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00:01Next on Secrets of War.
00:04It was a battle no one really wanted and a victory far greater than anyone expected.
00:10Israel, outnumbered and outgunned, fought the Six-Day War on the field of espionage.
00:15Secret agents gathered information vital to a daring first strike
00:19and crafted an ingenious plan to capture a Russian jet.
00:23Shadows of the Six-Day War is next on Secrets of War.
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03:11where East meets West.
03:16It was 1967, and the stage was set for a battle
03:19that would change the landscape of the Middle East forever.
03:29Along Israel's Mediterranean coast,
03:31near the metropolis of Tel Aviv,
03:33stands a unique monument to spies.
03:37It is known as the memorial to those in intelligence,
03:40and like the world of intelligence,
03:42it is appropriately shaped like a maze.
03:47Engraved on its smooth walls are the names and dates of death
03:50of more than 400 men and women who gave their lives
03:53in the service of Israeli intelligence.
03:59Most of these names remain as mysterious and unyielding
04:02as the stone they are cut in.
04:07Like the rest of Israeli intelligence,
04:09the monument is a compromise between official secrecy
04:12and the need to honor those who lived and died for their country.
04:20In the 1960s, Israeli intelligence resided in the shadows.
04:25Even its very existence was officially denied.
04:31Of its two key agencies,
04:33Amman was responsible for army intelligence,
04:35while the Mossad was in charge of foreign intelligence.
04:43Together, they launched a series of operations
04:45that would determine Israel's fate
04:47against the combined military force of five Arab nations.
04:55They definitely had the advantage of numbers.
05:01We didn't have any special qualitative edge.
05:07Our artillery and our aircraft and our naval boats,
05:12everything, were more or less similar to what the other side had.
05:18We made much more of an effort to have the right spies.
05:25Israel's small budget for espionage activities
05:28did not reflect its success in intelligence gathering.
05:32According to Mayor Amit, the Mossad chief at the time,
05:36his agency relied on human, or human intelligence,
05:39its people as its most effective resource.
05:44We were relying on human and not always on what you would call agents,
05:53which are paid,
05:56but many a time by people that we call them warriors,
06:01because they didn't come to the intelligence because of money,
06:05because of devotion, because of conviction,
06:10because they considered what they are doing as a mission.
06:18Confronting Israel's northern border
06:20were the Arab states of Lebanon and Syria.
06:23To the east, the Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Iraq.
06:28To the west, the largest and most feared nation
06:31of the Arabic empire, Egypt.
06:35While politically divided,
06:37the Arab states were united in their efforts
06:39to learn more about their common enemy.
06:44General Faiz Jaber of the Jordanian army
06:47worked in Jordanian military intelligence in 1967.
06:53We were doing our work, in fact,
06:55gathering information,
06:56where are their positions,
06:58where are their groupings,
07:00what is their intentions.
07:02You have to watch the ground,
07:04and watching the ground reconnaissance,
07:08a little bit the borders.
07:13Combined, the five Arab states
07:15totaled over 100 million people.
07:17Their leaders believed
07:18that two and a half million Jews would be no match.
07:22Their overconfidence inspired a certain complacency
07:25within the ranks of Arab intelligence.
07:28For them, Israel was nothing more than a weak puppet state
07:31serving the interests of the West.
07:35Arab intelligence in those days
07:39was suffering from something
07:44that is quite common,
07:47but is extremely dangerous.
07:51wishful thinking according to your political mindset.
08:00And they simply refused to face reality.
08:06The step-by-step escalation that culminated in 1967
08:10began a decade earlier, in 1956.
08:14Eight years after Israel survived its war for independence,
08:18Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser
08:20seized control over the Suez Canal
08:22and blocked Israel's only port to the Red Sea.
08:29Israel launched a four-day Suez campaign
08:31which broke the blockade
08:33and expelled the Egyptian army
08:34from the Sinai Peninsula.
08:41The United Nations brokered a truce.
08:46As the Israelis withdrew from Sinai,
08:49UN troops took over their positions,
08:51creating a buffer between Egypt and Israel.
08:58Nasser turned Israel's withdrawal
09:01into a victory for Egypt.
09:03Propaganda newsreels praised
09:05Egypt's successful military campaign.
