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In July 1943, a simple British invention exposed a critical weakness in Germany's vast radar defense network. The story follows RAF bomber crews, German radar operators, and the engineers behind the famous Würzburg and Freya radar systems. It reveals how a few strips of aluminum transformed the air war and exposed the dangers of technological overconfidence.
For years, Nazi Germany relied on one of the world's most advanced radar systems to detect and intercept Allied bombers. The Kammhuber Line, supported by Würzburg and Freya radar stations, formed an electronic shield that many believed was nearly impossible to penetrate.
Then came Operation Gomorrah.
As British bombers approached Hamburg, they released millions of carefully cut aluminum strips known as "Window." Within minutes, radar screens filled with false echoes, night-fighter controllers lost track of incoming aircraft, and Germany's air-defense network descended into confusion.
For years, Nazi Germany relied on one of the world's most advanced radar systems to detect and intercept Allied bombers. The Kammhuber Line, supported by Würzburg and Freya radar stations, formed an electronic shield that many believed was nearly impossible to penetrate.
Then came Operation Gomorrah.
As British bombers approached Hamburg, they released millions of carefully cut aluminum strips known as "Window." Within minutes, radar screens filled with false echoes, night-fighter controllers lost track of incoming aircraft, and Germany's air-defense network descended into confusion.
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00:00July 24, 1943. Deep inside a German radar station, operators stared into the glow of their screens
00:08as a strange storm drifted across northern Germany. The echoes were enormous, larger than entire
00:14bomber formations, thousands of bright returns spread across the displays, merging into vast
00:20white clouds that seemed to swallow the sky itself. Some men blamed atmospheric interference,
00:25others suspected faulty equipment. A few simply watched in silence, unable to explain what they
00:32were seeing. But hundreds of kilometers away, RAF bomber crews already knew the truth.
00:38As their aircraft crossed the North Sea, they began throwing bundles of thin aluminum strips
00:44into the darkness below. The strips weighed almost nothing, they carried no explosives,
00:49they made no sound. Yet within minutes, they would cripple one of the most sophisticated
00:55air defense networks ever built. That night, Germany's radar did not fail because it was weak.
01:01It failed because it was too confident. And before dawn, that confidence would help open the way to
01:07one of the most devastating bombing attacks of the entire war. By the summer of 1943,
01:15Germany possessed something no other nation on Earth could claim. An integrated electronic shield
01:20stretching across an entire continent. Long before Allied bombers appeared over their targets,
01:27German radar stations could detect them. Long before fighter pilots saw navigation lights in the
01:32darkness, controllers on the ground already knew where those aircraft were heading. To the men responsible
01:38for defending the Reich, this system represented the future of warfare. The age of surprise was over.
01:45At least, that was the belief. Along Germany's coastline stood large radar installations known
01:51as Freya stations. Their antennas swept the skies day and night, searching for movement far beyond
01:58visual range. A bomber formation crossing the North Sea might still be hundreds of kilometers away,
02:04yet Freya could already see it approaching. But finding an enemy was only the first step.
02:10Tracking it required something far more precise. That responsibility fell to another radar system.
02:17Würzburg. Compared to the broad search capabilities of Freya, Würzburg was a sniper rifle. Its large
02:24parabolic dish could lock onto individual aircraft and follow them with remarkable accuracy.
02:30Operators could determine a target's position, altitude, and movement with a level of precision
02:36that had seemed almost impossible only a few years earlier. Together, the two systems formed the
02:42backbone of Germany's air defense network. And that network had a name. The Kammhuber Line.
02:50Named after General Joseph Kammhuber, it stretched across occupied Europe like a giant electronic wall.
02:57Radar stations, searchlights, anti-aircraft batteries, communication centers, and night fighter squadrons
03:04were linked together into a coordinated machine designed for a single purpose. Destroy allied
03:10bombers before they reached their targets. The system was not perfect. No defense ever is. But it worked.
03:19Night after night, German controllers guided fighters toward incoming bomber streams.
03:24Pilots who could see nothing in the darkness depended entirely upon voices from the ground.
03:29Those voices depended entirely upon radar. And the results were often deadly. For British bomber
03:36crews, crossing into German-controlled airspace could feel like entering a trap that already knew where
03:41they were. Many did not return. Success bred confidence. Confidence became certainty. Within
03:49German engineering circles, radar was increasingly viewed as a solved problem. The technology had matured.
