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During the Cold War, the U.S. military races against time to recover classified footage from a top secret surveillance satellite that crashed into the Pacific Ocean before it falls into enemy hands.
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00:00Como um externo FBI agente e presidente do Comitê do House Inteligente,
00:05eu tive a pesquisa de todas as 16 de nossas entidades inteligentes.
00:09Meu nome é Mike Rodgers.
00:12Eu tive acesso a informação classificada por nossos operadores.
00:17As pessoas que risquem tudo para os Estados Unidos e nossas famílias.
00:21Você não sabe o seu rosto ou o seu nome.
00:23Você não sabe as histórias reales das pessoas que vive o medo e o pressão.
00:28Até agora.
00:30Nós não usamos normalmente o termo espying.
00:35É usado freely, e certamente a mídia e o público usamos.
00:39Mas, na verdade, há uma pequena parte da comunidade inteligente
00:44que é dedicado a o que as pessoas conjuntam em sua mente como espying,
00:50em um contexto de James Bond.
00:53Na verdade, muito do que é feito na comunidade inteligente é técnico.
01:28A necessidade é muito importante.
01:32A segurança nacional e a manter o país seguro e seguro.
01:36O que é o que é que é?
01:43A segurança nacional e a manter o país do seuu coração.
01:45A segurança nacional e a terça.
01:48O que é o que é?
01:48A segurança nacional e a terça.
01:49Abertura
02:19Abertura
02:21Abertura
02:23Abertura
02:25Abertura
02:27I would suggest that the availability of broad area coverage was nothing short of miraculous for defense intelligence.
02:35Broad area coverage that hexagon provides is just absolutely essential.
02:39The hexagon system was extraordinarily important to the defense intelligence business in general.
02:49Information is power.
02:55The hexagon is a story about information and security.
03:01This is a story about capabilities, both our technological capabilities and the military and economic capabilities of others throughout the world.
03:13We want to protect the safety of the United States citizens, and the one way to do that is to counteract what the enemy has.
03:23And our biggest enemy after World War II was the Soviet Union.
03:29And in order to find out what they are capable of, you need to spy.
03:35Want to eavesdrop on somebody, attach a small hidden device, and the telephone caller will have an audience he never suspected.
03:43Spying is a necessity.
03:46More important, overhead photography gives our nation the ability to keep a vigilant watch on its potential enemy.
03:54Spying has been necessary ever since probably the first tribes started to fight with each other.
03:59Try to figure out what the other guy is doing so that you're prepared for it.
04:03The urgency to develop reconnaissance methods was underscored by the detonation of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb in August 1953.
04:13The Cold War was a very scary time for Americans.
04:26The Soviets were definitely a threat to the United States because they had developed the nuclear weapons just a few years after we did.
04:34And the mood was somewhat scary when you actually thought about the possibility of nuclear warfare.
04:40It became extremely important to monitor Soviet progress in nuclear armed intercontinental range ballistic missile systems.
04:49We knew that the Soviets were building missile sites.
04:53They were building nuclear submarines.
04:55They were testing.
04:56Now, we must be ready for a new danger.
04:59The atomic bomb.
05:01People were building shelters in their backyard.
05:04We had a clearly defined enemy.
05:07It was the Soviet Union.
05:09They were, in fact, a mortal enemy of the United States.
05:18On the part of the intelligence community, there was great pressure to gain access to the Soviet Union.
05:27Attention!
05:28The United States is under nuclear attack.
05:31The overarching fear, of course, they're going to push the button.
05:40And we worried a lot about that because we didn't really have a firm understanding of the decision-making process and what their thresholds were for the use of nuclear weapons.
05:58President Eisenhower was very concerned about not knowing what the Soviet Union were up to.
06:05So there was a question of how many ballistic missiles, how many submarines, how many airplanes, bombers and so forth existed.
06:11The Soviet Union was a denied area in many respects during the Cold War.
06:21The ability of the US to find out anything of importance militarily was near zero.
06:30It was the highest priority for the intelligence community, and in particular the CIA, to find out what was going on.
06:43And so the idea of sending an aircraft camera system was endorsed by the President.
06:50No one wants another Pearl Harbor.
06:53This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world.
07:00Some high-flying picture-takers looked down rather than up.
