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00:00Putin felt that Russia faced an existential threat.
00:03He had to deal with that threat.
00:05And the United States and the Europeans were doing nothing to negotiate a way to avoid war.
00:12The West is leading Ukraine down the primrose path.
00:17And the Israelis are executing a genocide in Gaza.
00:20It's not China's fault that it wants to be powerful.
00:24So if you get into trouble and you dial 911, there's nobody at the other end.
00:31Hi, this is John Mearsheimer.
00:33And I'm here today to make my first video on my new YouTube channel.
00:41And the subject I'd like to talk about is the origins of the war in Ukraine.
00:47That war began on February 24th of 2022.
00:51And, of course, the war continues on.
00:54Indeed, it's been longer than World War I.
00:58And I want to talk about its origins.
01:01And in particular, I'm interested in the question of why the Russians were not deterred
01:09and why they actually attacked on February 24th, 2022.
01:16And this is essentially a question of conventional deterrence, because the attack was a conventional attack.
01:23Nuclear weapons were not involved here.
01:25Nuclear deterrence was not at play.
01:28It's a question of conventional deterrence.
01:30And again, why were the Russians not deterred?
01:35Now, this is a very interesting subject to me because the war is important,
01:40but also because I actually wrote a book on conventional deterrence.
01:45During the Cold War, the whole question of whether or not the Soviet Union,
01:52or more generally the Warsaw Pact, would attack NATO was an issue of great importance.
01:59And people paid attention to the question of when or under what circumstances the Russians might attack against NATO.
02:10And I actually wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on the subject of conventional deterrence.
02:16And my first book, which grew out of my dissertation, is entitled Conventional Deterrence.
02:22So I've thought a lot about this subject.
02:26And because the NATO-Warsaw Pact situation from the Cold War bears a lot of resemblance to the Russian decision
02:36to invade Ukraine,
02:38I think I have a lot to say, or I should say I think my theory has a lot to
02:42say about the origins of the Ukraine war.
02:46So what I'd like to do today is I'd first like to lay out my theory of conventional deterrence,
02:54leaving aside the whole question of the Ukraine war.
02:57Just explain to you how I think about conventional deterrence.
03:02And then once I finish that task, switch gears and talk about the Ukraine war.
03:09Talk about what happened on February 24th, 2022, and what has happened subsequently.
03:17And in essence, marry my theory of conventional deterrence to the Ukraine war.
03:25Now, let me start by talking about conventional deterrence.
03:30And the first point I want to make, and this is a terribly important point,
03:35is that when you think about conventional deterrence, you have to focus on the political variable and the military variable.
03:44And you're probably saying to yourself, what exactly does he mean?
03:47When I talk about the political variable, it's very important to understand that there are political forces that push a
03:56state to go to war.
03:57And the question of how powerful those political forces are really matters for purposes of understanding deterrence.
04:05So you have this political variable.
04:08And then you have a military variable.
04:11And the military variable is all about how well you will do on the battlefield.
04:19Once you're engaged in the fight militarily, how likely are you to succeed?
04:27What sorts of costs will you have to pay?
04:30That's what the military variable is all about.
04:33The political variable deals with those broader political forces that are pushing you to contemplate going to war.
04:41And it's very important to understand that you have to take into account both the military and the political variable.
04:47And this, by the way, this relationship between politics and military considerations,
04:53is reflected in Clausewitz's very famous dictum that war is an extension of politics by other means.
05:03War, meaning the military variable, is an extension of politics by other means.
05:08So we have to always keep in mind that there are these two variables at play.
05:14And we have to think not only about each variable by itself, but how they relate to each other.
05:20Now, let me start by talking about the military variable.
05:24My argument is that when states think about going to war,
05:30and here we're talking about a large-scale conventional war, you want to keep that in mind.
05:34Remember, I said before, what motivated me to study this issue was the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional balance during the
05:44Cold War.
05:45And here we're talking about the balance of power between Russia's conventional forces and Ukraine's conventional forces back in February
05:55of 2022.
05:56So when a country, whether it's the Warsaw Pact, thinking about attacking NATO or Russia, thinking about attacking Ukraine,
06:07when it thinks about the military considerations at play,
06:14my argument is it focuses on the particular strategy that it might employ to win the war.
