Russian Economy Backed Into a Corner by European Sanctions

AeroDefense with Xavier Tytelman

Curious about how sanctions have really hit the Russian economy? Join us as we break down what’s happening behind the headlines—with economist Cyprien! From oil deals to shadow fleets and risky partnerships, we dig into what’s working, what’s not, and what’s next for Russia.   Subscribe for more insightful chats and tell us in the comments which fact surprised you most!  #Russia #Economy #Sanctions #War #Politics  👉 This channel was created in collaboration with https://www.youtube.com/@xaviertytelman  0:00 - Introduction and Overview of Sanctions 1:26 - Impact of Sanctions on Russian Economy 3:34 - Bypassing Sanctions and Economic Challenges 6:55 - Partnerships, Financing, and Oil Sanctions 12:43 - Economic Consequences and Future Projections 16:35 - Civilian Economy Decline and Ukrainian Actions 19:00 - Accelerating Pressure on Russia and Strategies 21:06 - Post-War Scenarios and Economic Outlook  We are now available on Spotify! Listen now https://open.spotify.com/show/6KW2Zo9GU39VZSvv2zIpxM

Transcript

00:00Hello and welcome. Today in this video we're going to talk about Russia, the Russian economy,

00:04and especially the sanctions that have been imposed on this country and their effects today.

00:08For that we have my friend Cyprian here. Hello?

00:10Hello, hi Xavier Teitelman. How are you?

00:12Cyprian, what do you do when it comes to the Russian economy?

00:14I'm an economist focusing on the Russian economy and an associate researcher at the National Gendarmerie Research Center.

00:20Excellent. So, first when we started there were what, about 20 packages of sanctions?

00:25Yes, that's right. The 20th package of European sanctions.

00:28What was our objective? What were we trying to do?

00:31It was to make Russia collapse economically, to harm its ability to wage its war.

00:36Actually, it's true that some politicians initially said that the sanctions would cause the Russian economy to collapse.

00:43In my opinion, that was wrong and not the main goal of the sanctions.

00:46Also, we have to admit the Russian economy hasn't collapsed.

00:50But if it hasn't collapsed, it's because its production is driven by the defense industrial base.

00:54That's something we can clearly see with exactly the DIB.

00:58We can clearly see it in the sectoral figures.

01:00Month after month, it's the sectors associated with the defense industrial base that are driving the economy upward.

01:09But despite everything, we still have to point out that the Russian economy is starting to catch a bit of

01:13a cold.

01:13In 2025, growth is only just above 1%.

01:17That's a drop compared to 2023 and 2024 when it was over.

01:214.1%.

01:23That's the effect of the war and the sanctions.

01:25Let's remember, Russia isn't directly comparable to us, since it's a developing country.

01:29It's catch-up growth, so it should be averaging around 4%, like Kazakhstan.

01:33Greece and all the others.

01:35That's a very interesting point because there are a lot of people from compros on social media who say,

01:40look at Russia, it's much less in debt than we are.

01:43What right do we have to criticize Russian growth when we ourselves are struggling to reach 1%?

01:48But yes, the average for developing countries, for emerging countries, is a little over 4%.

01:53And regarding Russian debt, if Russia had even half of France's debt, that's it.

01:58They would collapse because investors have little confidence in Russia's ability to repay its debt.

02:04Whereas we, France, are at more than, I think, 115% or 120%.

02:08But it's not very serious because behind that, we have an industrial base, a strong economy,

02:13and high-quality export products that give investors confidence.

02:16And by the way, we borrow at just a few percent, while Russia is around 17% to 20%.

02:20That's exactly right.

02:21And by the way, the interest rate, the key rate of the Bank of Russia, is at 14.5%

02:26while inflation is only at 6%.

02:28Well, 6% is a lot, but the key rate is really very high.

02:33Why?

02:34Because Russia is an emerging economy, and so to anchor the confidence of the markets, consumers, households,

02:40and to avoid hyperinflation, it is forced to have very high rates.

02:44So that means the fundamentals of the Russian economy are not great.

02:48But then, once again, is it because they're investing everything in the war?

02:51Or is it because our sanctions are having an effect?

02:54So, clearly, there is an effect.

02:56Putin is choosing to sacrifice the civilian economy to devote as many resources as possible to his war.

