- 5 months ago
Nailah Huda and Dr Amitav Acharya discuss his bold new book, The Once and Future World Order, where he challenges Western-centric narratives and reveals how a multiplex global system can emerge beyond the decline of the West.
Category
🗞
NewsTranscript
00:00This is Awani Global with me Nailah Huda and on Awani Global this week we want to take a close
00:12look at The Once and Future World Order, a book that's been recently launched looking at the
00:19decline of the West and what follows. The author Dr. Amitav Acharya proposes after the decline
00:26of the West, what follows is the multiplex global order looking at increased roles played
00:33by other nation states and also proposing some rather radical or some groundbreaking ideas
00:39such as questioning whether values such as democracy, human rights and whether they are
00:45truly exclusively Western in origin. And I believe to talk about this in great detail, there's no
00:52better person than to talk about this. We have Dr. Amitav Acharya joining us live from
00:57Washington at this moment. Thank you so much Dr. Amitav for joining us. I believe it's very early
01:01in the morning there so thank you, we really appreciate your time. We want to look at The
01:06Once and Future World Order of course. A lot of great reviews so far, we've heard about the book
01:12but can you just tell us a little bit the bigger picture of what this book is trying to propose.
01:17Essentially, the main premise is that global civilization will survive the decline of the West.
01:24What do you mean by this?
01:26Okay, first of all thank you very much Nayla for having me on your show and it's great to be connected
01:34to a Malaysian and Southeast Asian audience. About your question, I think the big argument of the book,
01:42the one big argument of the book is that a world order, which is a kind of arrangements, norms,
01:50principles, institutions, governance mechanisms to sustain peace and stability and prosperity in the
01:59world is not a monopoly of any civilization or nation or power or region. So world order is not a monopoly,
02:10but a shared creation. Now shared creation means many of the ideas and institutions of world order,
02:16whether in the past or today, the contemporary world order, were developed in multiple locations around the
02:24world and partly in Europe but well before Europe, in Asia, in Islamic world, in Africa, in South America,
02:38the pre-Columbian South America or North America. And so that argument also leads to how these ideas
02:49spread. And I argue that some of these ideas are independently invented or developed because human
02:56human beings, societies try to provide similar solutions to problems of, say, war and conflict,
03:04for example. But also sometimes they spread through diffusion, through interactions between civilizations.
03:12Now to illustrate this point or this argument, I go through 5,000 years of history. So this is actually a book
03:21about the world order history of 5,000 years going back to the, say, 3000 BC, the beginning of the Egyptian and the Sumerian civilizations.
03:33And I come all through history to the present. And what I find and what I present in my book is that,
03:44again, the institutions and ideas of world order, that independence of states or empire, which has been
03:52a big foundation of world order. And in many ways still is very important to us. Empires still exist. We are all living in the legacy of empires.
04:02And also diplomacy, peacemaking of peace treaties, humanitarian values, which includes, but is broader than human rights.
04:15And republicanism, kind of an idea of organizing the state, not on the basis of hierarchy or
04:24territory principle, but on the will of the people.
04:29All these things, interdependence, economic interdependence, freedom of siege, where the Indian Ocean and places like
04:37Malacca plays a very important role. All these ideas of world order were created in multiple places and at
04:45different stages of history. And, but they kind of are coming together now. So the current world order,
04:52therefore, it's a shared creation, not a monopoly. So that is the big argument.
04:57Moving on to your other question, the decline of the West will be a good thing. It follows that
05:04since the West did not invent these ideas exclusively, it did play its part, but didn't invent them. So
05:12these values, these ideas, these institutions will survive, maybe in different form, but fundamentally,
05:19they will remain. Now, why the decline of the West will be a sort of good thing, I want to be careful
05:26about what they mean by good. Good doesn't mean it will lead to kind of a paradise, like a, you know,
05:33global Aiden. I call it a global multiplex, but it's not like a paradise. There will be conflict,
05:38there will be cooperation, but it will be a more inclusive, more just world. Why? Because the last 300
05:46years or so of Western dominance has really not been good for the countries that we call as Global South.
05:54There has been colonialism, racism, and also after World War II, even though formal colonialism
06:03ended, it took some time. But we still have this Western dominance, dominance of the West, the United
06:15States. And despite some good things that came out of it, it has been generally not, okay, I would say
06:23overwhelmingly more beneficial to the West than to the rest. And it has also, while some global South
06:32countries, some non-Western countries are getting out of this, countries like China, for example, or India,
06:39for example, they are still nowhere near what they were before the rise of the West. They used to be the
06:46leading economies of the world, China and India. So I think the decline of the West doesn't mean the end of
06:52the West, but the relative dominance or decline of Western dominance, that's what I mean, is actually going to
07:00create a more level playing field and open up opportunities for a more inclusive world order,
07:06even though it will also have conflict, as well as cooperation.