07:05The high-altitude U-2 aircraft is a good example.
07:09I can't tell you the value of the U-2 program.
07:12It was immeasurable information that was not obtainable any other way.
07:19But the US government knew it was only a matter of time before the Soviets developed a ground-launch missile that would shoot it down.
07:30The U-2 piloted by Francis Gehring Powers was brought down by a missile.
07:36The overhead reconnaissance program was the most comprehensive, systematic way of observing activity in the Soviet Union.
07:46So we had the realization that the only option we had to safely conduct overhead reconnaissance of these large denied areas,
07:55since we couldn't do it with a manned vehicle any longer, that was clear, was from space.
08:01The Soviet Union was our enemy because they wanted to take over the world.
08:26And we had to take measures to prevent that.
08:33We frankly recognize that the Soviets are building up types of power that could, if we were attacked, damage us seriously.
08:41We didn't know what their intent was in terms of the size of their arsenal.
08:47Photography produces pretty hard evidence.
08:51But airplanes were always risky.
08:54Because the risk of being shot down was there.
08:59So the reconnaissance satellite was the answer to that.
09:04The thoughts moved to an unmanned satellite that could remain in orbit to take pictures not otherwise obtainable.
09:12So President Eisenhower, in April of 1958, signed an executive order to start the world's first spy satellite program.
09:20The U.S. Air Force established a forward-looking development plan for satellite systems to collect various types of intelligence,
09:28including photographic coverage of denied areas.
09:32It was difficult for CIA to obtain successful human intelligence during the Cold War.
09:39That's why the hexagon program was so important.
09:42The advantage is the higher you get, the more you can see.
09:47The other advantage is the higher you are, the more impervious you are to any threat from countries you're traveling over.
09:55We could do it over time, over a period of months, and then we could learn something about their doctrine
10:02by just observing on a snapshot-by-snapshot basis what they were doing.
10:06This was a very, very sensitive operation.
10:09And even within the program, there were layers of detail that were not exposed to people unless it was absolutely critical.
10:17It was based on need to know. Did you have to know that to do your job?
10:22We started launching spy satellites under the corona program in the late 50s, early 60s.
10:30It went through a very traumatic birthing, if you will. There were 13 failures.
10:41Before they got it to work.
10:43But our initial capability was not very good in terms of resolution.
10:52Its best resolution, I think, was around six feet, no better.
10:59The need to get a better camera system on orbit was obvious to everybody. It was urgent.
11:10The CIA decided to form a design for a new, more capable satellite.
11:22Two cameras, billions of dollars, miles of film being launched into space,
11:29and four large, 1,100-pound capsules to be returned, one at a time, about three months apart.
11:35It was quite innovative.
11:37Two.
11:38One.
11:39One.
11:40One.
11:41One.
11:44Its name?
11:45Hexagon.
11:48In 1965, I was hired by the Perkin Elmer Corporation in Danbury, Connecticut.
11:53The Perkin Elmer Corporation was an expert at cameras, optics, and the CIA knew that.
12:04So they came to us to design a new reconnaissance camera with extremely good resolution.
12:11The Hexagon program, its magnitude was humongous.
12:18The program was ultra secret.
12:21But we had to hire a thousand people.
12:25So we interviewed people ourselves.
12:28The trouble was, you could not tell these people what they were going to work on.
12:37There were a lot of people, other companies, machine shops, companies that made our electronics.
12:44They didn't know what they were working on.
12:46They had no clue that it was a reconnaissance satellite.
12:50We did not want to compromise it, particularly with the adversary, who was interested in doing
12:55the same kinds of things.
12:59We worked in a building that had no windows.
13:02There were guards at every door.
13:05We had special phones.
13:08And, of course, we could never divulge anything to our friends or families about,
13:13what did you do today?
13:14I worked on a project, and that was it.
13:16You couldn't say anything about it.
13:18There were mind-boggling requirements.
13:22This camera system, which was very complicated, had to work perfectly,
13:27because it was an N-man system.
13:29We couldn't send anybody up there to fix something.
13:32We had to map the whole earth.
13:35Today, the reconnaissance cameras are digital.
13:38They don't have many moving parts.
13:40It's all computerized.
13:42So this was the most challenging mechanical device ever put in orbit.