03:02Russia's military spending went from 3% to 3.5% of GDP in 2021 to 7% to 7

03:09.5% in 2025.

03:10So, it's a massive increase, and obviously, it harms the civilian economy.

03:15It lowers productivity, competitiveness, and it pushes the civilian economy out of international competition in the medium and long term.

03:23So, it's a choice.

03:25Of Vladimir Putin.

03:26But it's also an effect of the sanctions that limit Russia's oil revenues and block direct access to Western technologies.

03:34And actually, I wanted to get to the three main objectives of the sanctions.

03:39The number one objective of the sanctions is to increase the cost of the war for Putin.

03:44Basically, what does that mean?

03:46It means that Putin knows that as long as he continues the war, he'll have less oil revenue, and he

03:51won't have access to high-quality Western technologies.

03:54Uh, and, uh, he'll also be disconnected from the international financial system.

04:00But then, typically, with these three examples you gave, we know that Russia is bypassing the sanctions.

04:05We know the missiles being fired at Ukraine today were made less than six months ago, so it's all very

04:11recent.

04:11And yet, we still find more than 200 Western components in every KS-1 missile that is fired at Ukraine.

04:17So, they still manage to get around them?

04:19Exactly, they get around them, but that doesn't mean the sanctions aren't working.

04:23That's also the second goal of the sanctions.

04:25It's that, in fact, it considerably increases the cost of the components that Russia imports.

04:33Basically, either it will still manage to import Western components through indirect routes,

04:38but it will cost more because you still have to pay for a logistics route that is longer and harder

04:44to access.

04:45You have to find intermediaries who are willing to take on the risk, so they expose themselves to American secondary

04:51sanctions.

04:52So, it's much more expensive for Russia.

04:54And when it can't access these Western components, it will import Chinese components of much lower quality.

05:01For example, just as an example, Huawei tried...

05:04Well, actually, Russia asked Huawei to replace the advanced semiconductors from the American company NVIDIA.

05:11And there's a Korean newspaper that tells us the failure rate was 80%.

05:16So, there you go. Exactly.

05:18And you recently did a show with Marianne where you explained that Russian drones had a much lower success rate

05:24than Ukrainian drones.

05:25So, the success rate you mentioned was 40 for the Ukrainians and only 10 for the Russians.

05:31Well, that's actually explained by the fact that Ukrainian air defenses are effective,

05:35but also because Russian air defenses are less effective than the Ukrainian ones.

05:40And also that whether it's the semiconductors used to make Russian drones or the electrical connectors,

05:47they're either already used.

05:48First, because Russia, Russia can't get new ones or their Chinese components of lower quality.

05:55So, that means first, the systems they're able to get, they pay more for them.

05:59That's it. There you go.

06:00Second, they don't have the volume they want.

06:02Exactly.

06:03So, if Russians got all the components they wanted from abroad, they could fire two to four times more missiles.

06:08That's already a small win. That's right.

06:10And you're saying that the Chinese are trying to compensate or take over a market because they've basically gained a

06:15monopoly over Russia?

06:17Pretty much.

06:18Okay, that's not the quality that was expected.

06:20But at least regarding the famous BRICS partnership, etc.,

06:24are the Chinese trying to trap the Russians because they have a monopoly, or is it still a real partnership?

06:29Well, no.

06:30For me, it's not a real partnership. It's an unbalanced partnership.

06:34And that brings me to the third objective of the sanctions.

06:37It's to isolate Russia. It's to force it to turn to a limited number of partners.

06:42So, it loses negotiating power.

06:44And if Russia is isolated, that means it's weaker.

06:47And so, the fact that it's weaker is interesting for the West and for Ukraine.

06:51As we said, it will pay a premium on the products it imports.

06:55There's an interesting study from the Bank of Finland from November 2025,

06:59which explains that China sells sanctioned products to Russia at a markup of more than 90%.

07:05So,

07:06The same product costs 90% more in Russia than in France.

07:09That's exactly it. Actually, we can also talk about financing.

07:13Uh, some people explain to us that even if Russia doesn't have the foreign currency to pay China,

07:19it's not a problem because China is ready to.

07:21That's not enough stuff.

07:23Lend? Yeah, that's it.

07:24Chinese banks don't want to lend to Russia because they're afraid of Western secondary sanctions,

07:29so there's also a problem with access to Chinese financing.

07:32China is reluctant to lend to Russia.