03:55The principles were understood. Improvements would continue, of course. But the foundations appeared
04:01solid. The system was working exactly as intended. And that belief would become far more dangerous
04:08than any technical flaw hidden inside the machinery itself. The confidence surrounding German radar was
04:15not born from arrogance alone. It was built upon results. Since the beginning of the war,
04:21German scientists and engineers had achieved extraordinary advances in radio detection technology.
04:28While other nations were still experimenting with concepts and prototypes, German researchers were
04:33deploying operational systems on a massive scale. The men who designed Würzburg were not dreamers.
04:39They were experts, physicists, mathematicians, engineers. Many had spent years solving problems that had
04:46never existed before radar made them possible. How do you identify an eye to aircraft using
04:52reflected radio waves? How do you distinguish a bomber from a flock of birds? How do you track a target
04:58moving through darkness, cloud cover, and bad weather? Each challenge had been overcome through careful
05:05design and relentless testing. By 1943, that success created a powerful assumption. If a threat existed,
05:14German engineers would already have considered it. If a weakness existed, it would already have been
05:19discovered. And if an enemy attempted to interfere with the system, the interference would reveal itself
05:25through analysis and observation. The belief was understandable. After all, radar was based on logic,
05:32radio waves followed predictable rules, signals behaved according to physics, machines did not panic,
05:39machines did not lie. Or so it seemed. Inside radar stations across Germany, operators were trained to
05:47trust what appeared on their screens. Bright echoes represented real objects. Strong reflections usually
05:53indicated large targets. Clear returns meant reliable information. Everything depended on separating
06:00signal from noise, useful information from meaningless interference. Years of experience had taught operators what
06:07normal looked like. They knew how weather appeared. They knew how atmospheric disturbances behaved. They knew
06:13how equipment malfunctions revealed themselves. What they had never encountered was an enemy deliberately
06:20attempting to transform the entire sky into noise. And that possibility had been discussed before. Years
06:28earlier, several researchers had quietly examined a disturbing question. What if an aircraft released thousands of
06:35small metallic objects specifically designed to reflect radar signals? The idea was simple. Disturbingly
06:43simple. Too simple, some believed, to ever become a practical weapon. Besides, there was another reason
06:49not to worry. If Britain used such a technique against Germany, Germany could use it right back. The weapon
06:56appeared self-defeating. A Pandora's box that neither side would dare open. As a result, the concept remained
07:03largely theoretical. A possibility. A possibility. A curiosity. A problem for the future.
07:11But on the night of July 24, 1943, the future was already approaching Germany's coastline.
07:18And many of the men responsible for defending the Reich had no idea they were about to confront the
07:24very scenario they had convinced themselves would never happen. The vulnerability that threatened
07:30Germany's radar network was not discovered in a laboratory during the summer of 1943.
07:36In fact, both sides had known about it for years. The principle was surprisingly straightforward. Radar
07:42worked by transmitting radio waves and measuring the reflections that bounced back. Aircraft produced
07:48strong echoes because their metal structures reflected those waves toward the receiving station.
07:53But an aircraft was not the only thing capable of creating a reflection.
07:57Any piece of conductive metal could do the same. Even something as small as a thin strip of aluminum.
08:04Scientists quickly realized that if enough metallic strips were released into the air,
08:09radar operators would face a serious problem. Instead of seeing a few distinct targets,
08:15their screens could become flooded with countless reflections. The concept was elegant and terrifying.
08:22In Britain, the project received a simple code name. Window. The idea was to cut aluminum coated paper into
08:29strips carefully sized to match the wavelength used by German radar systems. Released from a bomber,
08:36the strips would drift through the air like metallic snow. Each strip would reflect radio waves. Thousands of
08:42strips would create thousands of echoes. Millions of strips would create a false sky. British researchers tested the
08:50concept repeatedly. The results were astonishing. Radar screens became crowded with phantom targets.
