- 7 months ago
A look at Iran's rise to power in the Middle East and its challenge to the U.S. for influence in the region.
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00:00Transcription by CastingWords
00:30Tonight on Frontline
00:31Iran's active pursuit of weapons
00:32threatens the security of nations everywhere
00:35Diplomacy
00:35We squandered five years of time
00:38Every day when there is a problem
00:40the American has got a finger on it
00:41Or military action
00:43Threatens the Middle East
00:44Many of the people who argued
00:46to take the United States into Iraq
00:48are again beating the war drums
00:49Is Iran next?
00:51It would be the worst of all worlds
00:52for an outgoing administration
00:54to strike a conflict
00:55We will confront this danger
00:57before it is too late
00:58Tonight on Frontline
00:59Showdown with Iran
01:01a territory on 등
01:03of varsity
01:05and there is the situation
01:07between ellas and the two
01:07and the cavalry of the 팬
01:09and defense
01:10to act as a weights
01:11and to explain
01:12which is something that is
01:12more likely to turn
01:13than chciaifting
01:14later on
01:15thegring of everything
01:15during it is a positive
01:16In other diesenene
01:17UN très early
01:17International
01:18kamats
01:19The U.S.S.
01:49on patrol off Iran.
01:53America has dominated these waters for 50 years,
01:58ensuring the free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf.
02:02But to the east, Iran is rising.
02:06There's a combatante, Iranian patrol vessel,
02:10who is surveilling their areas adjacent to their territorial waters,
02:14and he has positioned himself about 10 miles away.
02:16He carries weapon systems that are a threat to the aircraft carrier.
02:28This year, Iran staged one of its largest military exercises ever,
02:34demanding its place on the world stage.
02:36Iran is a regional power.
02:42We can be the strongest in the Persian Gulf.
02:45The United States doesn't like this.
02:47It wants to see Iran weakened.
02:51It wants us to take orders from them.
02:53Iran wants to extend its influence across the Middle East.
03:02The Bush administration says not on its watch.
03:06We're sending clear messages to friends and adversaries alike.
03:10We'll keep the sea lanes open.
03:13And we'll stand with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons
03:17and dominating this region.
03:20Two days after Cheney's visit,
03:23Iran's president visited American allies in the Gulf
03:26and called on the U.S. to pack up and go home.
03:30Iran and the U.S. are now locked in a very dangerous game
03:34of each trying to appear harder than the other side
03:38and get the other side to blink first.
03:41But there is a threshold
03:42when this kind of an indirect game of cat and mouse
03:45will become an outright direct confrontation.
03:51Late this summer,
03:52Frontline traveled to Iran
03:54to learn the roots of the regime's new confidence
03:56and how it has found itself on a collision course
03:59with the Bush administration.
04:03Outside Friday prayers in downtown Tehran,
04:06a possible war with America
04:08was on everyone's minds.
04:30Inside,
04:31this week's official sermon,
04:33delivered by a leading Ayatollah,
04:35was about America and Iraq.
04:37It was about the price of the dollar.
04:39And whatever you brought to here,
04:42you will be more dangerous,
04:45the people of the world will be more bizarre,
04:47and the rest of you must be able to capture Iraq.
04:53That day,
04:54the same sermon was read
04:55in every town across the country.
05:00Anti-Americanism is one of the regime's
05:02founding principles.
05:03It's turned the former U.S. Embassy,
05:07where the hostages were seized back in 1979,
05:10into a kind of museum of grievance,
05:13recounting decades of U.S. meddling in Iran's affairs.
05:19In the main stairwell,
05:21a mural depicts the latest perceived grievance,
05:24America's actions in the Middle East since 9-11.
05:27The mural begins with Hollywood run by Jews who controlled Bin Laden,
05:36who worked with George Bush to attack America.
05:39Do you know any American or any Israeli who have been killed here in these buildings?
05:44The information that they have got is no American and no Jew were inside.
05:49If you have any information...
05:50It's a conspiracy theory Iran's current hardline government seems to encourage.
05:55There were thousands of Americans inside.
05:57But on 9-11 itself,
06:03Iran's reaction to the news was very different.
06:06Oh, my God.
06:06That just exploded.
06:08That looks like a second plane.
06:10Terrible.
06:11I think for the first couple of hours,
06:14everyone was in a state of shock,
06:16not knowing what was going on exactly.
06:18I mean,
06:19America was our enemy.
06:20Muhammad Ali Abtahi was Iran's vice president.
06:28But then,
06:29just a few hours later,
06:31President Khatami issued a statement condemning the attacks.
06:36It was a very important move for Iran.
06:45In North Tehran,
06:47thousands took to the streets to express sympathy with America.
06:50More importantly,
06:55Iran's supreme leader,
06:56Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
06:58also spoke out against the attacks.
07:00The attack was in Hiroshima and Nakhazaki,
07:06in Bosnia and Kozobo,
07:09or in New York and Washington.
07:12And that week at Friday prayers,
07:17the ritual death to America chants
07:19were dropped for the first time since the revolution.
07:26For Iran's leaders,
07:27it's important to have enemies.
07:31The reformists made great attempts to ban slogans
07:33that insulted the American people.
07:39Abtahi and the president,
07:41Mohammad Khatami,
07:42were leaders of Iran's reform movement,
07:44hoping to improve ties with America.
07:49Suspending the death to America chants
07:51was a political decision made at the highest level.
07:57Iran's change of tone was noticed in Washington
08:00as the Bush administration prepared to invade Afghanistan,
08:04Iran's neighbor.
08:05Iran initially,
08:06we had discussions with her right after 9-11.
08:09We made it very clear that
08:10although we would be kinetically involved in Afghanistan,
08:14that we bore no ill will to Iran.
08:16And the Iranians accepted this.
08:18So initially,
08:19things were on an even keel.
08:25On my orders,
08:26the United States military has begun strikes
08:29against al-Qaeda
08:31and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
08:34The U.S. accepted Iran's help in Afghanistan.
08:37Sunni extremists like al-Qaeda and the Taliban
08:41were also enemies of Iran's Shia regime.
08:46We shared a general view
08:48that stability in Afghanistan
08:49would very much benefit everybody.
08:52But the Iranians were not unhelpful,
08:54mostly by staying out of the way.
08:57Iran encouraged its allies,
08:59the Northern Alliance,
09:00to fight alongside U.S. special forces.