13:48We had to invent several new pieces of technology, things that had never been done before.
13:55Kodak supplied the film.
13:57And the film was about 6.6 inches wide.
14:01And each roll of film weighed approximately 1,200 pounds.
14:05There was 30 miles of film.
14:10That's incredible.
14:11For each camera.
14:12And the film had to travel extremely fast in order to get the resolution that the CIA wanted.
14:20At 200 inches per second, whoosh, like that.
14:24We also had to make sure that all the equipment, after being subjected to launch,
14:28you know, high G's and vibration, stayed in alignment and stayed in focus.
14:33Yeah, people really don't understand what it takes to build something like this.
14:39Because the hexagon camera was the largest and most complex ever put in space,
14:45a very large launch vehicle was required.
14:48Well, the size of the hexagon vehicle itself was about the size of a school bus, yes.
14:53The hexagon used an adaptation of the Titan missile, upgraded with solid fuel boosters,
15:00like the space shuttle had to get this whole system up there 100 miles into orbit.
15:05Yeah, it was a huge vehicle.
15:07Absolutely.
15:10The first launch of the hexagon was June 15, 1971.
15:15That was a nail biter.
15:18Sometimes those rockets exploded above the pad.
15:22That was my baby.
15:25I went into this large conference room, which we call the war room.
15:30It had all these maps and data.
15:33And there was a squawk box.
15:35It just said, okay, we're ready to launch.
15:38Fire.
15:39Four.
15:40Three.
15:41Two.
15:42One.
15:43Zero.
15:44Ignition.
15:45The first launch of the hexagon was June 15, 1971.
15:57That was a nail biter.
15:59It was a squawk box.
16:01It just said, okay, we're ready to launch.
16:04Fire.
16:05Four.
16:06Three.
16:07Two.
16:08One.
16:09Zero.
16:10One.
16:11One.
16:12One.
16:13One.
16:14One.
16:15One.
16:16One.
16:17One.
16:18One.
16:19One.
16:20One.
16:21One.
16:22One.
16:23One.
16:24One.
16:25One.
16:26One.
16:27One.
16:28One.
16:29One.
16:30One.
16:31One.
16:32One.
16:33One.
16:34Ele poderia capturar todos os quadros de terra, milas de filmes com camadas,
16:42obviamente concentrando no União Soviética.
16:46Eles tinham avanços e avanços, e então era necessário examinar os avanços,
16:52countar o número de avanços, countar o número de avanços, avanços não poderiam fazer isso.
16:58A avanços poderiam.
16:59A forma que os avanços são escolhidos para a Hexagon
17:02foi através de uma estrutura dentro da comunidade de inteligencia em Washington.
17:06Foi um balanço entre a prioridade do objetivo e como isso jogou com o tempo esperado para o objetivo daquele momento.
17:15Porque você não quer fazer o filme de filmes com pequenas fotos.
17:20A câmera de Hexagon foi realmente fixada para a missão,
17:25mas, infelizmente, você tinha que esperar até o filme de caixa para ver o que você pegou a foto.
17:30O filme de São Paulo, que era um elemento de Whatsipel.
17:32O filme de Itam, que era um elemento do filme de caixa para o filme de Segui.
17:36O filme foi capturado por um grupo de 6594 de testa,
17:39que era um elemento dentro da União Soviética,
17:41e baseado no Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.
17:46Então, quando era hora de voltar a caixa com filmes com filmes,
17:49Uma das caçadas de filmes serão expulsada do satélite,
17:55que então reentiria a atmosfera do planeta e chegaria perto de Hawaii.
18:01À 55,000 feet, o paracete serão desploiado.
18:06O desploiamento normal para qualquer dessas recuperações era cinco aeropuens.
18:13Qualquer uma das cinco poderia ter feito a recuperação.
18:16O designado primary aircraft commander
18:20was positioned closest to the expected area where the parachute came down.
18:26There was a beacon on the capsule.
18:30It was beautiful to hear it when we were sitting out there waiting for it.
18:35And then we would be guided to the capsule by that beacon,
18:39and at about 25,000 to 30,000 feet,
18:42we would be able to visually pick up the parachute.
18:44Alpha-1, visual sighting at 2-3, 3-7, Zulu.
18:48So the first thing you want to do is match the descent rate,
18:51so both the parachute and the airplane are descending.
