00:00So my question or what lends itself to ambiguity is, it is extremely unlikely that any of the pilots would have done this.
00:10Extremely unlikely.
00:11Theoretically, the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau should be having access to that and they should have been able to tell us very clearly
00:19as to what was the actual position of the switches in the cockpit at the time at which this transition has taken place.
00:28So I was sitting in Vienna when this particular accident had happened.
00:32My first thought was disbelief.
00:35What could have happened immediately after takeoff which has resulted in a complete loss of thrust?
00:42The preliminary report has already come out yesterday from the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau.
00:51And it is a 15-page report.
00:53It is fairly elaborate.
00:55But it is still a preliminary report.
00:56What, in my mind, the few points that I have is that, one, it is a bit ambiguous.
01:07The language which is used seems to be a little ambiguous as to what actually happened during the final stages of the aircraft
01:17after it got airborne till the time that it impacted upon the ground.
01:21The language which is lending itself to ambiguity is a statement made about the fuel control switches.
01:29Now, I am a Dreamliner pilot.
01:33I have flown the Dreamliner for 10 years.
01:35I have more than 4,700 odd hours in command on the Dreamliner.
01:39So I am familiar with the machine.
01:42I am familiar with the environment.
01:45The fuel control switch is the area of concern at this point in time as per the report.
01:54What the report says is that the fuel control switches have transitioned from run to cutoff.
02:03Now, whether this means that the physical movement of these fuel control switches has taken place or not is not clear at all.
02:13The enhanced and advanced flight data recorder would tell the position of all the switches in the cockpit.
02:22So, theoretically, the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau should be having access to that
02:29and they should have been able to tell us very clearly as to what was the actual position of the switches in the cockpit
02:35at the time at which this transition has taken place.
02:39As far as I am concerned, the pilots would have nothing to do with the fuel control switches during the takeoff.
02:50The only time at which the fuel control switches come into play is if, for example,
02:57there is an engine failure at or after V1 or at any stage immediately after takeoff,
03:04which results or an engine fire of a single engine,
03:10which results in the actions that would be involving the fuel control switch.
03:17These actions would only take place at a safe height of at least 400 feet
03:23once the aircraft is stabilized and the autopilot is on.
03:28So, these memory items would involve in what we call securing the engine,
03:34which in this case, let's take the case of engine failure,
03:39would involve putting the autothrottle arm switch off,
03:44identifying the correct thrust lever, confirming it from the other pilot,
03:50then bringing the thrust lever from its takeoff position to idle position,
03:55and then subsequently putting your hand on the fuel control switch,
04:01identifying it, confirming it with the other pilot,
04:05before putting it from run to cutoff.
04:07It's a very deliberate action. It's a very slow action.
04:11And the final action would be to pull the fire switch.
04:14So, all these actions would take place only at or after a minimum safe altitude of 400 feet,
04:21certainly not immediately after takeoff.
04:25So, my question, or what lends itself to ambiguity is,
04:31it is extremely unlikely that any of the pilots would have done this.
04:35Extremely unlikely.
04:37And that too, you're not talking about one switch, you're talking about both switches.
04:40And as per the report, both these switches have transitioned
04:44from run to cutoff within a period of one second.
04:48Now, even if you look at it from a pilot's perspective,
04:52if I have to put off a fuel control switch,
04:56I'm just saying normally,
04:58even if I do it at maximum speed,
05:01from a takeoff position, I will have to first look down,
05:05find out where that switch is,
05:07put my hand on that switch,
05:09lift it up because it's a spring-loaded switch,
05:12pick it up, move it to cutoff,
05:14and thereafterward release it.
05:18Thereafterward, I will have to follow the same procedure
05:20on the other fuel control switch,
05:24in which I have to identify it,
05:27pick it up, release the spring-loaded catch,
05:30move it to the cutoff position,
05:31and then release it again.
05:33This entire process certainly cannot be done within a second.
05:36So, my thinking is,
05:39perhaps you have to look at other aspects
05:40as to why these fuel control switches have transitioned
05:45into a cutoff position.
05:49Now, whenever the fuel control switch is put to run,
05:52which it is done when we first start the engine on the pushback,
05:56this fuel control switch is not touched at all
05:59until you switch off at the end of the flight.
06:01But whenever it is put from idle to run,
06:07or sorry, from cutoff to run,
06:09there are certain micro switches within the whole system itself
06:14which makes contacts, which control different things.
06:16Different signals are sent to the software,
06:19to the FADEC,
06:21to the systems which open up the fuel control valves
06:25of the engine, of this power fuel control valve,
06:29that means the valve which controls the fuel from your fuel tank
06:32to that particular engine.
06:34There are all different micro switches that are there
06:36which make contact when you move the fuel control switch
06:39from cutoff to on.
06:41Maybe these would have to be investigated in greater detail.
06:44I'm sure that the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau
06:47has all the necessary expertise.
