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00:57a prioridade.
00:58O presidente de Rússia sabia
01:00sobre o país de grande treasure.
01:02Ele disse que temos mais
01:04de gas e mais do que ninguém mais
01:06e que as pessoas devem lembrar isso.
01:10Os europeus sabem
01:12que há não
01:14realmente relígulado
01:15para a Rússia
01:17como um parque de energia.
01:19Os governos em particular
01:21continuam a relígulada
01:23na rola de rússia azul.
01:25Não havia dúvida
01:26as to who was in the driver's seat.
01:29Where do you extract raw materials?
01:32Which fields do we get access to?
01:34What pipelines are there?
01:35If you don't have any, and that's the case here,
01:38we have to look for ways to be compensated.
01:43Gazprom set the prices and the conditions.
01:46Anyone who rebelled was punished.
01:49You can very well call it a state of war
01:52when someone turns off the gas tap in the 21st century.
01:55Despite brutal, threatening gestures
01:58and gas cuts in Eastern Europe,
02:01Russia's aggressive foreign policy
02:03continued to be tolerated, and more.
02:05The idea that you would still build up
02:08this dependence on Russian energy
02:09was thought of as crazy.
02:13And then Nord Stream will play its part
02:15in ensuring that Europe has a secure gas supply in the future.
02:20Russia remained the guarantor
02:22of gas economic stability in Western Europe.
02:25while the political consequences were ignored.
02:28Gazprom is part of the Russian army.
02:30It's one of their weapons.
02:45Russia, Western Siberia.
02:47Here, the indigenous people of the region
02:50hold on to all traditions.
02:52The Nenets live from reindeer husbandry.
02:54Breeder Maiko Sirriueto's herd
02:57has known the route through the tundra
02:59up to the northern Cara Sea for decades.
03:02But suddenly the Nenets have to rethink.
03:05Gazprom has opened up a gas field
03:07in the middle of their route.
03:12Our way with the animals through the tundra
03:14is becoming more and more difficult.
03:16Railway tracks, pipes and roads,
03:18it's a big problem.
03:23The once untouched nature is history.
03:27After the river, the hard asphalt
03:29around the Bovonenkovo gas field awaits.
03:32The provisional solution on this day,
03:35Gazprom workers roll out bales of cloth on the road.
03:39This keeps the wooden runners of the Nenets sleds
03:42protected on the concrete crossing.
03:45Good afternoon.
03:47Hello, I'm the foreman.
03:49Pleased to meet you.
03:51How does it look?
03:52It wasn't quite that easy, was it?
03:54Yes, some animals didn't want to cross at first.
04:06Just like the red carpet.
04:13A togetherness born out of necessity.
04:16However, no one here knows how long the crossing
04:19at Bovonenkovo will remain passable
04:22for the Nenets and their reindeer.
04:24A conflict that Gazprom employees on site
04:27are well aware of.
04:30Man has come here and destroyed
04:32the unity and harmony of nature.
04:34On the other hand, he has opened up new areas.
04:37He's extracting gas from nature's resources.
04:40And that also brings good things.
04:42That feeds our families and creates many, many jobs.
04:52Gazprom employed 1,200 people in 2019
04:55at the Bovonenkovo gas field alone.
04:58Ten years ago, locksmith Sergei Povetkin
05:01came here for the first time.
05:04I wanted to be where the gas comes from,
05:07to be there at the source,
05:09participate in the process.
05:11The first time I was here,
05:12there was no gas flowing.
05:14But I was totally overwhelmed
05:15by the amount of tubes and metal structures.
05:18I was immediately fascinated.
05:252012, Gazprom finally started production here.
05:29A high-security wing,
05:30a kind of Russian gold reserve.
05:36We're hooked on gas and oil like a drug needle.
05:39Take them away, and then what?
05:41Withdrawal symptoms?
05:45We can't do without them.
05:47Take them away, what's left of our economy?
05:50Crash.
05:54But it wasn't just the Russians themselves
05:57who needed their blue gold.
05:59Europe was also dependent on gas.
06:01Gas from Russia.
06:02A dependence that Gazprom had known
06:05how to exploit for decades.
06:07And one that helped Russia's president,
06:09Vladimir Putin, achieve unprecedented power.
06:13Shortly before, Gazprom cut off
06:16the flow of gas to Ukraine
06:18for a short time
06:19in a dispute over a price increase.
06:22The effects were also felt
06:24by other European countries.
06:26A boost for Gazprom's pipeline plans
06:28beyond the transit countries' Nord Stream.
06:35New chairman of the shareholders committee,
06:37Mr. Schroeder.
06:40You know that we have a growing demand
06:42for gas in Western Europe
06:44and a declining self-supply within Western Europe.
06:47And that's why it's extremely important
06:49to build this pipeline
06:50to be able to reasonably satisfy
06:52the additional demand that there is
06:54and will continue to be.
07:04In the early discussions,
07:05Russians were not connecting Nord Stream 1
07:07who was removing transit flow from Ukraine
07:11into different routes.
07:13They were saying,
07:14it's new gas.
07:14But they were lying to everybody
07:17about what their real intent was.
07:21While the German ex-chancellor
07:23was active as a lobbyist,
07:25a central pipeline was blown up
07:27in the middle of winter,
07:28which supplied Georgia with gas.
07:30Previously, the Georgian government
07:32had refused to sell
07:33its own pipelines to Russia.
07:35The Georgians suspected a plot
07:37and felt blackmailed.
07:40I think the world should wake up
07:42to this threat
07:42because yesterday it was Ukraine.