06:23And my argument is that a state that's thinking about attacking another state in a major conventional war
06:30has three strategies that it can choose among.
06:35One is what I call blitzkrieg.
06:37Two is what I call attrition strategy.
06:40And three is what I call a limited-aim strategy.
06:44Now, let me unpack what I mean when I talk about each one of those strategies.
06:49An attrition strategy and a blitzkrieg strategy are both aimed at producing a decisive victory.
07:00A blitzkrieg is designed to produce a quick and decisive victory.
07:08Think about the Germans invading France in 1940.
07:13On May 10, 1940, on May 10, 1940, the Wehrmacht invades France.
07:18It quickly overruns France and then pushes the British army off the beaches at Dunkirk.
07:25This is a classic blitzkrieg.
07:28Blitzkriegs produce quick and decisive victories.
07:33An attrition strategy, in contrast, produces a slow, a protracted, but decisive victory.
07:44So it's important to understand that with both a blitzkrieg and an attrition strategy,
07:50you are pursuing decisive victory, defeating the other side almost, if not completely.
07:58The third strategy is a limited-aim strategy.
08:04And there, a state does not pursue a decisive victory.
08:08What it does is it simply conquers territory in that rival state.
08:16It goes to war and lops off or conquers a small piece of the other side's territory,
08:27and then it moves to a defensive strategy.
08:30This is why it's called a limited-aim strategy and not a strategy that pursues decisive ends,
08:39which is what blitzkrieg and an attrition strategy do.
08:45So these are the three strategies that a state can choose among.
08:51Now, how do we rank order these strategies?
08:54What do these three strategies say about the likelihood of deterrence succeeding or failing?
09:02My argument is that if a state can launch a blitzkrieg and win,
09:08or let me put it slightly differently,
09:10if a state thinks it can launch a blitzkrieg that will produce a quick and decisive victory,
09:17deterrence will fail.
09:19If it thinks that it has to launch an attrition strategy,
09:24it can't win quickly,
09:25it's aiming to win decisively,
09:28but it can't win quickly,
09:30then it will not attack.
09:32So, an attrition strategy promotes deterrence,
09:38and a blitzkrieg strategy promotes the failure of deterrence.
09:43Just to go to World War II,
09:45one of the principal reasons that the Germans invaded France in May of 1940
09:52was that they had a blitzkrieg strategy,
09:54which they thought would produce a quick and decisive victory.
09:58And that's why they went to war.
10:00And they were successful.
10:02When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union a year later,
10:06this is on June 22, 1941,
10:08they thought that the blitzkrieg strategy
10:11that they had ready to go
10:14would produce a quick and decisive victory inside the Soviet Union.
10:19Of course, it failed in the Soviet case,
10:22and the war evolved into a war of attrition.
10:28Very important to understand,
10:30the Germans did not go into the Soviet Union in 1941
10:34thinking they would end up in a war of attrition.
10:37If that were the case,
10:39I would argue they would not have attacked.
10:41They attacked because they thought
10:42they had a blitzkrieg strategy
10:44that would provide a war-winning strategy.
10:49So you see that blitzkrieg,
10:53blitzkrieg, because it produces
10:55or promises to produce a quick and decisive victory,
11:01is a formula for deterrence failure.
11:05And I would argue, by the way,
11:07that during the Cold War,
11:08the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies
11:11never gave any thought of attacking into Western Europe
11:14because they understood
11:15that they could not execute a blitzkrieg
11:18against the NATO forces
11:20that would be arrayed against them in the fight.
11:23And that's why deterrence was so robust.
11:26This is not to deny, of course,
11:28that nuclear deterrence mattered as well.
11:31Now, let's go to the limited aim strategy.
11:34The limited aim strategy
11:36is the easiest strategy to execute
11:40because it is limited,
11:42which means that all you're doing
11:45is grabbing some territory
11:48from your adversary.
11:50You're not attempting to defeat
11:52your adversary decisively.
11:54It is a limited strategy.
11:56There are limited aims at play.
11:58So it is the easiest of the three strategies
12:02to execute for sure.
12:04But actually, it is not ultimately
12:07an attractive strategy.