18:56The secret to aerial recovery is the aerial recovery hooks
19:00to engage the load lines going from the capsule
19:04all the way up through the parachute.
19:06And that has the strength then to keep all that system
19:10behind the airplane at 150 miles an hour.
19:14When it came time to make the recovery,
19:17we just turned in, pointed at the nose of the airplane at the parachute.
19:24We drive over the top of it,
19:26try to get the center of the parachute
19:27directly below the center line of the C-130,
19:30and everything's good.
19:31And then you reel it all on board
19:42to take it back to the people
19:44who need to see the film that's in that capsule.
19:46When we got filmed back from the very first launch
19:52and saw that photographs met our requirements,
19:54we were thrilled.
19:55Once we started receiving the data
19:57from the spy satellite film coverage,
20:00we had a distinct advantage over the Soviets
20:03in the military poker game they were playing.
20:05The hexagon camera was certainly the best camera
20:08that we had for broad area surveillance.
20:11It had about a two-foot resolution.
20:13A two-foot resolution means that
20:15you would be able to discern an object
20:17that is two-foot in diameter
20:18from around 90 to 100 nautical miles up.
20:23For example,
20:24we could see a picnic blanket,
20:29count the number of people.
20:31We might be able to have seen
20:32a ball being tossed.
20:36That's like Google Earth.
20:38Yeah, but these are much better pictures
20:40than Google Earth.
20:41That morning of the third mission
20:46on the first hexagon
20:48was very typical of a morning
20:52going out to catch a de-orbited space capsule.
20:55The first re-entry vehicle of four
20:58was a success.
21:01The second bucket came back.
21:03It didn't have any problems.
21:07But the third one...
21:11We had all sorts of backup capability
21:14to effect a recovery.
21:17But every once in a while,
21:18it didn't work out quite that way.
21:20It was very natural for us
21:25as we get closer
21:27to that estimated time
21:29of parachute deployment
21:29for everybody on the crew
21:31to be very tense and concerned.
21:34Have we done everything right?
21:36Have we got our equipment ready?
21:37We had an approach
21:38where the primary aircraft
21:40would be above the highest cloud deck.
21:44Our parachute harnesses are on.
21:47We're ready to open the airplane
21:48as soon as it's time.
21:52And we were out there
21:53waiting that morning
21:54for the signal.
21:57I started getting
21:58the telemetry signal,
22:00the beacon from the capsule.
22:02And then...
22:03I disappeared.
22:07The signal was gone.
22:11It was like 13 seconds
22:12and no signal, nothing.
22:14I looked at the EDF operator
22:16next to me
22:16who was also tracking
22:17the same beacon.
22:18And we both just held up our hands
22:20and went,
22:20what happened?
22:21Where's the signal?
22:25I was very concerned
22:26when I lost the beacon signal
22:28so quickly
22:29I knew something was wrong.
22:31I started getting the telemetry signal,
22:45the beacon from the capsule
22:46and then...
22:49the signal was gone.
22:57RV-3, we didn't see it.
23:00There was no opportunity
23:02for aerial recovery.
23:03We searched
23:04to see if there was any debris
23:05or if we could actually
23:07find the package
23:08on the surface.
23:14We were just doing
23:16the best we could
23:16to search
23:17to see if we could find
23:18a capsule
23:19or a parachute
23:20or anything on the water.
23:21We found nothing that day
23:24after hours of searching.
23:26We came home
23:26with nothing.
23:29It didn't appear
23:30that the parachute
23:30even opened
23:31and it just streamed on in.
23:36The parachute
23:37didn't deploy.
23:39It hit the water.
23:40It sank.
23:41I just said,
23:42oh my God,
23:43that's awful.
23:43That means we lost
23:44a whole vehicle,
23:46a quarter of the film.
23:47The film
23:48in that third bucket
23:49was taken
23:51over the Soviet Union
23:53during an extremely
23:55clear weather period.
23:59The intelligence community
24:00was extremely interested
24:03and eager
24:03to get this information.
24:05Some scientists
24:07and some people
24:08from the CIA
24:09decided that perhaps
24:11the edges of the film
24:12could swell up
24:13with the water
24:14and seal up
24:15the center portion
24:16of about two and a half inches
24:18and they wanted to recover
24:19hoping there would be
24:20some photographic data
24:22on there.
