- há 4 meses
President George W. Bush and the Joint Special Operations Command prioritise stopping violent Al-Qaida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from killing more innocent people.
Categoria
😹
DiversãoTranscrição
00:00As a former FBI agent and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I had oversight of all 16 of our nation's intelligence agencies.
00:09My name is Mike Rogers.
00:12I had access to classified information gathered by our operatives, people who risked everything for the United States and our families.
00:21You don't know their faces or their names.
00:23You don't know the real stories from the people who live the fear and the pressure.
00:28Until now.
00:30Zarkawi was Hitler-like, and his plan was to kill as many people that did not see life the way he saw it.
00:40Zarkawi was taking advantage of tensions that had been on the ground and taking a candle to that pocket of gas.
00:46You could watch the country going aflame.
00:49We needed to get Zarkawi, but he was good at evading capture.
00:52He could essentially remain invisible.
00:56Zarkawi made it clear we could lose in Iraq.
00:58Zarkawi made it clean.
00:59Zarkawi came boşlight from racist cl 났ies.
01:00Zarkawi made it clear we could lose in Iraq'sunkenás or not.
01:02You could maybe see them on the ground.
01:04Zarkawi made it clear we could lose and why he did not die in Iraq's location today.
01:04Zarkawi made it clear we could losewriter.
01:06Wellا西糞 made it clear we could lose a shadow of seeing a seducing in Iraq's location.
01:07By the way, with the damage made it clear we could lose, it could lose or take a cure in Iraq's location.
01:09Sonja made it clear we could lose, it could lose or take no matter a lack ofocus.
01:10To be able to kill always mention their flight onboarding.
01:11Zarkawi给我 more than let alone one will lose.
02:13Everybody's wonderful, like a World War II victory.
02:17That shit ain't gonna happen.
02:19In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.
02:30The United States and allies invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003, and there was a set of
02:39assumptions that proved to be wrong.
02:41One, that we would be accepted as liberators.
02:44And two, that there would be the ability to turn the keys over to a follow-on government
02:50after Saddam Hussein was thrown out of office.
02:52We got him.
02:53Saddam being captured, all of a sudden you had all this, like, sense of relief.
03:02Okay, maybe if you've got these top ten guys, the army's going to capitulate, they're going
03:07to give you their banners, and we can all go home.
03:10Forget it.
03:10That strategy was a failed strategy, and we didn't know it.
03:17After Saddam was captured, I think the plan had been to leave, to give the keys to a replacement
03:24government.
03:25But there was no replacement government.
03:26The looting that occurred right after the fall of Baghdad showed that there was almost no
03:33ability to govern.
03:34So had we left, I think we would have appeared extraordinarily irresponsible, as though we
03:39had knocked something over and set it on fire and then driven out.
03:43Those Iraqis who actually thought life would get demonstrably better were very disappointed
03:49because it actually got worse.
03:50In 120-degree heat, there was no electricity.
03:53There was no garbage pickup.
03:54There was no sewage.
03:55There was little law and order.
03:58So they became restless.
04:02We created a huge vacuum by disbanding Saddam's regime elements.
04:07When we disbanded the Iraqi army, we put a bunch of people, mostly Sunni, out onto the
04:13streets with nothing to do.
04:15They had a personal dignity that we took from them.
04:18And when we took it from them, and we didn't give it back to them, we basically sent them
04:21home, no paychecks.
04:22So now they're not being able to take care of their families.
04:24That vacuum was created, and it was immediately filled.
04:27And Zarqawi, he was the guy that was going to fill it.
04:30And he came in like a bat out of hell.
04:35Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started to build a network with the Sunnis who were frightened by their
04:42loss of political position inside the country.
04:46People, at the end of the day, are the same the world over.
04:48They want to matter.
04:49And in Zarqawi's case, he found people who thought they could matter if they, through
04:54deadly purpose, lethal purpose, applied their time and talent to the cause that he described.
05:02Therefore, he got much more support for what should have been a terrorist organization,
05:07and it now became much more like an insurgency.
05:10You have to look at it and go, Jesus, I mean, why did we do that?
05:26Nobody thought the second, third, fourth-order effects of telling an entire army, go home.
05:34What the hell are they going to do?