09:13The Zionist enemy retreated from Sinai.
09:18Nasser enjoyed a complete political recovery.
09:25Privately, the Egyptian president rejected the UN truce.
09:33By the 1960s, the Soviet Union was committed
09:36to making its influence known in the Middle East.
09:39After standing down in the Cuban Missile Crisis,
09:43tension in the Middle East would help Moscow
09:45regain its battered image
09:46and counter-America's growing hold on the region.
09:51Using Russian allies to confront Israel
09:54would be equivalent to confronting
09:55the imperialist United States itself.
10:02The Soviets began to supply
10:03advanced ready-made armaments
10:05like T-54 tanks
10:08and MiG-jet fighters
10:10to its new Arab clients.
10:13Now facing an armory of Soviet weapons,
10:16Israel had to gain the upper hand
10:18with vital intelligence
10:19on the exact makeup and capabilities
10:21of its enemy's mysterious arsenal.
10:25To learn more, the Israeli air force
10:27under the command of General Mordechai Hod
10:29would occasionally provoke its neighbors
10:31into combat.
10:34We learned by experience
10:39the behavior of the different type
10:42Russian equipment that the Arab air forces
10:45used before that war.
10:47We tested the way they react
10:49without them knowing that we're doing it
10:52by creating incidents
10:54just to see their behavior.
10:57While minor border skirmishes
10:59heightened tensions,
11:01they also provided opportunities
11:03to measure enemy strength and abilities.
11:06Yet engagements were not enough.
11:09Appropriating a weapon intact
11:11would be the best way to understand
11:13just exactly what they were facing.
11:15Israeli intelligence needed to capture
11:18what no one in the West had ever seen before.
11:23Israel's biggest threat from the sky
11:24was the mysterious and advanced
11:26Soviet MiG-21 jet fighter.
11:29Even the United States,
11:31mired in the Vietnam War,
11:32was suffering losses from these deadly jets.
11:37The Pentagon recognized its strength
11:40in the air over Southeast Asia
11:42and hoped to study the Soviet-made war plane.
11:47From Tel Aviv,
11:48the Mossad launched Operation 007,
11:51covert mission to capture intact a MiG-21.
11:56The intelligence agency concluded
11:59that its best chance
12:00was to persuade a pilot
12:01to actually fly his MiG-21 to Israel.
12:04The Iraqi Air Force was the chosen target.
12:09It isn't so simple
12:10because you have to first know
12:12what's going on inside the Iraqi Air Force.
12:14You have to know who are the pilots,
12:17what are their attitudes to their own government,
12:19do they have reasons to be satisfied or not satisfied.
12:23That entails a tremendous amount of work
12:25just to get that particular piece of information.
12:29A Mossad contact inside Iraq
12:31located a pilot,
12:33Muni Redfa,
12:34a deputy commander of a MiG-21 squadron
12:36who, as a Christian,
12:38felt persecuted.
12:41Redfa was met by a female agent
12:43who lured him to Europe.
12:45It was rumored to have been a romantic encounter.
12:50Redfa was offered $1 million
12:51and a safe haven for his family
12:54if he would deliver the MiG-21.
12:57He accepted
12:58and was secretly invited to Israel.
13:03The Iraqi pilot was here
13:06before he bought the MiG-21.
13:09The Iraqi pilots flew
13:11with the chief of intelligence,
13:15who was the second guy
13:16who was in the plot,
13:19flew with him
13:21in a dual-control jet
13:24to show him
13:25the state of Israel
13:26from up top
13:28to make him
13:30aware
13:31how it does look.
13:33Redfa slipped back into Iraq
13:35and returned to his air base.
13:38Then,
13:39in the morning
13:39of the 16th of August,
13:401966,
13:41he set out
13:42on the pre-designated route
13:43to Israel
13:44in his MiG-21.
13:47It would be
13:47a 600-mile zigzag course
13:49over Jordan
13:50that avoided
13:50radar stations
13:51and air bases.
13:54After a 65-minute flight,
13:56he entered Israeli airspace.
14:02Nobody knew.
14:03In the Air Force,
14:05two people knew,
14:07the chief intelligence
14:09and myself,
14:10and then I called
14:11this squadron commander.