07:11What prompted you to write about this now? Some of the central arguments that you talked about, the idea
07:19that these civilizational values, you know, ideas about democracy and human rights, they will continue to
07:26exist but not necessarily dominated by the West. Why is this an important reminder now?
07:32So why I wrote this book? Partly because of my profession as a professor, teaching courses and trying
07:40to tell students about world order or international order. And I found that most of the textbooks that are
07:48out there are heavily biased. And in fact, I myself did not know most of the things I did write about
07:56the book. Ten years ago, I did not know that until I started writing and teaching a course and writing
08:02about this book. And you are full of books by, say, Henry Kissinger on world order, come out in 2014, Neil Ferguson,
08:11civilization, civilization, and of course, Samuel Huntington, even more balanced books like William
08:23MacNeil. All these books are full of this celebration of the superiority of the West. And Francis Fukuyama is
08:34another one. So I felt that I cannot just give my students a narrative or a bunch of texts that kind
08:44of more or less celebrate the idea that the West is kind of as a monopoly on creating world order,
08:53that the current world order is a Western creation or any arrangement to create peace and stability and
08:59prosperity in the world has to be a Western invention. So I decided to write my book. I couldn't
09:04find anything that is comprehensive, holistic. I mean, there are books written by individual
09:11writers about their own countries and own regions. So you have scholars in China, India, but also in
09:21Malaysia. Said Hussein Alatas is one of the scholars who actually talked about Western dominance and
09:29ethnocentrism. So we have Islamic scholars, African scholars, but they're all kind of piecemeal. They
09:38don't bring together the picture over a long period of history. So such a book is not available, especially
09:46in the English language, which is a sort of global distribution. So I decided to then spend my time
09:52writing this book to create an alternative narrative about world order based on facts, not just opinion.
10:01So it took a long time to go through this. And I must say that some of the conclusions of the book that I
10:07told you just now about shared creation of world order did not come to me in the beginning. I went out to
10:16look what's out there, what's common, what's different among civilizations. But as I kept doing research,
10:23I was struck by how much of this is actually developed in other parts of the world. And they're
10:31similar, but not exactly the same. Sometimes these ideas are developed, like you talk about human rights
10:37or republicanism, which is something I talk about instead of democracy, which is much more narrow term.
10:43Now, these ideas may have existed in a very early, or you can say crude foundational forms,
10:51but they did exist nonetheless. And they're like more developed now. And we don't give enough credit,
10:59and no credit in many cases to the creation of these ideas in other parts of the world. I can give you
11:05many examples of this humanitarian values coming out of India, the idea of, say, not
11:13harming civilians in war time. Or the first diplomatic peace treaty, the very first peace treaty that we
11:22know, we have evidence for, was signed, concluded, rather, in 1259 BC between Egypt and the Hittite Empire.
11:33Well, that's well before anything the West did, or the idea of the West even existed, or even the Greek and
11:39Roman civilizations existed. So I also found the freedom of sea, the idea that seas are a common to
11:48all humankind, and nobody should monopolize sea or trade. Actually, it was developed in the Indian Ocean,
11:56with 15th century Malacca playing a very important role, where you had more than 80 communities,
12:03different nationalities. It was rules-based. It was, there were actually, it's a code, you might have
12:10heard about this, Undang Undang Laot Malacca, the maritime code of Malacca. This laid out processes for
12:17compensation, arbitration, and how to judge prices, if there is a dispute, how to do this. Anybody can
12:25trade there. You don't have to be Malay, or Javanese, or Chinese to trade there. The sea was open. So all
12:32these ideas you bring together, I was struck by the fact that how much of these ideas about
12:39world order actually came from outside the West. And sometimes they influenced the West,
12:45but suddenly they were out there. So that actually got me very excited, as I found
12:52this sort of evidence from Africa, humanitarian values, also trade, the Americas, the Inca civilization,
13:00the Maya civilization, the Iroquois in North America. I found that they also had ways of managing peace,
13:08managing order, empire, which actually are significantly, which are very similar to
13:16what we have elsewhere, despite cultural differences. So that came together. And that's what the book
13:24became, therefore, that the world and future world order, the world order of the past and the world
13:30order of the future, and of course, the present, and not a Western creation, as we've incorrectly,
13:38misleadingly attributed it to.