05:36And, you know, the Middle East is not some, you know, great vacation spot.
05:41Zarqawi rose to where he did because he took advantage of the Hofstream's aspirations of
05:48a group of people who felt that they'd been disenfranchised, right?
05:51Largely a Sunni population felt that their interests had been pushed aside for others.
06:00If you look at what Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda offered, it was pretty extreme.
06:05It was far more extreme than the average Iraqi was interested in.
06:08No, no, you are safe! No, no, you are safe! No, no, you are safe!
06:13But what was the counter-narrative?
06:15If a young person who's frustrated with this situation comes and says,
06:19I think I'll join al-Qaeda, the mother or father says, don't do that,
06:24and they start to point and they say, well, join the government.
06:26But the government was not credible at that point because it was Shia-dominated
06:30and it became increasingly so.
06:32There was not a narrative to which a person could to have an either-or.
06:37So you are asking a tremendous amount of mature self-restraint not to join the insurgency
06:43when they've got really no reinforcing counter-narrative.
06:48God will revenge upon us. God will take our revenge from them.
06:52And he's giving them an order to go.
06:54And suddenly you have the rise of this al-Qaeda-in-Iraq leader who can propagate extraordinary violence.
07:02And what he was trying to do is, of course, create a civil war between Sunni and Shia.
07:08Zagawi didn't have the forces to take the United States and the coalition, you know, on directly.
07:13And he therefore needed to create murder, mayhem, chaos, you know, by using the assets that he had.
07:19And there was then this tension between Sunni and Shia.
07:23And he could essentially exacerbate those tensions and make it such that it wasn't just him
07:29that the United States needed to worry about,
07:31but it was the chaos and the conflict that ensued between multiple parties already on the ground.
07:36At least 60 people killed, 220 wounded, many taken to hospitals in the center of Baghdad.
07:43Very possibly this was a sectarian attack.
07:46Zagawi was kind of Hitler-like.
07:48I mean, he was an individual who was incredibly brutal.
07:50He was a dictator with a plan.
07:52And his plan was to kill as many people that did not see life the way he saw it
07:57and to try to change the face and the nature of the Middle East and, frankly, the Islamic world.
08:04Zagawi was taking advantage of tensions that had been on the ground between the Sunni and the Shia
08:08for hundreds, if not thousands, of years,
08:10and essentially taking a candle to that pocket of gas.
08:16Horrific violence that was occurring across the country.
08:20There were people being killed every day in Baghdad by the score.
08:24There were these big suicide bombings, car bombings, 14 a day in some periods during Iraq.
08:30It was a chaotic scene.
08:32It was a dangerous place to be, both for uniformed military
08:35and for the innocent civilians who were kind of caught in the maw of that trap.
08:47Zagawi became the symbol of the ability to fight head-on-head against America.
08:52He absolutely hated the West.
08:55He hated the United States and hated what we represented.
08:57He was the person that suddenly made it clear we could lose in Iraq.
09:05Zagawi absolutely needed to be killed.
09:15He needed to be killed.
09:24Abu Musaba Zagawi was the person that suddenly made it clear we could lose in Iraq.
09:29When I got there in the fall of 2003, I thought it was going to be tough, but I didn't think we'd lose.
09:34Six or eight months later, I realized we could lose.
09:38Zagawi absolutely needed to be killed.
09:41He needed to be killed.
09:42The only way that you were going to defeat somebody like him was to understand who he was personally.
09:51We started to paint this picture of who we actually needed to focus on capturing.
09:56Zagawi was a young tough out of Jordan, the industrial town of Zarqa.
10:04He'd been in prison for five years in the 1990s, and he'd come out as a very hardened extremist.
10:11Zagawi initially was not al-Qaeda.
10:13In many ways, he was more extreme than many of the senior al-Qaeda and made them uncomfortable.
10:18But on the other hand, he was very successful in Iraq, which had become the biggest battlefield between al-Qaeda and the West.
10:26And therefore, they didn't have much choice other than to back him.
10:29Zagawi was so successful in Iraq that bin Laden, at a distance, could only confer upon him the right to be the emir of that region
10:37and to create what we have called al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI.
10:44Abu Musaba Zagawi was a good organizer and a good leader.
10:47He would travel around the country.