14:13I didn't tell him
14:14what's going to happen,
14:15and when we caught him
14:16on the radar,
14:18I sent him to the air,
14:21and I told him,
14:22look,
14:22we have a MiG-21
14:23coming in
14:24from the east.
14:25You are to intercept him,
14:27not to shoot him down.
14:30You are to intercept him
14:31and lower your wheels
14:33to show him
14:34that he should follow you.
14:37The plane successfully landed
14:39on an air base
14:40in Israel's desert.
14:42Redfo was met
14:43by his family
14:43already in Israel,
14:45and all were swiftly
14:46taken into hiding.
14:48Israel had its reward.
14:50The sophisticated
14:51Soviet war plane
14:52had reached the west
14:53as it was seen here
14:54for the first time.
14:57In Washington,
14:58the CIA was informed
14:59that the United States
15:00would be able
15:01to examine
15:01a MiG-21 closely.
15:05They were here
15:07less than 12 hours
15:08after he landed.
15:10The Americans
15:11were very, very excited
15:12because they never
15:13had a chance
15:14to have a flyable
15:16MiG-21 before that.
15:17This was the first one.
15:19Every Israeli pilot
15:21trained in simulated combat
15:22against the MiG-21.
15:24As tensions grew
15:26in the Mideast,
15:27leaders of the Jewish state
15:28hoped this training
15:30would provide
15:30a decisive edge
15:31in any future conflict.
15:39In the mid-1960s,
15:41Israel was winning
15:42the intelligence war
15:43in the Middle East,
15:44penetrating deep
15:45into the Arab world.
15:49Not to be outdone,
15:51the Arab states
15:51struggled to maintain
15:52a balance in their efforts
15:54to spy across the border.
15:59While Israel successfully
16:01recruited agents
16:02to work behind enemy lines,
16:03the Arab states
16:04were limited
16:05in their ability
16:06to infiltrate
16:07Israeli society.
16:10They did not succeed
16:12in recruiting agents
16:13in Israel.
16:14I think they were
16:15relying heavily
16:16on foreign people
16:18visiting the country,
16:19and foreign people
16:20don't really have
16:20very much access
16:22to the secrets.
16:24since Israel's independence,
16:26Syria had controlled
16:28the strategic Golan Heights
16:29along Israel's northern border.
16:32From the heights,
16:33Syrian guns fired
16:34on Israeli farmers
16:36working in the valley below.
16:38In the 1960s,
16:40Mossad agents
16:41were ordered
16:41to gather intelligence
16:42to pinpoint the locations
16:44of the Syrian gun emplacements.
16:50Mossad agent
16:51Eli Korn
16:52breached the inner circle
16:53of the Arab world.
16:56As a Syrian-born Jew
16:58operating undercover
16:59as an Arab businessman,
17:01Korn was accepted
17:02into the highest levels
17:04of the Syrian government.
17:07He was frequently invited
17:08to visit Syrian army bases
17:10and given a complete tour
17:12of the fortifications
17:13confronting Israel
17:14in the Golan Heights.
17:19With a photographic memory,
17:21Korn was able
17:22to secretly radio back
17:24information on Syrian
17:25gun emplacements
17:26and troop deployments
17:27facing Israel
17:28to headquarters
17:29in Tel Aviv.
17:32He had a lot of access
17:35to move all around
17:38to see the Golan Heights,
17:41to see the Syrian units
17:43and formations,
17:45and he, all this time,
17:48sent a lot of excellent information
17:52about what happens in Syria.
17:54But in 1965,
17:56he, unfortunately,
17:57was catched and executed.
18:01Captured while transmitting
18:02a message to the Mossad,
18:04Eli Cohen's tragic story
18:06was a disaster
18:07for the intelligence agency.
18:11Yet he provided Israeli intelligence
18:13with a remarkably complete picture
18:15of an enemy country
18:16that had once seemed impenetrable.
18:27By 1964,
18:29tension was escalating
18:30over one of the most precious resources
18:32in the Middle East,
18:34water.
18:37Israel had opened
18:38a national pipeline
18:39that brought water
18:40from the Jordan River
18:41and the Sea of Galilee
18:42in the north
18:43down to the expanding settlements
18:45in the Negev Desert
18:46in the south.
18:49The sources for this water
18:51were tributaries
18:52that flowed from Syria
18:53and Jordan.
