00:00The report is factual mostly, but in my opinion, there are certain areas which lends itself to a degree of ambiguity.
00:10Something that would have been explaining with the time frame as to what happened exactly at what stage,
00:18including the failure of both the engines.
00:21Neither of the two pilots would have had their hands on the fuel control switch.
00:27Both their hands would have been elsewhere.
00:31I am also a pilot. I also firmly believe that it would take a very deliberate act in the process of take-off,
00:39while you are involved in something else, to even think of putting any control switches off,
00:44which I don't think has happened in this case.
00:46I want to know your initial understanding of the report.
00:50You have been a pilot and have also worked in DGCA as a flight operating inspector.
00:59So, what is the initial understanding of the report?
01:03See, it's the duty and responsibility of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau
01:08to come out with the preliminary report, which they have within the 30-day stipulated period.
01:14The report is factual mostly, but in my opinion, there are certain areas which lends itself to a degree of ambiguity.
01:26Specifically, I would have liked to have seen something that would have been explaining with the time frame
01:34as to what happened exactly at what stage, including the failure of both the engines,
01:41including when this apparent conversation happened between the pilots, and when the Mayday call happened.
01:49That would have made the report a little bit more factual.
01:53It would have made it a little bit more clearer, and it would have lent itself lesser to this degree of ambiguity,
02:00which we are seeing at this point in time.
02:01What, in your expertise, could be the cause of engine-cule cut-off switches to move from run to cut-off within just one second?
02:13Could it be manual defect, electrical defect, or software malfunction?
02:19I would like to take a little bit of time on this, since I've flown the aircraft for 10 years,
02:23and I've got a lot of experience, about 4,500 hours, on the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.
02:32The mechanics of the take-off, if you look at it from a layman's point of view,
02:39there is one person who is flying, and another person who is monitoring.
02:44As per this preliminary report which has come out,
02:46it was the first officer who is seated on the right seat who is flying,
02:50and the pilot-in-command who is sitting on the left seat who is monitoring.
02:55So during a normal take-off,
02:57the moment the first officer, in this case who was a pilot flying,
03:03would have pressed the toga switches to start the take-off roll,
03:08he would take his hands off, and put his hands on the control column.
03:14And thereafterward, both his hands would be on the control column,
03:17and the pilot monitoring, in this case,
03:20would normally have his right hand on the thrust levers.
03:23The take-off appeared to be normal,
03:26and somewhere around, I would say about 40, 50-odd feet,
03:30there seemed to be a little bit of a yaw,
03:33based upon the video evidence that I have seen,
03:36which is probably indicative of the time at which the first engine had failed.
03:43Neither of the two pilots would have had their hands on the fuel control switch.
03:50Both their hands would have been elsewhere.
03:53The first officer, if he was a pilot flying,
03:57both his hands would have been on the control column on the right,
04:00and the pilot monitoring, in this case the pilot-in-command,
04:04would have been on the left, with his right hand on the thrust lever,
04:08which is distinct from where the fuel control switches are,
04:11and monitoring the take-off.
04:14I do not think anybody would have had his hands
04:20anywhere remotely close to the fuel control switches.
04:24And in any case, even if a single engine had failed,
04:29our normal standard operating procedure would indicate
04:32that you climb to a safe height of minimum of 400 feet,
04:37stabilize the aircraft, autopilot on,
04:39and only then you carry out memory items,
04:42which might involve securing a failed engine.
04:46You've just explained in detail about how the system works.
04:53But when we talk about human errors,
04:56in the report itself,
04:58there was a clear communication between the pilots
05:00on denying switching off the fuel cut-off switches.
05:06So is it safe to rule out pilot error during the accident?
05:10Because there has been a statement of our minister that has come,
05:14a civil aviation minister,
05:16and he has said that do not jump to conclusion
05:21based on pilots' conversation.
05:23How do you see the statement?
05:25My interpretation of the conversation would be something as follows.
05:29This is my interpretation.
05:31And logic.
05:31Let's imagine that I was the pilot flying
05:34and I suddenly find a loss of thrust of both engines.
05:39Or rather, I was a pilot monitoring
05:40and see that there is a loss of thrust in both engines.
05:44And I will ask,
05:46did you cut off to the other person?
05:48What does that imply?
05:49That I have not done anything myself.
05:51I am asking the other person.
05:53Right?
05:53And he replies, I have not.
