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Discover how Henry Kissinger's anti-Communist zeal would shape U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam, China, Chile, and the Soviet Union in the second half of the 20th century, through the voices of historians and colleagues.
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00:00:15Richard Nixon is getting his daughter married at the White House.
00:00:23In the meantime, behind the scenes,
00:00:27this fellow Daniel Ellsberg has leaked the secret history of the Vietnam War to the New York Times.
00:00:34And on the same Sunday, where there's the picture of Trisha Nixon being married,
00:00:39there's this story about the Pentagon Papers.
00:00:43Daniel Ellsberg, ex-Pentagon employee, made history by leaking to the New York Times,
00:00:48the Pentagon Papers, a top-secret study of Vietnam policy.
00:00:52Pentagon Papers were 7,000 pages of secret history of the war in Vietnam commissioned
00:00:58by Robert McNamara, the former Secretary of Defense, who became disillusioned with the
00:01:03war and wanted a full record of how we got into it and how it went wrong.
00:01:10Nixon reads his newspaper and his daily briefings, doesn't care about it.
00:01:15Most of the Pentagon Papers are about Johnson and Kennedy. They're not about him.
00:01:18Hello?
00:01:19Mr. President, I have Dr. Kissinger calling you.
00:01:22Okay.
00:01:22But for some reason, Henry Kissinger reads this story in the New York Times and goes ballistic.
00:01:29It's, it's treasonable. There's no question. It's actionable. I'm absolutely certain that this violates all sorts of security laws.
00:01:37What, what do we do about it?
00:01:39Kissinger is convinced that Daniel Ellsberg, if he had access to the Pentagon Papers, has access to what's going on
00:01:48in Cambodia.
00:01:49And he's obsessed that Ellsberg's next step is to release information about the secret bombing campaign in Cambodia.
00:01:57Ten years in prison was very cheap if they could contribute to ending this war.
00:02:00Ellsberg was the Kissinger protege. And so, Kissinger is worried that the finger eventually is going to come back at
00:02:08him.
00:02:09Kissinger describes Ellsberg as unhinged.
00:02:13Of course, that son of a bitch. I know him well. He was annoying. Oh, well. From early 69 on,
00:02:19he just went off his rocket. Just totally wild. And he's moved into a more and more intrinsic, radical position.
00:02:27So, it's Kissinger that gins up Nixon about Ellsberg.
00:02:32We've got to get here. We've got to get here.
00:02:38Kissinger's frantic, self-protective reaction to the exposure of the Pentagon Papers drives Nixon to a place which eventually becomes
00:02:47the first step towards work.
00:02:51Kissinger's frantic,кол
00:02:55Kissinger's frantic,
00:02:57Kissinger's frantic...
00:03:06Kissinger's frantic,
00:03:36Transcription by CastingWords
00:03:55Transcription by CastingWords
00:04:08The broad strategy was to know where you want to go over the long run, to see how the pieces
00:04:13fit.
00:04:14So what you did with one country, how it would affect another country.
00:04:18And I think Kissinger felt you had to reconcile the just with the possible.
00:04:32Vietnam to Kissinger and to Nixon was a thorn in their side.
00:04:35They wanted it off page one so they could get to all the kind of things that Nixon had on
00:04:40his very expansive and aggressive foreign policy plate.
00:04:44You couldn't do those until you had the Vietnam question settled.
00:04:50The United States seemed hemmed in in Vietnam.
00:04:54We seemed unable to do anything right.
00:04:58But Kissinger recognized that there was a lot of power in taking the initiative.
00:05:03He was willing to take risks and he was able to manufacture opportunities where they did not exist before.
00:05:18Before they came to power, both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger thought what might be done with China.
00:05:28I think it took the two of them spending time together contemplating the great chessboard of the Cold War to
00:05:36realize
00:05:37that if we can only establish some communications with China, that could be helpful in a number of ways.
00:05:45It could help you with the Vietnam problem, but it could also help you with the Soviets.
00:05:52We had, for the last few decades, assumed that communism was a seamless hold.
00:05:57Well, suddenly not so much.
00:05:58In the late 60s, you started to see friction and then clashes between the Soviets and the Chinese along border
00:06:04areas.
00:06:05And you had people in the intelligence community saying,
00:06:08hey, rather than being on the same team, these guys are in different teams.
00:06:13There's actually a split, which we began to call the Sino-Soviet split.
00:06:17A disputed frontier between the dragon and the bear.
00:06:22A war broke out.
00:06:24A border dispute between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
00:06:30More importantly, there was an ideological battle for leadership of the communist world.
00:06:37This was the setting within which Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger developed perhaps the boldest ploy in all of Cold
00:06:47War statecraft.
00:06:53Mao's China was probably the most closed country in the world.
00:06:58There were very few people who went in there.
00:07:00So it really was this place on the moon.
00:07:03Nobody really knew what was going on inside.
00:07:07Mao's policies had reduced China to one of the lowest standards of living in the world.
00:07:14Wretched poverty enforced by the draconian measures of communist rule.
00:07:22I was born in late 1959, ten years after the communists took over China.
00:07:29Mao was our red sun, was the savior of China.
00:07:34We were schooled on all this anti-Western propaganda.
00:07:41I grew up seeing these famous Korean war movies called Heroic Children.
00:07:48And in it, you see American soldiers played by Chinese actors with fake noses and white powder.
00:07:58And they were incredibly ridiculous creatures who would be mauled down by Chinese machine guns.
00:08:06So that was the very cartoonish picture of Americans that we had in our head.
00:08:16As we came into office one week after his inauguration...
00:08:20You, Richard, Milhouse, Nixon...
00:08:23Nixon sent a memo to Kissinger and said, get in touch with the Chinese, see what we can do.
00:08:28One week, you can see his priority.
00:08:30This is where the story gets the most cloak and the most dagger.
00:08:36The process of trying to get in touch with Beijing started almost immediately in 1969.
00:08:42But it was extremely difficult because the Chinese were extremely hard to get to.
00:08:48The Chinese had no diplomatic representatives anywhere in the world.
00:08:51Even having an address where you could confidentially and reliably communicate with the Chinese didn't exist.
00:09:01So what they had to do is find discreet intermediaries who could play that role.
00:09:07Of all countries, it turned out to be Pakistan that made the connection happen.
00:09:15Today's highlight is the new ambassador from Pakistan and his family.
00:09:19And what would happen is that the Chinese would send a secret message which would end up with the Pakistani
00:09:25ambassador in Washington who would call on Kissinger with the message.
00:09:30In January 1971, we had sent a message and we hadn't heard back for months.
00:09:36And indeed, we got quite nervous.
00:09:39Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, were great believers in the subtle approach.
00:09:46And so the faintest of signals were sent out from Beijing to the effect that there might possibly be a
00:09:56conversation worth having.
00:10:01April of 1971, in Japan, an American ping-pong team was playing in international ping-pong matches.
00:10:10And one of the participants in that was the People's Republic of China.
00:10:15What happened was there was a young, sort of a hippie ping-pong player with long hair and tie-dyed
00:10:22shirts, and he got on the wrong bus.
00:10:24It was the Chinese bus.
00:10:27And met their star player.
00:10:29And they kind of got to be friends.
00:10:36One of the coaches from the People's Republic approached the Americans about the possibility of them coming to China to
00:10:47play exhibition.
00:10:49This was an extraordinary moment and received incredible coverage in the American media.
00:10:55The first films are now coming out of red China of the visit by the first U.S. group ever
00:11:00invited by the Chinese communists.
00:11:03The day Premier Zhou Enlai met the visiting players, he told them their visit opens a new door.
00:11:08It was a signal that, yes, there was an opportunity to send an American representative to Beijing.
00:11:18The question was, who would that be?
00:11:22Secrecy was crucial, and that meant that Nixon could only really entrust it to the one person who already knew
00:11:29that this was his cherished goal.
00:11:33And that was Henry Kissinger.
00:11:35I knew nothing about China.
00:11:38That's a great qualification for a secret mission, but it happens to be true.
00:11:43I had the same thought in the 50s that everyone else had did, that the Chinese were revolutionary near-madmen.
00:11:56We had to set up what the cover store would be.
00:12:02So we go on a public trip to the four countries.
00:12:07And we stop, of course, in Pakistan.
00:12:10Henry's cover was going to be that he's got a stomachache.
00:12:14Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger is staying an extra day in Pakistan because of an upset stomach.
00:12:21So, at 2 a.m., we're driven to the Islamabad airport by the defense minister.
00:12:27The four of us get on the plane.
00:12:31And so here we are, flying toward Beijing.
00:12:34None of the world knows where we are.
00:12:37We were exhilarated and anxious.
00:12:39I mean, this was a gamble.
00:12:40This is no sure thing.
00:12:46He landed in a military airport in Beijing.
00:12:50And, of course, we drove in automobiles where the curtains were down.
00:12:54Nobody could see us.
00:12:57Kissinger was deeply impressed by Zhou Enmai, the Chinese premier.
00:13:02And this was one of the great meetings of minds that happened in his career.
00:13:09He was a man of extraordinary intelligence.
00:13:13One of the most intelligent people I've ever met.
00:13:16He had an extraordinarily expressive face.
00:13:20He understood English, though he did not admit it.
00:13:23So, his face registered while you talked to him.
00:13:28The driving force was hopes that if we could pull China more into our orbit,
00:13:34we could resolve the Vietnam War.
00:13:37Most of the military equipment going to North Vietnam was coming through China.
00:13:43I remember him telling Zhou Enmai,
00:13:46we don't want to wake up in the morning in the second term
00:13:48reading battlefield reports from Vietnam.
00:13:52One term was enough.
00:13:54The Chinese had two major goals.
00:13:57One was to balance the Soviet Union, which is increasingly threatening them.
00:14:02And the other was coming out of diplomatic isolation.
00:14:05The key issue, of course, we had to get around was the Taiwan issue.
00:14:10And so Kissinger made it clear to the Chinese
00:14:12that the United States would withdraw some of its forces from Taiwan
00:14:16if the Vietnam War came to an end.