10:48He would visit local leaders of Sunni groups who were potential supporters of al-Qaeda, and he would deal with them.
10:54And he was a very reasonable, very charismatic leader in a small environment.
10:58He could solve damn near any problem that you give him because he was that kind of a person.
11:03I remember once we listened to a radio program that he had done, and he talked to a bunch of his forces around the nation,
11:10and he basically gave credit to the heroes of Samara and whatnot.
11:14And it was the kind of thing a corporate leader would do, saying,
11:18sales did a great job this week, supply chain's doing wonderfully.
11:22It was good leadership.
11:23Zagawi motivated thousands of his followers to commit their lives to the cause.
11:48And troops across the coalition were suffering on a daily basis because of improvised explosive devices, insurgent attacks.
11:56He was walking the walk.
11:58He wasn't just some bin Laden in a cave kind of thing, you know, spewing hatred to the West.
12:04He was the field commander for al-Qaeda fighting America.
12:08I was placed in command of Joint Special Operations Command in October of 2003.
12:19JSOC is an organization that was put together to do the nation's most sensitive missions.
12:24I was the senior intelligence officer working for Stan McChrystal while he was the commander of Joint Special Operations Command.
12:30I was transitioning into the role of deputy director at the National Security Agency, and was very engaged in the hunt for Zagawi.
12:37I immediately went on a tour of forces that were deployed, and it became clear to me that our effort in Iraq was going to have to increase significantly.
12:45As soon as I entered the country, it was evident that the insurgency growing, which turned out to be Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was much stronger than people appreciated, and we were likely in for a long fight.
12:59So my mission was to be focused against that entity.
13:02Where was this transition from Saddam to Zarqawi?
13:07The most visible sign of that transition was in March of 2004, which is what's called First Fallujah, the Battle of First Fallujah.
13:17It was insurgency, and Zarqawi was leading that.
13:21Fallujah exploded when four contractors were ambushed, killed.
13:34Their bodies were burned and mutilated.
13:37One of them was my old operations sergeant in the Rangers.
13:42The bodies were hung famously from the traffic bridge, and there were people dancing in the streets.
13:48There were young children holding pieces of American bodies, almost like you'd wave around a lollipop.
13:56The first thing you feel is just rage.
13:58You feel frustration.
14:00You want to get in and you want to solve the problem.
14:02They want to kill innocent life to try to get us to quit, and we're not going to.
14:07And our military commanders will take whatever action is necessary to secure Fallujah on behalf of the Iraqi people.
14:13This fight starts.
14:18The first thing that happens is we're going to go in and get control of Fallujah, and very quickly it boils down into a fight and then to a siege.
14:29They were fighting Zarqawi and al-Qaeda.
14:32We realized, you know, holy shit, this guy's for real.
14:34U.S. troops are attacking on several fronts, but they're under fire everywhere, and the casualties are mounting.
14:44As an effort was made to recapture the city, it was pushed initially and it was halted for political reasons.
14:50Tonight, there are reports that two of the three marine battalions surrounding Fallujah have now pulled back from their frontline positions.
15:09And what happened was it created this standoff with coalition forces, with a few Iraqi forces on the outside, and then al-Qaeda insurgents controlled by Abu Misad al-Zarqawi on the inside.
15:23You could watch the country going aflame.
15:26It was really during that period of Iraq when the American military was stopped from going in, and inside Fallujah became an al-Qaeda safe haven.
15:40You had a sanctuary inside.
15:51We knew Abu Misad al-Zarqawi was operating.
15:53And, of course, whenever a terrorist or insurgent organization controls ground, whenever they control an area, it gives them credibility that they wouldn't otherwise have.
16:05We needed to get Zarqawi.
16:07Zarqawi became the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq in a way that was recognized from Mosul to Basra to al-Anbar.
16:31Zarqawi became larger than bin Laden.
16:33Zarqawi was a very clever man.
16:40Whenever a terrorist or insurgent organization controls ground like Zarqawi in Fallujah, it gives them credibility that they wouldn't otherwise have.