07:35And then, incidentally, with the war in Iran, we saw that the Emirates, Qatar, Turkey,

07:40all those countries that were helping Russia circumvent sanctions,

07:43they found out that they were getting components that they themselves had helped Russia to circumvent.

07:48I think these countries will also cut supply, putting Russia in even more trouble with procurement.

07:55There's a very important element that we haven't really talked about yet, and that's oil and gas.

08:00The sanctions we've applied fall into different categories.

08:04First, we stop buying it ourselves, but we also require other countries to pay less for Russian oil.

08:08How does that work then?

08:10That's right, as you mentioned.

08:12First, there was a European embargo that meant we stopped importing 90% of Russian oil.

08:17So, there is an exception for Hungary and Romania, which are isolated.

08:22But overall, Europe has stopped importing Russian oil.

08:26And so, that means that in order to sell its oil, Russia turned to India, Turkey, and China.

08:31As a result, it lost negotiating power.

08:34And that's what I was saying about the third objective of the sanctions, which is to weaken Russia diplomatically.

08:39In fact, it is forced to sell its oil at a discount that has reached as much as $30 below

08:44Brent crude, the North Sea benchmark, and the international benchmark.

08:48So, that's the embargo.

08:50Then, there's the price cap, which works, and which worked especially at the beginning.

08:54The price cap, which was initially set at $60, then went even lower.

08:59In fact, that's if Russia used Western services, for example, maritime freight, maritime insurance, fleet managers, and so on, to

09:09export its oil.

09:11It was allowed to use Western services, but only if the oil was sold for less than $60 initially.

09:18Then, I think it went down to $47 or $47.5.

09:21In any case, it was decreasing.

09:24After that, it built up a shadow fleet, a phantom fleet.

09:27So, again, people say yes.

09:29As a result, it managed to get around it, but it was extremely costly for Russia to build a phantom

09:34fleet to acquire tankers.

09:36Tens of billions of dollars in purchases of Russian oil.

09:39Yeah.

09:40And then, you have to operate them, and you have to protect them.

09:42And then, we shouldn't forget that when Russia uses its shadow fleet, meaning it also uses insurers that aren't Western,

09:50but these insurers are afraid of sanctions, of American sanctions.

09:54And so, they impose a risk premium on Russia.

09:57And what's really interesting is that since the end of 2023, the United States has started to impose secondary sanctions.

10:04They have sanctioned ships, fleet managers, and so on.

10:08And so, all these parallel non-Western players who are supporting Russian oil exports, actually, they are taking on a

10:15bigger risk because it's very serious to be put on the SDN list, the American sanctions list, since they are

10:21cut off from the American market.

10:23They can't use the dollar.

10:25They can't open or have a bank account in the United States.

10:28So, it's really very serious for them.

10:30And so, they impose prices.

10:31It should be pointed out that as soon as there is an international contract, it is settled in dollars.

10:36So, if they can't use the dollar anymore, it doesn't work.

10:39And then, the companies that produce oil, if they can't buy equipment anymore, if they can't buy systems to drill,

10:45to bore, if they can't buy ships anymore, it's a mess.

10:48That's it, exactly.

10:50It's kind of, it's the weapon, secondary sanctions, it's the nuclear option to actually deter these operators from serving Russia

10:57and its oil exports.

10:59And so, Russia still manages to sell its oil in volume, but with risk premiums that are high.

11:05And it's the same with what we saw yesterday with the interception of the ship.

11:09When the European states, the European navies, the French navy, so this has happened four times,

11:15they intercept a ship from the Shadow Fleet, and then they bring it back to a port to inspect it.

11:20They impose fines on it, and most importantly, they reveal who the operators associated with this ship are, who can

11:28themselves be sanctioned.

11:30So, this already increases delivery delays.

11:33Russia may have to pay penalties, so we increase the costs.

11:37A hundred dollars per day of delay.

11:39Exactly.

11:40So, there are those penalties, there are the imposed fines.

11:43And then, there are also all those operators linked to the Shadow Fleet who face, who incur an additional risk.

11:50So, they increase the risk premium they impose on Russia.

11:53And the higher the risk premium is, the more Russia has to discount its oil to compensate for the final

11:59price delivered to the buyer, which is set by the market.

12:02But here, do we have any idea of the loss of earnings that these oil and gas sanctions have represented

12:07since the beginning?