12:09And the reason that it is ultimately
12:11not an attractive strategy
12:14is because you don't defeat
12:16the other side decisively
12:18and invariably the other side
12:21will continue the fight
12:24and you will end up in a war of attrition.
12:29Now, it's very important to understand
12:31that what I'm saying here
12:32is that if you launch a blitzkrieg
12:34and it fails,
12:36you'll end up in a war of attrition.
12:38And if you launch a limited aim strategy,
12:40you'll be successful at first,
12:43but it will probably end up
12:46turning into a war of attrition
12:49and nobody wants a war of attrition.
12:52So there is a powerful incentive
12:55to stay away from a limited aim strategy
12:57and there's certainly a powerful incentive
13:00to stay away from an attrition strategy.
13:04So when those are the two options on the table,
13:08you're likely to see deterrence succeed.
13:12It's when an army can launch a blitzkrieg
13:15that deterrence is likely to fail.
13:17So this is my story about the military variable.
13:23Now, as I said earlier,
13:27you have to take into account
13:28the political variable as well.
13:32Now, there's no question
13:34that any time a country
13:36is thinking about going to war,
13:39the political variable
13:43is going to basically say
13:46we have very good reason
13:50to go to war.
13:52By definition,
13:53you don't think about
13:54launching an attack
13:57against an adversary
13:59unless you think
14:00there is a strong set
14:03of political reasons
14:04for doing so.
14:06Nevertheless,
14:08in some cases,
14:10in some cases,
14:12the intensity
14:13of the political forces
14:15that are pushing a state
14:17to go to war
14:18are extremely great.
14:22That a state feels
14:24that it has to solve
14:28the problem that it faces.
14:29It has to solve
14:31the political problem
14:32that it faces
14:33with military force.
14:37And what happens
14:38in cases like that
14:40is that states
14:43usually go
14:44to a limited aim strategy.
14:47This is the set of cases
14:50where you see
14:51a limited aim strategy
14:53lead to deterrence failure.
14:55You remember my point
14:56when I talked about
14:58the military variable
14:59was that blitzkrieg
15:02produces deterrence failures.
15:04Attrition strategy,
15:05deterrence success.
15:07Limited aim strategy,
15:08most of the time,
15:10deterrence success.
15:11What I'm telling you
15:12is when you factor
15:13in the political variable
15:15and there are intense pressures
15:18to go to war,
15:20then the state,
15:22if it doesn't have
15:23the capability
15:24to launch a blitzkrieg,
15:27will launch
15:27a limited aim strategy.
15:29And let me give you
15:30what I think
15:31are the two classic examples
15:33of that.
15:34One is the 1973
15:36Egyptian attack
15:39against the Israelis
15:42in the Sinai.
15:44The Egyptians
15:45crossed the Suez Canal
15:46and they grabbed off
15:48a piece of territory
15:50in the Sinai
15:51that Israel had controlled
15:53up till then
15:54and then they shifted
15:55to the defensive.
15:56It was a clear
15:58limited aim strategy.
16:00Now, why did
16:01the Egyptians do that?
16:04Anwar Sadat,
16:05who was then
16:06the president of Egypt,
16:08felt that it was
16:09absolutely essential
16:10that the Egyptians
16:12use military force
16:14against Israel
16:15to send a clear message
16:17to Israel
16:18that they had,
16:19they meaning the Egyptians,
16:21had to get back
16:22the Sinai Peninsula.
16:25So,
16:26they launched
16:27in October of 1973
16:30this limited aims strategy.
16:33They did not launch
16:34a blitzkrieg
16:35because there was
16:36no way
16:37that the Egyptians
16:38could defeat the Israelis
16:39with a blitzkrieg strategy.
16:41That was off the table.
16:42And they did not want
16:43to engage
16:44in an attrition war
16:45if they could avoid it.
16:46So,
16:47they launched
16:48a limited aim strategy.
16:50Same is true
16:51with the Japanese
16:52when they attacked
16:53the United States
16:54at Pearl Harbor
16:55in December of 1941.
16:57It was a limited aim strategy.
17:00The Japanese
17:01understood
17:02full well
17:04that they could not
17:05defeat the United States
17:06decisively.