24:23Another reason
24:24why this huge effort
24:26mounted to recover
24:26this thing
24:27that went in a drink
24:28was just on the off chance
24:30that the Soviets
24:32were aware of it
24:34and would make an attempt
24:35to recover it themselves,
24:37learn from what
24:38we had been doing
24:39and get a leg up
24:41on us technologically.
24:42There was nothing
24:43that anybody could do
24:44in my outfit
24:46except well there goes one
24:48you know somebody else
24:49will have to get that.
24:51And that's when
24:52we got the call
24:53to go do it
24:54to go recover it.
24:57I didn't know anything
24:58about the hexagon program
24:59but in the summer
25:01of 1971
25:02we at the Trieste
25:04got a call
25:05to say recover an object
25:06from the bottom
25:07of the ocean
25:08and that's all
25:10we knew about it.
25:10we were the only unit
25:14in the U.S. Navy
25:15that could do this.
25:18The Trieste
25:19is a bathyscaf
25:20which is a deep
25:21submergence vehicle.
25:25It's capable of going
25:26deeper than 20,000 feet.
25:29and the pressure
25:31at that depth
25:32it's around 7,200 pounds
25:35per square inch
25:36is the outside pressure
25:37while you're there.
25:39We used to do this.
25:41If you take a
25:42styrofoam coffee cup
25:43that's this big
25:44on the surface
25:45you leave it
25:46on the outside
25:47you go to 16,000 feet
25:49and it comes out
25:49the size of a shot glass.
25:52It squeezes the life
25:53out of things.
25:56But that's the challenge
25:57of the deep water
25:58is to be able
25:59to have equipments
26:00that will operate
26:01down there.
26:02The only major
26:04pressure resistant
26:05portion of Trieste
26:06is the sphere
26:07that you ride in.
26:09The sphere is
26:118 inches thick.
26:13The window
26:14that we look out
26:15as you go deeper
26:16it gets forced
26:17into the seating area
26:18of the sphere
26:19so it seals tighter
26:21and tighter
26:21as you go deep.
26:23So if that leaked
26:25you would be gone.
26:28I mean there's no
26:28that would just be it.
26:32The way the dive starts
26:34is the three pilots
26:35get in the sphere.
26:39You had to be
26:40lithe enough
26:41to climb down
26:41a ladder
26:43that was 12 feet long.
26:46I am scared
26:47to death of heights.
26:47I don't like ladders
26:48or anything.
26:50Once you start the dive
26:52what you feel
26:52is closeness
26:54of the other
26:55two crew members
26:56that are with you
26:57because you have
26:5816 cubic feet
27:00per person in there.
27:03Think of your refrigerator.
27:07Get in it.
27:10There's no visible light
27:12once you leave
27:14about 400 feet.
27:15I mean it is darker
27:16than the darkest night
27:17or cave you've ever been in.
27:19there is no light.
27:22Let me flash a light
27:23through it.
27:25You can see
27:26big undulating
27:27jellyfish-like creatures
27:29in front of your window.
27:32No matter what you were doing
27:33you would see something
27:34that would amaze you
27:35and be wonderful.
27:37the Navy knew where the capsule
27:41hit the surface
27:43and so they had an area
27:44of probability
27:45where this thing would be.
27:46They estimated
27:47what the currents would be
27:49what the speed it would have
27:50as it went through the water
27:51and it's all scientific guesses
27:53at that point
27:54because you really didn't know.
27:56It's like finding a needle
27:57in a haystack.
27:58It's harder than that.
27:59At least you know
27:59where the haystack is.
28:01The Navy had a contract
28:03with Scripps Institute
28:05and Dr. Spees
28:06was the head
28:06of that program
28:07and he was a real
28:08pioneer
28:10of underwater search
28:11and he had devised
28:13a sled
28:13that had sensors on it.
28:15It had film cameras
28:17and communication stuff
28:18on it
28:19that they towed
28:20at the end
28:20of a long tow wire
28:22from the surface ships.
28:25So they went out
28:26and it took them
28:27I think it was two days
28:28and boom
28:30there it was
28:30they found it.
28:34It's 16,400 feet.