08:56Operators struggled to determine what was real and what was artificial. Entire formations seemed to
09:02disappear behind clouds of reflections. It worked even better than expected. And that success created an
09:09uncomfortable dilemma. Because the British were not the only ones capable of using it. Military planners
09:16feared that the moment Window was deployed, Germany would inevitably copy the idea. Every advantage gained
09:22over German radar might be offset by similar attacks against British defenses. For years, the project remained
09:29locked away. Not because it failed, but because it succeeded. Some officials argued that using Window would
09:35be like opening a door that could never be closed again. Others insisted the risk was worth taking. The debate
09:43dragged on
09:44while bomber losses continued to rise. Month after month, British crews flew into increasingly dangerous air
09:50space. German radar networks improved. Night fighter tactics evolved. Casualties mounted. Eventually, a decision
09:58had to be made. The weapon could remain hidden forever. Or it could finally be unleashed. When that moment
10:04arrived, the consequences would reach far beyond the crews carrying the aluminum strips. They would shake the
10:10foundations of Germany's entire air defense strategy. Ironically, German researchers had reached many of the
10:17same conclusions. They understood the danger. They understood the theory. And they understood exactly
10:23what metallic strips could do to radar. The possibility had been discussed inside Germany long before
10:29Operation Gomorrah. Reports had circulated. Studies had been conducted. Engineers had examined the concept and
10:36recognized its potential. Yet somehow, knowledge did not become preparation. The reason was rooted in a
10:43powerful assumption. German planners believed that Britain faced the same dilemma they did. If Britain
10:49introduced radar deception techniques, Germany could simply retaliate with identical methods. Any short-term
10:55advantage would eventually become a long-term problem for both sides. Therefore, many officials concluded that
11:02the British would never take the risk. Why reveal such a valuable capability? Why sacrifice future
11:09security for a temporary gain? The logic seemed reasonable. Perhaps even obvious. And that was
11:15precisely the danger. The assumption was repeated so often that it gradually transformed from a theory
11:22into something closer to certainty. Few people challenged it. Fewer still imagined that British leaders might
11:29eventually decide the immediate benefits outweighed future consequences. As the war intensified,
11:36German radar engineers focused their attention elsewhere. Increasing range, improving accuracy,
11:42refining tracking systems, making radar better, not making it resilient. There was a subtle difference.
11:49And that difference mattered. The engineers were solving technical problems. The British were preparing a
11:55psychological attack. One side asked how radar could become more precise. The other asked what would
12:01happen if precision itself became a weakness. As a result, Germany entered 1943 with one of the world's
12:08most advanced radar networks. But there was remarkably little planning for the day that network might be
12:14deliberately overwhelmed. No large-scale operational response existed. No proven doctrine had been developed.
12:21No comprehensive contingency plan stood ready for implementation. The threat was known. Yet it remained largely
12:29theoretical. Something that might happen. Someday. Perhaps.
12:35Then July arrived. Across airfields in eastern England, RAF ground crews loaded bombers for a mission unlike any that had
12:43come before.
12:44Fuel, bombs, ammunition, and bundles of carefully prepared aluminum strips.
12:49The crews received special instructions. At designated intervals, they would release the material into
12:55the night sky. Again. And again. And again. Many of the airmen understood that they were participating in
13:04something important. Few realized they were about to expose one of the greatest weaknesses in Germany's
13:10defensive system. Because within hours, the assumptions that had guided years of planning would collide with
13:17reality. And reality was approaching fast. Shortly before midnight on July 24, 1943, hundreds of RAF bombers
13:29crossed the North Sea and headed toward Germany. Their target was Hamburg, one of the Reich's largest
13:36industrial cities, a center of shipbuilding, manufacturing, and wartime production. For British planners,
13:43the operation represented far more than another bombing raid. It was the first large-scale combat
13:49deployment of window. Years of research. Years of debate. Years of hesitation. Everything would be
13:56tested tonight. Inside the bombers, crews carried bundles of aluminum strips packed into small containers.
14:02At carefully timed intervals, the strips were thrown from aircraft hatches and drifted into the darkness
14:08below. There was nothing dramatic about the process. No explosions. No flashes of light. No visible sign
14:15that history was being made. The strips simply floated downward. Thousands became millions. Millions
14:22became billions. And as they spread across the night sky, German radar stations began to notice something
14:28strange. At first, operators saw isolated patches of interference. Nothing alarming. Weather
14:35occasionally produced unusual returns. Atmospheric conditions sometimes distorted signals. Equipment
14:43could generate anomalies. The unexpected was not necessarily dangerous. But the echoes kept growing.