16:49he was clearly the leader we were tracking and my force was going after him and we were
16:56constantly trying to figure out where he was zikawi was a very clever man he was quite
17:02intelligent not simply about how he could create murder and mischief but how he could essentially
17:08remain invisible we'd have reports the same day that he was in mosul or he was in al-qaim hundreds
17:14of miles apart or he was in baghdad one day and then he was in ramadi an hour before that you say
17:21there's no way zarkari was good at evading capture first he had good what we called operational
17:28security didn't use cell phones and whatnot that we could track effectively he also would go from
17:34his traditional sort of black terrorist leader dress into western civilian clothes or into
17:42iraqi native garb he actually came through checkpoints think about how bold that is you're
17:50the number one guy being hunted and you're gonna drive around in public he came through checkpoints
17:57and got away there was a sense that he was everywhere and nowhere he was an absolute ghost on the
18:06battlefield we say every american is out there looking for abu basaba zarqawi that's technically
18:14true but every american soldier doesn't know what he looks like when he's clean shaven doesn't know
18:20what he looks like when he's in western dress driving a sedan if we were going to find zarqawi we had to
18:27operate faster than zarqawi was operating because he was operating pretty damn fast on that battlefield
18:32we begin tonight with torture outrage arab tv networks plastering photos all over the airwaves
18:41today of u.s. troops apparently abusing iraqi prisoners we blurred out the images but we warn you
18:47some of them are disturbing in the spring of 2004 is when i first heard about abu grabe as being a
18:53potential scandal abu grabe was a prison that saddam hussein had operated with pretty horrific conditions
19:00and then the coalition was using it to hold detainees to the average american soldier what
19:08you saw was mistreatment of iraqi prisoners by criminally ill-disciplined american guards
19:16but if you step back from that and you look at it from the eyes of iraqis i think it was very
19:25different many iraqi said publishing these pictures is just another way to humiliate iraqis
19:31and i think most americans didn't understand that well the military has brought criminal charges
19:37against six american soldiers and their commander has been suspended but the worst damage may be yet
19:42to come as the picture spread throughout the arab world sparking anger and outrage absolutely helps
19:48zarqawi helped in recruiting a lot of the foreigners that we captured uh and we asked them why did they
19:53why were they here they said to avenge their brothers from abu graf zarqawi was given a gift he had
20:00gotten credibility fighting the americans with the siege of fallujah and then you have this moral
20:05component that says this is what the americans do they claim saddam hussein was bad but they are just
20:12as bad here's proof was it a disaster maybe it was worse than a disaster for my strategic level it was
20:21just difficult to imagine it being much worse
20:24nick berg was a young man who had come to iraq and he was doing contract work he got captured and then
20:45he got turned over to al qaeda
20:52my force was responsible for hostage rescue so of course we tracked every american and allied person
20:59who was taken hostage with the potential to rescue him if we could we didn't know where nick berg was
21:06and then one afternoon uh one of my subordinate commanders came in the office and said you need
21:12to watch this and he put his laptop on my desk and it hit play on a video it was of course the al qaeda
21:19video that had captured nick berg standing in front of a series of black clad hooded al qaeda leaders nick
21:28berg's in an orange jumpsuit and then at the end of that they pull out a large knife and they they decapitate
21:35i was frankly um fixated on the video in a sort of morbid kind of way because i remember my my fists were
21:50just clinched up because not only you're frustrated you're angry people were always second guessing with
21:57who actually did the who actually did the beheading i i'll sit here today and tell you that i believe
22:02from the from the nuances that we saw the body language that we saw of the different individuals
22:07that's our callie was the was the individual who grabbed that young man by the stock of hair at the
22:12top of his head and cut his head off and and then stood there like you know screw you america
22:19it really brought the war to a personal level as it got more and more brutal
22:27if we were going to find zarkawi we had to operate faster than zarkawi was operating because he was
22:40operating pretty damn fast on that battlefield the kali was a crisis he had an advantage he was on the
22:46ground he understood the ground and he was essentially taking local activities and turning
22:52them to deadly purpose insurgencies in fallujah and ajaf threatened to undermine stability in the
22:58country and this april proved to be the bloodiest month ever in iraq with at least 126 americans killed
23:06very quickly we realized that just going after enemy leaders won't defeat the enemy movement you've