28:39Now
28:39we were looking at the task
28:41to go out
28:41and recover this object
28:42from the bottom of the ocean.
28:45It had never been done before.
28:47We weren't told
28:48what the object was.
28:50The Russians
28:51were developing
28:52a deep submergence capability
28:53but we didn't know
28:55where they were
28:56at that point.
28:57All we needed to know
28:58was that it was
28:59important enough
29:00for us to go out
29:01and get it
29:01and bring it back.
29:03Proconoma was chosen
29:04to design this hook
29:06to grasp the vehicle
29:08on the bottom.
29:09In the end
29:10it looked like
29:10a big hay hook.
29:13The thing where
29:13you reach down
29:14with the hook
29:14and pick up
29:15the fuzzy toy.
29:15we did our training
29:19down around 4,000 to 5,000 feet.
29:22The Air Force
29:23sent us out
29:24a spare bucket
29:27and we took that out
29:28to sea
29:29put it on the bottom
29:30and then we got the hay hook
29:32to try and pick it up.
29:34Now we had some problems
29:34with that.
29:36We had some real problems
29:37with that.
29:37in maneuvering
29:40to pick up
29:41the practice bucket
29:42the lift line
29:44on the hay hook
29:45broke
29:46and we lost
29:48the hay hook
29:48was gone.
29:51The whole thing
29:52that the operation
29:54revolved around
29:55had just failed.
29:57The task was
30:05to go out
30:06and recover an object
30:07from the bottom
30:08of the ocean
30:08at 16,400 feet.
30:12We weren't told
30:13what it was.
30:14All we needed
30:15to know was
30:15that it was important
30:16enough for us
30:17to go out
30:18and get it
30:18and bring it back.
30:20It had never
30:20been done before.
30:22But, you know,
30:23we were convinced
30:24that we could do it.
30:25The CIA wanted
30:28to recover the film.
30:29In the best case scenario
30:30after the impact
30:32and the sinking
30:32of the reentry vehicle
30:34there might be
30:35some good photography
30:37in the central
30:38two and a half inches
30:39of the film stacks
30:40and there were always
30:42Russian trawlers
30:42in the area
30:43and they certainly
30:45did not want
30:45the Russians
30:46to go down
30:47and recover it
30:48to find out
30:48what we were doing
30:49as far as
30:50reconnaissance is concerned.
30:52On one of our
30:53first training dives
30:55we had some
30:56mechanical problems
30:57and we lost
30:58the hay hook.
31:00It was gone.
31:02So, you know,
31:03that's devastating.
31:05So we maneuvered back,
31:07picked up the hay hook
31:08with our mechanical arm
31:10and brought it back
31:12to the surface.
31:14Saved the operation.
31:17When they found
31:18the hexagon bucket
31:19they marked the area
31:21that it was in
31:22with three things
31:23they were called
31:24the deep ocean
31:25transponders,
31:26dots,
31:26which are
31:28electronic devices
31:29that you put down
31:31on the bottom
31:32of the ocean
31:33so that you can
31:34go back
31:35and find it again.
31:36We got out to
31:41the dive site
31:42in early November
31:43of 1971
31:44made our first dive
31:46took us about
31:47two hours
31:47to reach the bottom.
31:50We got down
31:51on the bottom
31:51and started
31:52our search patterns
31:54using information
31:55given to us
31:56as to the position
31:57of the dots
31:57that we were supposed
31:58to be navigating with.
32:00In the process
32:01of this dive
32:02we just
32:03got garbage.
32:04we had no contacts
32:06we found nothing.
32:09We got back
32:10to the surface
32:11and started analyzing
32:12the navigational data
32:13that we collected
32:14and found out
32:14that the position
32:15of two of the dots
32:17had been reversed.
32:19So we were
32:20navigating
32:21some 2,500 yards
32:22outside the area
32:23where the bucket
32:24should have been.
32:26The crew
32:27is busting their tails
32:28and we get out there
32:29and we're
32:30in the wrong place.
32:32Yeah, it's frustrating
32:33as heck.
32:35When the weather
32:36improved in the fall
32:37late November
32:38we went out again
32:39and made a second dive
32:40on the site.
32:42Didn't find anything
32:43right off the bat
32:44but toward the end
32:45of the dive
32:46we picked up
32:47a promising contact
32:49using our search sonar.