12:07Are we talking about tens of billions, hundreds of billions of dollars?

12:10It's, uh, it's tens of billions.

12:13Actually, it's hard to estimate because it depends on the volumes, it depends on the prices.

12:18Actually, even in terms of discount, there are different sources.

12:21The discount isn't the same to the east of Russia as it is in India.

12:24We even have to admit that during the war in Iran, Russia actually benefited from a premium in India.

12:31There was such a shortage of oil and such a fear of running out that, in fact, the Indians were

12:35willing to pay a premium to Russia.

12:37So, it was very short-lived, but it's very difficult to estimate.

12:40But the scale is in the tens of billions.

12:42But the war, because, well, at the beginning of the year, Russia was actually supposed to give up an increase

12:47in its military budget.

12:49And then, when Trump had the bright idea to invade Iran, Russia thought, well, in the end, I'm not cancelling

12:54my budget increase.

12:55So, it still gave Russia, which was economically drained, a little bit of breathing room.

13:00And it gave them a few months of reprieve, I would say, economically.

13:04So, actually, we're coming back a bit to the Russian situation.

13:08Russia's growth in the first quarter of 2026 is negative.

13:11It's at minus 0.2, and that's despite the boost in March, which actually helped to restart growth.

13:18But in January and February, it was minus 1.8.

13:22So, that's year on year.

13:23It's compared to the same period last year.

13:27But even with Iran in the first quarter, growth is negative.

13:30And the Russian Ministry of Economy in May significantly revised its growth forecasts downward.

13:36It is forecasting growth of only 0.4% in 2026, even with Iran.

13:42So, yes, Iran is a reprieve.

13:44We can say it's a reprieve.

13:46It's not going to boost growth to 3%.

13:49Since 2023, growth has been declining.

13:514%, 4.1%, 1%.

13:53And now, we would expect 0.4% in 2026.

13:57That's the effect of the war.

13:59That's the effect of the sanctions.

14:00And the war in Iran will eventually come to an end.

14:03Of course, of course.

14:03It's actually possible because it will hurt the Russians and it will benefit us.

14:07That's exactly it.

14:09You discussed many aspects of the war.

14:12There are quite a few economists making projections.

14:14I was told that by the second half of 2025, Russia, at the pace it had before, would be done

14:20for.

14:21But actually, they sold their gold reserves.

14:23They are being economically drained.

14:25Now, they're short on men and can't produce enough anymore.

14:29Are there still scenarios where we say, that's it, it's not possible to continue, the population will wake up?

14:35That's the limit.

14:36The limit, in my opinion, is that Russian growth, in fact, is likely to stagnate around zero.

14:41Because if the military-industrial complex has reached its growth potential, it can only grow through modest productivity gains.

14:51Because, as we said, since Russia no longer has access to Western technologies, productivity gains are weaker.

14:57So, when the growth potential has been reached by the military-industrial complex and the civilian economy has very little

15:03labor,

15:04because the workforce will have been absorbed by the defense industry or directly by the war,

15:09or because they have fled to...

15:10Abroad as about a million men have.

15:12Exactly.

15:13Uh, well, I don't have a crystal ball, but we're still heading towards sluggish, if not negative, growth.

15:18By the way, Deputy Suleymane Suleymanev, sorry, clearly said that he expected the economy wouldn't survive if the war continued,

15:28and, uh...

15:30That's a Russian deputy.

15:31That's it, that's exactly right.

15:32So, despite the regime, voices are starting to speak out.

15:37And similarly, a famous mathematician in Russia at the Moscow Economic Forum didn't hesitate to say that he expected a

15:44double-digit recession.

15:45So, what awaits Russia in the short term is clearly sluggish growth.

15:51And even the IMF is forecasting growth of only one 1.1 in 2026.

15:56And that's probably going to be revised downward with the negative growth in the first quarter.

16:03But what's especially interesting, sorry, is the fact that Russia is actually sacrificing its long-term economy.

16:09Even before the war, one of the main issues was diversification.

16:12Because Russia depends too much on oil, too much on gas.

16:17And in this era of ecological transition, it could be dramatic if it fails to diversify.

16:22And with the war, obviously, there are only two main sectors.

16:25It's the defense industry and the oil and gas sector.

16:30And here, Putin is sacrificing.

16:32He missed the big opportunity for diversification.