17:08They did not have
17:10a strategy
17:11that would produce
17:12decisive victory.
17:13But nevertheless,
17:15the Japanese felt
17:15that they were compelled
17:17to attack the United States
17:18because the United States
17:19was strangling them
17:20economically
17:21and they had to figure
17:23a way
17:23to get out
17:24of this
17:25incredibly
17:27difficult situation
17:28that they were in.
17:29The United States
17:29would not
17:30negotiate with them.
17:32So,
17:32they decided
17:33to launch a war.
17:34And again,
17:35they did not have
17:36a blitzkrieg strategy.
17:37They wanted to avoid
17:38a war of attrition
17:39so they launched
17:41a limited aim strategy
17:42which is what
17:42the Pearl Harbor attack
17:44was all about.
17:46So,
17:47you see
17:47in the case
17:48of Egypt in 73
17:50and the Japanese
17:51in 1941
17:52two instances
17:53of a state
17:54actually pursuing
17:55a limited aim strategy.
17:57Two cases
17:58where deterrence
17:59broke down
17:59because the attacking
18:01forces adopted
18:03a limited aim strategy.
18:06But the only reason
18:08you got
18:08a limited aim strategy
18:10in those two cases
18:12was because
18:13the political forces
18:14pushing each one
18:16of those states
18:17to go to war
18:18were just so
18:19incredibly powerful.
18:21But otherwise,
18:22as I say,
18:23the key to understanding
18:24whether or not
18:25deterrence fails
18:26is whether or not
18:28a state that's
18:29contemplating war
18:30has a blitzkrieg strategy
18:32available or not.
18:33In other words,
18:34whether it can win
18:35a quick
18:36and decisive victory.
18:37So this is basically
18:39my theory
18:40of conventional deterrence.
18:42Now what I want to do
18:44is switch gears
18:46and I want to talk
18:48about the Russian decision
18:52to invade Ukraine
18:54on February 24, 2022.
18:56And of course,
18:58my argument is
18:59that the Russians
19:00could choose
19:01among three strategies.
19:04They could choose
19:05a blitzkrieg.
19:07They could choose
19:08an attrition strategy
19:10or they could choose
19:12a limited aim strategy.
19:14Maybe I shouldn't say
19:14they could choose.
19:15They could contemplate.
19:17It's probably
19:17a better way to put it.
19:18They could contemplate
19:19a blitzkrieg strategy,
19:21an attrition strategy,
19:22or a limited aim strategy.
19:24Now,
19:25the conventional wisdom
19:27in the West
19:28is that the Russians
19:31launched a blitzkrieg.
19:33Let me say a bit more
19:34about this.
19:36The conventional wisdom
19:38in the West
19:38is clearly
19:39that Vladimir Putin
19:44was an aggressor
19:46who was interested
19:48in conquering
19:50all of Ukraine
19:51and incorporating it
19:54into a greater Russia.
19:56And of course,
19:57as you know,
19:58many people believe
20:00that after he was done
20:01with Ukraine,
20:02he would try to conquer
20:03other territory
20:04in Eastern Europe
20:06and reestablish
20:07the Soviet Empire.
20:08But that's all
20:09beside the point
20:10because we're simply
20:10concerned here
20:11about the question
20:12of why Russia
20:16attacked Ukraine.
20:17And again,
20:18the goal,
20:19so the conventional wisdom goes,
20:22is that Putin
20:23wanted to conquer
20:25all of Ukraine.
20:26this is another way
20:27of saying
20:28that Putin
20:29was pursuing
20:31a decisive victory.
20:34And of course,
20:35he thought
20:36he was going to win
20:38a quick
20:39and decisive victory.
20:40He thought
20:41that he had
20:42this formidable
20:43military instrument,
20:44the Russian army,
20:46that would quickly
20:47overrun
20:48the Ukrainian army,
20:50end up conquering
20:51all of Ukraine
20:53and then incorporating
20:56it into a greater Russia.
20:58This would be
20:59a quick
21:00and decisive victory.
21:01And of course,
21:02as I said to you
21:03when I laid out
21:03my theory,
21:05that if a state
21:06thinks that it
21:07can affect
21:08the blitzkrieg,
21:09then deterrence
21:10is going to fail.