18:55When the Arab states united
18:57to divert this water source
18:58in 1965,
19:00Israel retaliated.
19:02The Arabs fought back
19:03with a new kind of weapon,
19:05terrorism.
19:10Palestinian refugees
19:12who'd been living
19:12in Arab countries
19:13formed a resistance movement
19:15to oppose Israel.
19:18Syrian military intelligence
19:20created a military wing
19:21for the Palestinian
19:22Liberation Organization,
19:24the PLO.
19:25It was known as El Fatah.
19:29In January 1965,
19:31El Fatah,
19:32that was created
19:34as a terrorist
19:35and guerrilla movement,
19:37they began to increase
19:39their terrorist activity
19:41into Israel.
19:42Israel didn't find
19:44the right way
19:45to tackle this problem.
19:48By 1967,
19:50terrorist infiltrations
19:51into Israel from Syria
19:53were on the rise.
19:55Northern settlements
19:57were raided
19:57with acts of sabotage
19:59and murder.
20:03Tensions culminated
20:04on the 7th of April
20:05when Israel struck back
20:07using tanks,
20:08artillery,
20:09and aircraft
20:09penetrating Syrian territory.
20:13Capturing a MiG
20:14proved highly effective
20:15for the Israeli air force.
20:17At the end
20:17of a short battle,
20:19six MiG-21 fighters
20:20had been shot down
20:21and at least
20:2260 Syrian soldiers
20:23were dead.
20:28In Moscow,
20:29there was rising concern
20:30over the frequency
20:31of hostilities
20:32in the Middle East
20:33between its Soviet allies
20:34and Israel.
20:37After the brief battle
20:39with Israel
20:39that ended
20:40in Syrian defeat,
20:41Moscow was determined
20:42not to let the situation
20:44go unchallenged.
20:48The Mossad learned
20:49that a power struggle
20:50inside the Kremlin
20:51was causing a rift
20:53between the more moderate
20:54Soviet premier,
20:55Kosygin,
20:56and his extremist party secretary,
20:58Leonid Brezhnev.
21:00The results
21:01would dictate
21:02the future
21:02of Soviet foreign policy.
21:06The motivation
21:07of the Soviet Union
21:08in 1967
21:11was to establish
21:13or create
21:14an additional center
21:16of tension
21:17to Vietnam
21:18because that was
21:19in the middle
21:19of the Cold War
21:20and they knew
21:22that the Americans
21:22are stuck there
21:23up to their neck
21:24in Vietnam.
21:27We have evidence
21:28that two months
21:29before the war,
21:31Brezhnev told
21:32his colleagues
21:33that they are going
21:34to beat the Americans
21:35in the Middle East
21:36soon.
21:41The Soviets
21:42hoped to make
21:42the Middle East
21:43another stage
21:44in the theater
21:45of the Cold War.
21:49To inflame
21:50an already tense
21:51situation,
21:52the KGB
21:52released a report
21:54that Israeli defense forces
21:55were mobilizing units
21:56along their northern border
21:58with Syria
21:58for a possible attack.
22:02They spread
22:04disinformation,
22:06wrong information
22:07about Israel
22:09going to attack
22:10Syria
22:12and there's
22:12a concentration
22:13of forces
22:14of seven brigades
22:16on the Syrian border,
22:18et cetera, et cetera.
22:19Then
22:20they came
22:21to Egypt
22:23and they say
22:24you must
22:25assist
22:25the Syrians
22:26because the Israelis
22:27are going
22:28to attack them.
22:31Egypt's
22:32President Nasser
22:33sent his deputy
22:34Anwar Sadat
22:35to Moscow.
22:37Sadat
22:37and his delegation
22:38met with Soviet leaders
22:40who informed them
22:40of the supposed buildup.
22:43They returned home
22:44convinced
22:45of an impending
22:46military offensive.
22:50Denials
22:50by Israel
22:51were not given
22:52a hearing.
22:53Even Russia's
22:54ambassador to Israel
22:55had made up
22:56his mind.
22:59There was
23:00an interesting
23:00meeting
23:01between
23:01a Russian
23:03ambassador
23:04in Tel Aviv
23:05in Israel
23:05with Eshkol
23:06our prime minister
23:07who came
23:08to warn Eshkol
23:09our prime minister
23:11why are you
23:11concentrating forces
23:12and there are no forces.