00:14:23Toward the end of the talks,
00:14:25it was finally raised that President Nixon would come to China.
00:14:31I think Kissinger did have a recognition something big had happened.
00:14:35After all, he had gotten to the top of China.
00:14:39And he had, in effect, triggered an invitation for Nixon himself.
00:14:48I do remember how jubilant he was when he returned from his secret trip.
00:14:53I had never seen him like that before.
00:14:55He was just vibrating with excitement.
00:15:01Kissinger briefs Nixon,
00:15:03and Nixon schedules a national television speech.
00:15:06Good evening.
00:15:07The secrecy was such that people thought it was about Vietnam.
00:15:12It hit the nation on a Sunday night as a complete surprise.
00:15:16I have taken this action because of my profound conviction
00:15:21that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions
00:15:27and a better relationship between the United States
00:15:31and the People's Republic of China.
00:15:34The tales of Henry Kissinger's secret trip,
00:15:37which led to that announcement,
00:15:38were spelled out today in a factual account
00:15:40which makes most detective story fiction seem bland.
00:15:43Henry, can you just tell us,
00:15:44do you feel encouraged as a result of your trip to Peking?
00:15:48I think we made some progress.
00:15:53The Taiwanese ambassador was visibly upset.
00:15:56I got a 20-minute notice last night.
00:16:00I couldn't believe it.
00:16:01We think that's not the kind of thing
00:16:03a friend and an ally should do to another.
00:16:11Observers may argue
00:16:12over whether Dr. Henry Kissinger is a secret swinger
00:16:15or a square masquerading as one,
00:16:17but there's no doubt he is the deputy president on this trip.
00:16:21The brilliant, elusive intellectual
00:16:23who has structured the substance of the top-level talks
00:16:26will be at the president's side throughout.
00:16:30We heard this official announcement
00:16:32that Nixon was coming to China.
00:16:36I still remember rounds of school briefings
00:16:39to prepare in case you should encounter
00:16:43any Americans on the street.
00:16:45The correct attitude is not too arrogant
00:16:49and not too obsequious.
00:16:54And I remember when Nixon actually landed,
00:16:59somehow I have a sense
00:17:00this was a super important moment
00:17:04that's going to, in some ways, change your life.
00:17:08The first American president ever to do so
00:17:10steps onto Chinese soil.
00:17:18The meetings with Mao Zedong took place
00:17:20in an area adjacent to the Forbidden City
00:17:23called Zhongnanhai,
00:17:24and that's where Mao held court.
00:17:27The fact that Chairman Mao arranged
00:17:29an immediate meeting
00:17:30with the American chief of state in his home
00:17:32is considered significant by diplomatic observers.
00:17:35Just to be there
00:17:36was to be in the most forbidden,
00:17:40inaccessible place on earth.
00:17:41I think it must have been quite exhilarating.
00:17:46It's one of those few experiences you have
00:17:49when you are an adult
00:17:51which have some of the quality of childhood about them
00:17:54that everything is totally new.
00:17:58We were used to these elegant Mandarin discourses
00:18:02by Zhou Enlai.
00:18:03What we got from Mao was laconic phrases,
00:18:07allegories, either that were brilliant
00:18:09and we stupid Westerners couldn't understand
00:18:12or he was slightly senile.
00:18:15Mao was a great performer.
00:18:17He said a Chinese phrase.
00:18:20He said,
00:18:21the wind and rain are coming,
00:18:24so the swallows are busy.
00:18:27Kissinger's reaction was,
00:18:29oh, that was so deep,
00:18:31it would take me several days
00:18:32to fully grasp that.
00:18:34But in fact,
00:18:35there's a very tacky,
00:18:37trite Chinese,
00:18:38you know,
00:18:39sort of saying.
00:18:40Kissinger ate it right up.
00:18:44Joe and Nixon sit down for conversations
00:18:46which last for more than 30 hours.
00:18:48The result is the Shanghai Communique.
00:18:51You can see the mastery of Kissinger's diplomacy
00:18:54by looking at what's called the Shanghai Communique,
00:18:57which is,
00:18:58how do you get around the problem
00:18:59that the United States basically thinks
00:19:01Taiwan is the real China?
00:19:03So what did they do
00:19:05to put the Taiwan question aside?
00:19:07They agreed on this very guileful solution
00:19:11where the United States,
00:19:13there's a word in Chinese,
00:19:15they said it was,
00:19:15we acknowledge,
00:19:19we take note of the fact
00:19:21that China says Taiwan is part of China.
00:19:25It's masterful in its obfuscation
00:19:29and vagueness,
00:19:31but it somehow satisfied everyone.
00:19:36It was a dream come true
00:19:40for Richard Nixon himself
00:19:41and also for Henry Kissinger.
00:19:44This was good news
00:19:47after an unremissing diet of bad news
00:19:50over Vietnam and over Cambodia.
00:19:53It felt as though
00:19:55they were changing the subjects
00:19:57of the American conversation.
00:20:00We have witnessed
00:20:01through the miracle of satellite television
00:20:04the sights and sounds
00:20:07of a society that has been closed
00:20:10to Americans for over two decades.
00:20:14Opening to China was maybe
00:20:17in the 20th century
00:20:18the most strategic move
00:20:20that any president has ever made.
00:20:22It was the height of the Cold War.
00:20:24China and the Soviet Union were allies
00:20:28and we peeled off China.
00:20:30It was that simple.
00:20:33I think to see the real politic
00:20:35played out was very sobering.
00:20:39The whole thing was part
00:20:41of a geopolitical game
00:20:43to balance the Soviet Union.
00:20:45Nixon and Kissinger had no interest
00:20:49in helping improve
00:20:51the political situation in China.
00:20:55They had no thoughts,
00:20:58not a iota of thoughts
00:21:00about human rights.
00:21:02At one level,
00:21:03how could I expect anything more?
00:21:07I think it's a mistake
00:21:09to see Kissinger's realpolitik
00:21:11as an absence of morality.
00:21:14What he sees as the moral good
00:21:16is the preservation
00:21:18of American security.
00:21:20Where I think
00:21:22we begin to enter
00:21:23into a moral grey area
00:21:26for Kissinger
00:21:27is what means are acceptable
00:21:29in order to achieve that end.
00:21:31And I think
00:21:33he had very few limits.
00:21:37Every president,
00:21:39every national security advisor
00:21:41takes decisions
00:21:42in which there are priorities
00:21:45accorded to countries
00:21:46and in which evils are ranked,
00:21:49not just according
00:21:50to their moral magnitude,
00:21:52but more importantly,
00:21:53according to their strategic magnitude.
00:22:02The East Pakistan crisis erupted
00:22:06at the time
00:22:08that Pakistan was our only channel
00:22:11of communication to China.
00:22:13We were in the process
00:22:15of arranging my secret trip
00:22:19in the precise period
00:22:21that West Pakistan
00:22:22was trying to put down
00:22:24the uprising
00:22:25in East Pakistan.
00:22:28The partition of British India
00:22:31had produced
00:22:31a strange situation
00:22:33in which there were
00:22:34essentially two parts
00:22:35to Pakistan.
00:22:37What we know today
00:22:38as Pakistan
00:22:39was West Pakistan.
00:22:41What we know today
00:22:42as Bangladesh
00:22:42was East Pakistan.
00:22:45East Pakistan and West Pakistan
00:22:47did not share a language,
00:22:49they did not share culture,
00:22:50they did not share history.
00:22:51It's a complete recipe
00:22:53for conflict.
00:22:56In 1970,
00:22:57the residents
00:22:59of East Pakistan
00:22:59voted overwhelmingly
00:23:01for a different government
00:23:03from the West Pakistanis.
00:23:05The Eastern portion
00:23:07is beginning to revolt
00:23:08against the authority
00:23:10of the West Pakistani government.
00:23:12It's got its own
00:23:13elected parliament,
00:23:15its own elected leadership,
00:23:16a man named Mujib,
00:23:18and it's on the verge
00:23:19of civil war.
00:23:20The Eastern portion
00:23:22is the channel
00:23:28through which
00:23:29Nixon and Kissinger
00:23:30are communicating
00:23:31with China,
00:23:32and it's absolutely vital
00:23:34that he remain in power.
00:23:36President Yahya Khan
00:23:37of Pakistan
00:23:38flies to East Pakistan
00:23:40tomorrow
00:23:40to try to talk
00:23:41his opposition
00:23:42into obeying
00:23:43the central government.
00:23:45In Dhaka,
00:23:46I was the junior
00:23:47political officer.
00:23:49At 1.26 in the morning
00:23:52of the 26th of March,
00:23:55all hell broke loose.
00:23:57The West Pakistani military
00:24:00were unleashed
00:24:01with a vengeance.
00:24:02Automatic weapons
00:24:03right outside
00:24:04of our bedroom.
00:24:08The Pakistanis
00:24:09murdered large numbers
00:24:10of the opposition politicians
00:24:13in their beds at night,
00:24:15killed their families,
00:24:17raked Dhaka,
00:24:18the capital
00:24:19of East Pakistan,
00:24:20with artillery,
00:24:21wantonly killing
00:24:22innocent civilians.
00:24:25The Pakistani army
00:24:27went into Dhaka University
00:24:30and just rounded up
00:24:32academics,
00:24:33including my uncles,
00:24:34and disappeared them.
00:24:38I mean,
00:24:38what was happening
00:24:39was genocide
00:24:41before our very eyes.
00:24:44We are in the process
00:24:45of attempting
00:24:46to negotiate
00:24:47a ceasefire
00:24:48in the Dhaka area
00:24:49in order to be able
00:24:50to evacuate
00:24:51the Americans.
00:24:53The Nixon administration
00:24:54had lots of information
00:24:57about what's happening.
00:24:58They're getting
00:24:59real-time reporting
00:25:00from the U.S. consulate
00:25:03in Dhaka.
00:25:04These Foreign Service
00:25:05officers have seen
00:25:06that kind of violence
00:25:07before,
00:25:08and they're saying,
00:25:09this is in a completely
00:25:10different category.
00:25:12We've never seen
00:25:14anything like this.