07:45Today it's much worse than Georgia.
07:46Tomorrow it can be any other European country.
07:48It's due to that it's dependent
07:50of this irresponsible
07:51and unpredictable supplier.
07:54Gazprom has long since
07:55launched a counter-campaign.
07:59We have been assured by Mr. Miller
08:02that there will be no problems
08:03in the future with Germany's supply.
08:05After all,
08:06there have been no problems
08:08with the German supply either.
08:12A little later,
08:13Alexei Miller struck a different tone
08:15with EU ambassadors in Moscow.
08:18Money alone wasn't enough.
08:20He said the EU had to commit itself
08:22unreservedly to Russia.
08:24The head of Gazprom said,
08:26get over your hostility to Russia
08:28or you won't get any gas.
08:30They thought they were in an imperial position
08:32when it came to natural gas.
08:42In 2005,
08:43they took us all to Western Siberia
08:46and then we had the dinner
08:48with President Putin.
08:49I asked him,
08:50is Russia an energy superpower?
08:52And so he looked at me
08:54and he said,
08:55oh, I think, you know,
08:56energy superpower is an old-fashioned
08:58Cold War term.
08:59But, he said,
09:00we do have more oil and gas
09:02than anyone else
09:03and people should remember that.
09:05The Germans didn't forget.
09:07In 2006,
09:08the Chancellor
09:09and the BASF CEO
09:11travelled to Siberia,
09:13a new access
09:14to a new gas field.
09:15Even then, of course,
09:17there were thoughts
09:18of building pipelines
09:19to the east.
09:20Gases needed there,
09:21in China.
09:22That's another reason
09:23why it was geopolitically important
09:25for us to secure
09:26these gas reserves
09:27for ourselves in Europe.
09:31In parallel,
09:32the pipeline
09:33was being pushed ahead
09:34without the states
09:35of Eastern Europe
09:36being asked.
09:40The Polish defense minister,
09:42Radek Sikorski,
09:43was worried
09:44by the solo effort
09:45at the time.
09:46Today,
09:46he's a member
09:47of the European Parliament.
09:49There's a long history
09:50of very ominous
09:52direct relationships
09:54between Germany
09:55and Russia.
09:56We count among those
09:57the partitions of Poland
09:59and then, of course,
10:00the Hitler-Stalin pact.
10:01When Germany and Russia
10:03fix something together
10:04over our heads,
10:05we don't like it.
10:06We feel threatened by it.
10:11The Europeans know
10:13that there's no truly
10:16reliable alternative
10:17to Russia
10:18as an energy partner.
10:21But Europe
10:22should not pretend
10:23that the Russians
10:25had to be grateful
10:26for being allowed
10:28to supply oil and gas
10:30to Europe.
10:30On the contrary,
10:32the Europeans
10:32should make allowances
10:34for the pride
10:36of the Russian people,
10:37the vulnerability
10:38of the Russian soul,
10:41and the special features
10:43of the country's history.
10:47Putin's power
10:48depended on efficient
10:49exploitation
10:50of Russia's energy reserves.
10:53You could see
10:54Russian production
10:55decline very rapidly
10:57with the collapse
10:58of the Soviet Union.
10:59It came back
11:00very strongly
11:01in the 2000s.
11:02Russian production
11:03had recovered,
11:04oil prices went up,
11:06and Vladimir Putin
11:07rode into a stronger
11:09and stronger position
11:10on the back
11:11of rising oil prices.
11:13Gazprom's influence
11:14was growing
11:15and the company
11:15wanted to appear
11:16open to the world.
11:17In 2006,
11:18the company invited
11:19a British film crew.
11:21Gas from the likes
11:21of the Orangoy field
11:23has made this company
11:24wildly wealthy,
11:25and they let us
11:26have a rare glimpse
11:27inside the company's
11:28nerve center.
11:29The TV team
11:30was even allowed
11:31to film the control center.
11:33The managers
11:33were brimming
11:34with self-confidence.
11:36The next benchmark
11:37will be one trillion.
11:39Biggest company
11:40in the world?
11:40Yes.
11:43The British reporter
11:44was presented
11:45with the entire
11:46Gazprom headquarters.
11:47It didn't look
11:48like a trillion
11:48in sales yet.
11:51The sanatorium
11:52for employees
11:53and the small
11:54Gazprom TV studio
11:55also looked modest.
12:01Thirteen years later,
12:03we were also given
12:04a tour of the group.
12:05Nothing here
12:06was modest anymore.
12:13Gazprom had earned
12:14over 200 billion euros
12:16from its gas business
12:17with Germany alone
12:18since 2006.
12:26Sochi,
12:27a city on the Black Sea
12:28and the venue
12:29of the Winter Olympics 2014,
12:32sponsored by Gazprom,
12:34among others.
12:35An employee
12:35takes us on a tour
12:37of the Olympic stadium.
12:43Gazprom is also hard
12:44to miss in St. Petersburg.
12:46Even if completion
12:47inside is a long time coming,
12:49Gazprom's new headquarters
12:51is the tallest building
12:52in Europe.
12:59In the year 2021, however,
13:02after years of planning,
13:04the Lacta Centre
13:05still stood empty.
13:06A backdrop.
13:07Millions for a hollow
13:08symbol of power.
13:23Russia seemed to be
13:24a struggling country
13:25economically.
13:26But then, you know,
13:27the big boon for Putin
13:28was that energy prices
13:30then were rising
13:31so fast.
13:32And that, I think,
13:33emboldened him
13:34to do a lot of things
13:35that he wouldn't
13:36have done otherwise.