23:14General Amit
23:15I was president
23:16there
23:16can accompany you
23:19to Syria
23:20to the north
23:21and you can
23:22fight for yourself
23:23if there are
23:23any concentrations.
23:25No, I don't want
23:26to go.
23:27Soviet intelligence
23:28predicted that both
23:29Israel and the Arabs
23:31would stop short
23:32of actual war.
23:33But what began
23:35as an intentional
23:36deception
23:36would evolve
23:37into a grave
23:38miscalculation?
23:40The countdown
23:41to the ultimate
23:42battle
23:42was about to begin.
23:53In April 1967
23:55as the Soviet Union
23:56confronted its Cold War
23:57adversary
23:58the United States
23:59it was unwittingly
24:01pushing the Middle East
24:02to the brink of war.
24:07Nobody at that time
24:09was ready for war
24:10but when things began
24:13about the grouping
24:15forces of the Israelis
24:16on the Syrian sector
24:20and the Russian
24:22government
24:23tried to show
24:24the world
24:25that there is
24:26a very, very
24:27short attack
24:28will come
24:29against Syria
24:30in fact
24:31and against
24:32the Arab world
24:33we began to realize
24:35that there is a war
24:37and psychologically
24:38we began
24:39to prepare for war.
24:43Nasser responded
24:45to the Soviet warning.
24:47The Egyptian president
24:48who never accepted
24:49the settlement
24:50of the 1956 campaign
24:51that demilitarized
24:53the Sinai
24:53now raised the ante.
24:56He was about
24:57to embark
24:58on a path
24:59of no return
24:59that would catch
25:00the Israeli intelligence
25:01community
25:02completely off guard.
25:08The rumor put out
25:10that the Soviet Union
25:11had now escalated
25:12causing the Egyptian
25:13military
25:13to take up positions
25:15in the Sinai Peninsula.
25:16Nasser then demanded
25:18that the United Nations
25:19personnel in the Sinai
25:20be confined
25:21to their bases.
25:22The UN General Secretary
25:24Uthant
25:25insisted that his troops
25:27hold their positions
25:28or depart Sinai
25:29altogether.
25:32Nasser stuck
25:33to his ultimatum
25:33forcing the evacuation
25:35of the entire
25:36UN force
25:37from the peninsula.
25:38The Israelis
25:39went on the alert.
25:50With six full
25:52Egyptian army units
25:53deployed in defensive
25:54positions in the Sinai,
25:55Israel called up
25:56its army reserves.
25:58Yet Israeli intelligence
26:00believed that Nasser's moves
26:02did not mean a war
26:03was imminent.
26:07The Egyptian leader
26:08was consolidating
26:09his power
26:10in hopes of leading
26:11an empire
26:11of Arab nations,
26:12but most were not
26:14quite ready
26:14to accept
26:15his authority.
26:21I never think that
26:22Nasser was
26:24in his heart
26:25believing
26:26that there
26:26would be war.
26:27But his motive
26:28was to
26:29make an empire,
26:30an Arabic empire.
26:32In fact,
26:33we don't want
26:33to tailor this
26:35empire
26:35according to
26:36his ways
26:37or moves,
26:38you see.
26:39We need
26:40to have
26:41an Arabic empire.
26:43We need
26:44to have
26:44one Arabic state,
26:45in fact,
26:46but not
26:47according to
26:47the ways
26:48and means
26:49he wants
26:49to do it,
26:50Nasser himself.
26:53On the morning
26:54of the 23rd of May,
26:55Israeli Prime Minister
26:56Levi Eshkol
26:57was awakened
26:57with the news
26:58that Egypt
26:59had closed
26:59the Straits of
27:00Tehran
27:00at the southern
27:01tip of the
27:02Sinai Peninsula
27:03to all Israeli
27:04shipping.
27:09Just as in
27:09the action
27:10that precipitated
27:11the 1956 war,
27:13Israel's naval
27:13passage to its
27:14vital southern
27:15port of Eilat
27:16was blocked.