00:25:17There's enormous pressure
00:25:19on Nixon and Kissinger
00:25:20to cut aid
00:25:22and military support
00:25:23for Pakistan,
00:25:25but they choose
00:25:26not to do that.
00:25:28We were absolutely
00:25:30mortified
00:25:30that our government
00:25:31was not responding
00:25:33in what was
00:25:34a humanitarian disaster
00:25:37inflicted by a government
00:25:38that we supported.
00:25:40So a number of us,
00:25:41especially younger officers,
00:25:43felt that we needed
00:25:44to send in
00:25:45an expression of dissent.
00:25:48Our government
00:25:49has failed
00:25:50to denounce
00:25:51the suppression
00:25:51of democracy.
00:25:53Our government
00:25:54has failed
00:25:54to denounce atrocities.
00:25:57Our government
00:25:57has evidenced
00:25:58what many will consider
00:26:00moral bankruptcy.
00:26:02We've been in touch,
00:26:04of course,
00:26:04with the Pakistanis
00:26:05through messages
00:26:06that were sent
00:26:06to President Yahya.
00:26:08And incidentally,
00:26:09he's been very forthcoming.
00:26:11We can't be blamed for.
00:26:12There are many areas
00:26:13in the world
00:26:14that we just can't,
00:26:16we can't be responsible for.
00:26:19I was shocked
00:26:20by the lack of reaction
00:26:22from Kissinger and Nixon.
00:26:24They seemed
00:26:27unaffected by it,
00:26:28except in the sense
00:26:31that they wanted it
00:26:32to go away.
00:26:34As far as Kissinger
00:26:36was concerned,
00:26:37these lives
00:26:38in South Asia,
00:26:39they just didn't matter.
00:26:42We've never covered
00:26:43the bodies
00:26:44of my uncles.
00:26:47There could have been
00:26:48an arms cutoff.
00:26:49There could have been
00:26:50stronger measures
00:26:51taken against Pakistan,
00:26:52which were not taken.
00:26:55Ultimately,
00:26:56it comes down
00:26:56to Kissinger's assessment
00:26:58that what matters
00:26:59is China.
00:27:01And what happens
00:27:03in East Pakistan
00:27:04is almost a footnote
00:27:05relative to these
00:27:06larger objectives.
00:27:09There are governments
00:27:11in power
00:27:11that may not meet
00:27:14all our criteria
00:27:15for democratic principles,
00:27:18but the alternative
00:27:19to which are likely
00:27:20to be positively hostile
00:27:22to our interests.
00:27:23To manipulate
00:27:25the domestic politics
00:27:26of another country
00:27:27is always
00:27:28an extremely complicated matter.
00:27:32and you can start
00:27:33a process
00:27:33which you cannot control
00:27:34and you may not know
00:27:35how to do it.
00:27:41My first encounter
00:27:43with the great man
00:27:45was when
00:27:46there was a luncheon
00:27:47at our residence.
00:27:50My father was
00:27:51foreign affairs minister
00:27:52and in this luncheon
00:27:54there was a big debate
00:27:56and Kissinger says,
00:27:58look,
00:27:59I don't care
00:27:59about Latin America.
00:28:01I don't care
00:28:02about your development.
00:28:04History doesn't
00:28:05go through the South.
00:28:06History comes
00:28:07from Russia
00:28:08to Japan
00:28:09to Europe
00:28:10and to the United States.
00:28:12The South
00:28:12has no importance.
00:28:18Kissinger called Chile
00:28:19a dagger pointed
00:28:21at the heart
00:28:21of Antarctica.
00:28:23He did not think
00:28:24that Latin America
00:28:25was important.
00:28:26He, in fact,
00:28:27said Latin America
00:28:28is not important.
00:28:30Chile was probably
00:28:31the country
00:28:32that first
00:28:32had a stable democracy
00:28:34in the region.
00:28:36We had a democracy
00:28:37even before
00:28:38some European countries.
00:28:40Salvador Allende
00:28:41was a person
00:28:42who had
00:28:43represented
00:28:44the hopes
00:28:44of the poor
00:28:45in Chile
00:28:46for decades.
00:28:48And poor people
00:28:49felt that he
00:28:49was their leader.
00:28:53Allende was head
00:28:54of the Socialist Party.
00:28:55He believed
00:28:56in the need
00:28:57for social change,
00:28:59redistribution
00:29:00of wealth
00:29:00and that this
00:29:01could be done
00:29:01through the ballot box.
00:29:04There is a sense
00:29:05in Kissinger
00:29:06that Allende's example
00:29:08could proliferate
00:29:10all over the continent
00:29:11and he consented
00:29:13leaders that one must
00:29:14stop the contagion.
00:29:16Allende
00:29:17made no secret
00:29:19of his determination
00:29:21to bring about
00:29:22a revolutionary
00:29:23transformation.
00:29:25Nobody wanted
00:29:26another Cuba.
00:29:27And so when
00:29:28any left-wing leader
00:29:29showed signs
00:29:30of coming to power
00:29:32in a Latin American
00:29:33country,
00:29:34the red lights
00:29:35started flashing
00:29:36on the dashboard
00:29:38in the Situation Room.
00:29:42In the Cold War,
00:29:43every inch
00:29:44of territory matters.
00:29:47It's a zero-sum game.
00:29:49Any victory
00:29:50for the communists
00:29:51is a loss
00:29:52for the United States.
00:29:54And so
00:29:55all eyes were on Chile
00:29:57on September 4, 1970
00:29:59as this election
00:30:01took place.
00:30:09The presidential election
00:30:10in Chile in 1970
00:30:12is a three-way race
00:30:13in which Salvador Allende
00:30:15wins 36.6% of the vote.
00:30:20But this must be ratified
00:30:21by Congress.
00:30:23So there is a chance
00:30:24for those who are
00:30:25against Allende
00:30:26to try to find a way
00:30:28to stop Allende
00:30:29from becoming president.
00:30:32Kissinger talks
00:30:33to CI Director
00:30:34Richard Helms
00:30:35on the phone
00:30:35and basically says,
00:30:36we cannot let Chile
00:30:37go down the drain.
00:30:39And Helms says,
00:30:39I'm with you.
00:30:41And they start
00:30:42to plot out
00:30:42how they are going
00:30:43to keep Allende
00:30:44from actually being
00:30:46inaugurated
00:30:47as president.
00:30:49Allende!
00:30:50Allende!
00:30:51Kissinger says,
00:30:52I don't see why
00:30:53we should let a country
00:30:54go communist
00:30:55just because of
00:30:55the irresponsibility
00:30:56of its own people.
00:31:02President Nixon
00:31:03called in to Richard Helms
00:31:04and Kissinger
00:31:05to the Oval Office
00:31:06and Helms took
00:31:08handwritten notes
00:31:09on Nixon's orders.
00:31:11Save Chile.
00:31:12Don't tell the ambassador.
00:31:13Make the economy scream.
00:31:1548-hour game plan.
00:31:18Nixon authorizes
00:31:19two tracks
00:31:20and then Kissinger
00:31:21carries these out.
00:31:22Track one
00:31:23is essentially
00:31:24an attempt
00:31:25to bribe
00:31:26the Chilean members
00:31:26of Congress
00:31:27from ratifying
00:31:28Allende.
00:31:29Track two
00:31:30is what becomes
00:31:31infamous.
00:31:32It is an effort
00:31:33to help
00:31:35the Chilean military
00:31:36institute a coup
00:31:38against Allende.
00:31:40The Chilean
00:31:42consultants
00:31:43that the CIA
00:31:44had
00:31:44and Kissinger
00:31:46had at the time
00:31:47recommended
00:31:48the kidnapping
00:31:50of the commander-in-chief
00:31:51of the armed forces.
00:31:53That meant
00:31:54General Schneider.
00:31:56General René Schneider,
00:31:58head of the Chilean
00:31:59armed forces,
00:32:00was pro-Constitution.
00:32:01He was the principal
00:32:02obstacle
00:32:03to any coup plot
00:32:04involving the military.
00:32:06And so he had
00:32:08to be removed,
00:32:09neutralized,
00:32:10eliminated.
00:32:12They sent machine guns
00:32:14through the pouch
00:32:15of the American embassy
00:32:16and $30,000
00:32:18for the general
00:32:19who was in charge
00:32:20of the Santiago.
00:32:24On October 22nd,
00:32:26General Schneider
00:32:27got into his car.
00:32:28The car drove
00:32:29three or four blocks.
00:32:31It was intercepted
00:32:32by several other vehicles
00:32:34filled with thugs.
00:32:36One thug got out
00:32:37with a sledgehammer
00:32:38and started smashing
00:32:39in the windows.
00:32:41General Schneider
00:32:42had a gun
00:32:43and he tried
00:32:45to defend himself
00:32:46and they killed him.
00:32:48Henry Kissinger
00:32:49gets on the phone
00:32:50with Richard Nixon
00:32:51as General René Schneider
00:32:53lies dying
00:32:54in a military hospital.
00:32:56And he says,
00:32:58the first step
00:32:58of the coup plot
00:32:59took place,
00:33:00but such an incompetent bunch,
00:33:02these Chilean
00:33:02military officers,
00:33:03that the rest of the plot
00:33:05is not going forward.
00:33:12The shock
00:33:13that this murder
00:33:15produced in China society
00:33:16instead of weakening Allende
00:33:19gave an enormous strength
00:33:21to the election of Allende.
00:33:25Allende, therefore,
00:33:26was proclaimed president
00:33:27ten days later.
00:33:31Kissinger does not give up.
00:33:32He wants Allende out of there.
00:33:35So there's an American effort
00:33:37to undermine his government
00:33:40and that includes
00:33:41cutting off loans
00:33:42and aid,
00:33:44funding opposition parties,
00:33:46opposition media,
00:33:47and fomenting strikes.
00:33:50The first thing
00:33:52that Nixon said
00:33:53after the election
00:33:53of Allende
00:33:54was make the economy scream.
00:33:56In fact,
00:33:57the economy screamed.