09:03Within weeks,
09:04the Taliban collapsed.
09:05This was Iran's first major effort
09:11to help the United States,
09:13to topple the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
09:15This would have been impossible
09:16without Iran's help.
09:21In fact,
09:22Hamid Karzai took charge in Kabul
09:24only after Iran had broken an impasse
09:26with the Northern Alliance.
09:28We've been negotiating with them
09:30for all these months,
09:31and it culminates with the Iranians
09:33basically telling the people
09:34that they had a relationship with
09:36to get out of the way
09:37for the pro-American Afghans
09:40to stand up and take control.
09:43The Iranians thought legitimately
09:45that they had done a tremendous amount
09:48to help us and to help Afghanistan.
09:50There was another side
09:52to U.S.-Iran relations.
09:54Their cooperation on Afghanistan was good,
09:56but I think it was,
09:57from my own view,
09:58it was somewhat lacking in other areas.
10:01U.S. officials believed
10:03senior al-Qaeda operatives,
10:05including bin Laden's son,
10:07had crossed the Afghan border
10:08into Iran
10:09and found safe haven in Tehran
10:12under the protection
10:13of hardliners in the regime.
10:14The fact is that the government authorities
10:17knew where they were.
10:18There's no question about that.
10:20And you were asking what?
10:21Turn them over.
10:23We like them.
10:24We wanted to get them.
10:25We wanted to question them.
10:27And the response was?
10:29There was no cooperation.
10:31There was a variety of responses,
10:33as I recall,
10:34from we don't have them
10:35to we don't know where they are,
10:38which we don't believe.
10:44The White House decided
10:47it couldn't trust Iran's government.
10:52Our second goal is to prevent regimes
10:54that sponsor terror
10:55from threatening America
10:58or our friends and allies
10:59with weapons of mass destruction.
11:03Iran aggressively pursues these weapons
11:06and exports terror,
11:07while an unelected few
11:09repress the Iranian people's hope
11:11for freedom.
11:12States like these
11:15and their terrorist allies
11:17constitute an axis of evil,
11:20arming to threaten
11:21the peace of the world.
11:28Iran's response was immediate
11:30and President Khatami
11:32was thrown on the defensive.
11:33The reformists felt undermined
11:44by Washington
11:45at a crucial time.
11:49The very least expectation
11:51we had at the height
11:52of our struggles
11:53for real reform
11:54was not to be branded
11:56like this.
11:59Politically,
11:59it was an odd thing to do.
12:01We helped overthrow
12:03the Taliban.
12:04Instead of opening a path
12:05for even greater cooperation,
12:07they turned to this slogan,
12:09the axis of evil,
12:11that was Mr. Bush's
12:12biggest strategic
12:13and political blunder.
12:14My personal reaction,
12:19I said,
12:20the American administration
12:22is the center
12:23of the evilism
12:24in the world.
12:26And I still believe that.
12:28Why?
12:29The center,
12:30because everywhere
12:31when there is a problem,
12:32everywhere
12:33when there is
12:34a chaos,
12:35everywhere
12:35when there is a war,
12:36the American
12:37has got a finger in it.
12:38Hamid Reza Asafi
12:43was Iran's spokesman
12:44at the time,
12:45adept at crafting
12:46the regime's
12:47anti-American rhetoric.
12:49He's now a senior diplomat.
12:51You see,
12:51there is one thing
12:53wrong with the Americans,
12:55especially this administration.
12:58They think
12:58they are responsible
13:00for every event
13:01in every part of the world.
13:04Nobody has given
13:06this responsibility
13:06to the American.
13:10We believe
13:11the world order
13:12must be changed.
13:17Hussain Shariat Madari
13:19is the editor of Kayhan,
13:21the newspaper
13:22that is the mouthpiece
13:23of the supreme leader himself.
13:26Ayatollah Khomeini
13:27never gives interviews
13:28to Western journalists.
13:30The editor is said
13:31to speak on his behalf.
13:34The supreme leader believes
13:37America doesn't want
13:39negotiations
13:40to solve the problems
13:41that exist between us.
13:43America wants negotiations
13:44just for the sake
13:46of negotiations.
13:52The official distrust
13:54of America
13:55extends to the conspiracy
13:57theories about 9-11.
14:00Frankly,
14:01we consider Al-Qaeda
14:02an American creation.
14:03So,
14:04did 9-11 take place
14:05to justify
14:06Mr. Bush's next moves?
14:08We believe
14:08it paved the way
14:09for the neocons
14:10to take the actions
14:11they did.
14:12Invade Afghanistan,
14:13invade Iraq,
14:14and invading Iran
14:16was in the works as well.
14:18In fact,
14:19behind closed doors
14:20in Washington,
14:21one of the arguments
14:22for invading Iraq
14:23was the possible impact
14:25on its neighbor,
14:26Iran.
14:26I think the idea
14:29in the minds
14:30of some
14:31who were so
14:31enthusiastic
14:33about the invasion
14:34of Iraq
14:35was twofold.
14:37One,
14:38that Iraq,
14:40which was much more
14:41kindly disposed
14:42to the United States,
14:43would give us
14:44the ability,
14:45should we want to,
14:45to be able to pressure
14:46Iran from the use
14:48of facilities,
14:49military facilities,
14:50in Iraq.
14:51Secondarily,
14:51and this is certainly
14:52the presence,
14:52few democracy
14:53in Iraq,
14:55would have a very
14:55positive effect
14:56on the other states.
14:57I heard the president
14:58say exactly that.
15:01If you went to war,
15:02overthrew Saddam,
15:03it would empower
15:04those in Tehran
15:06who really wanted
15:07to push for
15:08a different kind
15:09of political order.
15:11Flint Leverett,
15:12a senior director
15:13for Mideast Policy
15:14at the National Security
15:15Council,
15:16was skeptical.
15:18It was a nice idea,
15:20completely out of touch
15:21with the way that
15:22Iranian politics
15:23and society work
15:25and fundamentally rooted
15:27in ignorance
15:28about the region.
15:31A new regime
15:32in Iraq
15:34would serve
15:36as a dramatic
15:37and inspiring example
15:38of freedom
15:40for other nations
15:42in the region.
15:46While the administration
15:48made its case at home,
15:50in London,
15:51Iraqi opposition leaders
15:52in exile
15:53gathered to plan
15:54their nation's future.
15:56Many of them
15:56had close ties
15:57to Iran.