14:49More reflections appeared. Then more and more. Within minutes, radar screens that normally displayed distinct
14:57aircraft tracks began filling with enormous clouds of returns. The operators stared at displays they had
15:04trusted for years. The patterns made no sense. A normal bomber formation produced a recognizable signature.
15:11This was different. The echoes merged together. Expanded outward. Multiplied beyond anything they had ever
15:18encountered. Some stations reported huge masses of apparent aircraft. Others struggled to track anything
15:24at all. Controllers attempted to separate real targets from interference, but the distinction became
15:30increasingly difficult to maintain. The information flowing through Germany's air defense network began
15:36to lose its clarity. And clarity was everything. The entire Kammhuber line depended upon accurate information.
15:45Freya stations detected incoming raids. Würzburg sets tracked individual aircraft. Controllers directed night
15:52fighters toward specific targets. Each step relied upon the step before it. When uncertainty entered the system,
15:59it spread rapidly. A small error became a larger one. A larger one became confusion. Confusion became paralysis.
16:08Meanwhile, the bomber crews continued releasing window exactly as planned.
16:13Many could not see the effects of what they were doing. They simply followed instructions and maintained
16:18course. Yet behind them, an invisible storm was spreading across the sky. A storm made not of rain or cloud,
16:26but of reflections. And as German radar operators struggled to understand what they were seeing,
16:32a far more disturbing realization was beginning to emerge. Their equipment was not malfunctioning.
16:39The radar was working perfectly. That was the problem. For years, German radar operators had been
16:47trained to trust their instruments. The screens represented reality. Perhaps not perfectly. Perhaps
16:53not completely. But accurately enough to fight a war. Now that relationship was breaking down.
17:00As more reports arrived from stations across northern Germany, a troubling pattern emerged. The
17:06interference was not isolated. It was everywhere. Entire sectors were becoming saturated with reflections.
17:12Massive white clouds drifted across displays, obscuring the very targets operators were supposed to
17:18track. Imagine trying to identify a single snowflake inside a blizzard. That was the challenge confronting
17:25Germany's radar network. Some controllers attempted to continue operations as normal. Night fighter crews
17:32were scrambled. Interception orders were issued. Tracking solutions were calculated. But every decision depended
17:38upon information that was becoming less reliable by the minute. A bomber stream that should have
17:43appeared as a defined formation now seemed to dissolve into a sea of echoes. Aircraft vanished, reappeared,
17:51merged with false targets, disappeared again. The system was still generating data. In fact, it was
17:58generating more data than ever before. The problem was that most of it had become useless. The distinction between
18:04signal and noise had collapsed. For years, German engineers had focused on extracting the maximum
18:11possible information from radar returns. They had pursued greater sensitivity, greater precision,
18:18greater detection capability. Now those strengths were being turned against them. Every aluminum strip
18:24reflected energy. Every reflection demanded attention. Every demand consumed valuable time and resources.
18:31The radar network was effectively drowning in information. And drowning systems rarely make good
18:37decisions. Inside command centers, frustration grew. Operators searched for explanations. Some blamed
18:44atmospheric conditions. Others suspected technical failures. Still, others believed the British had
18:50developed an entirely new form of electronic attack. Few immediately grasped the simplicity of the truth.
18:56The enemy had not destroyed the radar. The enemy had overwhelmed it. There was an important
19:02difference. Destroying a radar station required bombs. Overwhelming it required imagination. As the
19:09confusion spread, RAF bombers continued toward E. Hamburg. Many reached their targets with far less
19:16opposition than planners had expected. Night fighter interceptions declined. Coordination suffered. The
19:23defensive machine that had protected Germany for years was suddenly struggling to perform its most basic
19:28function. Finding the enemy. And before the night was over, Hamburg would pay the price. The city below
19:36remained largely unaware of the battle unfolding high above it. Citizens heard air raid warnings. They saw
19:42searchlights probing the darkness. They listened to anti-aircraft guns firing into the night. But hidden behind
19:48those familiar sounds was a historic collapse. For the first time, one of the most advanced air defense
19:55networks in the world had been effectively blinded. Not by a revolutionary superweapon. Not by a secret
20:01wonder device. But by strips of aluminum drifting silently through the air. And for Germany's military
20:08leadership, the implications were only beginning to become clear. In the days following the Hamburg raid,
20:14German engineers and military planners faced an uncomfortable reality. The disaster had not been
20:21caused by a flaw they didn't know about. The possibility had been known for years. That fact made the failure
20:27even harder to explain. Across Germany, technical teams began analyzing reports from radar stations,
20:35command centers, and night fighter units. They collected data, reviewed operator accounts,
20:41and attempted to understand how a handful of aluminum strips could produce such devastating results.