05:56So what does this mean to you?
05:58Logically, it would see that
05:59neither of the two had anything to do with the fuel
06:01cut-off switches.
06:03So I would imagine that this event has happened
06:05without any pilot intervention
06:07on the fuel control switches.
06:09That's my interpretation.
06:11On the report,
06:12the Airline Pilot Association has also made a statement.
06:16They questioned the report.
06:19They said,
06:19the tone and the direction of investigation
06:21suggests a bias towards pilot error.
06:24We categorically reject this presumption
06:27and insist on a fair fact-based inquiry.
06:30See, that is the ALPA's responsibility.
06:33And naturally, they will stand up for the pilots.
06:36And I am also a pilot.
06:37I also firmly believe that it would take
06:40a very deliberate act
06:42in the process of take-off
06:44while you are involved in something else
06:46to even think of putting any control switches off,
06:50which I don't think has happened in this case.
06:52An event has happened.
06:53What is that event?
06:54That event has happened
06:55that both the engines have failed
06:57within a second of each other.
06:58And now,
06:59if you look at it from a pilot's viewpoint,
07:02if I have to switch off the fuel control switch,
07:05I have to first look for it
07:06because my attention is elsewhere.
07:08I have to identify it.
07:10I have to pick it up.
07:11It's a spring-loaded switch.
07:12Pick it up.
07:13Take it out from where it is engaged.
07:15And move it deliberately to the cut-off position.
07:18And then release it into its cut-off position.
07:21This takes time.
07:23Right?
07:23And then I have to do it with two switches.
07:26I don't think there is any commercial pilot in the world
07:28who can put off both the switches in one second.
07:31So now, just to elaborate a little bit
07:33upon this fuel control switch.
07:36When the fuel control switch is put to cut-off,
07:38or rather when it is put to run,
07:40as it was during this entire period from the start-up
07:43till that particular point in time
07:46in which apparently there is a loss of thrust
07:52and a cut-off of the fuel supply.
07:54There are a few things that happen.
07:56Once the fuel switches are moved to the run position,
07:59which happens at the start-up of the first engine,
08:03and then the start-up of the second engine,
08:05in which both the fuel switches are to run.
08:08Incidentally, the report also says that in the crashed site,
08:13both the fuel switches were found to be in the run position.
08:16Right?
08:17So now, once contact is made,
08:20a sequence of actions happens.
08:21There are certain micro switches
08:22which are embedded inside where the fuel control switches are.
08:26They send signals to different places.
08:28One is to the FADEC.
08:30The other is the software control,
08:31which controls the engines.
08:33And next is the fuel control switch,
08:35which switches on or switches off
08:37the fuel supply from the aircraft tanks into the engine.
08:42So where in these three positions
08:45or four positions a failure has occurred?
08:49Because in my opinion,
08:50I'm just a pilot in this,
08:52it is near impossible for it to have happened manually
08:56within one second of each other.
08:58You're taking your eyes off,
08:59you're not thinking about the take-off,
09:00and then you are manually putting it.
09:02It can't happen in one second,
09:04unless you're a fighter pilot,
09:06which I safe to presume that both of them were not.
09:10I do not think that anybody could have done that.
09:16Possibly the cause will have to be investigated further,
09:21for which the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board
09:23has the requisite support of all the experts available.
09:27The NTSB is there, Boeing is there,
09:29GE is there,
09:30whoever they want, whatever they want,
09:32all expertise is available to them.
09:34I'm sure they'll come out with the result.
09:36Lastly, now that the preliminary report is out,
09:40and after narrowing down the investigation,
09:44what is in your point of view
09:46the investigators must be focusing
09:48and viewing the further course of investigation
09:51as per the preliminary report?
09:54Okay.
09:55First is that the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau
09:59is a set of professionals.
10:01They know exactly what is to be done.
10:02They know the direction in which it is to be done.
10:05All that I find in the preliminary report
10:07is that that report itself
10:09lends itself to a degree of ambiguity,
10:12which is the result,
10:13and as a result of which
10:14you've got so many questions being asked.
10:16I'm sure that they are proceeding
10:18in the correct direction.
10:19I'm sure that they have the expertise available,
10:22and where they do not have the expertise themselves,
10:24they will seek expertise
10:25from the other domain experts.
10:27I'm sure that they can actually find some of whom
10:32so far%,
10:32and what I teach them to be done.
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