13:44Putin's global agenda
13:46was becoming
13:46more ambitious
13:47and aggressive.
13:48Tens of thousands
13:49of people had died
13:51since the beginning
13:51of his term
13:52in Chechnya,
13:53an ex-Soviet republic
13:55that wanted to be
13:56independent of Moscow.
14:05A courageous journalist
14:06criticised Putin
14:08for the brutal war.
14:11The situation is constant.
14:14Human rights
14:14are totally disregarded.
14:17After two attempts
14:18to poison the journalist,
14:20she was shot dead
14:21in the elevator
14:22outside her Moscow apartment
14:24on October 7, 2006.
14:26It was Putin's 54th birthday.
14:32Former FSB agent
14:33Alexander Litvinenko
14:35publicly exposed
14:36the president
14:37shortly thereafter.
14:42Somebody has asked
14:43here directly
14:44who is guilty
14:45of Anna's death?
14:46Who has killed her?
14:50And I can directly
14:52answer you
14:52it is Mr. Putin,
14:54the president
14:54of the Russian Federation
14:55who has killed her.
14:56Three days
14:57after the murder
14:58Vladimir Putin
14:59was visiting
15:00Angela Merkel
15:01in Germany.
15:10In a TV interview
15:12that same evening,
15:13Putin praised
15:14Merkel's ability
15:15to listen well.
15:17A few days later,
15:19Alexander Litvinenko
15:20was poisoned
15:21with a radioactive substance
15:22in Great Britain.
15:24He died in agony
15:25after weeks
15:26in the hospital.
15:30Vladimir Putin
15:32had one more
15:32appointment
15:33beforehand
15:34during his visit
15:35to Dresden.
15:36He introduced
15:37Gazprom
15:37as the new sponsor
15:39of the Bundesliga club
15:40Schalke Noffea.
15:42Gazprom
15:42invested over
15:43200 million euros.
15:45Gazprom
15:46needed to
15:47essentially charm
15:48its way
15:49into the hearts
15:49of German football fans
15:51so that it
15:51legitimized
15:52what it was doing.
15:54So it would be
15:55just seen
15:55as a legitimate
15:56member
15:56of the ecosystem
15:57so that people
15:58wouldn't ask questions
15:59and they wouldn't feel
16:01as though
16:01there was something
16:03strange
16:03or insidious
16:04about all of this.
16:06Soon it was impossible
16:07to imagine
16:08the Bundesliga
16:09and the Champions League
16:10without Gazprom.
16:14Sport is very important
16:15to people.
16:16People fall in love
16:17with sport,
16:18they feel very passionately
16:19about it
16:20and so because of that
16:21people had almost
16:22this unquestioning
16:24relationship
16:24not just
16:26with Gazprom
16:26but by implication
16:28with the Kremlin.
16:29That proxy war
16:30that we've lived
16:31for the last 10 years
16:32is intended
16:33to disrupt,
16:33divide,
16:34deceive.
16:35Sponsorship
16:35and spending
16:37on sport
16:38has been part
16:39of that proxy war.
16:40So whilst many
16:41of us may think
16:42well we've been
16:43watching a UEFA
16:43Champions League game
16:45sponsored by Gazprom,
16:46we've been watching
16:46Schalke
16:47sponsored by Gazprom,
16:49in reality
16:50we've been watching
16:51a weapon
16:52that has been deployed.
16:55Gazprom's most powerful
16:56lobbying weapon
16:57was Gerhard Schröder.
16:59At the Nord Stream race
17:01he fired the starting gun
17:02in Kiel in 2019.
17:04Here too,
17:05the political turbulence
17:06seemed detached
17:07from the sporting event.
17:13After all,
17:14the motto of this regatta
17:15is connecting Baltics
17:17and we connect sports,
17:18cultures, clubs,
17:19sailors of different nations
17:20and in the end
17:22that's exactly
17:23what Nord Stream
17:23is doing as well.
17:25A great contribution
17:26actually also
17:27to international understanding
17:28and for the coexistence
17:30of cultures.
17:33The route
17:34led the sailors
17:35of the long distance
17:36regatta
17:36to St. Petersburg,
17:38always along
17:39the Baltic Sea pipeline.
17:55Meanwhile,
17:56Schröder seized the PR opportunity,
17:58another stage
17:59for Gazprom.
18:08There is,
18:09ladies and gentlemen,
18:10let's face it,
18:11a hell of a lot of trouble
18:12all over the world.
18:15And isn't it nice
18:17that there are then
18:18events like this
18:19that make it clear
18:20that you can live differently,
18:22peacefully,
18:23amicably
18:23and in a way
18:24that benefits us all.
18:31Transfiguration as a method.
18:33Schröder knew how to do it
18:34and the partners
18:35were satisfied.
18:40If you have
18:41such a precious instrument,
18:43you have to protect it
18:44from all sides.
18:45Propaganda
18:46is one of the elements
18:47of protection.
18:50Gazprom has continued
18:51to play out its power,
18:53publicly or in back rooms
18:55to this day.
18:56In the year 2007,
18:58Miller and his team
18:59put pressure
18:59on the next former
19:00ex-Soviet republic
19:02that broke ranks,
19:03Belarus.
19:07As of August 3rd,
19:0910 a.m.,
19:10gas supplies to Belarus
19:11will be curtailed
19:13by about 21 cubic meters
19:15per day.
19:19It's a classic
19:21Russian playbook.
19:22The debt you had yesterday
19:23said that's due today
19:24and there'll be a 300%
19:27price increase
19:28if you don't pay it.