20:47The answer was hiding in plain sight. Germany's radar experts had spent years asking how to make
20:54their systems more effective. But they had spent far less time asking how an enemy might deliberately
20:59exploit them. There's a profound difference between improving a machine and challenging the assumptions
21:06behind it. The first requires expertise. The second requires imagination. And imagination is often
21:15in short supply when a system appears successful. By 1943, German radar had become one of the great
21:22technological achievements of the war. The Kammhuber line had intercepted countless raids.
21:28Wurtzberg had proven remarkably accurate. Freya had demonstrated impressive range. Success reinforced
21:36confidence. Confidence discouraged doubt. And doubt is often the first casualty of expertise. Within
21:43engineering circles, there existed an unspoken belief that the major vulnerabilities had already been
21:48identified. Problems were expected to come from technical limitations, not conceptual surprises. As a result,
21:56few people were actively searching for ways to break the system. Few were conducting realistic simulations of
22:02large-scale radar saturation. Few were asking what would happen if the enemy deliberately flooded
22:08every receiver with more information than operators could process. The possibility was acknowledged. But
22:14acknowledgement is not preparation. History is filled with armies that understood a threat in theory,
22:20but failed to prepare for it in practice. Germany's radar network was becoming another example.
22:26The British had not defeated superior technology with superior technology. They had defeated assumptions.
22:33And assumptions are often far more vulnerable than machines. Because once a machine fails, engineers rush to
22:40repair it. But when an assumption fails, people first have to admit they were wrong. And that can take much
22:47longer.
22:47Perhaps the greatest irony of the entire episode was that Germany's radar network failed because it was
22:54exceptionally good at what it had been designed to do. The engineers behind Würzburg had pursued precision
23:01relentlessly. Every improvement focused on producing cleaner signals, sharper tracking, more detailed
23:07information. The radar could distinguish targets with remarkable accuracy, allowing controllers to guide night
23:14fighters towards specific aircraft in darkness and poor weather. Under normal circumstances, this was a
23:21tremendous advantage. But warfare rarely remains normal for long. Window changed the rules. Instead of presenting
23:28the radar with a few meaningful targets, it presented thousands, then millions. Every strip reflected radio energy.
23:36Every reflection appeared legitimate. The radar could not understand intent. It could only detect echoes.
23:43And so it did exactly what it had been designed to do. It reported everything. The result was a kind
23:50of
23:50information overload. Decades before that phrase became common, operators suddenly faced an impossible task.
23:58They were no longer searching for targets. They were searching for targets hidden inside an ocean of false returns.
24:06The very sensitivity that made the system effective now made it vulnerable. A less sophisticated radar might have
24:13ignored some of the weaker reflections. Würzburg saw them all. The machine was not broken. The machine was being exploited.
24:21That distinction mattered because it revealed a deeper lesson about technology. Engineers often focus on
24:27maximizing capability. More range. More precision. More data. More performance. Yet every capability
24:34creates a corresponding vulnerability. The stronger a system becomes in one area, the more dependent it
24:41often becomes on certain assumptions remaining true. German radar assumed that meaningful targets would
24:47remain relatively rare and distinguishable. Windows shattered that assumption overnight. For military leaders,
24:54the implications were alarming. If radar could be deceived this effectively, what other certainties might
25:00also be vulnerable? What other systems depended upon assumptions nobody had challenged? Those questions
25:06extended far beyond Hamburg. They reached into the heart of Germany's war effort, because the problem was no
25:13longer a collection of aluminum strips falling through the night sky. The problem was realizing that some of the
25:19Reich's most sophisticated defenses had been built upon a foundation far less secure than anyone had imagined.
25:27And while engineers worked urgently to find solutions, the enemy was already preparing the next raid.
25:34The morning after the Hamburg raid, there was no debate about whether something had gone wrong.
25:39The evidence was impossible to ignore. German radar stations across the country had experienced the same phenomenon.