27:20Israel,
27:21in Nasser's eyes,
27:22and this we know
27:23from intelligence,
27:24Mr. Serial,
27:25Nasser thought
27:26Israel was
27:27in a weak situation
27:28and that therefore
27:29by bullying
27:29and by threatening
27:31and by moving
27:32troops,
27:33Israel would
27:34recoil
27:35and he didn't
27:36think that he
27:36would have a problem
27:37with Israel.
27:38It was completely
27:39mistaken intelligence
27:40on the part
27:41of the Egyptians.
27:44Supported by
27:45their intelligence
27:45reports,
27:46the men around
27:47Israeli Chief of Staff
27:48General Yitzhak Rabin
27:49were convinced
27:50that Israel could
27:51launch a successful
27:52first strike
27:53against Nasser's army.
27:56Rabin began
27:57to pressure
27:58the hesitating
27:58Prime Minister
27:59Levi Eshkol.
28:00His recommendation
28:02was direct.
28:03The time
28:04to go to war
28:05was now.
28:08All IDF
28:09mobilized
28:10the forces,
28:11but the government
28:12didn't give
28:13any, let's say,
28:15green light
28:15to the army
28:16to do something
28:17more than this
28:18because
28:20they sent
28:21the foreign minister,
28:23Abba Eben,
28:24abroad
28:24to try
28:26to arrange
28:28a diplomatic solution.
28:32Abba Eben
28:33presented Israel's
28:34case before
28:35the United Nations.
28:36The three
28:37Western powers
28:38and the Security
28:39Council
28:39made frantic
28:40efforts to
28:41alleviate the
28:41crisis at the
28:42last moment.
28:43Egypt was urged
28:44to make a
28:45compromise,
28:46but Nasser,
28:47convinced of
28:47Israel's weakness,
28:48would not yield.
28:51In Washington,
28:52President Lyndon Johnson
28:53sent a message
28:54to the Israeli
28:55Prime Minister.
28:56The U.S.
28:57proposed to
28:58open the
28:58straits
28:59with an
28:59international
29:00task force
29:00and Johnson
29:01urged Eshkol
29:02to delay
29:03a first
29:03strike.
29:06The American
29:07Sixth Fleet
29:08and British
29:09destroyers,
29:10shadowed by
29:10Soviet warships,
29:12a total of
29:12over 70
29:13vessels in all,
29:14entered the
29:15eastern
29:15Mediterranean,
29:16compounding
29:17an already
29:17tense atmosphere.
29:20Sailing with
29:21them was a
29:22mysterious U.S.
29:23naval vessel
29:23outfitted with
29:24top-secret
29:25intelligence
29:25gathering
29:26equipment.
29:29Operating
29:29for the
29:30National
29:30Security Agency,
29:31it was known
29:32as the
29:32USS Liberty.
29:36On the
29:3730th of May,
29:38a reluctant
29:39King Hussein
29:39of Jordan
29:40joined in
29:41a defense
29:41pact with
29:42Egypt.
29:43The Jordanian
29:44army was now
29:45placed under
29:46Egyptian command
29:47and two
29:47Egyptian battalions
29:49were moving
29:49into Jordan.
29:52Jordanian
29:53diplomatic relations
29:54with Syria
29:54were renewed
29:55and strengthened.
29:56It was now
29:57evident that
29:58Israel would
29:58not be fighting
29:59a minor skirmish.
30:01This would be
30:02a three-border
30:03war.
30:07before the
30:08break of the war
30:08we had a treaty
30:09with Egypt
30:10about a month
30:11before.
30:13How would it
30:14work, a treaty
30:14before the war?
30:15It needs month
30:16and month
30:17to coordinate,
30:19to mingle the two
30:19armies,
30:20to understand
30:21each other.
30:24The Egyptian
30:25army was
30:27working according
30:28to the Russian
30:29school.
30:31We have our
30:32units,
30:32we have our
30:34ways and
30:35means to
30:35how to fight,
30:36you see.
30:37So there was
30:39short of,
30:40less of
30:41coordination.
30:44Confusion
30:45within the banks
30:45of the Arab armies
30:46was overshadowed
30:47by loud calls
30:48for Israel's
30:49destruction
30:49throughout the
30:50Arab capitals.
30:58While the
30:59saber-rattling
31:00grew more
31:00intense,
31:01the Israeli
31:02army remained
31:03mobilized
31:03but inactive.