06:50They have access to all the experts,
06:52the domain experts,
06:53the original equipment manufacturers.
06:55I'm sure they'll be able to find out exactly what went wrong.
06:57As far as I'm concerned,
06:59I think it is extremely, extremely remote
07:02that anyone during a process of takeoff
07:05takes his attention off the takeoff,
07:07looks down,
07:09finds the switch,
07:11puts it off,
07:12and then finds the other switch,
07:13again puts it off,
07:14and all within a period of one second.
07:16In my opinion, extremely unlikely.
07:18Also, the Pilot Association is raising the question on the FEM.
07:25They are also saying that,
07:27it is also being said that,
07:29the report has been leaked without authorization.
07:32What would you like to say?
07:33I have no comment on that
07:36because I am not aware of what is the procedure
07:39by which these reports are leaked,
07:41whether it's deliberate,
07:42whether it's not deliberate.
07:43As I understand,
07:44this report has been put up by the AIIB
07:46within the stipulated period of time of 30 days,
07:49and I think they've done that.
07:50Whether a preliminary report,
07:52somebody else had access,
07:54I would not be able to comment on that.
07:56And on Boeing,
07:58what's your reaction on the overall situation?
08:01What happened?
08:05My initial thinking is that,
08:07since like,
08:08for example,
08:09when this particular accident happened,
08:11I was sitting in Vienna.
08:13I had just taken off from Delhi to Vienna the previous day,
08:17and I was waiting in Vienna
08:18for the Dreamrunner flight from Delhi to Vienna to come,
08:21and then we would have taken that flight from Vienna to Washington.
08:24So I was sitting in Vienna
08:25when this particular accident had happened.
08:28My first thought was disbelief.
08:31What could have happened immediately after takeoff
08:34which has resulted in a complete loss of thrust?
08:38Please do remember that time,
08:40nobody knew what had happened.
08:41So there were different speculations going on.
08:43There were different theories going on.
08:45Somebody talked about flaps.
08:46Somebody talked about this.
08:47Somebody talked about that.
08:49Somebody said instead of retracting the gear,
08:50he raised the flaps.
08:52And all sorts of wild speculations were going on.
08:55My thinking is that if the preliminary report
08:59had shown something alarming or something dangerous,
09:04both the Accident Investigation Board Bureau of India,
09:09the DGCA,
09:11again in consultation with Boeing,
09:12and with the FAA of the US would have stopped all Dreamliner flights
09:18or stopped the combination of Dreamliner flights
09:21with this particular brand of engine,
09:23which is the GE engine.
09:24As you are aware,
09:25there are different engine manufacturers,
09:27GE, Trent, Rolls-Royce, etc.
09:28The fact that they didn't to us at that point in time,
09:33one month before,
09:34that is when the accident happened,
09:36indicated that maybe it's nothing to do with,
09:39it's nothing that is alarming
09:41or nothing that is dangerous enough
09:44for the regulatory authority to step in
09:47and say that it is dangerous to fly, stop flying.
09:50So, coming back to your question
09:53about what has possibly happened.
09:57Now, Boeing is the original equipment manufacturer
10:01of the Boeing 787.
10:03This aircraft is widely in service
10:05all across the world with many airlines.
10:08I have flown this aircraft for 10 years.
10:10I have found no problem with it.
10:12This aircraft has logged more than,
10:15I would say,
10:15about 4 million flying hours across the world
10:18in its 13, 14-odd years
10:21since the time it's been introduced.
10:23It's a very advanced aircraft.
10:25It's the most advanced aircraft
10:26that Boeing has in its fleet.
10:28And I'm sure that they have the expertise
10:30and they have the knowledge,
10:32they have the capability
10:33of knowing what is wrong with their equipment
10:36or what are the glitches in the equipment.
10:39If you put your mind back onto early days,
10:42there were certain teething problems
10:43that the Dreamliner had,
10:44primarily to deal with its lithium-ion batteries
10:47about overheating.
10:48But that was the initial glitches.
10:50It got sorted out.
10:51And it's been running without any problems
10:53for a fairly long period of time.
10:55So, I do not think that there is anything dramatic
10:59which would have caused
11:01either the regulator here in India
11:03or the regulator in the US
11:05or Boeing or the engine manufacturer
11:10to be alarmed and stop flying.
11:14So, it's up to the authorities
11:16to investigate what are the reasons
11:18why it's happened.
11:19My input to this would be that
11:21the flight data recorder
11:23has the position of all the switches
11:27in the cockpit.
11:28What is the position?
11:30Is it in run?
11:31Is it in cutoff?
11:32All this data is available
11:34from the DFDR.
11:36Enhanced airborne flight data recorder.
11:40So, all that they have to check
11:41to my mind is to say that
11:44at the point in time
11:45at which this fuel control switch
11:49has transitioned
11:50from run to cutoff,
11:53what was the physical position
11:55of what was the physical position?
11:55What was the physical position?
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