15:59During the week
16:00before the London
16:01opposition conference,
16:02which was the penultimate event
16:04during the run-up
16:05to the war,
16:06all the leading opposition
16:07figures met
16:08in Tehran
16:09in order to caucus
16:10their strategy.
16:12David Phillips
16:13was a State Department
16:14liaison
16:14to the Iraqi opposition.
16:16The fact that they went
16:17to Tehran
16:18to do that
16:19was revealing.
16:20And when it became
16:21time for Iraqis
16:23to designate
16:24an advisory council,
16:26none of those
16:27Iraqi Shia groups
16:28were prepared
16:28to put names
16:29on the table
16:30before they got on the phone
16:31to Tehran
16:32and cleared that.
16:33I think that was
16:34an important wake-up call,
16:36that a lot of these
16:37Iraqi Shia groups
16:38were much more beholden
16:40to Tehran
16:41than they were to us.
16:42All these people,
16:43the rulers of Iraq,
16:45they were living in Iran,
16:46we were supporting them,
16:48Mr. Talibani,
16:49Mr. Hakeem,
16:50all of them,
16:51all of them.
16:52The Iranian government
16:53thought it deserved
16:54to be consulted
16:54on Iraq's future.
16:56We believe
16:57the Americans
16:58should have acted
16:59from the beginning,
17:01listen to other people's
17:02advices,
17:03because the Americans
17:03are far from the region.
17:06They do not know
17:06the region.
17:07They do not know
17:08the delicacy
17:11of the region.
17:12Iran wanted more
17:14than George W. Bush,
17:16Saddam Hussein overthrown.
17:18That was absolutely
17:20100%.
17:21There was not
17:22an epsilon of doubt
17:24on Iran's side
17:25that Saddam has to go.
17:27Hushang Amirahmedi,
17:29a prominent Iranian-American
17:30often used
17:31as a back channel
17:32by both governments,
17:34says he was privy
17:35to a series
17:35of high-level meetings
17:36during the run-up
17:37to the war.
17:39One of the most important
17:40was between
17:41Zalmay Khalilzad,
17:42then at the National
17:43Security Council,
17:44and Javad Zarif,
17:47then Iran's
17:48UN ambassador.
17:49Dr. Zarif told
17:51Zalmay Khalilzad
17:53that, listen,
17:54you really need
17:55our help.
17:56Let us get in
17:57it with you,
17:58because after
17:59Saddam leaves,
18:00that place
18:01will be a mess.
18:03But
18:04after the mess
18:06is created by you,
18:07we will not get in.
18:08We will only be there
18:10with you
18:11if we are also
18:13part of the mess.
18:15They had a good sense
18:16of the competing tensions
18:17and the ethnic strife,
18:18sectarian strife,
18:20that did exist
18:21and was kept
18:22from boiling
18:22because of the lid
18:24of Saddam Hussein.
18:25That's what
18:26their concern was.
18:27They thought
18:27if they were in
18:30the partnership
18:32with the U.S.
18:34in overthrowing Saddam,
18:35U.S. then
18:36will have a hard time
18:37to extend that war
18:39into Iran.
18:41As American forces
18:42massed in the region,
18:44the administration
18:44was confident
18:45it didn't need Iran.
18:48There was a sense
18:49that Iran was going
18:49to be the big loser
18:50in this game.
18:51They were going
18:52to be surrounded.
18:54If things had
18:55gotten better in Iraq,
18:56if Iraq had been
18:57the Bush administration's
18:58version of success,
18:59then, yeah,
18:59I think there would have been.
19:00I think Iran was next.
19:02Iran could only watch
19:17as the U.S. military
19:18crushed Saddam's forces
19:19in a few weeks.
19:21The same Iraqi army
19:22Iran once fought
19:23for eight years
19:24to a stalemate.
19:27On April 9th,
19:28when that statue
19:29of Saddam Hussein
19:30came down,
19:31the world
19:32thought George Bush
19:34was brilliant.
19:36Remember that day?
19:37Nobody was complaining.
19:41The mode in Tehran
19:43was a fearful mode,
19:47a frightening mode.
19:49The Iranian government
19:50had almost 100%
19:52come to the conclusion
19:52that after Iraq,
19:54it is their turn.
19:55and they wanted
19:58to prevent that
19:59at any price.
20:04A few weeks
20:05after the invasion,
20:07a strange document
20:08arrived in Washington.
20:09It laid out the terms
20:11for a grand bargain,
20:13in essence,
20:14a peace treaty
20:15between Iran
20:16and the United States.
20:19But it came
20:20as a fax
20:20from a Swiss ambassador
20:22in Tehran
20:22on plain paper.
20:24There are many reasons
20:25why it came
20:26through the channels
20:26that it did.
20:27We forget
20:28that this offer
20:29came after Iran
20:31made its boldest
20:32cooperation
20:33with the United States
20:34over Afghanistan
20:34only to be
20:36put on the
20:37access of evil
20:38list afterwards.
20:39Iran's reformists
20:40were again
20:41trying to reach out
20:42to Washington,
20:43as they had
20:44after 9-11.
20:45So as the Khatami government,
20:48the reformist government,
20:49is making one last effort
20:50to make a pitch
20:52to the U.S.,
20:53it is running a risk.
20:55And I assumed
20:56that their hope
20:56was that the U.S.
20:57would test the proposal
20:58by coming back,
21:00which then would have
21:01made a signal
21:03to the Iranian leadership
21:04that the U.S.
21:05was interested.
21:07The reformists
21:08put everything
21:09on the table.
21:10Iran's support
21:11for terrorism,
21:12its nuclear program,
21:14even its hostility
21:15towards Israel.
21:17In exchange,
21:18they asked Washington
21:19for security guarantees,
21:20an end to sanctions
21:22and a promise
21:23never to push
21:24for regime change.
21:26We were at the height
21:27of our apparent power
21:28in the region.
21:30The president of Iran
21:31was not Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
21:33but Mohammed Khatami.
21:36Iraq had not yet
21:38fallen apart.
21:40It was exactly
21:41the time
21:43for the United States
21:44to take up this offer
21:46and strike a deal.
21:49I've seen Flint Leverett,
21:50a man for whom
21:51I've had a lot of respect.