16:35And for four years now, the war has been going on.

16:37Four years that he has been deprived, at least in part, of direct access to Western technologies.

16:42And he is sacrificing his economy, his civilian economy.

16:45And that's innovation.

16:47There are a lot of, well, there are more.

16:50When there were rates at 21 at the start of the war, the central bank's key rate, and now it's

16:56at 14, 14, 5.

16:58How do you expect to invest when you're a company with such high rates?

17:02Let's be clear.

17:03Does that mean a bank will lend to a company at 14?

17:07Approximately.

17:08In an economy growing at once.

17:09So actually, investments will never pay off through growth.

17:12That's exactly it.

17:14There are also a lot of bankruptcies, which is interesting.

17:17I found the number for sole proprietors.

17:19The number of bankruptcies in 2025 was three times higher than in 2023.

17:24It's an explosion.

17:25And conversely, the number of new business formations dropped by 20 in 20.

17:3025 compared to 2024 reaching the lowest point in 14 years.

17:35So as we can see, the civilian economy is wasting away.

17:39It's a catastrophe for Russia's civilian economy.

17:42And well, to top it all off, Ukrainian sanctions, what impact do they have in all this?

17:48In the end, isn't it effectively an extension of our sanctions?

17:51Because with our sanctions, it feels like we've hit a ceiling.

17:54Ultimately, what hurts even more is Ukraine destroying the productive base and the means of financing the war.

17:59Yeah, that's a very effective lever.

18:02There were debates a while ago at the beginning of the war.

18:05People were afraid it would cause panic in the markets, an explosion in the price of crude oil.

18:09But actually, the quantities compared to the global markets are still negligible.

18:15But on the other hand, for Russia, it's a hard blow.

18:19For example, last April, the price of Russian oil went up by 20.

18:23But thanks to Ukrainian sanctions, so Ukrainian strikes, the exported volumes have dropped by 24.

18:30And so if you combine the two, it results in a 9% drop in revenue.

18:35Since they're only producing crude now, they can't export refined products anymore.

18:39Which is worth more.

18:40Yeah.

18:41They have shortages, even internally.

18:42There are shortages in Russia.

18:44Exactly.

18:44And just yesterday, they put an embargo on kerosene exports until November.

18:50And there's also an ongoing embargo on gasoline until July.

18:54So what's interesting is that refined products actually bring in much more than crude oil because they're higher quality.

19:00So when the Ukrainians target the refineries, it's very interesting because it erases part of the added value that Russia

19:07can add to its oil.

19:10Okay, we're in a situation that's not great.

19:13Could we accelerate the economic collapse of Russia?

19:16The goal is still to make sure it doesn't have the means to keep attacking Ukraine.

19:19What more can we do anyway?

19:21To significantly increase the cost of weapons production, slow down production times, limit production volumes,

19:28and above all, improve the quality of the weapons that are being used in Ukraine.

19:33How do we do that?

19:35How do we go about it?

19:36So far, we've banned pretty much everything we could ban.

19:39What we could implement, for example, with oil is not just a price cap, but a complete service ban.

19:44We prohibit Western services, maritime insurance, and so on from servicing Russian oil.

19:51That way, Russia will be even more forced to turn to non-Western operators and intermediaries

19:56who have greater bargaining power and can impose additional costs on Russia.

20:01All right.

20:02And, of course, what's absolutely crucial is to continue methodically and systematically with the policy of secondary sanctions.

20:10Because, as I was saying, secondary sanctions panic the intermediaries who help Russia.

20:16They raise Russia's risk premiums and costs directly tied to secondary sanctions.

20:22That's where I believe we have room to maneuver.

20:24It's the maritime pressure on Russian ghost ships, namely the ships exporting oil, but also, why not, the ships transporting

20:33weapons?

20:34Well, not weapons, but technological components to Russia.

20:38But I have an idea.

20:39Yeah.

20:40Couldn't we help the Ukrainians strike?

20:42That's also an indirect sanction, right?

20:45It's not us.

20:46It's a special logistical operation.

20:48We provide the Ukrainians with equipment.

20:50No, well, why not?

20:51And also set up this sky shield.

20:54That's essential because not only would it save Ukrainian lives, but it would help Ukraine win the war of attrition.

20:59And so it would increase the costs for Russia.

21:02So that's, I don't know, it's essential.