23:11actually got to defeat the enemy's network we have to reform how we do intelligence operations
23:18on this sort of modern battlefield if you go back to when i was younger intelligence would be collected
23:24by military units or civilian intelligence agencies and then they would send this intelligence to
23:31the operational force you'd go out and capture somebody you'd come back and you'd turn them over
23:35and that's sort of it that's way too slow and so all of the things for which operators had
23:41risks their lives on was being wasted because we didn't have the capacity to digest it
23:47but it's difficult to change an army in combat i wanted to break down every single wall that existed
23:54i did not want operators that were operating out of ramadi not talking to operators that are operating
24:00out of mosul because the guys that they were fighting they're talking to each other in order to defeat
24:05a network you got to be a network so so guys gals let's get our together let's open up
24:10the lines of communication especially when it came to intelligence the single most important thing
24:16we could do is collaborate we got the capabilities that we didn't have and additional capacity that
24:22we could never produce inside my small force and we leveraged that with conventional forces
24:29with intelligence organizations with other parts of the government
24:32mccrystal flynn um their pitch to the national security agency was um we don't want your material
24:43we want you right we want you to join us so that your talent is making a difference in real time
24:52i first met mike flynn when he was a colonel he came into my office he pushed on all fronts for a
24:57different relationship between the national security agency and special operations command
25:02asking us to take risks with how we did our work that would essentially change the order of how we
25:08did what we did for 50 years prior i mean this is a freaking battlefield so don't come out here with
25:21u.s policies that function well in washington dc but have no function whatsoever on a battlefield
25:29he was right of course he pushed us in all the right ways he got us to a place where we couldn't
25:33have gotten to alone oftentimes people's idea of nsa is a bunch of people sitting in a basement
25:38somewhere cracking codes but in order to make a difference you do it in the proximity the operators
25:43are going to use it so 17 500 or more times we took a person from an nsa organization and deployed
25:50them to an operational facility we implemented this blending of operations and intelligence
25:59and exploitation of documents media all facets of intelligence we began to really feel like wow we've
26:07got something different here with how we're bringing together our ops and our intel team
26:12every day we did an operations and intelligence video teleconference and it had about 76 locations
26:18and at the height of the war that video teleconference would have 7 500 to 9 000 participants passing
26:26information coming up with common strategies informing each other it is an information war the person who
26:33knows first and learns fastest wins during the hunt for zarkawi stan mccrystal caused the united states
26:41intelligence community to collaborate unlike any other time in their history that transformation that
26:48he led actually still alive today and will never go away it took us a while we were able to operate at
26:57a speed that was different by the summer of 2005 we'd been after zarkawi actively for about a year and a
27:05half and he was probably at the height of his power at that point he controlled much of the western
27:10euphrates river valley he was able to push violence almost anywhere in the country and we hadn't been
27:17able obviously to get him i was told i needed to fly down to the white house and meet with the president
27:25in the narrow confines of the situation room with all of the national security council sitting there
27:31around the table and the president he asked me very directly he says okay what are you doing
27:35and are you going to get him i told him what we had done and i said yes we will get him
27:40i can't tell you when but we'll we will be successful in killing or capturing
27:47our task force had gotten better and better at what we do we were able to do more raids connect
27:52intelligence better one of the things that first happened was we captured a video across the internet
27:58of abu muzab al-zarkawi shooting weapons and it was sort of a propaganda video and we captured the
28:05the raw footage of it when al qaeda had finished producing it and they put it out as a propaganda
28:17video it showed him in a very effective combat leader way shooting an american squad automatic weapon
28:24what we did was immediately released the outtakes
28:32and it showed that when the weapon jammed somebody else had to come and clear the jam for him
28:47and as they walked away from the range and he handed the weapon to one of his terrorist comrades
28:52that person then handed it to another person who grabbed it barehanded by the hot barrel
28:58and burned their hand terribly it really made them look like clowns and so what had been a very
29:05impressive propaganda video became a clown show that didn't capture him but that just convinced me we
29:11were closer than ever we were able to get the video before he had released it we were able to figure out