19:29And if you don't pay it,
19:30we're going to cut off
19:30the supply.
19:31It's transparent.
19:33Belarus also buckled.
19:35Gazprom's pressure
19:36was too great.
19:42We see real efforts
19:43on the part of Belarus
19:45to solve the debt problem.
19:46We have therefore
19:47taken the decision
19:48not to implement
19:49any supply restrictions today.
19:51We expect all gas debts
19:54to be settled
19:55by Thursday of next week.
20:02All ex-Soviet republics
20:04eventually felt
20:05the power of Gazprom.
20:07One example after another
20:09was made before
20:09the eyes of the world.
20:17met Putin and his chosen successor
20:20Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow.
20:23With him,
20:24he opened the next
20:24BASF gas field.
20:29energy supplies from Russia
20:31cover almost 40%
20:32of German demand
20:33in the gas sector.
20:37And that is based
20:38on a resilient
20:39and trusting energy partnership
20:41between German
20:41and Russian companies.
20:45This can be allowed
20:46to continue in the future.
20:50So getting direct access
20:52to the gas fields as well
20:53and not just being
20:54dependent on the pipelines
20:55was in principle
20:56the right thing to do.
20:57The question is
20:58how dependent
20:59do I make myself?
21:02Steinmeier criticised
21:03Frank Umbach's approach
21:04in an article.
21:06He had warned
21:06against too much dependence
21:07on Siberian gas
21:09in a new Cold War.
21:11That then led to
21:12an argument
21:13with Mr. Steinmeier
21:14who said
21:14no, this is not a Cold War.
21:17This is part of our
21:18Ostpolitik, so to speak.
21:19We must not go back
21:21to a new East-West conflict.
21:22That is old thinking.
21:24We need new thinking.
21:26Factually,
21:27this amounts to
21:28wishful thinking
21:29and is ultimately
21:30something like
21:30a collective denial
21:32of reality.
21:35There is a school
21:36of foreign policy
21:37that asserts
21:38the deeper
21:38the economic relations are
21:40the more harmonious
21:41the foreign policy
21:42relationships are.
21:43But it wasn't about
21:44a historical disagreement
21:45about the power of trade
21:46to change foreign policy.
21:48It was about this person
21:50and his policy
21:52and the risk
21:53that he posed.
21:56It wasn't
21:57interdependence,
21:58all right,
21:59but it's the kind
22:00of interdependence
22:01that you have
22:02between wolves and sheep.
22:14and it's the kind
22:15of interdependence.
22:18The U.S. has overstepped
22:20its bounds in all spheres,
22:22economic, political
22:23and humanitarian.
22:25Well, who likes this?
22:27It leads to the fact
22:28that nobody feels safe
22:30anymore.
22:32I want to underline that.
22:34Nobody feels safe
22:36anymore.
22:37At that time,
22:40I was not yet
22:41the head of the conference,
22:42but I sat in the audience
22:44and listened to it
22:45and I certainly got
22:46how the German-American
22:47audience took note
22:48of this speech
22:49with astonishment,
22:50but without really
22:51taking it seriously.
22:58It was the first time
23:00very publicly
23:00that Vladimir Putin said
23:02my attempts
23:04at being a partner
23:06to the West
23:07or working with the West,
23:09that's over.
23:10Russia will now
23:11follow and pursue
23:13its interests.
23:15Putin was still
23:16under the impression
23:17of the Orange Revolution
23:18in which Ukrainian
23:20politicians who had
23:21been working toward
23:22EU membership prevailed.
23:24The Orange Revolution
23:26did have a big impact
23:28on him.
23:28That was his first
23:30major, major defeat
23:32in Ukraine.
23:33The color revolutions
23:35were beginning
23:36in the post-Soviet space
23:37and it was at that speech
23:39at the Munich Security
23:40Conference where he said
23:41that era is now over.
23:44In 2008,
23:46Putin was invited
23:47to a special NATO summit
23:49as so often in the past
23:50six years before.
23:52of Russia's borders
23:54We consider the appearance
23:55of a powerful military bloc
23:57on our borders
23:57as a direct threat
23:59to the security
24:00of our country.
24:01We are not satisfied
24:02with assurances
24:03that this operation
24:04is not directed
24:05against Russia.
24:06National security
24:08is not based on promises.
24:11What he wanted from the United States
24:13certainly was a recognition
24:15that, you know,
24:16the European Union
24:18and NATO
24:18would never expand
24:19anywhere near Russia's borders
24:21when he didn't get that.
24:22And I think he reverted
24:23more to true form.
24:25The German government
24:26continued to stand
24:27by Putin.
24:28NATO is not directed
24:30against anyone,
24:31certainly not against Russia.
24:33Russia is a partner.
24:35Vladimir Putin was allowing
24:36Russian nuclear bombers
24:38to train near the United States
24:40for the first time since 1992.
24:44Vladimir Putin began long-range bomber flights
24:47in 2007.
24:48And then he began
24:49to demonstrate
24:50that there cannot be
24:52independent, sovereign countries
24:54around Russia.
24:56Putin supported separatists
24:58in Georgia
24:58with Russian tanks
24:59and soldiers.
25:00The first European war
25:02in the 21st century.
25:052008 was just
25:07a greater warm-up act
25:08for what he would do
25:09in Ukraine.
25:11The dead Georgians
25:13didn't change anything
25:15concerning the business
25:16with Russian gas.
25:21I don't recall
25:22any government
25:23even seriously
25:24talking about
25:25boycotting energy
25:26in the situation
25:27at that time.