32:52The object
32:53came out of the murk
32:54and went past
32:55right down
32:55the starboard side
32:56of the trios.
32:57Went right by the window
32:58and we tried to maneuver
33:02to get back to it.
33:03Now driving the trios
33:04is like driving
33:05a semi-truck.
33:07You don't stop it
33:08and turn it around.
33:09It takes, you know,
33:11takes power
33:12and it takes time
33:13to do it.
33:15It was at the end
33:16of the dive
33:17and we'd used up
33:18our battery
33:18which is not
33:19a good thing.
33:20We had to go back
33:21to the surface.
33:22So we thought,
33:25okay,
33:25we've seen this object
33:27we can't go back
33:28and get it
33:29at this point
33:30so we'll mark it
33:30with a mini-dot.
33:33To launch the mini-dot
33:34you had to use
33:34the mechanical arm.
33:36Well,
33:37we tried to use
33:37the mechanical arm
33:38at 16,400 feet.
33:40We had never been
33:41that deep
33:41to try and use it before.
33:44It didn't work.
33:46Would not work
33:47that deep.
33:48Worked fine
33:49on the surface.
33:50Worked fine
33:51on some other
33:51shallow dyes.
33:52got to 16,000 feet.
33:54Nothing.
33:56We needed
33:56to correct
33:57that problem
33:58because we had
33:59to use
34:00the mechanical arm
34:01to make
34:02the hay hook
34:03work.
34:05So,
34:06we had to surface.
34:07We hadn't marked it.
34:09Our whole
34:10morale.
34:13Oh,
34:13it was down.
34:15We were there.
34:16We had it.
34:19At that point
34:20the weather
34:20started picking up
34:21and we had to
34:22take the Trieste
34:23back to port.
34:25At the higher levels
34:26people started thinking,
34:28you know,
34:28do we really need
34:29to keep going
34:30and paying
34:30to do this mission?
34:33We needed to do it.
34:35Recovering it
34:36was necessary.
34:38They wanted to recover it
34:40so the Soviets
34:40didn't recover it.
34:41there's no question.
34:42There's no question.
34:42They were very eager
34:44to learn what we were doing,
34:47understand,
34:48and, of course,
34:48if they could learn anything
34:49about our technology,
34:51they'd purloin it.
34:54I wanted the mission
34:56to be completed
34:57and that was getting the bucket.
34:59That was the important thing.
35:01We knew that we had
35:04to make the claw operate
35:06without using
35:07the mechanical arm.
35:09You have to be able
35:10to change things,
35:12use your ingenuity
35:12and imagination
35:13to get it to work right.
35:15And, you know,
35:16traditionally,
35:17submarine sailors
35:17are that way.
35:19They can do that.
35:20And in this case,
35:22we did it again.
35:24Two of our guys
35:25did it using lift wire
35:27and some shackles,
35:29surgical tubing,
35:30plastic-type things.
35:31We didn't have any duct tape,
35:33but we probably
35:33would have used that.
35:35We were anxious
35:36on the next dive
35:37that we made.
35:39It had to work.
35:41And the pressure
35:42at that depth,
35:43if we had sprung a leak
35:44in the tree,
35:45I wouldn't be here today.
35:47And I remember this
35:48distinctly.
35:49We had several
35:50sonar contacts
35:52and we went
35:53to investigate them.
35:55First thing we found
35:56was a big pile
35:57of junk.
35:59It wasn't what
36:00we were looking for,
36:01but it was man-made,
36:03so we knew
36:04we were in the area
36:05where something
36:06had gone down.
36:08We investigated
36:09another contact,
36:10more man-made debris.
36:14The third contact
36:15that we investigated,
36:17we found our bucket.
36:20When we saw it,
36:21I thought,
36:23wow,
36:24here we are.
36:25Now let's do it.
36:27the third sonar contact
36:35that we investigated,
36:37we found our bucket.
36:40I wanted the mission
36:42to be completed,
36:43and that was
36:44getting the bucket.
36:45It was a big object
36:49with gold pieces
36:51hanging off the edges
36:53of it.
36:55I knew it was film
36:56at that point.
36:58I was thinking
36:59it must have been
37:00very important
37:00to the defense
37:01of the United States
37:02to spend this amount
37:03of money
37:03and this time
37:04to do this.