21:54I must say
21:55that speaking for me
21:56and most of my colleagues
21:58at the State Department,
21:58we didn't see it that way,
21:59and I don't think
22:00many others did
22:01at the time
22:03because it didn't fit
22:04with some of the other things,
22:05as I say,
22:06that we've been hearing
22:06from Iran.
22:09The State Department
22:10thought the reformists
22:11were politically weak
22:12and promising
22:13more than they could deliver.
22:14The White House,
22:18newly victorious in Iraq,
22:20saw no need
22:21to negotiate with Iran.
22:25The grand bargain facts
22:27never received a reply.
22:33In Tehran,
22:34sources confirmed
22:35that the Supreme Leader
22:36had in fact given
22:37the proposal
22:38his tacit blessing.
22:40A senior diplomat
22:41connected to his family
22:43even helped draft it.
22:44But today,
22:46the leader's confidant
22:47denies everything.
22:49I'm sure the Supreme Leader
22:51had nothing to do with it.
22:52Whoever wrote that letter
22:53was in no position
22:54to do so.
22:58Iran's reformists
23:00were humiliated.
23:01Their days in power
23:03numbered.
23:04And they don't talk
23:05about the grand bargain
23:06anymore.
23:07What is certain
23:12is that it didn't
23:13get anywhere
23:13and that case
23:14is now closed.
23:23The hardliners
23:24now had the upper hand.
23:29The Supreme Leader,
23:30Ayatollah Khamenei,
23:32concluded the reform era
23:33was dead
23:33and blessed
23:36a new president.
23:41It was very clear
23:42that the reformists
23:43were not going
23:43to deliver Washington.
23:45Their cooperation
23:46in Afghanistan
23:47failed.
23:48Their offer
23:48of a peace treaty
23:49in 2003
23:50was rejected.
23:52And the assumption
23:53was that
23:54the hardliners
23:55would do a better job.
23:56And that's,
23:57many argue,
23:57is why the Supreme Leader
23:59threw his support
24:00to Ahmadinejad.
24:03Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
24:04was a former
24:05revolutionary guard
24:06connected to
24:07the security establishment.
24:09A fiery populist
24:10determined to assert
24:11Iran's influence
24:12across the Middle East.
24:19I don't want to say
24:20that I agree
24:21with everything
24:21Ahmadinejad says,
24:23with every word
24:24he uses.
24:27But his politics
24:28have been successful
24:29against the bullying
24:30and power plays
24:31of the United States.
24:34Mr. Bush
24:35pays attention
24:36only to the language
24:37of force.
24:41Hamid Haji Babaei
24:42is one of the senior
24:44hardliners in Parliament.
24:46Like many of his generation,
24:47he is a veteran
24:48of the Iran-Iraq war
24:49in which a million
24:51Iranians were killed
24:52or wounded.
24:53If the U.S.
24:57had removed Saddam
24:58and put the Iraqi people
25:00in power of their government,
25:01we would have applauded
25:02the Americans.
25:04We would have thanked them
25:05and been grateful.
25:06But the United States
25:08didn't come to Iraq
25:09for the sake
25:09of the Iraqi people.
25:11They came because
25:12Iraq is tucked
25:13in the Muslim belt
25:14of nations.
25:16They came to establish
25:17a presence
25:17in the region.
25:23Within Iraq,
25:25Iran boosted
25:25its support
25:26for Shia militias
25:27fighting the American
25:28occupation.
25:31The Americans,
25:32again,
25:32they made a mistake.
25:33They said they toppled
25:34Saddam Hussein,
25:35that is tantamount,
25:37to win the heart
25:38of the Iraqi people.
25:39That was their mistake.
25:41And they continue
25:42to do that.
25:43They continue.
25:43OK, then you have
25:44toppled the regime.
25:45With Saddam's removal,
25:50Iran opened its border.
25:52Iranian pilgrims
25:53flooded into southern Iraq.
26:02They came by the millions
26:04to the holiest shrines
26:05of the Shia religion.
26:09This was the start
26:11of a Shia awakening
26:12Washington never anticipated.
26:14We thought of Iran
26:17and Iraq
26:18in nation-state terms.
26:20They're Arab.
26:21These guys are Iranian.
26:23They fought a war.
26:23They should hate
26:24one another.
26:27We just didn't understand
26:29how much southern Iraq
26:30has changed.
26:31So when we took
26:32the lid off,
26:33Iran not only had
26:34better intelligence
26:35about Iraq,
26:36not only had better
26:37connections
26:37with the militias
26:39or the militias-to-be
26:40and with the leaders,
26:41but it had the goodwill
26:44of southern Iraq.
26:46When Iraq held
26:47its first free elections,
26:49Iran helped get out
26:50the vote
26:50and saw its long-time allies
26:52take power in Baghdad.
26:55I was somewhat flummoxed
26:57by the description
26:57of Prime Minister
26:58al-Maliki
26:59as being a good man
27:00and a great leader.
27:01He may be,
27:01but I would have been
27:02much more suspicious
27:03of the long-term nature
27:05of his involvement
27:06with Iran.
27:08This is the first
27:09Shia Arab government
27:11in history,
27:13ever.
27:13And Iraq is not
27:15a backwater country.
27:16In historical memory
27:17of Muslims,
27:18it's where the battle
27:19between Shias and Sunnis
27:20was settled.
27:22Now for the Shiites
27:23to reverse this domination,
27:26to take over
27:26an Arab state
27:27and a key Arab state,
27:29has enormous amount
27:31of religious
27:32and political implications
27:34for the Arab world.
27:35Iran has an impact
27:39in the Shiites,
27:40no matter what they have,
27:41they have a lot of people.
27:42And the Shiites
27:43are in about 65%
27:46of the Shiites.
27:49And the Shiites
27:51in all countries
27:52have a huge number.
27:54And the Shiites
27:54always have Iran.
27:57U.S. allies
27:59like Egypt,
28:00Bahrain
28:00and Saudi Arabia,
28:02many with large
28:03Shia minorities
28:04of their own,
28:04worried the Shia revival
28:06could spread.
28:08Some of them
28:08began privately
28:09supporting Sunni insurgents
28:11who targeted
28:12Iraq's Shia population.
28:20Then in February 2006,
28:23Sunni terrorists
28:24from Al-Qaeda
28:25destroyed one of the
28:26holiest sites
28:27in the Shia religion,
28:29the Alaskaria shrine
28:30in Samarra.
28:35What are all these
28:36explosions for?