25:30Meanwhile,
25:31Gazprom was celebrating
25:32in Moscow.
25:34The group had been
25:35a joint stock company
25:37for 15 years.
25:42Our energy exports,
25:43including those
25:44to far away places,
25:46help ensure
25:46international energy security.
25:49On the same day,
25:50Gazprom threatened Ukraine
25:52and used its own media
25:54as a stage to do so.
25:56as a result.
25:59We have already prepared
26:01an action plan for tomorrow
26:03in connection with the
26:04restriction of our gas
26:05supplies.
26:08In Kiev,
26:09the message was getting
26:10through.
26:12Nothing will change
26:13until Ukraine kneels
26:15before Russia.
26:17Alexei Miller
26:18invited the head
26:18of the Ukrainian gas
26:20company.
26:20He publicly accused Ukraine
26:22of stealing Russian gas.
26:24The man was not allowed
26:25to defend himself.
26:27At a meeting
26:28at Putin's
26:29official residence
26:30outside Moscow.
26:32Miller reported
26:33to the president.
26:35He suggested
26:36that the flow of gas
26:37to Ukraine
26:37should be curtailed.
26:39This should be reduced
26:40by the exact amount
26:41that the Ukrainians
26:42were alleged to have stolen.
26:44Putin agreed.
26:45The plan was implemented
26:47immediately.
26:51Over 80% of Russia's
26:53gas exports to Europe
26:54go via pipelines
26:55which run through
26:56the Ukraine.
26:57And on this coldest
26:58day of winter,
26:59three of those
27:00have basically been
27:01shut down.
27:02Romania has a 75% reduction
27:04and over here
27:05Austria is 90% down.
27:11You can very well
27:12call it a state of war
27:14when someone turns
27:14off the gas tap
27:15in the 21st century.
27:16I can't think of any
27:18other word.
27:23This situation is
27:24obviously very serious
27:26and needs to improve
27:28rapidly.
27:31This Ukraine story
27:32at the time,
27:33the stopping,
27:34put certain question
27:35marks on Gazprom's
27:36reliability as a supplier.
27:38I didn't like that.
27:39I also talked to Alex
27:41Miller about it.
27:42He said,
27:43well, this will pass.
27:47I was personally in the room
27:50of Mr. Miller
27:51when he was clearly telling
27:52our delegation,
27:54everything you want to
27:55discuss,
27:56you tell me,
27:58here's the phone,
27:59I call there,
28:00he tells me,
28:01yes or no,
28:03if it is about Ukraine,
28:05Putin decides.
28:06Putin was waging the gas war
28:08with all his might.
28:09Arguments from Ukraine
28:10didn't interest him.
28:12It doesn't matter
28:13who presents what,
28:15I could just throw
28:15all these papers
28:16in the oven.
28:21What's important
28:22is something else.
28:30No transit country
28:31has the right to abuse
28:33its position
28:33and hold European
28:34customers hostage
28:35in this way.
28:38The Russians are brilliant
28:40propagandists
28:41and Ukraine did not help
28:42itself in those days
28:43because the suspicion
28:44of corruption
28:45was quite high
28:46and Ukraine was not always
28:48a sympathetic case
28:49and so the Russians
28:50were able to leverage
28:51that to say,
28:54you poor Europeans
28:55are suffering
28:56because these
28:56irresponsible Ukrainians
28:58are not paying
28:59their bill.
28:59Russia has actually
29:00been very successful
29:02at framing those disputes
29:06and blaming Ukraine,
29:09blaming Ukraine
29:10supposed theft
29:11of the gas.
29:12And I think that
29:13there's a lot of people
29:14in Germany especially
29:15who buy into that
29:17and agree that actually
29:19the problems
29:20with the Ukraine
29:22transit are more
29:25Ukrainian than they
29:26are Russian.
29:27And there's a lot
29:28of sympathy I think
29:29for the Russian point
29:30of view in Germany,
29:31not necessarily anywhere
29:32else, but I've seen
29:33it very much here.
29:35It was Ukraine
29:36that was distrusted,
29:37not Russia.
29:38Russia.
29:43On behalf of the
29:44Ukrainian state,
29:46I would like to declare
29:47that contrary to all
29:48claims of the Russian
29:49leadership,
29:50Ukraine did not steal
29:51a single cubic meter
29:52of Russian natural gas.
29:55The Ukrainians
29:56were fighting back
29:57but were hardly
29:58noticed in Germany.
29:59My take is that
30:00that particular view
30:01builds upon perhaps
30:03in particular
30:03German narrative
30:04vis-a-vis Ukraine.
30:05a narrative
30:06in which Ukraine
30:07is invisible
30:08and if it is visible
30:09it's only visible
30:10through stereotypes.
30:14The EU finally
30:15sent supervisors
30:16to control the gas
30:17flow.
30:18Putin continued
30:19to pretend innocence.
30:24to take all the
30:25So I ask you to take
30:26all the necessary documents
30:28including contracts.
30:29We have nothing
30:30to hide there.
30:31These are not
30:32secret papers.
30:34My country strongly
30:36condemned
30:37Russia's actions
30:38in Georgia.
30:39We also are very
30:40troubled by using
30:42energy as a tool
30:44of intimidation.
30:47Putin was losing
30:48on the propaganda front.
30:54In the control center
30:55he continued
30:56to blame Ukraine.
30:58It may well be
31:00that the state
31:00of Ukraine's
31:01pipeline network
31:02is such that
31:03it's not even capable
31:04of pumping through
31:05such volumes of gas.