37:05The film roll
37:08had broken out
37:09of the bucket
37:09and it probably
37:11happened when
37:11it impacted
37:12the surface.
37:14So we maneuvered
37:15and put the claw
37:16down over it,
37:17operated our winch
37:18to try and pick it up.
37:20It didn't work
37:21the first time.
37:23It didn't work
37:24the second time.
37:25It took us five tries
37:26and on the fifth try
37:27everything came together
37:29just right.
37:30We were able
37:31to pick it up.
37:33On the way back up,
37:35we got to about
37:352,000 feet
37:36from the surface
37:37and I was watching
37:40the claw
37:42with the film capsule
37:43inside it.
37:44I was watching it
37:45out the window
37:46and pieces started
37:47falling off of it.
37:48You could see
37:49silver-like objects
37:50falling from it.
37:51So I called
37:53the surface
37:54and told them
37:54to have the divers
37:56ready when we get
37:56there because this
37:57thing looks like
37:58it's breaking up.
38:01And when we got
38:02to the surface,
38:04essentially,
38:05there was a cloud
38:09of dust
38:09and it was gone.
38:17When the re-entry
38:18vehicle hit the water,
38:20it hit it
38:21at 2,000 Gs.
38:26And unfortunately,
38:27the impact force
38:29was so large
38:30that it destroyed
38:31most of the structure
38:32and the film just
38:33unraveled and fell down.
38:36It wasn't until 2012
38:39when the hexagon operation
38:40was declassified
38:42that I learned
38:43what the hexagon program
38:46was and what
38:47we were after.
38:48we hadn't failed.
38:52We, the team,
38:54found an object
38:55at 16,400 feet
38:57and we picked that thing up
38:59and brought it
39:00to the surface.
39:01Never been done before.
39:03A one-ton object.
39:05And,
39:06in the CIA's eyes,
39:08the Soviet Union
39:09didn't get it.
39:10I think the hexagon program
39:13contributed significantly
39:14to the security
39:16of this country.
39:17I would say
39:18that the ability
39:20to get the broad area
39:23search that we get
39:23out of the hexagon system
39:24may have been
39:25the most important
39:26intelligence contribution
39:27that's ever been made
39:28by a reconnaissance system.
39:29to have it operate
39:30so successfully
39:32for as many years
39:33as it did
39:34is just remarkable.
39:36It was remarkable then
39:37and it's still remarkable today.
39:39The capabilities
39:41that were represented
39:42by the program
39:43and its success
39:44were, in fact, remarkable.
39:47By the end
39:47of the hexagon program,
39:49the system
39:49had probably covered
39:51just about every square mile
39:53of land mass
39:54in the northern latitudes.
39:55contributed mightily
39:57to better gauge
39:59the adversary
40:00and what the adversary's
40:01capabilities were.
40:05It is a testament
40:06to our technological prowess
40:09to be able
40:09to operate in space
40:11and to recover something
40:12at the depths of the ocean.
40:14It is also illustrative
40:15of where we have to operate
40:18and the lengths
40:19that we'll go to,
40:21if we need to,
40:22to collect vital information.
40:25The hexagon program,
40:27I believe,
40:27it contributed greatly
40:28to our national security,
40:30allowing us
40:31to sign treaties
40:33with the Soviets
40:33on reducing
40:34the number of missiles.
40:37The Soviet Union
40:37and the United States
40:39concluded the first
40:40SALT treaty in 1972.
40:42And we could,
40:43through the spy satellite program,
40:46absolutely confirm
40:47that they were destroying
40:48some of these systems.
40:49I did not feel like a spy
40:54in the sense
40:55of where you have
40:56an undercover identity,
40:58but I guess you could say
41:00in our technological age
41:02of the 60s and 70s,
41:04we were spies, yes.
41:06We launched 19 hexagon satellites
41:10over 15 years.
41:12Our cameras verified
41:14what was going on
41:16in the world
41:16and what the Soviets'
41:18capabilities were.
41:20I honestly think
41:21that the hexagon program
41:24was responsible
41:26for preventing World War III.
41:28We'll be right back.
41:30We'll be right back.
41:31O que é isso?
42:01O que é isso?
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