28:39In Samarra,
28:39the security
28:40was in the hands
28:41of the U.S.
28:41Shia militias.
28:44Are the Americans
28:45powerless?
28:46Or do they want
28:47these conflicts
28:47to exist?
28:52Shia militias,
28:53many funded by Iran,
28:55struck bad.
28:58Sectarian violence
28:59exploded.
28:59In Iran,
29:08we found Iraqi Shia
29:09who'd fled the violence.
29:11The Iraqi people had great potential,
29:38which was trampled
29:39by the boots of Saddam.
29:42This huge potential
29:43was released.
29:44And once released,
29:46it didn't go toward America.
29:48It came to us.
29:50Historically,
29:51no one in the Middle East,
29:53although they may
29:53like or dislike
29:55our policies quite a bit,
29:56no one has ever
29:57accused us
29:57of being incompetent.
29:59And for the first time,
30:01there was a question
30:02of competency.
30:04And this is a very
30:05frustrating feeling,
30:07I think,
30:08for our friends
30:09in the Middle East.
30:12In Israel,
30:13Iran's rise
30:14was viewed with alarm.
30:16They certainly
30:17can draw satisfaction
30:18that the course
30:19of history
30:20has played
30:21into their hands.
30:23Uzi Arad
30:24was chief of intelligence
30:25for Mossad
30:26and says Israel's
30:28greatest threat
30:29comes from
30:30a resurgent Iran.
30:31The weakening
30:32of the American position
30:33is also
30:34much to
30:35their benefit.
30:37Even the
30:37unconvincing
30:39Israeli military
30:40performance
30:40in Lebanon
30:41is also playing
30:42into their hands.
30:47Israel's war
30:48in Lebanon
30:48last year
30:49was meant
30:50to destroy
30:50Hezbollah,
30:51an extremist
30:52Shia group
30:53nurtured
30:53and armed
30:54by Iran.
30:55The Islamic
30:59revolution
31:00was an example
31:00for Hezbollah
31:01and thanks
31:02to our model,
31:03Hezbollah's
31:04been transformed
31:04into a major
31:05force across
31:06the region.
31:09When Hezbollah
31:10survived,
31:11it was also
31:12seen as a victory
31:12for Iran.
31:15A new era
31:16has begun
31:16and great things
31:17are in store.
31:19The new
31:20Middle East
31:20that Mr. Bush
31:21is talking about
31:22is something
31:23we also believe in,
31:24but it's based
31:25on Islam.
31:30Iran is playing
31:31a highly risky
31:32game of
31:34encouraging violence
31:35and supporting
31:36terrorists.
31:37And all this
31:38when they are
31:38relatively inferior
31:40on account
31:41of the fact
31:42that they do not
31:43have nuclear weapons.
31:44Just think about
31:45the transformation
31:46that would occur
31:47in Iranian's
31:48sense of confidence
31:49and real capability
31:51to operate
31:51if they feel
31:52that they are
31:53capable of
31:54deterring the
31:55United States
31:55from doing
31:56anything against
31:57them.
31:58The new
31:59American policy
31:59is to contain
32:00Iran.
32:02This year,
32:03President Bush
32:04ordered two
32:04carrier strike groups
32:05into the Persian Gulf,
32:07the biggest show
32:08of force since
32:09the Iraq invasion.
32:13This is probably
32:14the most dangerous
32:15four and a half acres
32:16on the earth.
32:19The proverbial
32:20800-pound gorilla,
32:22you know he's
32:23in the room.
32:23So Nimitz,
32:251,100 feet
32:26of American
32:27diplomacy
32:27is here.
32:29And all the
32:30countries in the
32:31region know
32:31that we're here.
32:33While the U.S.
32:34sent this message,
32:35it was also fighting
32:36a different battle
32:37with Iran
32:37on the ground
32:38in Iraq.
32:41Iran is providing
32:42material support
32:43for attacks
32:44on American troops.
32:46We will disrupt
32:46the attacks
32:47on our forces
32:47and we will seek
32:49out and destroy
32:49the networks
32:50providing advanced
32:51weaponry and training
32:52to our enemies
32:53in Iraq.
32:54Since the
32:55insurgency began,
32:57roadside bombs
32:58have been the biggest
32:59threat to U.S. troops.
33:03Washington says
33:04Iran is supplying
33:05Shia extremists
33:06with advanced
33:07explosives that cut
33:08through American
33:09armor.
33:13The Iranians
33:13began to send
33:14weapons into Iraq
33:15probably to make
33:16sure that the
33:16Americans understood
33:17Iran's capabilities
33:18in Iraq,
33:19the capability
33:20of creating
33:21a lot more havoc
33:22than the United
33:23States is currently
33:24confronting in Iraq.
33:26The U.S. military
33:27says the advanced
33:28roadside bombs,
33:29known as EFPs,
33:31explosively formed
33:32penetrators,
33:34now account for
33:35almost 20% of all
33:36U.S. combat deaths
33:37in Iraq.
33:39Washington said
33:40the operation
33:41was being run
33:41by the Quds Force,
33:43the elite foreign
33:44operations branch
33:45of Iran's
33:45Revolutionary Guards.
33:47I can't say it
33:48more plainly.
33:50There are weapons
33:51in Iraq that are
33:52harming U.S. troops
33:54because of the Quds Force.
33:56The President
33:59authorized strikes
34:00against
34:00Quds Force operatives.
34:03In January,
34:04U.S. special forces
34:05raided an Iranian
34:06government office
34:07in northern Iraq.
34:10The United States
34:11was trying to send
34:11a strong message.
34:12We know you're
34:13operating here.
34:13We're going to go
34:14after your agents.
34:15He was looking for
34:16the deputy national
34:17security advisor
34:18and another senior
34:19Revolutionary Guard
34:19official.
34:21The two of them
34:21escaped,
34:22and instead the United
34:23States got five
34:24mid-level
34:25Revolutionary Guard
34:26and Iranian operatives.
34:29This May,
34:30U.S. and Iranian
34:31diplomats crossed paths
34:33at a regional conference
34:34on stabilizing Iraq.
34:37Iran sent its
34:38foreign minister,
34:39who has relatively
34:40little power.
34:42Walking behind him
34:43was the man
34:43considered the real
34:44authority,
34:45a man the U.S.
34:48had just tried
34:49to capture
34:49in northern Iraq.