13:40Earlier, you described this book as sort of an alternative narrative, especially in the field
13:47of international relations. There's definitely that gap. But I have to say, I was very lucky that
13:52when I was studying international relations, I had your books, and I had your research, I had your work
13:57amongst the Henry Kissingers of the world. So I was very lucky. But going back to what you said about
14:03this decline of the Western dominance leading to a more level playing field, and some of your observations
14:11that drew to the conclusions that you made in the book, how much of this are you already seeing
14:16playing out right now? For example, we're seeing, you know, the Western grip on mainstream thought on
14:22issues like Israel and Palestine is already faltering, it's falling apart. So do you see some of these
14:28things, some of the theories that you make in the book already playing out?
14:35Yes, it is a bit too early. But let me see how I see the current situation in the world.
14:42Of course, I never argue in the book that the decline of the West will lead to perfect stability. No
14:48world order is free from conflict. The past world order that we call the liberal international order,
14:55which we credit to the United States, it was not really very good for the global south. You know,
15:03some like 98.98% of major conflicts in the world happened in the global south. Only Europe was saved.
15:16Now, so that for the Europeans and the United States did not know what it meant to have a major conflict.
15:25It was also in terms of economic benefit. Maybe East Asian countries benefited,
15:32but later China and India also benefited. But for the most part, the global south countries did not
15:39benefit from globalization. They were left behind. So no world order is perfectly stable, including the
15:48or perfectly peaceful. And the last world order, which is passing before our eyes, was not really all
15:57that benign to the global south. Now, what is happening now is we see changes. I mean, well, in some ways,
16:05Europe, for the first time since the World War Two, has a major war at the heart of Europe. And that's what
16:12President Trump and President Putin are trying to talk about in Alaska tomorrow. But it's something that
16:23is relatively new since the 1945. And we also see that the rise of the global south in not only China
16:33or India, but generally global south is doing much better. And it's not necessarily due to the
16:39benevolence of the west. The west sometimes has helped. But look, it has to do with also
16:47the rulers in the countries in the global south. You can say that those governments, despite the domestic
16:56failings, who have adopted wise policies, not wasted their resources, have actually done very well. And I
17:04would say that, you know, you will find that examples in Southeast Asia. Now, the agency for creating
17:15stability and prosperity in the global south is not a western, it actually belongs to the people and
17:21governments. They elect the government that have ruled this global south nations. So we see kind of
17:31a leveling of what some people call it reconvergence, because the global south countries, many of them
17:38are great empires in the past. I mean, whether you include China and global south or not, but certainly
17:46India, in Indonesia, in Malaysia, the past of politics of today's Malaysia, you will look at also
17:58Islamic world, very good example. They were very prosperous and powerful entities. So in some ways,
18:06they are reasserting themselves. And we'll find also examples in South America and Africans. So there is
18:13a reconversion, meaning that the global south is actually catching up after hundreds of years of
18:20being left behind and part due to colonialism and imperialism. Another thing I see is that the global
18:29south is more assertive diplomatically as well. And we don't hear about it very much in the media,
18:37in the Western media. But a lot of countries in the Middle East, and of course, China and East Asia,
18:45middle powers like Indonesia, Korea, they have been playing a very important role. Regional institutions
18:52like ASEAN, African Union, they are also playing an increasingly important role in regional conflict
18:58management. And not always with a great deal of success, but they're nonetheless very important.
19:04Without their role, things will be a lot worse. So again, you see another major change where the
19:13structure of global cooperation, conflict management is changing. Globalization is changing. It's not going
19:19to be driven by the West for the last few hundred years, but maybe more by the East, including a country
19:26like China and India. Globalization is not disappearing. It's just taking a new form or returning to a form
19:33that used to be there before the rise of the West, when China and India were the leading economies of
19:38the world. So all this I see as changes that are very inevitable in some ways. Even if you don't like
19:47it, there's not much you can do about it. They're part of the historical safes in power and wealth.
19:56But why not we embrace it? Why we resist it? So the problem with the West is that the West is
20:03moving from a very privileged position to a relative decline. The West is not going to disappear.
20:09It will remain important. But West is fractured because of the United States policies of Trump,
20:15basically, you know, imposing sanctions on its most important allies, or trade tariffs on allies like
20:23Canada and European Union, although less so now. But still, Trump is also threatening to withdraw from
20:33NATO or reduce its commitment to NATO unless they do certain things to his liking. So the West as a
20:39singular entity, the transatlantic idea of the West is fractured. So what we see, therefore, a number of
20:48shifts that are happening that are actually consistent with what I see the long pattern of global history,
20:55where the majority of the countries living outside the West actually played an important role in shaping
21:02world order. And I cannot predict the future. Nobody can. But I generally think this process of the order
21:12shift in the world is inevitable. And the idea that I present is that instead of challenging it,
21:20being afraid of it, as many people in the West feel, they think that the end of the American-led world order means the
21:27collapse of world order as a whole. And therefore, we should resist it, or we should deny it. Instead of doing that, let's
21:35embrace it. And there are opportunities one can find in this shift to build a more inclusive, more just world.