00:33:59A country becomes tense,
00:34:02becomes polarized,
00:34:03and then you have a society
00:34:04which was a healthy society
00:34:06in political terms
00:34:07that becomes
00:34:09absolutely out of control.
00:34:14Army, Navy, Air Force,
00:34:16and National Police
00:34:17staged the coup
00:34:18that ends 46 years
00:34:19of democratic rule in Chile.
00:34:21The military moves in.
00:34:23The palace is surrounded.
00:34:26September 11, 1973,
00:34:28the Chilean military
00:34:30undertook a very violent coup.
00:34:32They launched rocket attacks,
00:34:35bombarding the Moneda Palace.
00:34:46Allende was there
00:34:48in the presidential palace.
00:34:49He began talking on the radio.
00:34:52Viva, chief!
00:34:53Viva, world!
00:34:54He persuaded the rest
00:34:56of the people
00:34:56who were inside
00:34:57to leave the palace.
00:35:00When they were leaving
00:35:01the palace,
00:35:02one of the doctors
00:35:03of Allende
00:35:04decided
00:35:04that he would come back
00:35:06to where the office
00:35:07of the president was,
00:35:09and he saw Allende
00:35:10sitting with the machine gun
00:35:12here,
00:35:13and he shot himself.
00:35:17There is no direct evidence
00:35:19that Nixon and Kissinger
00:35:21knew about that coup
00:35:22in advance,
00:35:24and there's no evidence
00:35:25that they helped plan it.
00:35:27But they were thrilled
00:35:29that Allende was gone,
00:35:30and they immediately
00:35:31threw U.S. support
00:35:32behind Pinochet.
00:35:36Augusto Pinochet
00:35:37was the commander-in-chief
00:35:38of the army
00:35:39at the moment
00:35:39in which the coup happened.
00:35:43Pinochet came late
00:35:44to the conspiracy
00:35:45to organize a coup.
00:35:47And in order
00:35:49to persuade
00:35:50those who had been
00:35:51from the first moment
00:35:52in favor of the coup,
00:35:54he had to be more brutal
00:35:55than them
00:35:56when he took power.
00:36:01Pinochet began rounding up
00:36:03leftists
00:36:04and suspected subversives,
00:36:07gathered them up
00:36:08in a series
00:36:08of detention centers,
00:36:09including the National
00:36:11Soccer Stadium,
00:36:12and it began the process
00:36:14of executing many of them.
00:36:17Many were tortured
00:36:18for information.
00:36:19Many more were tortured
00:36:21simply for the purpose
00:36:23of instilling
00:36:23the Chilean population
00:36:25with fear.
00:36:27There were thousands
00:36:28of people killed,
00:36:29thousands of people tortured,
00:36:31thousands of people
00:36:32who had to live abroad forever.
00:36:34I would say that
00:36:35it is incomparable
00:36:36to any other event
00:36:37in our history.
00:36:41After the coup,
00:36:43Nixon seems preoccupied
00:36:44that the United States
00:36:45might be exposed.
00:36:47And Kissinger says,
00:36:48we didn't do it.
00:36:49I mean,
00:36:50we helped them,
00:36:51quote,
00:36:52create the conditions
00:36:53as best as possible.
00:36:57You would think
00:36:58that as a refugee
00:36:59from Nazi Germany,
00:37:01that Kissinger would be
00:37:02deeply committed
00:37:03to democracy.
00:37:04But he seemed to think
00:37:06that it was not a problem
00:37:07at all
00:37:07to have dictators
00:37:08be on the side of the U.S.
00:37:09in the struggle
00:37:10against communism.
00:37:12And in cases like Chile,
00:37:14he was clearly willing
00:37:15to subvert democracy.
00:37:18The argument
00:37:18that Kissinger makes
00:37:19is that everything
00:37:21that he is doing
00:37:21is in the service
00:37:22of the best outcome
00:37:24for the world.
00:37:25He's thinking about
00:37:26the global chessboard.
00:37:27And the fact that
00:37:28there are going to be
00:37:29people suffering,
00:37:30dying on the ground,
00:37:32that to him
00:37:33is a necessary consequence
00:37:34of pursuing policies
00:37:35that are going to
00:37:36result in global stability.
00:37:43Russia puts on
00:37:44its annual May Day
00:37:45show of strength
00:37:46in these just-released
00:37:47films from Moscow.
00:37:50The Soviet Union,
00:37:51at the beginning
00:37:52of the Nixon administration,
00:37:54had good reason
00:37:55to think that they
00:37:56were winning the Cold War.
00:37:58The United States
00:37:59was bogged down
00:38:00in Vietnam,
00:38:02but that wasn't
00:38:02its only problem.
00:38:04With every passing year,
00:38:06the Soviets built
00:38:07more nuclear weapons
00:38:09until they achieved parity
00:38:10and then overtook
00:38:12the United States
00:38:12in terms of the size
00:38:13of their nuclear arsenal.
00:38:16From 1945,
00:38:18from Hiroshima
00:38:19until the early 70s,
00:38:22it's a breakneck race
00:38:23to build more nuclear weapons.
00:38:25This was a very
00:38:26unstable situation
00:38:27and there was
00:38:28no obvious end to it.
00:38:31When the decision
00:38:32of peace and war
00:38:33involves the survival
00:38:34of tens of millions
00:38:35of people,
00:38:36you are no longer
00:38:37playing power politics
00:38:38in the traditional sense.
00:38:40To conduct
00:38:41confrontation politics
00:38:43when the stakes
00:38:44are going to be determined
00:38:45by nuclear weapons
00:38:46is the height
00:38:48of irresponsibility.
00:38:49This is what we mean
00:38:50by detente.
00:38:52Detente is a French word
00:38:55that really just meant
00:38:56improving relations.
00:38:59It was about
00:39:00buying some time,
00:39:02reducing the risk
00:39:03risk of World War III
00:39:04and trying to recover
00:39:06from what was becoming
00:39:08the insolvable problem
00:39:10of Vietnam.
00:39:13Kissinger definitely
00:39:15saw a role
00:39:15for the Soviet Union
00:39:17in the resolution
00:39:18of Vietnam
00:39:18and he is very clear
00:39:22that he's interested
00:39:24in getting help
00:39:25from them
00:39:25in bringing this
00:39:27to a close.
00:39:28Kissinger would creatively
00:39:30suggest the possibility
00:39:31of a summit meeting
00:39:32and the Soviets
00:39:33would say,
00:39:35njet.
00:39:37This changed
00:39:38with the opening
00:39:40to China.
00:39:41When we opened
00:39:42to China,
00:39:43the Soviets
00:39:44suddenly realized
00:39:45that we had
00:39:46a bigger canvas
00:39:47to paint on
00:39:48than they had calculated.
00:39:51And in that sense,
00:39:52there was leverage.
00:39:54The Soviets
00:39:55who are looking
00:39:55at the world stage
00:39:56are saying,
00:39:57wait a minute,
00:39:58we've just been
00:39:59outflanked
00:40:00and if we don't
00:40:01get into talks
00:40:02with the Americans
00:40:03and strike a deal
00:40:05that makes us
00:40:06an equal superpower,
00:40:08the Chinese
00:40:09are going to
00:40:09replace us.
00:40:11Good evening.
00:40:12President Nixon
00:40:13has announced
00:40:13that he'll be going
00:40:14to Moscow next May
00:40:15for a summit conference
00:40:16with Soviet leaders.
00:40:18It will be the first
00:40:19trip to the Soviet Union
00:40:20by an American president
00:40:21since Franklin Roosevelt
00:40:22journeyed to Yalta
00:40:23in the waning days
00:40:24of World War II.
00:40:29Kissinger and Nixon
00:40:30accepted an invitation
00:40:31to stay in the Kremlin.
00:40:34I mean,
00:40:35whether you
00:40:36as president
00:40:36of the United States
00:40:37would have wanted
00:40:38everything you did
00:40:39in your guest room
00:40:41bugged and photographed,
00:40:42I don't know,
00:40:43but that's what
00:40:44Henry agreed to do.
00:40:47So they stayed
00:40:48in the Kremlin.
00:40:51The Soviet leadership
00:40:53had installed
00:40:54Leonid Brezhnev,
00:40:55not the sharpest knife
00:40:56in the drawer
00:40:57intellectually,
00:40:58let's put it that way.
00:40:59Brezhnev is a classic
00:41:01Communist Party
00:41:02apparatchik
00:41:03who's risen to the top
00:41:05by being very careful
00:41:06at playing all sides
00:41:09against each other.
00:41:11He's not a thug.
00:41:13He's not very far
00:41:14from a thug.
00:41:20The most surreal moment
00:41:23in their relationship
00:41:23must have been
00:41:24when Brezhnev treated Kissinger
00:41:27to a visit
00:41:27to his hunting lodge.
00:41:31Henry Kissinger
00:41:33was not the kind of person
00:41:34who goes shooting wild boar
00:41:37as a recreational pastime.
00:41:40They put out the food.
00:41:41You sit in the tower
00:41:42and shoot the poor bastard
00:41:44as they come by to feed.
00:41:46When he had chilled
00:41:47about three poars
00:41:49a gun out of what else,
00:41:51he up packed a picnic
00:41:53and said,
00:41:54look, I'm going to talk
00:41:54to you privately.
00:41:55And he said,
00:41:56look, you and me are
00:41:57problemless.
00:41:57You and me are
00:41:58going to have the work.
00:42:00I participated
00:42:01in a meeting
00:42:02with Brezhnev
00:42:03at his dacha.
00:42:04It was an evening
00:42:05devoted to Vietnam.
00:42:07The meeting
00:42:08was just three
00:42:08or four top
00:42:09Soviet leaders,
00:42:10including Brezhnev,
00:42:11took turns
00:42:12lambasting Nixon
00:42:13about his Vietnam policy,
00:42:16all of which
00:42:17was to show Hanoi
00:42:19how tough they were.
00:42:20And we met
00:42:21for four hours.
00:42:22And I remember
00:42:23Nixon leaning over
00:42:24to Kissinger saying,
00:42:26you know,
00:42:26Jesus Christ,
00:42:27we've got to get out of here.