21:11And if you accept
21:13the conventional wisdom
21:15about what Putin
21:17was up to,
21:18it's obvious
21:20why deterrence
21:22failed
21:23and why
21:24Russia invaded Ukraine.
21:28Now,
21:28I disagree
21:29with this argument,
21:30but before I
21:31tell you why,
21:32let me note
21:34that once
21:35the blitzkrieg failed,
21:37and of course
21:37the blitzkrieg failed
21:39in the conventional wisdom,
21:40what you got
21:41was a war of attrition.
21:43And this was the point
21:44that I made
21:45to you earlier.
21:45Remember I said
21:47when a blitzkrieg fails,
21:48it leads to a war
21:50of attrition.
21:51This is what happened
21:51to the Soviets
21:52on the Eastern Front
21:53in World War II.
21:55And so the conventional wisdom
21:57goes,
21:57this is what happened
21:58to the Russians
22:01after they invaded Ukraine.
22:03The blitzkrieg failed
22:05and we got a war
22:05of attrition.
22:07Now,
22:09why is this argument wrong?
22:11First of all,
22:12there is no way
22:15that the Russian army
22:17that went into Ukraine
22:19could have come
22:20even close
22:21to conquering
22:23all of Ukraine.
22:24It was just too small,
22:27the Russian army,
22:28and it was not
22:29a high-quality
22:31military machine.
22:32It was not an army
22:34that was well-oiled
22:36for offensive operations.
22:38It was an army
22:40that was basically built
22:41for a defensive mission.
22:43And furthermore,
22:44as I said,
22:45it was a rather
22:46small army.
22:47I argue
22:48that the Russian army
22:51that went into Ukraine
22:52had at most
22:54190,000 troops.
22:57190,000.
22:59General Siersky,
23:00who is the head
23:01of the Ukrainian military
23:04today,
23:05argues that the Russians
23:07went in
23:07with 100,000 troops.
23:09There is absolutely
23:11no way
23:12that the Russians
23:13could even come close
23:14to conquering
23:15all of Ukraine
23:16with 100,000 troops
23:18or even with
23:18190,000 troops.
23:21When the Wehrmacht,
23:22the German army,
23:24went into Poland
23:25in 1939,
23:26and you want to remember
23:28that the Wehrmacht
23:29was only interested
23:30in conquering
23:32the western one-half
23:33of Poland
23:34because the Soviet Union
23:35was going to conquer
23:37the eastern one-half
23:38of Poland.
23:39When the Wehrmacht
23:40went into western Poland,
23:42it had 1.5 million men.
23:461.5 million.
23:48And the western half
23:49of Poland
23:50is much smaller
23:51than Ukraine.
23:53And again,
23:54General Siersky says
23:55the Russians went in
23:57with 100,000 troops.
23:58I say they went in
24:00with at most
24:00190,000 troops.
24:02And again,
24:03this was not an army
24:05that was well-suited
24:07for offensive military operations.
24:09To put it
24:10in slightly different terms,
24:11this was not the Wehrmacht.
24:13The Wehrmacht
24:14was a formidable
24:15fighting force
24:16that was top-notch
24:19when it came
24:19to executing
24:20offensive armored operations.
24:22That was not
24:23the Russian army.
24:25So my first argument
24:27against the conventional wisdom,
24:29and again,
24:29the conventional wisdom
24:30is that Russia
24:31was bent on
24:33achieving a quick
24:35indecisive victory,
24:36is that they just
24:36didn't have an army
24:37that was big enough
24:38to achieve that goal.
24:40Second point
24:41I would make to you
24:42is that one day
24:44after the offensive started,
24:46on February 25th,
24:48Dmitry Peskov,
24:50who was,
24:51at the time,
24:55Putin's principal spokesman,
24:57reached out
24:58to the Ukrainians
24:59and said
25:00that the Russians
25:00were interested
25:02in starting negotiations.
25:04Just think about this.
25:06One day,
25:07after the Russians
25:08start the war,
25:10the Russians
25:10reach out
25:11to the Ukrainians
25:12and say
25:13they'd like to start
25:15negotiations
25:16to put an end
25:17to the war.