31:06Intelligence
31:07warned that
31:07with each
31:08passing day
31:08of inaction,
31:09Israel was
31:10showing signs
31:11of weakness
31:11in the eyes
31:12of its Arab
31:12neighbors.
31:15Eshkol
31:16needed to
31:16know the
31:17status of
31:17the international
31:18task force
31:19to open
31:19the straits.
31:22He dispatched
31:23Mossad Chief
31:24Mayor Amit
31:25to Washington
31:26where he met
31:26with his
31:27American
31:27counterpart
31:28and friend
31:28Richard Helms,
31:30director of
31:30the CIA.
31:34So Dick
31:35told me,
31:36look,
31:37I'll tell you
31:37the truth,
31:38there's no
31:38task force,
31:40no naval
31:42forces,
31:43we couldn't
31:44assemble them.
31:46Faced with
31:46the prospect
31:47of returning
31:48home without
31:48an American
31:49response to
31:50the crisis,
31:50Amit requested
31:51a meeting
31:52with Secretary
31:52of Defense
31:53Robert McNamara
31:54to explain
31:55Israel's position.
31:58And I told him
31:59we don't want
31:59external intervention,
32:01neither on your
32:01part nor on the
32:03Russian part.
32:04Then he said,
32:04I read you
32:06loud and clear.
32:09And I asked him,
32:10Mr. Secretary,
32:11what do you think
32:12should I do?
32:13Should I stay
32:14for another day
32:17else sometime
32:18here?
32:18He said,
32:19no, you go
32:20back home.
32:22I would not say
32:23that Washington
32:24gave the Israelis
32:25the green light,
32:26but they didn't
32:28object to what
32:30the Israelis told
32:31them would be
32:31the next step
32:32if the Egyptians
32:34continue to keep
32:35their troops on
32:36the frontiers
32:36and if the Egyptians
32:38continue to blockade
32:39the Straits.
32:42In the end,
32:43the United States
32:44understood Israel's
32:45reasoning and
32:45indicated by its
32:47silence that it
32:47did not oppose
32:48an Israeli first
32:50strike.
32:51Amit traveled
32:51back to Jerusalem.
32:52In a late night
32:53meeting at the
32:54prime minister's
32:55residence, he
32:55reported on his
32:56trip and recommended
32:58war.
33:01In a meeting
33:02on the 4th of June,
33:03Eshkol's cabinet
33:04voted to attack.
33:06The fate of Israel
33:07was now in the
33:08hands of the army.
33:12An entire Israeli
33:13generation of
33:14264,000 men
33:17would be facing
33:18an imposing
33:18United Arab Army
33:20of 540,000 soldiers.
33:24In heavy weaponry
33:25and aircraft,
33:26Israel was outnumbered
33:28three to one.
33:32On the following
33:33morning of the
33:345th of June,
33:35a daring first
33:35strike would be
33:36launched.
33:38With the code
33:40words,
33:40Sadeen Adom,
33:41red sheet,
33:42the attack would
33:43begin.
33:55As the sun broke
33:57on the morning of
33:57the 5th of June,
34:001967, Israeli pilots
34:01began what they
34:02thought would be
34:03another ordinary day
34:04until they were issued
34:05target sheets.
34:07It was the first time
34:08they learned of
34:09Operation Moked,
34:10the plan to attack
34:12Egyptian air bases.
34:16The preemptive
34:17airstrike was designed
34:19to give Israel
34:20complete control
34:21of the airspace.
34:24Nearly the entire
34:25Israeli air force
34:26took off,
34:27flying low over
34:28the Mediterranean.
34:29In less than an hour,
34:31they would be making
34:32military history.
34:35The big question mark
34:38was, could we get there
34:42and, in surprise,
34:4445 minutes,
34:45the longest 45 minutes
34:47of my life,
34:48200 aeroplans flying,
34:50radio silence,
34:52on the ground.
34:53Nobody's talking,
34:54nobody knows if they're
34:56okay or not.
34:57We knew that
34:58if we will surprise
34:59them,
35:00and they will not
35:04discover that we are
35:06on the way
35:07to the targets,
35:08then after that,
35:11it will take
35:12the Egyptian air force
35:13at least half an hour
35:15to understand
35:15what happened.