31:06That is also
31:07quite possible.
31:08But then you have
31:09to say that
31:09directly and openly.
31:13finally Putin let the
31:14gas flow again.
31:17This is the senior
31:18dispatcher of
31:19Gazprom headquarters
31:20Pavlov.
31:21I ask you to ensure
31:22gas supply through
31:23the gas metering
31:24station of Zucha
31:25at 10 o'clock
31:26Moscow time.
31:29By this time however
31:31Putin had long
31:32since achieved his
31:33main goals with
31:34Gazprom.
31:36Putin got concessions
31:38from the Ukrainian
31:39government that they would
31:40not try and push for
31:41NATO membership.
31:42He got the
31:43Black Sea Fleet
31:44which was on a
31:45lease basis.
31:46He got the
31:47Ukrainians to extend
31:48that lease to
31:492017.
31:50It was very clear
31:51that he got those
31:52as part of the
31:53gas deal negotiations.
31:54And Putin also
31:56succeeded in one
31:57thing.
31:57His German customers
31:58stayed with him.
32:00Miller had ensured
32:01that the gas always
32:02flowed to Germany
32:03during the crisis.
32:07Germany has not suffered
32:08from the Ukraine
32:09gas crisis.
32:10Not at all.
32:11It was discussed at
32:12one point and it was
32:13also signaled that it
32:14might be necessary to
32:15turn back a bit.
32:16But that didn't
32:17happen.
32:20That was never a
32:21German problem.
32:23No one did that to
32:24the Germans.
32:24They did it to the
32:25others.
32:48The German strategy was
32:50not being adapted.
32:51It wanted more and more
32:52Russian gas as cheaply
32:54as possible.
32:55We should be grateful
33:01that we had access to
33:02Russian gas and also to
33:04the gas fields.
33:05That will still be
33:06important in the long
33:06term.
33:07I mean, we must not
33:08forget that gas has been
33:10extremely cheap.
33:11So the Russian gas, I'll
33:12make an analogy now, is
33:14about as good as the
33:15discount store Aldi.
33:18At the beginning of
33:192009, Chancellor Angela
33:21Merkel wrote a letter to
33:22EU Commission President
33:24Jose Manuel Barroso in support
33:26of Nord Stream.
33:27A secure connection was
33:29needed.
33:30The problems with Ukraine
33:31have shown that again.
33:34Of course, it would have been
33:36possible to erect major
33:37barriers.
33:38And there have been phases of
33:40this.
33:40That's why things went so
33:41slowly.
33:42And that's why political support
33:44was very important in Europe.
33:46in Europe.
33:47Gazprom persistently worked the
33:49EU.
33:50Construction stages of the
33:51pipeline were celebrated in a
33:53big way.
33:54At one of these celebrations,
33:56German EU energy commissioner
33:58Gunther Oettinger gave the
33:59pipeline his blessing.
34:01time and again, we actually had to
34:04intervene there and provide
34:05assistance.
34:06Above all, also work politically
34:09in Brussels.
34:09That's true.
34:11Gazprom alone was not able to do
34:13the lobbying.
34:14I mean, it's simply too far away.
34:16And you need European partners.
34:18Of course, we lobbied together.
34:24If you build a large wind farm in the
34:27North Sea today, you have similar
34:29issues to deal with.
34:30Sometimes shorter, sometimes longer.
34:34At the end of 2010, Putin made fun
34:37of the slow EU and the delayed
34:40approval of the pipeline in Berlin.
34:57How do you want to actually heat?
34:59You don't want our gas nor nuclear
35:01energy.
35:01Do you want to heat with wood?
35:07And even for that, you'll have to go to
35:08Siberia.
35:11From his point of view, I'm sure that
35:15was a clue.
35:16You need me more than I need you.
35:19In that respect, you can always say,
35:21yes, there were enough indications
35:22that perhaps should have been taken
35:24more seriously.
35:25And yes, were not taken seriously
35:27to the extent that they perhaps
35:29should have been.
35:37Berlin on the same day, meeting in
35:39the evening in a restaurant.
35:43Putin and Warnich dined with the
35:45ex-Chancellor in a posh restaurant
35:47owned by Matthias Warnich's son.
35:54I don't know how many French presidents,
35:57how many British prime ministers,
35:59have been photographed with Putin,
36:00possibly also in restaurants in Paris.
36:04This debate, to say retroactively,
36:06yes, that should have been done at the
36:08time, and yet these photos document
36:10this special closeness.
36:12everyone across Europe was happy that the
36:14Germans made sure there was a high level
36:17of energy security.
36:23The governments in Sweden and in Finland were
36:26strongly against the pipeline due to
36:29environmental problems and also due to
36:33geopolitical problems.
36:35The Swedish military intelligence came out
36:38with a statement or warning saying that
36:42this pipeline could be used to spy on Sweden.
36:46Sweden used to get visits from Russian submarines.
36:52They were very concerned about that could
36:55happen again and that they could use
36:57Nord Stream, some of the platforms and the
37:01pipeline to actually to spy on Sweden.
37:06Ex-Chancellor Schröder came to work for Gazprom again.
37:09He contacted a man who was once prime minister of Sweden.
37:14John Persson and Gerhard Schröder, they are old buddies.
37:17He was one of the first top-level politicians to talk about
37:21the climate crisis and hardly against lobbyism.
37:26In 2007, he received a phone call and Schröder invited him for lunch.
37:33And after the lunch date, John Persson went public and told that
37:37he has now signed as a consultant at the public affairs bureau in Sweden,
37:44linked up to E.ON, the German energy giant and one of the shareholders of Nord Stream.