29:17where he had been in iraq our effectiveness as an intelligence agency was better than ever
29:25we were hotter on the trail of abu muzab al-zarkawi than ever
29:36we implemented this blending of operations and intelligence and i was increasingly confident that
29:44we were hotter on the trail of abu muzab al-zarkawi than ever in late april of 2006 our intelligence
29:52people using unmanned aerial vehicles were watching a location and they saw activity and it was just not
30:00natural it looked like a gathering of of cars and people in a place where they shouldn't have been
30:06and one of our intelligence sergeants major said we need to go there right now and so the force flew to
30:11the objective and immediately did a right on it there was no fighting at that objective but they
30:17captured 12 iraqi men now this was a farming community but the people that they captured were
30:23clearly not farmers you're talking engineers teachers a cleric we narrowed the 12 down to five
30:34we bring the five up to balad for questioning and through interrogations we narrowed that down really
30:39to the one guy and that was abu alawi we did not mistreat prisoners the two interrogators a male and
30:51female that worked with him built a real relationship with him they took him down to baghdad one time to
30:58meet other people they let him watch his favorite movie one night which was the exorcist but then
31:03finally after about 40 days they felt frustrated that he knew more than he was willing to tell
31:11and so they said okay we are going to stop interrogating you we're going to send you on
31:17in the regular detention system and of course he didn't want to be put in the regular detention system
31:23so at a certain point he simply said i have something to tell you and he started to tell us about
31:30this spiritual advisor named avdal rockman
31:37the individual said he knew who the spiritual advisor was the spiritual advisor would periodically
31:44go meet with zarqawi and conduct the kind of spiritual advice that you might get from a mentor one of the
31:51pieces of intel that we got during interrogations was that when there was going to be a meeting with
31:56zarqawi amdal rockman would actually physically move his entire family from whatever home they were living
32:03in to another house so once we located the spiritual advisor we watched him put him under surveillance and
32:12day after day we watch for this particular indicator
32:16now this was a difficult time because the violence in baghdad was high and it was just skyrocketing
32:24and so every day we had this discussion how long do you go and as you go day after day the pressure
32:30arises to just go and get him before he you might disappear finally one day we see the spiritual
32:38advice you move his family we're like holy this is for real then amdal rockman departs we thought he
32:46was going to go out west towards ramadi and go out towards the euphrates river valley i mean we're
32:51thinking the whole time that's where zarqawi's been and lo and behold the guy doesn't drive west of baghdad
32:58he goes north towards bakhava he moved north in the sedan and then suddenly the sedan on a divided highway
33:12moving through baghdad pulls off to the side of the road and the individual just gets out in the bank
33:17and the car drives on within seconds a truck called a bongo truck pulls up next to him picks him up and he
33:25jumps in and they drive off it was clearly a planned switch we'd call that tradecraft and it was pretty impressive
33:37now abdal rockman is moving in another vehicle we decided that we were going to follow every single
33:44vehicle so we're following both of them he went north and went to a small town and he went into a
33:50corner restaurant little shop slash restaurant he went in one door and a little bit later he comes
33:57out another door and there are multiple pickup trucks parked outside almost like out of a movie
34:03multiple white pickup trucks all with very similar markings and so from 10 000 feet look the same
34:10now we've watched him enough people are starting to be confident they know how he walks now he looks
34:14he gets in one of the vehicles so we saw the vehicle the next vehicle he gets in and we follow that one
34:24he goes up to this area called hib-hib which is an area that looks like a very nice suburb
34:30it's got a road and a small canal behind that is palm grove
34:34and so we see the pickup truck come up come into the uh driveway of one of the houses and as it
34:43parks in the driveway the individual gets out and an individual dressed in all black comes out of the
34:49house walks to meet the car and greet him and comes out to the edge of the driveway looks right looks
34:57left to make sure nobody was following abdel rockman to that site when he came kind of swaggering out
35:03and is all dressed in black everybody we were all standing here we were like holy that's our coward
35:12everybody's hair was up in their neck so now it's let's make sure that everything that we do
35:18is done exacting and precise and with with absolute laser focus
35:26we order a part of our force which is down in baghdad to conduct a an air assault movement by
35:32helicopter to go up and capture him capture kill we wanted to capture him because i desperately