21:44We can't predict the future, but the least we can do is to better prepare ourselves for what's to come. So perhaps some
21:52final words, what do you think is one lesson that states in Southeast Asia can take away from this, can better
22:00prepare for the uncertain future, whether within or beyond the ASEAN framework?
22:05Yes, Southeast Asia is in the crossroads of civilizations. It's actually, in some ways, a microcosm, what I call a
22:14multiplex world, multi-civilizational, no single dominant power member in ASEAN, very much connected to the rest of the
22:25world through trade, a flow of ideas, and connections, connectivity. So Southeast Asia is one of the
22:33most appropriate examples here we have about the multiplex world. But at the same time, Southeast
22:41Asian countries are also not great powers. There is no great power in Southeast Asia in the traditional
22:46sense, despite Indonesia being one of the leading countries and economies in the world. So Southeast
22:54Asia's strength lies in unity and cooperation. And that's what ASEAN has provided since 1967. So the
23:03most important thing Southeast Asia can do is to keep ASEAN going, keep it alive and well. Now,
23:10despite conflicts like what we have in Thailand and Cambodia, in the larger scheme of things,
23:15they're not big deals. But still, they can undermine ASEAN's unity and credibility. At the same time,
23:23while maintaining ASEAN unity, ASEAN should also maintain its what you call ASEAN centrality, playing
23:31a convener role in the Asia Pacific or Indo-Pacific, whatever you call it, and making sure that it
23:41doesn't take sides in the great power rivalry but engages all of them on an equal basis and gives them
23:48space to come to Southeast Asia and harness their help and cooperation to Southeast Asia's own benefit.
23:59So if Southeast Asia can maintain its unity and the principle of ASEAN centrality in the face of a
24:06rising great power tensions, I think that will be Southeast Asia's great contribution. I should also say
24:13that Southeast Asia is economically very open, but not politically very open. And that's something
24:20Southeast Asia should think of doing. I mean, Southeast Asia has all kinds of regimes from
24:26total dictatorships to democracies. But I think political openness is also important, especially when
24:33you get the will of the people to go with you to play a role in world affairs. So playing a role in
24:44global politics in the multiplex world order requires also domestic justice, domestic openness, and
24:51democracy. So I think Southeast Asia also should pay more attention to what the people want. And this is
24:59where it has kind of lagged behind despite its economic openness and diplomatic dynamism.
25:08We've just got a couple of minutes left briefly while we're on the topic of ASEAN. You talk about the
25:13rise of the Global South, the potential in the Global South, and we see blocks like BRICS Plus and ASEAN
25:21often framed as sort of an alternative formation to the West. But for the sake of argument, we can also see
25:28there are deeply embedded Western political and economic systems or institutions within these
25:36member states or how they operate in the global world, in the global stage. So how do you think
25:43these groupings, these alternative formations can truly be counter-hegemonic to the West?
25:48Yeah, the current world order is still very much kind of dominated by ideas and institutions developed
25:59or controlled by the West, if not developed in the West. But I think we see some changes happening. We
26:04see new forms of cooperation emerging and they're happening both at the global level, like the BRICS,
26:12but also at the regional level, the regional organizations. And slowly we see a
26:21rejection or at least a moving away from the very exclusively Western dominated
26:28ideas and institutions of world order. But it's still going to take a long time because we're talking
26:34about the last three to four hundred years of history. You can say that the turning point would
26:40have been the Portuguese arrival in India or the Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511. We have a
26:48long history of the rising West, dominant West. It's not going to be possible to unravel it overnight.
26:57But what we see is because the vast majority of the people and nations of the world live outside the West,
27:05because we have several dynamic nations and emerging powers in what we call the global South. And
27:12whether you include China or not, the global South is still kind of dynamic and rising. And because we
27:21have that, and because of the opportunities that we see have come from, you know, the kind of the
27:29fracturing of the idea of an overarching, cohesive, intellectually, racially superior West. And because
27:39of all these changes, we do have an opportunity, have a window to create a more open world order where
27:49more actors play a role. And that's what I call a multiplex world.
27:53Yeah, plenty more we'd like to discuss. But unfortunately, that's all the time that we
27:57have today on Awani Global. Thank you once again to Dr. Amita for joining us today.
28:02Thank you very much. And before we go, I want to show you the book, if people haven't seen the
28:07American cover. And I believe it's on sale in stores in KL. So you can go ahead and check it out.
28:14Thank you once again to Dr. Amita for joining us from Washington. That's all the time we have on Awani Global
28:18this week with me now. And we'll catch you at the time.
Be the first to comment