37:53Gazprom also saw a need for action in Finland.
37:57Schröder took care of a top Finnish politician.
38:03They really needed a person to speak in their favour.
38:06A high-level person.
38:08And they found Paavo Lipponen.
38:11Lipponen led the Social Democrats in Finland
38:14and served as prime minister for eight years.
38:18Lipponen was invited to Berlin.
38:20He was received by Schröder and Matthias Warnick,
38:23the former strategy captain.
38:26Lipponen became a paid lobbyist for Nord Stream.
38:29He was a key person.
38:31By meeting politicians in Finland to convince them
38:35that this is a very good thing for Finland and for Scandinavia
38:39and for whole Europe, we will secure the gas supply.
38:44So that was his task, to convince the Finnish government about that
38:48and the population.
38:50And he succeeded.
38:51Vladimir Putin could visit the pipeline construction site in the Finnish Gulf
38:55and showed the world that he was advancing towards Europe.
39:00It was very, very clever from the Russian side to recruit all the former top-level politicians
39:06and to fill their pockets.
39:09Were there any consequences?
39:11No way.
39:12They are living in the best way today.
39:16The pipeline could no longer be stopped.
39:20In September 2011, Putin and Schröder symbolically turned on the gas.
39:29At this point, Germany finally turned to gas because of the catastrophe that had occurred shortly before.
39:41The Fukushima disaster terrified not only Japanese but also European politicians
39:47into fear of the security of nuclear power.
39:58We will gradually phase out nuclear power completely by the end of 2022.
40:06At that time, we clearly said, OK, then we'll just have to invest more in coal and especially in gas.
40:13That design of the energy transition was all about gas.
40:20That created an enormous vulnerability for Germany and it only accelerated the dependence on Russian gas.
40:29Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
40:35And then Nord Stream will play its part in ensuring that Europe has a secure gas supply in the future.
40:41In addition to Merkel, the French and Dutch prime ministers were invited.
40:46From now on, gas would flow through Nord Stream to Western Europe,
40:50while increasingly less gas would be piped through Poland and Ukraine.
40:55I would challenge you to find one example of how any of these pipelines
41:00or any of these energy deals with Russia made Russia more open, more democratic.
41:05It's never happened and it was never going to happen.
41:08And I think that German leaders knew this and went along with it anyways.
41:12Actually, I also think they knew what they were doing.
41:16Because I don't think, you see, it was naivete.
41:19It was greed.
41:22This basic attitude didn't change in the following years.
41:25German politicians made a pilgrimage to Russia.
41:33Saxony's Prime Minister Kretschmer signed a new gas contract 2019.
41:39And lobbyist Schröder defended the next Russian pipeline.
41:43He left no doubt about who the opponents were.
41:48For months now, Danish policy has been jeopardizing the timely completion of the project.
41:53Because while construction is already underway in Russia, Sweden, Finland and also Germany,
41:59a permit from Denmark is still pending.
42:01And that has to do with political pressure from the US and, of course, Ukraine.
42:15Corruption is a strategic tool of the Kremlin.
42:18In many ways, it's how Russia's system works.
42:22In many ways, they're exporting how it works inside Russia.
42:26And I think they were surprised how easily it was imported into the West.
42:32A board seat, a very lucrative contract.
42:35When you consider what is at stake, a nation's energy security, a nation's national security,
42:42it's very cheaply purchased.
42:48You have the former Econ Minister of Austria being a senior advisor for Nord Stream 2 AG.
42:53You have former foreign minister of Austria, Karen Knysel, with whom Putin was invited to
43:00and she danced with at her wedding.
43:04Dear bride and groom, I congratulate you with all my heart on your marriage
43:09and formation of a new family.
43:13You have former French Prime Minister François Fillon,
43:17nominated to not one but two Russian state-owned oil and gas trading firms.
43:22And the list goes on and on.
43:24There's one country Putin never lost sight of, Ukraine.
43:32Zurya Yayanti worked at the US Embassy in Kyiv
43:35and experienced Russian influence firsthand.
43:39A fair amount of the corruption in Ukraine is Russia as a malign actor and a malign influence.
43:45For example, in the gas sector.
43:48A Ukrainian played the leading role, Dmitry Fyrtash.
43:53The billionaire lived in exile in Vienna.
43:55He became rich through gas trading, partly because Gazprom offered him special conditions.
44:04Dmitry Fyrtash is one of the oligarchs of Ukraine.
44:08He has his fingers in every single cookie jar.
44:11He has media holdings, he has energy holdings.
44:14He became rich, among other things, by stealing from the Ukrainian gas sector
44:19and by siphoning off very large portions of the gas.
44:23Gazprom let him.
44:26Fyrtash denies illegal actions to this day.
44:29US authorities want him extradited from Austria.
44:32Dmitry Fyrtash has been indicted by the US government for bribery schemes.
44:36He has extremely strong connections to Russian organized crime and to Putin.
44:43Aren't you afraid?
44:45If you want to lick honey, don't be afraid of the bees.
44:49Fyrtash has founded a company with Russian partners.
44:53Gazprom had over 160 subsidiary companies.
44:57Money could move around, change hands, and you'd never be the wiser as to where it went.
45:02In my estimation, a lot of those companies existed so that they could take money off the books and buy
45:08politicians.
45:09And we all knew who was behind.
45:11It was established to give corrupt money to politicians.
45:16So they used the revenue from the gas to basically corrupt Ukraine and take money themselves?
45:22Yes.