34:51Mohammed Jafari,
34:54a senior commander
34:55of the Khots force,
34:56accused of orchestrating
34:57attacks on U.S.
34:59troops in Iraq.
35:00Oh, there's a great
35:01irony that in the
35:02weeks after this,
35:04the raid designed
35:05to capture him,
35:06he shows up
35:06at an international
35:07meeting attended
35:08by Condoleez Rice
35:09in Sharm el-Sheikh,
35:10Egypt, to talk
35:11about Iraqi stability.
35:13It tells you that
35:14Mohammed Jafari
35:15is a player,
35:16and his capture
35:17would have been
35:18a real blow to Iran.
35:21After weeks
35:22of requests,
35:23Jafari sat down
35:24with Frontline
35:25in Tehran
35:26in his first
35:27television interview.
35:29He brushed off
35:30the U.S.
35:30attempt to capture him.
35:35It wasn't a big deal
35:37from our perspective.
35:39Jafari is one
35:40of the architects
35:40of Iran's policy
35:42in Iraq,
35:42and what he really
35:43wanted to talk about
35:44was the role
35:45of America's
35:46Sunni allies.
35:4770% of the terrorists
35:50captured in Iraq
35:51are from an Arab
35:52country that is a
35:53friend of the United
35:54States.
35:56To this day,
35:57not one Iranian
35:59terrorist has been
36:00captured.
36:01Not one suicide
36:02bomber has been
36:03Shia.
36:05But the propaganda
36:06is all directed
36:07against Iran.
36:10Why?
36:10Jafari rejected
36:14Washington's charge
36:15that Iran
36:16is supplying
36:17Shia extremists.
36:18We are not helping
36:23any group
36:23that is causing
36:24problems in Iraq.
36:25Our policy
36:26has been very clear.
36:28Anti-occupation,
36:29anti-violence.
36:31That's our policy.
36:35What about the
36:37specific accusations
36:39that they have made
36:40about the explosively
36:41formed projectiles?
36:43The questions
36:47were supposed
36:48to be about
36:48the role of Shia
36:49in the region.
36:51Abandon this
36:52line of questioning.
36:56At that
36:57regional conference,
36:59Jafari and
36:59the Iran delegation
37:00witnessed an
37:01historic American
37:02overture by
37:03Secretary of State
37:04Condoleezza Rice.
37:05If Iran
37:06is prepared
37:07to accept
37:09the obligations
37:10that have been
37:11placed upon it
37:12by the
37:12international community,
37:13we are prepared,
37:14the United States,
37:15to change
37:1727 years
37:18of policy
37:19and engage
37:21with Iran
37:21on a broad range
37:23of issues,
37:24whatever is
37:24on anybody's mind.
37:26The Americans
37:27came there
37:27almost like
37:29a supplicant.
37:30They had
37:31the proud
37:31Secretary of State
37:32of the United States
37:33accommodating
37:34what it
37:36would not have
37:37accommodated
37:38in the past.
37:39So it is very much
37:40the Iranians
37:41on their terms
37:42who are
37:42dictating
37:43some of
37:43the approach
37:45to the United States.
37:50We met briefly,
37:51less than a minute.
37:53A representative
37:54of Iran
37:55met a representative
37:56from the United States.
37:58And we set
37:59a time
38:00for talks
38:00in Baghdad.
38:01Jafri wanted to talk
38:06about one of Iran's
38:07key demands
38:08at those talks,
38:09that the U.S.
38:10stop supporting
38:11an Iranian opposition
38:12group based in Iraq
38:13known as the
38:14Mujahideen-a-Halk,
38:16or M.E.K.
38:17The U.S.
38:23gets its intelligence
38:24about Iran's
38:24role in Iraq
38:25from two sources,
38:27Saddam's old spies
38:28and the
38:29Mujahideen-a-Khal,
38:30a group even
38:31the U.S.
38:32government says
38:33are terrorists.
38:35But unfortunately,
38:36over the past
38:37four years,
38:38the United States
38:39has put them
38:40under its protection
38:40in Iraq
38:41and has used
38:43them to spy
38:44on Iran.
38:47During the 1980s,
38:49M.E.K.
38:49forces like these
38:50were essentially
38:51part of Saddam's
38:52military,
38:54Iranians who
38:55fought against
38:55their own country
38:56in the Iran-Iraq
38:57war.
38:59Self-styled
39:00Islamic Marxists,
39:02the M.E.K.
39:03had also targeted
39:04Americans in the
39:0570s,
39:05and the State
39:06Department considers
39:07it a terrorist
39:08group.
39:10I actually
39:10served in Iran.
39:12I lived there
39:12for a year,
39:13and it was
39:14during that time
39:15that our
39:15people were killed
39:17by the M.E.K.,
39:18assassinated.
39:19U.S. citizens?
39:20Yes.
39:20So from my point
39:21of view,
39:22they were terrorists.
39:25In 1981,
39:27the M.E.K.
39:27tried to assassinate
39:28the present
39:29supreme leader,
39:30Ali Khomeini,
39:31with a bomb,
39:32disabling
39:33his right arm.
39:36In Tehran,
39:37the government
39:37took us to meet
39:38families of other
39:39victims of M.E.K.
39:40violence and
39:41assassination.
39:43It was members
39:55of the Mujahideen
39:56Khalq
39:57who first
39:58strapped themselves
39:59with explosives
39:59and blew themselves
40:01up among
40:01civilians,
40:03killing our people
40:05and our officials.
40:10Unfortunately,
40:11the West
40:11did not condemn them.
40:13Terrorists,
40:14just 200 meters
40:16from where we are sitting,
40:18assassinated the president
40:19and prime minister
40:20at the same time.
40:21in a moment.
40:24This is the M.E.K.
40:28based near Baghdad.
40:30After the Iraq invasion,
40:32they were disarmed,
40:33but remained
40:34under the protection
40:35of U.S. forces.
40:36After the invasion,
40:38there were some
40:39in the administration
40:40who wanted to use
40:41the Mujahideen
40:43as a pressure point
40:46against Iran.
40:49The M.E.K.
40:50had given intelligence
40:51on Iran to us
40:53and that they
40:54might have capabilities
40:55in Iran
40:56of a covert nature.
40:57The M.E.K.
41:00remains a potent force
41:01with thousands
41:02of followers.
41:04And rallies
41:04like this one
41:05at its base in Iraq
41:07infuriate Iran.