35:37wanted to talk to him i wanted us to be able to interrogate him so we went to launch the raid force
35:42and then we get the word that one of the helicopters of the raid force had broken
35:48which was very abnormal almost never happened we had to get another helicopter so there's a delay
35:53now we're worried because he's in the house but what if he leaves
35:55and behind the house is a palm grove if he slips into the palm grove it'd be almost impossible to get
36:02him so the commander of the subordinate task force i looked at him i said okay what do we want to do
36:07and he goes so i'm going to bomb it we can't get the raid force there fast enough and i was initially
36:13frustrated because i i really want to capture him but i knew he was right so i said okay so two airplanes
36:19were up in the sky at that moment they're refueling when they come off of refueling only one comes off
36:27so the commander then says okay we can't wait for the other one just take yourself and go in there
36:34so he says you got to make sure that you are absolutely precise don't miss don't miss
36:39and so you're waiting you're waiting you're waiting and then finally you get word okay bombs away
36:48and a few seconds later you see a big explosion
37:00when the bomb went off i thought jesus i hope he's dead that's not a given when you drop bombs like
37:05that i've seen people get up and walk away
37:17when the bomb went off i thought at that moment jesus i hope he's dead
37:23still not sure whether we got him you're not sure he hadn't slipped out
37:35so they show up about 10 minutes after the bomb goes off when they show up the first encounter
37:45they have is an ambulance driven by some iraqi police and they have zarqawi's body in the back
37:55i believe they knew who he was i believe that they were taking him somewhere that americans wouldn't get
38:00him but i can't prove that the iraqi police first said okay we got him and then our force said nope
38:05we got him and there was a moment where guns were drawn and then the iraqis back down five more minutes
38:11they would have gotten the body out of there we didn't ever know
38:14so our guys try to revive zarqawi try to save his life and he was so imploded from the explosion
38:22that that he was you know he was dead we subsequently brought his body down to our headquarters and they
38:33lay him on a a poncho myself and and stan stood over the top of him we just sort of looked at each
38:41other you know nobody's cheering over dead bodies this is this is that's him he looked exactly like abu
38:48muzabu al-zarkawi from the pictures he was in the right clothes he was not disfigured he was just
38:55internally injured he was just dead now zarqawi has met his end and this violent man will never murder
39:04again zarqawi's death is a severe blow to al-qaeda we'd lost people against him we we killed a tremendous
39:12number of people in his network and he killed an extraordinary number of innocent iraqis so there
39:17was a satisfaction that we had done away with something that was in my view inherently evil
39:26we accomplished a major mission but we knew we had a lot more to go because there was a lot more
39:32bad guys out there still so it wasn't like we crushed his army and they all capitulated
39:38and surrendered this is not the kind of warfare that we're involved in
39:42uh as some iraqi policemen celebrated the news many others worn down by three long years of violence
39:50are hoping this could be a turning point when zarkawi was removed from the battlefield
39:55that was in no means the end of anything that was merely the restart of of the larger purpose
40:01this thing's not over by far i mean it's great that we got him but
40:05Zarqawi created an army, and he created an army that was not just in Iraq.
40:14He created a credible insurgency with terrorist tactics,
40:18something bigger than a small terrorist organization.
40:21He created a movement.
40:23We also remind you of the haunting words that our Shaykh Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi told you.
40:28The spark has been lit here in Iraq.
40:31I mean, when I look at what we're facing now, I see Zarqawi all over this battlefield.
40:37I mean, Zarqawi is the father of the Islamic State.
40:42And that consists of Lebanon, Jordan, parts of Israel, all of Syria, most of Iraq,
40:48even the northern part of Saudi Arabia.
40:52Zarqawi, he named it.
40:55So the modern-day Islamic State that we still will be dealing with years from now, he created it.
41:06The terrorist group known as ISIL must be degraded and ultimately destroyed.
41:10I think Zarqawi absolutely laid the foundation for the Islamic State,
41:13and he convinced people it was achievable.
41:19It's an ideology, it's a belief system.
41:22Until we change the behavior of this radical form of Islam,
41:27we're never going to defeat this crowd.
41:29We're never going to defeat this crowd.
41:30We're never going to defeat this crowd.
41:31We're never going to defeat this crowd.
41:59The danger being the power
42:11you think it's like a loop?
42:12Thinking the better thinking it's helped us,
42:13it's a little easier for them to defeat it,
42:17but always messes us through all drive.
42:19According to clique,
42:23it's one more progressive side of theespfire,
42:24it's a powerful one more progressive side of the world.
Comentários