25:47Night fighter controllers had reported confusion. Pilots had struggled to locate targets.
25:53Entire sections of the defensive network had become dramatically less effective at the exact moment they were needed most.
26:00The mystery now was not what had happened. The mystery was how quickly it could be fixed. Engineers moved with
26:07urgency.
26:08Reports flowed into research centers and military headquarters. Radar specialists dissected operator logs.
26:15Intelligence officers gathered fragments of information from recovered window strips. Laboratories began testing
26:22possible countermeasures almost immediately. For perhaps the first time, German planners were forced to
26:28confront the vulnerability they had long treated as a theoretical problem. Now it was painfully real.
26:34Several emergency solutions were proposed. Some focused on filtering out weaker reflections. Others attempted to
26:41distinguish slowly falling chaff from fast-moving aircraft. New procedures were introduced. Radar operators
26:48received updated instructions. Researchers worked around the clock searching for ways to separate genuine
26:54targets from the growing sea of false echoes. One of the most promising responses became known as
27:01Wurzlaus. Another would eventually contribute to a series of improvements often grouped under the Nuremberg countermeasures program.
27:09The details varied, but the objective remained the same. Restore clarity. Restore confidence. Restore control.
27:18And to a degree, they succeeded. The German radar network was not permanently destroyed.
27:25That is one of the biggest misconceptions surrounding window. The British had not eliminated German radar.
27:31They had disrupted it. Given enough time, skilled engineers could adapt. And they did.
27:37But war rarely grants the luxury of time. That was the real problem. Every week spent developing
27:44countermeasures was a week the Allies could exploit their advantage. Every raid conducted before those solutions
27:50became fully effective carried the possibility of further damage. The initiative had changed hands.
27:57Before Hamburg, German defenses had largely dictated the terms of the struggle. After Hamburg, they were
28:03reacting. And in warfare, reacting is often far more dangerous than attacking. The British had demonstrated that
28:11Germany's electronic shield could be penetrated. More importantly, they had demonstrated it in front of
28:17everyone. Military leaders, radar operators, night fighter crews, even the engineers themselves.
28:23A psychological barrier had been broken. The aura of invincibility surrounding the Kammhuber line
28:29was gone. The system would continue fighting. It would continue improving. But the illusion that
28:35technology alone could guarantee security had vanished forever. And as Allied bombers prepared for future
28:41operations, Germany found itself in an unfamiliar position. Not leading the contest between radar and
28:48countermeasures, but struggling to catch up. In the years after the war, historians would study the
28:55bombing of Hamburg for many reasons. The scale of destruction. The firestorm. The human cost. But hidden
29:02within that story was another lesson. One that extended far beyond the summer of 1943. The downfall of
29:09Germany's radar defenses was not ultimately a story about aluminum strips. It was a story about certainty.
29:16The engineers who built the Kammhuber line were not incompetent. Far from it. Many were among the
29:22most talented scientists and technicians of their generation. They had created a radar network that,
29:28only a few years earlier, would have seemed almost miraculous. Their mistake was not failing to
29:34understand the technology. Their mistake was believing they understood every possible way it could be
29:40challenged. The British did not defeat German radar by building a better radar. They defeated it by
29:46attacking the assumptions behind it. And that lesson has echoed through every generation of warfare since.
29:53From radar deception and electronic jamming to stealth aircraft, cyber attacks, and digital spoofing,
29:59the pattern remains remarkably similar. Again and again, military history shows that the greatest threat
30:07to a sophisticated system is often not a stronger system. It is an unexpected one. Because every defense
30:13is built upon assumptions, every technology has blind spots, and every expert, no matter how brilliant,
30:20sees the world through a framework shaped by experience.
30:24On the night of July 24th, 1943, billions of tiny aluminum strips drifted silently through the skies above Germany.
30:34They carried no explosives. They destroyed no radar stations. Yet they accomplished something far more important.
30:41They forced one of the most advanced defense networks in the world to confront a possibility it had never truly
30:48prepared for.
30:49That the enemy had imagined a weakness its creators could not. And sometimes, in war,
30:55that is all it takes to change everything. If you found this story worth remembering, consider sharing your thoughts below.
31:03Had you heard of Operation Window before today? And what other overlooked turning points of the Second World War
31:09deserve to be remembered.
31:11Until next time, thank you for watching.
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