45:23That's my assessment.
45:25In the early 2000s and even beyond that, the way that much of the gas was imported into Ukraine
45:32and then re-exported to Europe was through a very opaque company called Rosuk Energo,
45:38which had Russian and Ukrainian business people involved in it.
45:43Fyrtash supported the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych.
45:46After his election victory, he was steering Ukraine in the direction of Russia in 2010.
45:52These people had political influence in Ukraine and some of them were clearly agents of Russia.
46:00It was very clear that Russia was using its money from Gazprom to influence Ukrainian politicians.
46:09And I long thought that just like the trade in gas corrupted Ukrainian politics, so it would corrupt German politics.
46:18Merkel wasn't backing away from Putin and Russia.
46:23I think this is the right thing to do.
46:26Europe and Russia are strategic partners that have certainly far from exhausted their potential for cooperation.
46:34After a constitutional amendment, Putin allowed himself to be elected president again.
46:39We won. We won after an open and honest fight.
46:45On the day of Putin's third inauguration, tens of thousands of people protested in Moscow.
46:51Denouncing the president was corrupt, he brutally suppressed the protest.
46:58The West was telling itself its own stories. We didn't want to change our business, our behavior, our agenda.
47:05And Mr. Putin kept telling us, I'm going to disrupt you until you take my interests seriously.
47:12More and more Russian money was also flowing into destabilizing Ukraine.
47:17In 2013, the country was in a dangerous crisis when President Yanukovych had to decide whether to move closer to
47:26the EU.
47:34Yanukovych came to a special summit of the European Union and he told us, the other side is offering more.
47:41And the European leaders told him, that's our limit, that's all you're going to get.
47:45And that made him say, then I won't sign the association agreement.
47:50That was what Putin wanted. The consequence of that was the Maidan.
47:57The spark was followed by an explosion. In the end, Yanukovych fled to Russia.
48:09In August 2015, I started at the U.S. Department of State as European Energy Security Advisor.
48:15I took over the job about a year after Russia legally invaded eastern Ukraine, the Donbas region, and purportedly annexed
48:23Crimea.
48:25The idea at the time was, Nord Stream 2 had been shelved.
48:28The idea that you would still build up this dependence on Russian energy was thought of as crazy.
48:36But less than a year later, Nord Stream 2 was back and the ghost of Putin's pipeline was once again
48:42haunting Europe.
48:43In September 2015, the contract for the construction of Nord Stream 2 was signed.
48:51I don't see a strategic trap there.
48:54I mean, the moment is very much marked by the war with Ukraine, which is bad, very bad, and really
49:00can't be justified with anything.
49:02But to say, because of that, we've been strategically trapped here, I think is overstated.
49:11Miller visited Berlin shortly before the Crimea annexation. He once again blamed Ukraine.
49:21Yes, Ukraine is in a deep political crisis. You still have to pay for the gas.
49:26And Miller had another surprise in store.
49:32Even I didn't think that Germany would be so naive as to sell gas from its storage capacity.
49:38In 2012, a BASF subsidiary agreed to this sale.
49:44At that time, this was all subject to approval, of course.
49:47The German state could have said, no, we don't want that.
49:51We want to have these storage facilities ourselves, but that didn't happen.
49:54On the contrary, we needed even more gas.
49:58Economics Minister Gabriel gave his blessing.
50:01In 2015, the storage facilities were sold.
50:04So that's where we got even more shares.
50:07We expanded those even further, got additional gas fields, and that was the goal.
50:14Nord Stream 2 was pushed forward, just as Chancellor Angela Merkel and Vice-Chancellor Olaf Scholz wanted.
50:20I clearly, on a couple of occasions, saw the data which was prepared by Gazprom.
50:24Inside German ministries?
50:26Yes.
50:26And those people were top-ranked people in the German Ministry of Economy.
50:32That would mean minister and the state secretaries?
50:35Yes.
50:37They would?
50:37Very high.
50:39Propaganda had eaten deep into the system.
50:45Even during the Cold War, Russia was a reliable energy supplier.
50:51This is a purely economic, a purely commercial project.
50:55It's a private commercial project.
50:58I have German interests to represent.
51:01This project is not directed against any of our partners.
51:09I'm worried about Ukraine, because by shifting the gas transit, Putin is clearing the way for a large-scale military
51:18operation
51:19that will eventually lead to Russian tanks showing up on the eastern borders of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania.
51:31Excuse me for interrupting you, but do you really think this scenario is possible?
51:36Why did you say that?
51:38Because it is true.
51:40Gazprom is part of the Russian army.
51:43It's one of their weapons.
51:45Shortly before Putin ordered the attack on Ukraine, Nord Stream 2 was completed.
51:53Today, the second string of Nord Stream 2 must also be filled with gas.
51:59Seven months after the start of the attack on Ukraine, the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines were blown up.
52:06One pipe remained intact.
52:12After all, it looks like one strand of Nord Stream 2 has remained intact.
52:16In a nutshell, the ball is now in the EU's court.
52:20Is the will there?
52:21Well, let them just turn on the tap.
52:24Let them just turn on the tap.
52:46Just turn on the tap.
52:46I don't know the tap.
52:50Just reach me to myself.
52:51Now we helped to have your life if you have a listen or read as 17.
52:51It's eternal.
52:51490'm I think it was a Star Wars trick.
52:54I think it was fun to assistzu fan.
52:54We have toictions for the rest of this.
52:55The first time we see орг Gone grasses were priced and under been imp opacity all the time.
52:56They must go to radioogl and꺼.
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