00:42:28At that point,
00:42:29Brezhnev says,
00:42:30well, now we're going
00:42:30upstairs for dinner.
00:42:34The whole mood changed.
00:42:36Everyone got half drunk.
00:42:38And then toward
00:42:39the end of that dinner,
00:42:41Brezhnev says to Nixon,
00:42:42I think Kissinger
00:42:42should go off
00:42:43and negotiate
00:42:44with my people
00:42:45on the SALT agreement.
00:42:48SALT was the first treaty
00:42:52ever negotiated
00:42:53to limit the growth
00:42:55of what were
00:42:56euphemistically called
00:42:57strategic arms.
00:43:02We go back to Moscow.
00:43:04We needed to Xerox
00:43:06the SALT treaty
00:43:07because it was being signed.
00:43:09And suddenly,
00:43:10the Xerox machine
00:43:11wouldn't work anymore.
00:43:12And so Henry goes
00:43:14to the Xerox machine,
00:43:15he grabs the treaty,
00:43:17he holds it up
00:43:17to the chandelier,
00:43:19and he says,
00:43:20General Antonov,
00:43:21Antonov was our KGB minder,
00:43:23he said,
00:43:23General Antonov,
00:43:24can I have six copies
00:43:26of this, please?
00:43:30SALT one was signed.
00:43:33One of the results
00:43:33was the anti-ballistic
00:43:34missile treaty,
00:43:35an agreement to shell
00:43:37the elaborate and expensive
00:43:38anti-ballistic missile apparatus
00:43:40in the US
00:43:40and the Soviet Union.
00:43:43The first SALT agreement
00:43:45was not a trivial achievement.
00:43:48Of course,
00:43:49it didn't stop the Soviets
00:43:51building nuclear warheads,
00:43:52but I think
00:43:54from Kissinger's
00:43:54point of view,
00:43:55you created a new basis
00:43:57for the relationship
00:43:58and you'd at least
00:44:00created a mode
00:44:01within which
00:44:02arms limitation
00:44:03could be achieved.
00:44:08The psychological impact
00:44:10was powerful.
00:44:11Powerful because
00:44:12we're acknowledging
00:44:14we're vulnerable
00:44:15to each other
00:44:15and we're saying,
00:44:17hey, this is crazy
00:44:18to keep spending money
00:44:19this way
00:44:20and threatening each other.
00:44:23My recollection
00:44:24is they let Nixon
00:44:25go on Soviet television,
00:44:27which was unheard of.
00:44:29We couldn't believe it.
00:44:31Dobrevetchir.
00:44:33I deeply appreciate
00:44:34this opportunity
00:44:35your government
00:44:36has given me
00:44:36to speak directly
00:44:38with the people
00:44:39of the Soviet Union,
00:44:40to bring you
00:44:41a message of friendship
00:44:42from all the people
00:44:43of the United States.
00:44:45The SALT agreement
00:44:46at the time
00:44:47was seen almost
00:44:47as the end
00:44:48of the Cold War.
00:44:50To many Americans,
00:44:51the idea that
00:44:52the Soviets
00:44:52and the Americans
00:44:53could actually meet
00:44:54and negotiate
00:44:56about their arms
00:44:57signaled that
00:44:58we were not headed
00:44:59toward nuclear destruction.
00:45:02What it really did
00:45:03was establish
00:45:04a relationship of trust.
00:45:06They weren't two enemies
00:45:08on either sides
00:45:09of the barricades anymore.
00:45:12But detente did not
00:45:14end the Vietnam War.
00:45:15The Vietnamese Communist Party
00:45:17was not going
00:45:18to abandon the idea
00:45:19of reunifying Vietnam
00:45:21simply because
00:45:22Moscow said so.
00:45:23I think Nixon
00:45:25and Kissinger
00:45:25and a lot of other people
00:45:26saw the North Vietnamese
00:45:28as being linked to
00:45:30and run by
00:45:31the Russians
00:45:31and the Chinese,
00:45:33and they weren't.
00:45:33They were running
00:45:34the war themselves
00:45:35for their own
00:45:37national mission.
00:45:43This was the 17th
00:45:45private meeting
00:45:45and the fourth time
00:45:46in the last two months
00:45:47that Kissinger
00:45:48has met secretly
00:45:49with Lei Duc-Tho
00:45:50and Zuan Pui.
00:45:51He left the meeting
00:45:52grim-faced and solemn
00:45:53without answering questions,
00:45:55giving no indication
00:45:56of what happened inside.
00:45:59The pace of negotiation
00:46:00with the North Vietnamese
00:46:02picked up
00:46:03in 1971-72.
00:46:07A big question
00:46:08was what exactly
00:46:10Kissinger was playing for.
00:46:12Was he playing for
00:46:14the long-term survival
00:46:16of South Vietnam
00:46:17or was he playing
00:46:19for a decent interval,
00:46:21a respectable amount of time
00:46:23that South Vietnam
00:46:25would survive
00:46:26long enough for,
00:46:28say, Richard Nixon
00:46:30to get re-elected?
00:46:33Mr. Nixon is running
00:46:34for a second term,
00:46:35but as he does,
00:46:36what happens in the war
00:46:38is his responsibility.
00:46:42Nixon and Kissinger
00:46:43could sometimes sound
00:46:44as if they were focused
00:46:46on getting through
00:46:47the 72 election,
00:46:48and after that,
00:46:49the fate of South Vietnam
00:46:50would really not be
00:46:51their problem.
00:46:53If you read some
00:46:54of the tapes,
00:46:56there's one place
00:46:56where Nixon and Kissinger
00:46:58are talking,
00:46:58and Kissinger says
00:46:59to Nixon,
00:47:00well, Mr. President,
00:47:01if Saigon collapses
00:47:02before the election,
00:47:04you really have a problem,
00:47:05but if it collapses
00:47:06afterwards,
00:47:07it doesn't really matter.
00:47:09The question is now,
00:47:11how can we maneuver it
00:47:12so that it can look like
00:47:13a settlement by election day,
00:47:15but if the process
00:47:17is still open,
00:47:18we can get better,
00:47:20and we can screw them
00:47:22after election day
00:47:23if necessary.
00:47:25The North Vietnamese
00:47:26worried about Nixon
00:47:27getting re-elected.
00:47:28Their latest offensive
00:47:30had been blunted
00:47:31by our military response.
00:47:33They thought Nixon
00:47:34might be anxious
00:47:35for a settlement
00:47:36before the election.
00:47:38The breakthrough
00:47:39came in early October
00:47:41when Le Docteau
00:47:42handed us
00:47:43a counterproposal
00:47:44which essentially
00:47:44left the South Vietnamese
00:47:46government in place.
00:47:48As soon as Le Docteau
00:47:50read out his proposal
00:47:51to us,
00:47:52we called for a break
00:47:54in the negotiations.
00:47:55Then Henry and I
00:47:56went outside
00:47:57in the Paris garden,
00:47:58and we shook hands
00:48:00and smiled at each other
00:48:01and said,
00:48:01we've done it.
00:48:04Kissinger was overjoyed,
00:48:06and he was absolutely
00:48:07convinced that
00:48:08the October agreement
00:48:09was a real achievement
00:48:11for American diplomacy.
00:48:14Kissinger went back
00:48:15to Washington
00:48:16and on the 26th of October
00:48:19had a famous press conference
00:48:20where he said
00:48:21peace was at hand.
00:48:24Months of secret meetings,
00:48:25days of persistent rumors,
00:48:27reached their climax
00:48:28as presidential advisor
00:48:30Henry Kissinger
00:48:30met with reporters.
00:48:33We believe
00:48:35that peace
00:48:36is at hand.
00:48:38What he overlooked,
00:48:40of course,
00:48:40was whether he could get
00:48:41the South Vietnamese
00:48:42to agree.
00:48:44Henry and I
00:48:45were quite optimistic
00:48:46that with some nudging
00:48:48and reassurance
00:48:49about support
00:48:50in the future,
00:48:51that President Thieu
00:48:52would be so pleased
00:48:53that we'd get him aboard.
00:48:55But we went in there
00:48:56and we ran into a buzzsaw.
00:48:58The Saigon government
00:49:00controlled radio
00:49:01says any separate agreement
00:49:02between North Vietnam
00:49:03and the United States
00:49:05were not concerned
00:49:06South Vietnam
00:49:06in any way.
00:49:08There were about
00:49:09100,000 North Vietnamese troops
00:49:11in South Vietnam
00:49:13at the time,
00:49:13and the South Vietnamese
00:49:15government wanted them out.
00:49:17But the agreement
00:49:19did not insist
00:49:20that North Vietnamese troops
00:49:21withdraw from South Vietnam.
00:49:24The South Vietnamese
00:49:25government blows up.
00:49:27They're absolutely furious.
00:49:28And they make that clear
00:49:30immediately
00:49:32that this is
00:49:33completely unacceptable,
00:49:34it's a sellout.
00:49:36We excluded them
00:49:38entirely
00:49:38from the negotiation
00:49:40of their own fate.
00:49:42I mean,
00:49:42this is a negotiation
00:49:43about the future
00:49:44of South Vietnam.
00:49:45Henry Kissinger
00:49:46confirming Radio Hanoi's
00:49:48claim that October 31st
00:49:49had been tentatively
00:49:50agreed upon
00:49:50as the date for signing
00:49:52of Vietnam cease fire.
00:49:53But Kissinger went on
00:49:54to say,
00:49:55Saigon's President Thieu
00:49:56declined to go along
00:49:57until more guarantees
00:49:58were given.
00:50:00I think he believed
00:50:01that we had such leverage
00:50:03on the South Vietnamese
00:50:04and that they didn't
00:50:06really have a choice.
00:50:11Richard Nixon,
00:50:13re-elected president
00:50:14by one of the largest
00:50:15margins in history.
00:50:16The mandate he sought,
00:50:18he got.
00:50:21After the election,
00:50:23we re-engaged
00:50:24the North Vietnamese
00:50:24in negotiations.
00:50:26And not only
00:50:27did we not make progress,
00:50:29but they began
00:50:30to slip back
00:50:31on some of the concessions
00:50:32they'd made.
