more constructive relationship.
11:53I know that sounds a little Pollyannish, but that's my hope.
11:57Well, I'm curious about that, because I think in the book you looked at 16 historical cases of a Thucydides Trap, where 12 had entered in war.
12:06So, certainly, history is the guide.
12:08That is what could happen.
12:10But what exactly, then, do you think needs to take place for that situation to be averted?
12:16Well, again, let me stretch my imagination to the positive.
12:22So, both Xi Jinping and Trump have said repeatedly, and Trump most vehemently, he says, I believe the U.S. and China working together can solve almost all the problems.
12:36So, if you look at Trump and his history and what he says, and try to read between the lines, I think he can imagine that he and Xi could be the great, that he could be a great dealmaker.
12:50Trump could be a peacemaker, he and Xi might redefine the relationship.
12:57So, when you say U.S.-China, I think the first word would pop out of your, the first word of your association would be partner, as opposed to enemy or adversary.
13:09Now, is that possible?
13:11I would say not likely, but impossible, no.
13:15So, particularly if they begin to work on some problems together, what could they work on?
13:20Well, how about bringing into the war in Ukraine?
13:23Trump imagined that he could do that in one day or one week or one month.
13:26Here it is now a year.
13:28Who could help do that?
13:30Xi Jinping.
13:31So, what about fentanyl?
13:35I think the Chinese have already done a lot on the fentanyl front.
13:38And I think if you imagine Xi and Trump sitting down together and saying, OK, whatever you want to do about fentanyl, we're doing it.
13:45You just put it on the list.
13:48That's an easy, easy win for Xi Jinping.
13:53And on the trade front, I think Trump is delusional about what he thinks trade can do to improve the U.S. economy.
14:03But he's not dumb.
14:05And when he runs up against a wall or up against Mr. Market in reality, he retreats.
14:11And in the relationship with China, the trade, which started off as essentially an embargo with 145 percent, was hurting the U.S. economy.
14:21So, again, he reduced that.
14:23The export control efforts, when China pushed back, we basically backed down.
14:30So, again, I think logic would suggest that this is going to be a very uncomfortable, uneasy relationship, but could involve at least as much partnership as it does confrontation and conflict.
14:45I think that's at least what – I mean, I think if Trump had his druthers, that's what he would wish for.
14:52Now, between an aspiration and an accomplishment, quite a long road.
14:56But I'm trying to be hopeful.
14:58So, again, I think it's going to be hopeful.
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