25:18This does not fit
25:20with the story
25:20that Putin was bent
25:22on conquering
25:23all of Ukraine
25:24and incorporating it
25:26into a greater Russia.
25:27Then what happens
25:29over the course
25:30of March,
25:32this is March 2022,
25:35right after the war starts,
25:37is that the Ukrainians
25:39and the Russians
25:41begin to negotiate
25:43with each other.
25:44And eventually,
25:45what happens
25:46is on 29 March,
25:50on 29 March,
25:52this is a little over
25:54one month
25:54after the war starts,
25:56negotiations
25:57to end the war
25:59start in Istanbul.
26:01These are the famous
26:02Istanbul negotiations
26:04that are designed
26:04to shut down the war.
26:06Furthermore,
26:07and this is very important,
26:09as a goodwill gesture,
26:11the Russians
26:12evacuate
26:14their military
26:15from around
26:17the Kiev region
26:18and they,
26:21in effect,
26:23turn the Kiev region
26:24over to Ukraine.
26:26Again,
26:27this does not sound
26:29like the Russians,
26:31and in particular,
26:32Vladimir Putin,
26:33were bent
26:33on conquering
26:35all of Ukraine,
26:37winning a decisive victory.
26:39And in fact,
26:41what happens
26:41after 19 March
26:43in Istanbul
26:44is that the two sides
26:46do begin to negotiate.
26:47and it's very clear
26:49that there are
26:50a lot of difficult issues
26:52on the table
26:53and it's not clear
26:55you would have ever
26:56gotten an agreement.
26:57But the central agreement
26:59on the table
27:00is the question
27:02of Ukrainian neutrality.
27:05And what was going on here
27:07is that the Russians
27:08just wanted to make sure
27:10that Ukraine
27:11did not join NATO.
27:13They were not interested
27:14in conquering
27:15all of Ukraine.
27:16they did not want
27:18Ukraine to turn
27:20into a western bulwark
27:21on their border.
27:23And that's what
27:24this operation
27:25was all about.
27:26I'll talk more
27:27about this in a second.
27:28But the point
27:29I'm trying to make
27:30to you
27:31is that
27:32given the size
27:33of the Russian army,
27:34given the quality
27:35of the Russian army,
27:36and given the fact
27:37that the Russians
27:38reach out to the Ukrainians
27:40to start negotiations
27:41right after the war starts,
27:43and then given the fact
27:45that those negotiations
27:46actually start
27:47a little over a month later,
27:49it's, in my opinion,
27:51almost impossible
27:52to sustain the story
27:54that the Russians
27:55were interested
27:56in conquering Ukraine.
27:59My final point
28:00on this
28:01is those negotiations
28:03eventually break down.
28:04And as I said,
28:05I'm not sure
28:06that they ever
28:06would have produced
28:08a final agreement
28:09that would have ended
28:10the war back then.
28:11But it's not the Russians
28:13who walk away
28:13from the negotiations.
28:16I think it's the Ukrainians
28:18who bear
28:18their principal responsibility
28:20from walking away
28:21from the negotiations.
28:22And, of course,
28:24what happens then
28:26once the war
28:29is not settled
28:31in Istanbul
28:32is it evolves
28:33into a war of attrition.
28:36Okay.
28:37Let me give you my view
28:39using my theory
28:42on what happened
28:43that led to the war
28:46on February 24, 2022.
28:50The Russians did not launch
28:52a blitzkrieg.
28:54I've just tried
28:55to give you
28:55some evidence.
28:56There's more.
28:58But I gave you
28:59some of the principal evidence
29:00that shows you
29:01this was not
29:02a case of
29:03Vladimir Putin
29:06turning his army
29:07loose
29:08to conquer
29:08all of Ukraine.
29:09No.
29:10What Putin did
29:11is he launched
29:12the limited-aim strategy.
29:14If you go into Ukraine
29:15with 100,000
29:16or 190,000 troops
29:18and you withdraw
29:19from Kiev
29:20as soon as
29:21the negotiations
29:22in Istanbul
29:23starts,
29:24you're pursuing
29:25a limited-aim strategy here.
29:27What Putin did
29:29was Putin went
29:30into Ukraine
29:31and he captured
29:33a small chunk,
29:36a small chunk
29:38of territory
29:39inside of Ukraine.