00:50:34So I was extremely depressed
00:50:35because things
00:50:36had reached a point
00:50:37where we were so close
00:50:39to a settlement
00:50:39and the thing
00:50:40blew up again.
00:50:41I want Hanoi
00:50:42that we would do something.
00:50:43I didn't tell them what
00:50:45because I didn't know
00:50:45what we were going to do.
00:50:48Kissinger said repeatedly,
00:50:49this raggedy-ass
00:50:50fourth-rate country
00:50:51has a breaking point.
00:50:53I'm going to find it.
00:50:55Nixon was of the view
00:50:56that something shocking
00:50:58had to be done.
00:51:01And I think Nixon
00:51:02turned out to be right.
00:51:07Nixon and Kissinger
00:51:08decide on a massive
00:51:10bombing campaign,
00:51:11the so-called
00:51:13Christmas bombing.
00:51:19North Vietnam
00:51:20has gone through
00:51:21another day
00:51:22of the most intense bombing
00:51:23in the history
00:51:24of the Indochina War.
00:51:25North Vietnamese officials
00:51:27claim that thousands
00:51:27of civilians
00:51:28have been killed
00:51:29or wounded
00:51:29and that large sections
00:51:31of Hanoi
00:51:31have been wiped out.
00:51:34The Christmas bombing
00:51:36inflicted tremendous damage
00:51:38not only to their soldiers
00:51:39but to civilians.
00:51:41It was just inflicting
00:51:42as much damage
00:51:43as you could.
00:51:45A lot of people said,
00:51:46oh, this was heartless
00:51:48and lots of innocent people
00:51:49were killed.
00:51:51Now, I'm sure there was
00:51:52some collateral damage,
00:51:53but basically we did
00:51:55hit military targets.
00:52:00Kissinger believed
00:52:01the Christmas bombings
00:52:02actually drove Hanoi
00:52:04back to the bargaining table.
00:52:06Good morning from New York.
00:52:08Peace is not only at hand,
00:52:09it is here.
00:52:10It has to be issued
00:52:11a new order
00:52:12on the ceasefire
00:52:14which is to go into effect
00:52:17roughly 36 hours from now
00:52:20and which we hope
00:52:21and expect
00:52:23will be implemented
00:52:25fully.
00:52:27The Paris agreement
00:52:29to end the war
00:52:29and restore the peace
00:52:31failed to do either.
00:52:32It did not end the war,
00:52:33it did not end the fighting
00:52:34and it did not bring about
00:52:35peace and stability
00:52:36to Vietnam.
00:52:39All that it achieved
00:52:40was allowing
00:52:41the United States
00:52:42to withdraw militarily
00:52:43from Vietnam.
00:52:45Kissinger knew full well
00:52:47that the fighting
00:52:48would resume
00:52:50even before the ink
00:52:51would dry
00:52:52on the piece of paper.
00:52:55Nixon and Kissinger
00:52:56definitely knew
00:52:57the deal they signed
00:52:58in January 1973
00:53:00would condemn
00:53:01South Vietnam
00:53:02to eventual defeat.
00:53:14Ladies and gentlemen,
00:53:16the President
00:53:17of the United States.
00:53:22We stand on the threshold
00:53:24of a new era
00:53:26of peace
00:53:27in the world.
00:53:301972 was
00:53:32the landslide victory
00:53:33but Watergate,
00:53:35of course,
00:53:36begins to sink Nixon
00:53:37despite the massive
00:53:39re-election
00:53:39and begins to erode
00:53:42that landslide support
00:53:44almost immediately.
00:53:46There's this
00:53:47tick,
00:53:48tick,
00:53:49ticking
00:53:49coming from
00:53:50closets
00:53:51in file cabinets
00:53:52in the White House
00:53:54because
00:53:54a bunch of
00:53:55ding-dongs
00:53:56had been caught
00:53:57burglarizing the
00:53:58Democratic National
00:53:59Committee headquarters.
00:54:00The Watergate
00:54:01bugging case
00:54:02involves a
00:54:03bizarre break-in
00:54:04at Democratic Party
00:54:05headquarters
00:54:06in which two men
00:54:07connected with the
00:54:08Nixon re-election
00:54:08campaign
00:54:09were arrested.
00:54:11From that point
00:54:12on,
00:54:13everything else
00:54:14goes on
00:54:15backburners
00:54:15while Nixon
00:54:16focuses almost
00:54:17exclusively
00:54:18on dealing
00:54:20with this
00:54:20threat
00:54:21to his
00:54:22presidency.
00:54:24When he came
00:54:25under attack
00:54:25for Watergate,
00:54:27Richard Nixon
00:54:27hoped that his
00:54:28way out
00:54:29was yet more
00:54:30foreign policy
00:54:31success.
00:54:33And if
00:54:33Kissinger
00:54:34could deliver
00:54:35success,
00:54:36somehow Nixon
00:54:37could extricate
00:54:38himself from
00:54:38the scandal.
00:54:40This was the
00:54:41moment when
00:54:42Nixon decides
00:54:43to appoint
00:54:44Kissinger to
00:54:45Secretary of
00:54:45State.
00:54:46The Senate
00:54:47today approved
00:54:48the nomination
00:54:48of Henry Kissinger
00:54:49as Secretary
00:54:50of State,
00:54:51so a country
00:54:52boy from
00:54:52Firth,
00:54:53Germany,
00:54:53becomes the
00:54:54first American
00:54:55Secretary of
00:54:55State ever
00:54:56born in
00:54:57another country.
00:54:58The time I
00:54:59became Secretary
00:55:00of State,
00:55:01the executive
00:55:01authority of
00:55:02the president
00:55:03was eroding
00:55:04at an
00:55:04alarming rate.
00:55:06One of my
00:55:07jobs was to
00:55:08give the
00:55:08impression
00:55:09that we
00:55:09were capable
00:55:10of a
00:55:10purposeful
00:55:11foreign policy
00:55:12in this
00:55:13miasma of
00:55:14a president
00:55:14who was on
00:55:15the verge
00:55:15of being
00:55:16indicted
00:55:16or impeached.
00:55:19If you're
00:55:20going to have
00:55:20a crisis in
00:55:21which you
00:55:22face the
00:55:22possibility of
00:55:23impeachment,
00:55:25Kissinger is
00:55:25the one firm
00:55:26thing.
00:55:27He becomes
00:55:28the indispensable
00:55:29man.
00:55:31October 6,
00:55:321973,
00:55:34a surprise
00:55:34attack on
00:55:35the holiest
00:55:36of days.
00:55:38With the
00:55:39outbreak of
00:55:40the Yom
00:55:40Kippur War,
00:55:42Kissinger faced
00:55:43the most
00:55:43complex problem
00:55:45of his
00:55:45career.
00:55:49The Yom
00:55:50Kippur War
00:55:50began with
00:55:51an attack
00:55:52by the
00:55:53Egyptian army
00:55:54crossing the
00:55:55Suez Canal
00:55:56and the
00:55:56Syrian army
00:55:57attacking the
00:55:58Golan Heights.
00:56:00The Israelis
00:56:01had an
00:56:01inkling that
00:56:02something might
00:56:03occur, but
00:56:04they did not
00:56:05realize how
00:56:05effective the
00:56:06Egyptian and
00:56:07Syrian assaults
00:56:08would be.
00:56:106.30 on
00:56:12October 6,
00:56:141973, my
00:56:16assistant
00:56:16secretary woke
00:56:18me up and
00:56:18said there's
00:56:19some trouble
00:56:19on the
00:56:20Suez Canal.
00:56:21And if you
00:56:22get on the
00:56:23phone right
00:56:23away, you
00:56:24can get it
00:56:24under control.
00:56:27We're in
00:56:27the Situation
00:56:28Room with
00:56:29the Secretary
00:56:29of Defense
00:56:30and the
00:56:31Director of
00:56:31CIA and
00:56:32everybody's
00:56:33wringing their
00:56:33hands, including
00:56:34me in the
00:56:35back bench.
00:56:36Henry,
00:56:37chairing the
00:56:38meeting, says
00:56:39there's an
00:56:39opportunity here.
00:56:41Henry always
00:56:42was looking for
00:56:43the opportunity.
00:56:45He immediately
00:56:46saw that we
00:56:47could use this
00:56:48if we'd play
00:56:48our cards right
00:56:49to begin
00:56:50negotiations
00:56:51between Israel
00:56:52and some of
00:56:53its neighbors
00:56:53and also to
00:56:54begin to
00:56:55displace Soviet
00:56:56influence in
00:56:57that region.
00:57:02There was
00:57:03panic inside
00:57:04the Israeli
00:57:04government.
00:57:05The Israelis
00:57:06were running
00:57:07short of
00:57:07ammunition, and
00:57:08so they
00:57:09appealed
00:57:09desperately for
00:57:11resupply from
00:57:12the United
00:57:13States.
00:57:14Kissinger wanted
00:57:15to ensure that
00:57:16Israel got the
00:57:18upper hand.
00:57:20We would
00:57:21try to prevent
00:57:22the military
00:57:23victory achieved
00:57:24by Soviet
00:57:25arms.
00:57:25So we've
00:57:27started an
00:57:27airlift and
00:57:28put in
00:57:28overwhelming
00:57:29amounts of
00:57:31arms.
00:57:32Now the
00:57:34counter-offensive
00:57:34has begun.
00:57:36Israelis claim to
00:57:37have knocked out
00:57:38most of the
00:57:39bridges the
00:57:39Egyptians laid
00:57:40across the
00:57:40canal.
00:57:41By the
00:57:42middle of
00:57:42October, the
00:57:44momentum had
00:57:45shifted in
00:57:46favor of
00:57:47Israel.
00:57:49The Israelis
00:57:50had struck
00:57:51back and
00:57:51they had
00:57:52surrounded the
00:57:52Egyptian army.
00:57:55Kissinger knew
00:57:55that if we
00:57:56could freeze
00:57:57that moment,
00:57:58you might have
00:57:59a psychological
00:58:00impetus on
00:58:01both sides to
00:58:02finally talk to
00:58:02each other.