41:13We have solid evidence
41:14that this group
41:15is providing intelligence
41:16to U.S. forces.
41:18We gave this evidence
41:19to the Americans
41:20and asked,
41:21why?
41:22This is a terrorist group.
41:24Why are you
41:24working with them?
41:25Why are they being used
41:26as a source?
41:29In Baghdad this summer,
41:31Iran raised the M.E.K.
41:33issue repeatedly
41:34with U.S. diplomats.
41:36America's Iran policy
41:37is overseen
41:38by Undersecretary of State
41:40Nicholas Burns.
41:42Is the U.S. using the M.E.K.
41:44for any intelligence gathering
41:45for any other purposes?
41:47I would not comment
41:49in any way, shape, or form
41:50in that question
41:50except to say
41:51that our policy
41:52towards the M.E.K.
41:53of many years
41:53has not changed.
41:55The Mujahideen
41:55had the experience
41:56of 30 years
41:58of fighting
41:59and countering
42:01this religious
42:02Islamic extremism.
42:04Ali Reza Jafrazadeh
42:06was associated
42:07with an M.E.K.
42:07front organization
42:08in Washington.
42:10He says
42:10they are supplying
42:11intelligence to the U.S.,
42:13including on Iran's
42:15covert nuclear program
42:16and Iranian operations
42:17in Iraq.
42:19The United States
42:20authorities there
42:21have been provided
42:23with extensive,
42:25very, very valuable,
42:28actionable information
42:30about the Iran regime's
42:32operations in Iraq,
42:34information that has resulted
42:36in saving the lives
42:38of the Americans.
42:40But at the talks
42:41in Baghdad,
42:42both the M.E.K. issue
42:44and Iran's alleged
42:45arming of Shia militias
42:46are sticking points.
42:48And since August,
42:49the negotiations
42:50have been effectively stalled.
42:53We're locked in
42:57to a situation
42:58of no forward movement
43:00in U.S.-Iran relations
43:02and at the same time
43:03increasing animosity
43:04being produced
43:05by these low-level
43:06confrontations.
43:08And then, you know,
43:08sort of the looming
43:09confrontation
43:10over the nuclear issue
43:11which rests on the horizon.
43:14And Iran's active
43:15pursuit of technology
43:16that could lead
43:18to nuclear weapons
43:19threatens to put a region
43:22already known
43:23for instability
43:23and violence
43:24under the shadow
43:26of a nuclear holocaust.
43:28In August,
43:30President Bush
43:30once again
43:31raised the stakes
43:32on the nuclear issue.
43:34We will confront
43:35this danger
43:36before it is too late.
43:40I don't know
43:40what the president
43:41will do between now
43:42and the end
43:43of the administration.
43:45He has said repeatedly
43:47that it is unacceptable
43:48for Iran to have
43:49nuclear weapons.
43:51And if he means
43:51unacceptable,
43:53then I assume
43:54he would take
43:55military action
43:55if he had to.
43:57Conservatives like
43:58former U.N.
43:59Ambassador John Bolton
44:00have been critical
44:01of the State Department's
44:02continuing reliance
44:04on U.N. sanctions
44:05and diplomacy
44:06led by the European allies.
44:09I think that
44:10is a failed policy
44:11that we squandered
44:12for almost five years
44:14of time
44:15while the Iranians
44:17played the Europeans
44:18like playing a fish,
44:21allowing the negotiations
44:22to go on
44:23all the while
44:24working as hard
44:25as they could
44:26to perfect
44:26the scientific
44:27and technological
44:28capabilities
44:29that they needed.
44:33There is a sense
44:34the drumbeat is rolling,
44:37that many of the people
44:38who argued
44:39to take the United States
44:40into Iraq
44:41are again
44:42beating the war drums.
44:44I think there's
44:46a basic feeling
44:46within the administration
44:47that they don't trust
44:48the Democrats
44:49to be able
44:50to be tough enough
44:50on Iran.
44:53I think it is
44:54in our interest
44:55to have the clerical elite
44:57believe that George W. Bush,
44:59yes, he could,
44:59in fact,
45:00bomb those facilities.
45:03I think it is possible
45:04that George W. Bush,
45:05before he leaves office,
45:06could look at this situation
45:08and say,
45:08do I want to be the president
45:10that has allowed
45:10the clerical regime
45:13in Tehran
45:13to get nuclear weaponry?
45:15I think he could say,
45:16no, I don't.
45:18While different
45:19military scenarios
45:20are being discussed
45:21behind closed doors
45:22in Washington,
45:24almost all
45:24would involve
45:25airstrikes,
45:26whether against
45:27Revolutionary Guard
45:28training camps
45:29or the regime's
45:30nuclear facilities.
45:32If this happens,
45:34it's going to be
45:35a series
45:36of very sophisticated
45:37air and cruise missile strikes.
45:40It will probably be
45:42a lot more decisive
45:44than the Iranians
45:45expect,
45:47and it will be
45:47backed by
45:48a re-strike capability,
45:50which means that
45:51once you start
45:52this process,
45:53you don't stop.
45:56I hope the Iranians
45:57understand that.
46:01Strikes on underground targets
46:03could involve weapons
46:04that are still classified.
46:05People talk about
46:08this largely
46:10in terms of,
46:11gee,
46:11it's really hard
46:12to hit underground targets.
46:15But what you think
46:16is hard,
46:16based on the technology
46:18the U.S. had in 1990,
46:20may not be hard at all
46:22in terms of systems
46:23we've never discussed
46:24publicly today.
46:25I think what you need
46:33to do is break
46:33the nuclear fuel cycle
46:35at one or more points.
46:36That means that
46:37you're denying Iran
46:39the capability
46:40of achieving
46:41nuclear weapons
46:42through completely
46:43indigenous efforts.
46:44That doesn't solve
46:45the problem,
46:46but it buys us time.
46:47As risky
46:48and unattractive
46:49as it is,
46:50the use of force
46:51would put time
46:51back on our side.
46:55I wouldn't advocate
46:58it now at all.
46:59I think that first,
47:01Iran still has
47:02some years to go.
47:05If we're ever going
47:06to have to do this,
47:08we really need
47:09to talk this time
47:11to our allies
47:12since we don't have
47:14a real threat yet.
47:16The only reason
47:17I can see
47:18that you would
47:19suddenly advocate
47:21going ahead
47:22right now
47:23is if you become
47:24obsessed
47:25by computer
47:26war games
47:26and you've forgotten
47:28there are real people
47:29somewhere
47:30outside the computer.