29:42and he then told
29:45the Ukrainians
29:47that he wanted
29:47to start negotiating.
29:49What's going on here?
29:51What's going on here
29:53is that Putin
29:55believed
29:56that NATO's
29:58policy
29:59of trying
30:00to incorporate
30:01Ukraine
30:02into the
30:04Western alliance,
30:06the West's policy
30:08of trying
30:08Ukraine
30:09to make Ukraine
30:10a Western
30:11bulwark
30:12on Russia's border
30:15was an existential threat.
30:18The Russians
30:19were perfectly clear
30:20on this issue
30:21from April 8th,
30:23excuse me,
30:24from April 2008
30:26forward.
30:27And of course,
30:28April 2008
30:29is when NATO
30:30says that Ukraine
30:31will become part
30:32of the alliance.
30:33From April 2008
30:35forward,
30:35the Russians
30:36are clear
30:37this is an existential
30:38threat
30:38and it's not
30:40going to happen.
30:43In December
30:44of 2021,
30:46January of 2022,
30:49and in February
30:50of 2022,
30:51these are the
30:52three months
30:53before the war
30:54starts,
30:55the Russians
30:57go to enormous
30:58lengths
30:58to try
30:59to negotiate
31:00with the West
31:02to avoid
31:03a war.
31:04the Russians
31:05are not
31:06interested
31:07in war.
31:08This is
31:09perfectly clear
31:10if you look
31:10at the historical
31:11record
31:11for those
31:12three months
31:12before the war
31:13started.
31:14Nevertheless,
31:16the West
31:16has zero
31:18interest
31:19in negotiating
31:20with the Russians
31:23to make sure
31:24that a war
31:25does not break
31:26out over Ukraine.
31:27Just go look
31:28at the historical
31:29record.
31:29You'll find
31:30hardly any evidence
31:32that the West,
31:33which believed
31:34the Russians
31:35might attack.
31:36You want to
31:37understand that.
31:38Many people
31:38in the West
31:39thought that
31:39there was a good
31:40chance that
31:41the Russians
31:42would attack.
31:42Nevertheless,
31:44the West,
31:44and here I'm
31:44talking mainly
31:45about the United
31:46States,
31:46did virtually
31:48nothing to
31:48prevent a war.
31:51What this meant
31:52was that Putin
31:53was desperate.
31:55He believed
31:56that he faced,
31:58well, I shouldn't say,
31:58his country faced
32:00an existential threat
32:01and he had to
32:02deal with this
32:03existential threat.
32:04He fully
32:05understood
32:07that he had
32:08no blitzkrieg
32:09option.
32:10That was not
32:11in the cards.
32:12Putin was not
32:16running the
32:17Wehrmacht.
32:18The Russian army
32:19was not the
32:20Wehrmacht.
32:20The Russian army
32:21was a defensively
32:22oriented army,
32:23small in number.
32:24It had no
32:25capability of winning
32:26a decisive victory
32:27in Ukraine.
32:28So he pursued
32:29a limited aim
32:30strategy.
32:31This is exactly
32:32what my theory
32:33would predict.
32:34The political
32:35variable here,
32:37the political
32:38forces that were
32:39pushing Putin
32:40to go to war
32:41were extremely
32:42powerful.
32:43Again, Putin felt
32:44that Russia faced
32:45an existential threat.
32:47He had to deal
32:48with that threat
32:48and the United
32:49States and the
32:50Europeans were
32:51doing nothing
32:52to negotiate
32:53a way to
32:54avoid war.
32:55So he felt
32:56what he had
32:57to use military
32:58force.
32:58And as I've
32:59said, he had
33:00no blitzkrieg
33:01option.
33:01So what he did
33:03was he launched
33:04a limited aim
33:04strategy.
33:05And if you look
33:06at the size
33:07of the army
33:07and if you look
33:08at his interest
33:09in sending a
33:10signal to the
33:11Ukrainians to
33:12let's start
33:13negotiating right
33:14after the war
33:15starts, you see
33:16clearly that this
33:18is what he had
33:19in mind.