00:58:04Kissinger said
00:58:05to the Israelis,
00:58:06you're in a
00:58:07very strong
00:58:08position right
00:58:08now, but
00:58:10don't overdo
00:58:10it.
00:58:11Take your
00:58:12win, and
00:58:13then we get
00:58:14serious about
00:58:15the diplomacy.
00:58:17Kissinger gets
00:58:19a ceasefire
00:58:20just in time
00:58:21for the
00:58:22Egyptian position
00:58:23not to
00:58:24collapse.
00:58:25He can then
00:58:26embark on a
00:58:26negotiation.
00:58:31You get this
00:58:33phenomenon that
00:58:34becomes known
00:58:34as shuttle
00:58:35diplomacy.
00:58:37Kissinger is
00:58:38going back and
00:58:39forth between
00:58:40various Middle
00:58:41Eastern capitals
00:58:42to meet
00:58:42separately with
00:58:44Middle East
00:58:44leaders.
00:58:47He knew
00:58:47you could only
00:58:49make progress
00:58:49if you talked
00:58:50to each side,
00:58:51understood its
00:58:52needs, that it
00:58:54wouldn't work
00:58:54just through
00:58:55cables.
00:58:55This was too
00:58:56emotional, too
00:58:57precarious.
00:58:58You had to go
00:58:59in person to
00:59:00Sadat, and go
00:59:01in person to
00:59:02go to Meir, and
00:59:04then go back to
00:59:05the other and
00:59:06explain where
00:59:07they were willing
00:59:08to move ahead
00:59:08and where they
00:59:09really had a
00:59:10need to dig
00:59:11in.
00:59:13They negotiated
00:59:14with Kissinger.
00:59:15They didn't
00:59:16negotiate with
00:59:16each other, and
00:59:18Kissinger frequently
00:59:19used American
00:59:20guarantees to get
00:59:22the parties to
00:59:23agree.
00:59:24Were you ever so
00:59:25tired you couldn't
00:59:26remember whether you
00:59:27were talking to
00:59:27Sadat or Barbara
00:59:28Walters?
00:59:29That distinction I
00:59:30never lost, but
00:59:35there's one thing
00:59:37that keeps you
00:59:38going, which is
00:59:40that you know
00:59:40there's nothing
00:59:41more important you
00:59:41could possibly be
00:59:42doing, and that
00:59:44has an exhilarating
00:59:46effect.
00:59:49Kissinger literally
00:59:50spends most of two
00:59:51years going from
00:59:53Damascus to Cairo to
00:59:55Tel Aviv and
00:59:56Jerusalem, meeting
00:59:58with one leader
00:59:58after another,
00:59:59cajoling them,
01:00:01negotiating at a
01:00:02detailed level, and
01:00:03as he himself says,
01:00:05it's literally a
01:00:05Middle Eastern
01:00:06bazaar.
01:00:07Henry, when I
01:00:08met him for the
01:00:09first time in
01:00:10November 73, I
01:00:12found him quite
01:00:14acquainted with the
01:00:15minute detail of
01:00:18all the dimensions.
01:00:19For that, we
01:00:21didn't spend except
01:00:22one hour, and
01:00:23after that, we
01:00:23felt that we are
01:00:24friends since years
01:00:26and years before.
01:00:28The massive
01:00:29achievement for
01:00:30Kissinger was
01:00:31Sadat's decision to
01:00:33essentially throw the
01:00:34Soviets out of
01:00:35Egypt and to take
01:00:36Egypt, the most
01:00:37important, the biggest
01:00:38Arab state,
01:00:39essentially out of
01:00:41the conflict and
01:00:42into friendship with
01:00:44the United States,
01:00:44and eventually, a few
01:00:45years later, into
01:00:47peace with Israel.
01:00:48Now, that came at
01:00:50the expense of the
01:00:53Palestinian question.
01:00:54He left this issue of
01:00:56the Palestinians to
01:00:58kind of fester away,
01:00:59unaddressed.
01:01:01Whatever you solve in
01:01:03foreign policy is not
01:01:04final.
01:01:05It's simply an
01:01:07admissions ticket for
01:01:08some other crisis.
01:01:12good evening.
01:01:13The news is dominated
01:01:15tonight by one
01:01:16explosive story.
01:01:17White House mounted an
01:01:18elaborate cover-up
01:01:20operation in the
01:01:20Watergate affair.
01:01:22There was, of course,
01:01:23the projects, including
01:01:25wiretapping, electronic
01:01:26surveillance, and
01:01:28photography.
01:01:29The number two man in
01:01:29the Nixon re-election
01:01:30campaign today admitted
01:01:31his own guilt in the
01:01:33planning and cover-up of
01:01:34Watergate.
01:01:35Sources say there is no
01:01:35question that the
01:01:36president knew of the
01:01:37cover-up operation, which
01:01:39may be the most damning
01:01:40accusation of all.
01:01:43As the Watergate scandal
01:01:45dragged on, it seemed like
01:01:47the president and his
01:01:48closest aides were being
01:01:49drawn into the mire.
01:01:52And Americans were
01:01:53relieved to see that at
01:01:56least Kissinger was
01:01:56untainted by the scandal.
01:01:59He survived Watergate,
01:02:01largely because he was
01:02:02seen as the only adult in
01:02:04the room.
01:02:08This was the height of
01:02:09Kissinger's fame.
01:02:11This was when he was like
01:02:12a kind of diplomatic
01:02:14version of Superman.
01:02:17Kissinger was the most
01:02:19admired man in the United
01:02:20States.
01:02:21He was tremendously popular.
01:02:26The world was so happy that
01:02:27the United States was finally
01:02:29getting out of Vietnam that
01:02:30Henry Kissinger received the
01:02:32Nobel Peace Prize.
01:02:34But his Vietnamese colleague,
01:02:36Le Duc Toh, said, this is not
01:02:38the end of the war, and I'm not
01:02:40accepting the Peace Prize.
01:02:43In Oslo, several thousand
01:02:45Norwegian students demonstrated
01:02:47today against the awarding of the
01:02:48Nobel Peace Prize to Secretary of
01:02:50State Henry Kissinger.
01:02:55I was on the playground, and some
01:02:58kid came up to me and said,
01:02:59you know, my parents don't think
01:03:01your father should have won the
01:03:02Nobel Peace Prize.
01:03:04And I apparently replied, that's
01:03:07okay, neither does my mother.
01:03:11That's the most important goal any
01:03:13administration can set itself, is
01:03:16to work for a world in which the
01:03:19award will become irrelevant, because
01:03:23peace will have become so normal.
01:03:26Of course, he was deeply honored, but
01:03:30I think it also presented a huge
01:03:32headache for him, because he knew
01:03:34that it would not be well received by
01:03:38President Nixon.
01:03:40Knowing Richard Nixon, it must have
01:03:43driven him crazy that Kissinger was the
01:03:45one awarded the Peace Prize.
01:03:49He managed to keep his jealousy under
01:03:53control, to a great extent, in part
01:03:55because he needed Kissinger more and
01:03:56more.
01:03:59The relationship between Nixon and
01:04:01Kissinger begins to reverse.
01:04:03There is a way in which Nixon now is
01:04:05almost pleading for reassurance and
01:04:07support from Kissinger.
01:04:10I have not even considered the
01:04:11possibility of frankly just throwing
01:04:15myself on the sword.
01:04:17No, no-
01:04:17Nothing-
01:04:17I have not had to take it.
01:04:19What the hell?
01:04:20That is out of the question.
01:04:22With all due respect, Mr. President,
01:04:23that cannot be considered.
01:04:26You have saved this country, Mr.
01:04:28President.
01:04:28The history books will show that
01:04:31no one will know what Watergate
01:04:33means.
01:04:35Henry Kissinger often said to me that there was a Shakespearean quality to Richard Nixon's
01:04:43presidency. The culmination of the tragedy is Nixon's final agonized decision to resign.
01:04:54One day, Kissinger goes over to the White House and they talk and there's this moment where
01:05:02Nixon says, Henry, I'm not a praying man, but pray with me. And you have this amazing scene of the
01:05:09two
01:05:09of them on their knees praying in the White House. I remember him coming home that night and this sense
01:05:18of sorrow and compassion that he had for Nixon at that moment. The human problem of a man who had
01:05:28spent all of his life trying to become president, whose personality really did not lend itself to
01:05:36politics. He didn't like to meet new people. He didn't like to give direct orders. He made
01:05:42himself do all these things. And everything collapsed on him.
01:05:58And repeat after me, I, Gerald R. Ford, do solemnly swear.
01:06:02I, Gerald R. Ford, do solemnly swear.
01:06:07Gerald Ford was as different in personal temperamental terms from Richard Nixon as it's possible to
01:06:15imagine. And yet, when Ford became president, one of the very first decisions that he took
01:06:26was to keep Kissinger on in both roles, National Security Advisor and Secretary of State.
01:06:35Somebody said that as soon as Nixon was gone, Kissinger would lose his Teflon position and become
01:06:42the lightning rod in turn. And so it proved.
01:06:47Good evening to all of you from California.
01:06:49Within a relatively short time of Nixon's departure, the attacks on Kissinger began.
01:06:58Dr. Kissinger is quoted as saying that he thinks of the United States as Athens and the Soviet Union as
01:07:05Sparta.
01:07:05The day of the U.S. is past and today is the day of the Soviet Union.
01:07:10But peace does not come from weakness or from retreat.
01:07:15My father had played such a dominant role for six years that in the nature of American politics,
01:07:22it's almost inevitable that you become a focal point and that the, uh, the worm turns.
01:07:36At 7.30 a.m. on April the 17th, 1975, the war in Cambodia was over.
01:07:43It was a unique war, for no country has ever experienced such concentrated bombing.
01:07:49On this, perhaps the most gentle and graceful land in all of Asia,
01:07:54President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger unleashed 100,000 tons of bombs,
01:07:59the equivalent of five Hiroshima's.
01:08:03Then out of the forest came the victors, the Khmer Rouge,
01:08:07whose power had grown out of all proportion to their numbers.