47:33In Tehran,
47:34our producers
47:35found a mixture
47:36of caution
47:36and confidence.
47:39Are you worried
47:40that the Bush administration
47:41might decide
47:41to attack Iran?
47:42I don't think so.
47:44They're going to do
47:45such a damn thing
47:46to our country
47:47because they have
47:49some lessons
47:50from Afghanistan
47:51and Iraq.
47:52Okay,
47:52that will be enough
47:53for them.
47:53you have a country
48:05of 70 million
48:06people in Iran
48:07over 70%
48:09of whose population
48:10is literate.
48:12It's very informationly
48:14connected with the world.
48:15You have a very
48:16dynamic society
48:17that comes from
48:18economic changes,
48:19cultural changes,
48:21youth,
48:21literacy,
48:22and that is also
48:24fueling the Iranian
48:26regional ambition.
48:28The interesting
48:29dynamic in Tehran
48:31today is that
48:31you have
48:32this generation
48:33of young
48:33and then you have
48:34a generation
48:34of hardliners
48:35who were young
48:37themselves
48:37at the time
48:38of the revolution
48:38who fought
48:39that bitter war
48:40with Iraq
48:41are committed
48:42to the idea
48:43of a modern
48:44theocracy
48:45and who feel
48:46very vulnerable
48:47particularly since
48:48the U.S. invasions
48:49of Afghanistan
48:50and Iraq
48:51and want
48:53to secure
48:54their position
48:55and Iran's
48:57Islamic identity.
49:00Just last month
49:01at a rally
49:02of revolutionary guards
49:03the supreme leader
49:04challenged
49:05the United States.
49:15As the supreme leader
49:18has said,
49:19if we're attacked
49:20we will threaten
49:21all American interests
49:22around the globe.
49:25The first step
49:25is our missiles
49:26can reach
49:27everywhere in Israel.
49:28I mean,
49:29there's not a single
49:30place in Israel
49:31outside the range
49:32of our missiles.
49:35I do not
49:37I do not believe
49:38that will happen
49:39at the end
49:40of the day
49:41but if that happens
49:43that is bad
49:44for the American
49:45president
49:46because he will suffer.
49:48How?
49:50Well,
49:50we are
49:51capable of
49:53defending ourselves
49:54I'm not going
49:54to tell you
49:55how because
49:56that is something
49:57which one
49:58should not
49:59speak
50:01before the press
50:03but
50:03definitely
50:04if the American
50:05makes such
50:06a bad mistake
50:08it is not
50:09in their own
50:10interest.
50:13Many strategists
50:14believe that Iran
50:15has a limited
50:16capacity for retaliation
50:17but that the
50:18greatest threat
50:19to U.S. forces
50:20would be in Iraq.
50:22I would expect
50:23them to try
50:24to cause trouble
50:24in Iraq.
50:26They will try
50:26to engage in terrorism
50:27they'll try
50:27to get proxies
50:28they'll try
50:29to hit supply lines
50:30all those things.
50:31Can the United States
50:33weather that
50:34in Iraq?
50:35I suspect so.
50:40We think it's bad
50:41today in Iraq
50:42if the Iranians
50:43really decided
50:44they could cut off
50:45supplies to U.S. troops
50:47very quickly.
50:48They have
50:49an incredible
50:50infrastructure
50:51and network
50:51in southern Iraq
50:52and our troops
50:53could very quickly
50:54be sitting ducks
50:54in the middle
50:55of a slum
50:56in Baghdad.
50:57You will not
51:03find a single
51:04instance in which
51:05a country has
51:05inflicted harm
51:06on us
51:07and we have
51:07not responded.
51:10So if the United
51:11States makes
51:12such a mistake
51:13they should know
51:13that we will
51:14definitely respond
51:15and we don't
51:17make idle threats.
51:22Last month
51:22President Ahmadinejad
51:24said negotiations
51:25on the nuclear issue
51:26were closed.
51:29They said
51:30all right
51:30well let's say
51:31that we have a fight.
51:33That's good for us.
51:35Why not?
51:37People like Ahmadinejad
51:38and his people
51:39have absolutely
51:40nothing to lose
51:41from an Islamic
51:43movement perspective
51:44because that
51:46would be the end result
51:47and they are right.
51:48think of U.S.
51:55going after Iran
51:56who's going to win?
52:00Islam.
52:04Having served in Iran
52:05I am fearful
52:07of their hegemonistic
52:08appetite
52:10even during the time
52:11of the Shah
52:12I find that
52:13I've never seen
52:14a more ethnocentric
52:14country in my life
52:16I've never seen
52:17a country
52:18for whom
52:19the days of Persepolis
52:21was unlike
52:22for you and I
52:232,500 years ago
52:25they see it as yesterday.
52:29So this leads me
52:31to some fear
52:32about their view
52:33of themselves
52:34on the world stage.
52:37That's quite a bit
52:38different from
52:39an impending invasion.
52:40And it would be
52:44the worst
52:45of all worlds
52:46unless it was
52:48absolutely necessary
52:49for the safety
52:50and welfare
52:51of this nation.
52:52It would be
52:53the worst of worlds
52:54for an outgoing
52:55administration
52:56to start a conflict.
53:01In a quiet street
53:02in Tehran
53:03Mohammed Ali Abdehi
53:05occupies a small office.
53:08The reformist
53:08vice president
53:09who once hoped
53:10for reconciliation
53:11with the U.S.
53:13watches from the sidelines.
53:16Relations between Iran
53:17and America
53:18won't get better
53:19any time soon.
53:22Leaders in both countries
53:24don't just see themselves
53:25as politicians.
53:27They also see themselves
53:28as carrying out
53:29the work of God.
53:31They've left
53:32the ground a bit.
53:34And that's very dangerous
53:36for the world.
53:39Next time on Frontline
53:56Thomas Lynch is a poet and an undertaker.
54:01Where death means nothing, life is meaningless.
54:04He lets us into his world to tell the story of life, death, and a family business.
54:11A good funeral gets the dead where they need to go and the living where they need to be.
54:16The Undertaking.
54:18Watch Frontline.
54:26To water Frontline's Showdown with Iran on DVD, call PBS Home Video at 1-800-PLAY-PBS.
54:56The Undertaking.
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