21:04I don't know why it hasn't been done yet.

21:06It's a political issue.

21:07It wouldn't cause an escalation, in my opinion, because we wouldn't, well, we would just be destroying Russian drones, Russian

21:14missiles.

21:15I don't see, it's a shield, not a sword.

21:17We agree.

21:18And we'll send you a link to this initiative where you can also sign petitions.

21:23Last, last point, the prospects for Russia.

21:26The war ends next week.

21:27They haven't collapsed.

21:28Things go back to normal.

21:31What happens to Russia?

21:32Because people say a lot that the Russian economy is overheating.

21:35Everyone's employed, blah, blah, blah.

21:37Does it collapse when the war ends?

21:39So?

21:39It's hard to say, but what is certain is that there will be imbalances.

21:43First, there will be thousands of soldiers returning to civilian life with problems like alcoholism, delinquency, and difficulties accessing the

21:51health care system.

21:52We know how Russia treats its veterans.

21:54It's not very honorable.

21:56These are also people who are unstable.

21:57We can already see it today.

21:59Former prisoners already face major challenges reintegrating into civilian life, and the statistics are alarming.

22:05There you go.

22:06That brings both social and economic costs.

22:08And then, as I was saying, there was an increase in bankruptcies, so there will be fewer civilian businesses.

22:14So then, how is Russia going to absorb this workforce and retrain them for civilian jobs?

22:20That already assumes there are companies and jobs available.

22:23But there are a lot fewer since there are bankruptcies, since there are fewer new businesses being created, since the

22:29civilian economy is in a slump.

22:31But also, these soldiers will need to be retrained.

22:34This is a career change.

22:36It's like when they join the army, they get training.

22:38I don't know how long it lasts in Russia.

22:40It probably isn't very high quality.

22:42But in any case, when you return to civilian life, you also need to learn a trade.

22:47So there will be a significant imbalance between the labor supply and the number of available jobs.

22:53Plus, there are millions of employees from arms companies who no longer have anything to produce, who will be left

22:57with nothing to do.

22:58There you go.

22:59That's it.

22:59So it's already really tough at the end of the war.

23:02And so, not only is there a risk of unemployment, but on top of that, all these people who received

23:07large bonuses will start spending them.

23:09So there will be a risk of a surge, an explosion in demand, while supply doesn't keep up.

23:14So, a very sharp rise in inflation.

23:17And so, the central bank will have to respond with an increase in interest rates, which will make investment more

23:22expensive, or at least make investment more complicated.

23:25So it could take one, two, three, four years for Russia just to get going again.

23:30And even if it manages to get going again, as we said, how much time will it have lost?

23:35Years, not just four or five years of war, maybe 10 years, 15 years.

23:39Because all those competitors in international trade, well, the other emerging economies will have, ah, will have taken a big

23:48lead over Russia in terms of competitiveness and productivity.

23:51And then, incidentally, they've also pre-sold part of their oil to China for decades, which means they'll actually have

23:57less oil revenue than they would have had if there hadn't been a war.

24:01It's not looking good for them, honestly.

24:02Yeah.

24:02They're in a bad spot, and, ah, well, they're, ah, they're just exposed.

24:08Well, they're dependent on two sectors, you know, the military sector and the oil and gas sector.

24:13Since they miss the big opportunity for diversification, they won't be able to produce medium or high-value-added goods,

24:19like computers or semiconductors.

24:22And that's, that's a shame for, well, for the Russian economy, at least for the civilian population who are paying

24:28the price for Putin's whims.

24:30That's it.

24:31We're not going to feel sorry for them, you know, in the meantime.

24:35It's very clear.

24:36I think the outlook isn't very, very promising, neither in the short term nor in the long term.

24:39No.

24:40The sooner they stop, the better, because waiting longer means more infrastructure will be destroyed and less invested in their

24:47own road, rail and gas systems.

24:50Forty percent of rural residents don't have toilets.

24:52Meanwhile, hypersonic missiles are being used to destroy power plants.

24:56In short, still, when we look back on this period, I think it's going to be pretty hard to justify

25:02to the Russian population.

25:03That's it, exactly.

25:04Cyprian, thank you very much.

25:06Thank you, Xavier.

25:07It was a pleasure.

25:08Hope you enjoyed it.

25:09See you soon.

25:10See you soon.

25:25Transcription by CastingWords

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