01:08:11The Khmer Rouge was essentially an insignificant, uh, movement up until 1970.
01:08:19And the question is, how is it that this relatively marginal force were able to seize power in five years?
01:08:27The bombing did not create the Khmer Rouge, but it was a powerful recruitment tool.
01:08:33A horror began almost immediately.
01:08:36Phnom Penh, a city of two and a half million people,
01:08:39was forcibly emptied within hours of their coming.
01:08:43Within 24 hours, they announced that the city would have to be evacuated.
01:08:49They emptied the hospitals while people were still in the middle of surgery.
01:08:53The patients were left to die on the gurneys, and that was just the beginning of the killing.
01:09:01The Khmer Rouge interrogated and then exterminated anyone they suspected of opposing them.
01:09:12I have yet to find anyone who have not been affected by a loss.
01:09:18We have a Khmer word, which is basabat.
01:09:21It's a broken spirit.
01:09:23It's like when the spirit has been so broken under fear, under terror, that it doesn't recover.
01:09:32I think the tragedy of Cambodia is directly attributable to the policies of Kissinger and Nixon.
01:09:40There's no question that our continued bombing of the countryside, which was savage and relentless,
01:09:46led to the rise of the Khmer Rouge.
01:09:49The North Vietnamese had bases in not only Cambodia, but Laos.
01:09:54They were coming over, killing American troops and South Vietnamese, and then retreating.
01:09:58So they spread the war to these countries.
01:10:00We did not spread it.
01:10:02You say in your book that you considered bombing North Vietnam,
01:10:05so that you had the alternative of bombing North Vietnam and not embroiling Cambodia.
01:10:11Cambodia was embroiled.
01:10:12It is an absurdity to say that a country can occupy a part of another country, kill your people,
01:10:18and that then you are violating its neutrality when you respond against the foreign troops that are on that neutral
01:10:26territory.
01:10:26It is total hypocrisy.
01:10:28They were all supposed to be well-intended decisions.
01:10:32My father, who died, my oldest brother, who is still missing to this day,
01:10:37are they the victims of geopolitics and of decisions made with good intentions,
01:10:42but that led to disaster?
01:10:44Yes, absolutely.
01:10:47Sometimes it makes me wonder about the hierarchy of suffering and the unequal value that's attributed to people's lives.
01:10:55Some lives are worth more than others, right?
01:10:58Some countries are worth sacrificing in order that others can prosper.
01:11:06Good evening.
01:11:08The fighting is over for American ground soldiers in Vietnam.
01:11:11The extraction of the last combat soldiers is a slow process.
01:11:16While the men wait, they happily donate some of their leftover ammunition to their South Vietnamese replacements.
01:11:24It is now their war.
01:11:27Ultimately, when the United States extricated itself from the Vietnam War,
01:11:32the South Vietnamese government hobbled along for two years.
01:11:36So great was the South Vietnamese entire dependence upon the United States that in no way, shape, or form could
01:11:42it stand on its own.
01:11:45I'm still hopeful that the United States would respond positively to our request for aid.
01:11:52Sir, Mr. Kissinger said today that that aid is not approved.
01:11:55The collapse of your country is inevitable.
01:11:57Do you share that assessment?
01:12:01I still think that the aid would be forthcoming.
01:12:09If my father had one regret that he often expressed to me,
01:12:14it was that Congress prevented the United States from having an ongoing military role after the peace accords.
01:12:24He believed that there was a path for at least preventing the human catastrophe that occurred in Vietnam after we
01:12:33withdrew.
01:12:34And that we failed to do that.
01:12:38We consider we have a moral obligation to the tens of thousands of people who worked with us,
01:12:45relying on us for 15 years,
01:12:48and we are positive that the American people will fulfill that obligation.
01:12:51Thank you, Secretary.
01:13:18I felt great anger at the United States government.
01:13:24We had deceived and misled, not only ourselves,
01:13:28but we had deceived and misled a whole people in South Vietnam.
01:13:37There was a chance, given his talents,
01:13:40that Henry alone might have been able to end that war much, much earlier.
01:13:47That he did not, I find that, like the rest of the war, rather unforgivable.
01:13:55At the end of the day, when Kissinger was alone with his own thoughts,
01:13:59I think he would have admitted to himself that South Vietnam did not have the ability to defend itself.
01:14:08I think all of the allegations to say that Congress lost the will to fight that the American people lost
01:14:14the will to fight that the media misreported that war was a way for him to assuage his guilt.
01:14:20The collapse of South Vietnam and the evacuation of Saigon was without doubt the saddest moment of my governmental experience.
01:14:34I am unreconstructed in my conviction that Vietnam did not have to fall, that we did that to ourselves.
01:14:46He was not a monster, but he was wrong, and the result was millions of people, not just American soldiers,
01:14:5455,000 plus,
01:14:56but millions of Indochinese, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, died as a result of this horrendous, horrendous mistaken effort.
01:15:10With 272 electoral votes, James Earl Carter, the next president of the United States.
01:15:19Our new president and secretary of state deserve the understanding and the support of all Americans.
01:15:27I expect to lead a happy and full life once I leave the government.
01:15:39One of Kissinger's most impressive achievements was staying famous for 50 years.
01:15:45Secretary of state, Dr. Henry Kissinger.
01:15:49Do you have any final words for the American public?
01:15:52No.
01:15:54He institutes this kind of remarkable self-levitation feat where he stays in the public eye for nearly half a
01:16:00century.
01:16:02Partly because he devotes his entire life to foreign policy.
01:16:06He's advising leaders.
01:16:08You know, I'm here as a private citizen.
01:16:10I'm here as a private citizen.
01:16:12I'm not speaking of my personal view, not necessarily Governor Reagan's.
01:16:17He's giving speeches, going to conferences.
01:16:20He's a ubiquitous presence on television.
01:16:23He was always invited to opine on whatever crisis is happening at the moment.
01:16:28I think that the warning of the president that a continuation of repression could harm U.S.-Chinese relations was correct.
01:16:35He publishes hundreds of articles and op-eds and many books, putting out his own version of history.
01:16:41Dr. Kissinger has a new book hitting bookstores tomorrow.
01:16:45If you looked at his schedule on any given day, it was packed with meetings, breakfasts, lunches, TV interviews.
01:16:54He stayed in the game because he loved international relations and he loved power.
01:17:03Throughout the long years out of government, Henry Kissinger fought to uphold his reputation against all comers.
01:17:13If an Allende were to come to power tomorrow, you would not feel that you could recommend such action as
01:17:19you thought appropriate in 1970.
01:17:21No, I'm not saying that.
01:17:22No criticism went unanswered.
01:17:25The statement Henry Kissinger is a war criminal is not a piece of rhetoric.
01:17:29It's not a metaphor.
01:17:30It's a job description.
01:17:32And it might feature an indictment.
01:17:34I want to know how you would amend your testimony today.
01:17:39Why should I amend my testimony?
01:17:42He was determined that he would be the one to write his own history.
01:17:49But it really was a double-edged sword because he kind of made himself a big target and in many
01:17:55ways became a kind of scapegoat for all the failures of American foreign policy.
01:18:00Arrest Henry Kissinger for her crime.
01:18:04Arrest Henry Kissinger for her crime.
01:18:07When people attack Kissinger by saying you're dealing with tyrants or you're ignoring human rights, they don't remember the agonizing
01:18:17choices that have to be made.
01:18:19After all, preserving civilization is a human right as well.
01:18:23The average person thinks that morality can be applied as directly to the conduct of states, to each other, as
01:18:33it can to human relations.
01:18:35That is not always the case because sometimes statesmen have to choose among evils.
01:18:44I think he thought whatever he was sacrificing of American values, he was doing so for American interests.
01:18:52My view of that is that the sacrifice of values was intrinsically a sacrifice of interests.
01:19:01One of the sources of strength that the United States has is the story that we've been telling around the
01:19:06world, which is a story about freedom and equality of peoples and nations.
01:19:12Yeah, I think Kissinger's theory was it's the credibility of being willing to use power, being willing to kill a
01:19:19lot of people, being willing to destroy countries, to send a message to other potential adversaries.
01:19:25This is what happens if you challenge the will of the United States, I think the fundamental problem with that
01:19:32is it just obliterates the credibility of the story that we tell.
01:19:36My father was a realist, but it was realism in the cause of principles that he believed in deeply.
01:19:46He was not just trying to advance the power of the United States in some kind of Darwinian struggle.
01:19:54He was advancing the strength of the United States in his mind because America was the last best hope of
01:20:03humanity.
01:20:03And he had experienced that personally.
01:20:08The final days of his life were deeply revealing.
01:20:13He was transported back to the trauma of his childhood.
01:20:18He was right back there.
01:20:21He was speaking German.
01:20:23He was afraid that pogroms were at the door.
01:20:27He was showing the deep-seated injury that he had experienced as a child.
01:20:34But there was also a tremendously moving final hallucination.
01:20:44He was lying in a bed looking out on this garden that he loved in Connecticut.
01:20:50And he imagined that his brother, who had died a couple of years earlier, was outside building a platform.
01:20:59It wasn't clear whether this was some kind of train stop or a platform for my father to ascend onto,
01:21:07but it seemed to give him a great deal of peace.
01:21:12At an early age, I have seen what can happen to a society that is based on hatred and strength
01:21:21and distrust.
01:21:24And that I experienced then what America means to other people, its hope and its idealism.
01:21:43And that we found the strength of the children that they loved in.
01:21:44And that we were living with shame is to take both sides of the room.
01:21:52Like I know of people, the neighbors are being taken away and experienced by the other people.
01:21:52And these people were büyük and wanted to find the rest of the history of the world.
01:21:53Of those people were afraid of the country.
01:21:54And these people were afraid of themselves being beaten into their land.
01:22:05American Experience Kissinger is available with PBS Passport and on Amazon Prime Video.
01:22:41Can you imagine or can you know when sorry if miss Is this video, please.
01:22:42Just a moment to Pat Sentent Allğim, this time and adm круг класс ok,
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