33:21However, as I
33:23told you at the
33:24beginning of the
33:25lecture, the
33:26problem with the
33:27limited aim
33:27strategy is that
33:30the other side,
33:31the target state,
33:33is unlikely to
33:34roll over and
33:35play dead.
33:36It's unlikely to
33:37surrender.
33:39And indeed, it's
33:40likely to continue
33:41the fight.
33:42And in this case,
33:45Ukraine, with
33:47help from the
33:48West, this
33:49includes the
33:49Europeans and the
33:50United States, and
33:51we're talking
33:52about with
33:53abundant help
33:54from the West,
33:55the Ukrainians
33:57continue the
33:58fight against
34:01Russia.
34:02I believe that
34:03one of the
34:03principal reasons
34:04that the
34:06Ukrainians walk
34:07away from the
34:07Istanbul
34:08negotiations, and
34:10I believe that
34:11the West
34:12encourages them to
34:13do this, is
34:15because they
34:15believe that
34:16Ukraine, with
34:17help from the
34:18West, can
34:18prevail over the
34:19Russians in the
34:21long term, because
34:22the Russian army
34:23is not that
34:24strong, which
34:26of course is why
34:26it pursued a
34:27limited aim
34:28strategy.
34:28So the
34:29Ukrainians, with
34:30help from the
34:30West, continue
34:31the war.
34:32And what's the
34:33end result?
34:34The end result
34:35is that this
34:36limited aim
34:37strategy turns
34:38into a war of
34:40attrition.
34:40And of course, as
34:42all the viewers
34:42know, we are
34:43now engaged in a
34:45war of attrition
34:48with Russia on
34:49one side, Ukraine
34:50and the West
34:51on the other
34:53side.
34:53So to sum up
34:55here, when you
34:56think about what
34:57happened on
34:59February 24,
35:002022, what you
35:02want to do is
35:03think about this
35:04as a case of a
35:05failure of
35:06conventional
35:07deterrence.
35:08And as I
35:09said before, when
35:10you think about
35:11conventional
35:12deterrence, you
35:13have to think
35:13about the
35:14political variable
35:15and the
35:15military variable.
35:17And when you
35:17think about the
35:18military variable,
35:19there are three
35:19strategies, blitzkrieg,
35:21attrition, and
35:22limited aim strategy.
35:23And if a
35:25potential attacker
35:26can pursue a
35:27blitzkrieg strategy,
35:28deterrence is likely
35:29to fail.
35:30And the only time I
35:32think you're going
35:33to get a state
35:33pursuing a limited
35:35aim strategy, which
35:36is the second best
35:37alternative, but not
35:38a great alternative,
35:40is when the
35:40political forces that
35:42call for war are
35:43so powerful that
35:45the state is
35:45willing to risk
35:46it and pursue a
35:47limited aim strategy.
35:49And I think what
35:50happened in the
35:52case of the
35:53Ukraine war is
35:55that the Russians
35:56did not have a
35:57blitzkrieg strategy.
35:59I know that's the
35:59conventional wisdom,
36:01but they did not
36:02have a blitzkrieg
36:03strategy.
36:05They pursued a
36:06limited aim strategy.
36:07And the reason they
36:08pursued a limited
36:10aim strategy is
36:11because they thought
36:13thought that they
36:14faced an existential
36:15threat, that they
36:16had to deal with
36:17that threat, and
36:19they could not deal
36:21with the threat
36:22through negotiations
36:23with the West
36:24because the West
36:26would just not
36:27negotiate.
36:28So they had to use
36:29military force, and
36:31they launched this
36:32limited attack on
36:35February 24, 2022,
36:37which at first began
36:39to look like it
36:40might work.
36:41You want to
36:41remember, you've got
36:42negotiations at
36:44Istanbul, and there
36:45are many people who
36:46do think there was a
36:47good chance those
36:48negotiations would
36:49have worked had the
36:52West not encouraged
36:53the Ukrainians to
36:54walk away.
36:56But the negotiations
36:58failed, and here we
37:00are in this lengthy
37:03war of attrition.
37:04And as I said, this
37:05is exactly what my
37:07argument would
37:08expect.
37:09That's my story on
37:12the origins and also
37:15on the conduct of
37:18the Ukraine war
37:20since February 24,
37:222022.
37:24Thank you very much
37:25for your attention.