35:17Israeli spies
35:19like Agent Wolfgang
35:20Lotz operated
35:21undercover inside Egypt
35:22and befriended
35:23many senior Egyptian
35:25army officials.
35:26Through their eavesdropping,
35:28they were able
35:28to pinpoint
35:29exactly when
35:30the Egyptian air force,
35:31its pilots,
35:32officers,
35:33and equipment
35:33would be most vulnerable,
35:36between 7.30
35:37and 8.00 in the morning.
35:40As a result,
35:41one agent reportedly
35:42entertained
35:43some Egyptian army officers
35:45the night before,
35:46keeping them up
35:47into the early hours
35:48in the morning
35:48of the attack.
35:53We have chosen
35:55the time of attack
35:59in accordance
36:01to what we knew
36:02is when
36:04are the Egyptian
36:05army officers
36:08and air force
36:09pilots
36:10driving their cars
36:12on their way
36:13to their units.
36:16the exact time
36:17had been set.
36:19The airstrike
36:20would commence
36:20at 7.45 a.m.
36:22after Egypt's
36:23morning air patrols
36:24had completed
36:24their rounds.
36:27Quarter to eight
36:28was after
36:29the first light
36:30patrol,
36:31Egyptian patrol,
36:32is already landed.
36:33Every morning,
36:34first light,
36:35they patrol
36:35because the world
36:36thought first light
36:37is the time
36:38to start a war.
36:39and they saw
36:40first light.
36:41Nothing happened.
36:42They landed.
36:42They landed.
36:43We came.
36:50Egyptian pilots
36:51on airfields
36:52all across the Sinai
36:53scrambled out
36:54of their barracks
36:54to find their planes
36:55on fire
36:56and exploding
36:57all around them.
37:00The Israelis
37:01destroyed
37:02a total
37:03of 419 aircraft.
37:0690%
37:07of the Egyptian
37:07air force
37:08on the ground.
37:10We kept it
37:11a secret.
37:13Not one
37:14single word
37:16telling about
37:17the achievement
37:18of our air force.
37:21And we wanted
37:22to gain time.
37:24We preferred
37:25the Israeli
37:26public opinion
37:27to go on
37:28being in panic
37:30and in order
37:32to make sure
37:33that the world
37:34doesn't know
37:35the results.
37:36To the best
37:37of my knowledge
37:38not even
37:40Gamal Abdel Nasser
37:41the Egyptian
37:42president
37:43in those days
37:44did really know
37:45what happened
37:45to his air force
37:46at that time.
37:49In fact
37:50it took six hours
37:51for the Egyptians,
37:52Jordanians
37:53and Syrians
37:53to understand
37:54what had happened
37:55and to react.
37:58Meanwhile
37:58General Hode
37:59trained his pilots
38:00on the Syrian
38:01and Jordanian airfields
38:02destroying Arab planes
38:04before they could
38:05strike Israel's cities.
38:06By 2.30pm
38:08on the first day
38:09of fighting
38:09Israel had successfully
38:11dominated the skies
38:12over the entire
38:13theater of war.
38:18On the same day
38:20three Israeli tank columns
38:22penetrated
38:22the Sinai desert.
38:27Israeli intelligence
38:28received invaluable
38:29detailed information
38:30on Egyptian troop
38:31strengths,
38:32movements,
38:33battle plans
38:34and even morale
38:35from agents
38:35working behind
38:36enemy lines
38:37and within
38:38the Egyptian army.
38:42Intelligence
38:43provided all details
38:45when you
38:46where are they,
38:48where they are deployed,
38:51how they are,
38:52what kind of obstacles,
38:54what kind of
38:54fortifications
38:55they had prepared,
38:57when you have everything.
38:59and in my briefing
39:01to my troops
39:01I told them
39:02that we are
39:05facing
39:06big
39:08army formations.
39:11The side
39:12that will win
39:13this first battle
39:15will win the war.
39:18Intelligence
39:19on exact
39:19Egyptian positions
39:20provided for a
39:21successful charge
39:22by Israeli forces
39:24into Sinai.
39:25more than a thousand
39:27tanks engaged
39:28in the largest battle
39:29the Sinai desert
39:30had ever seen.
39:32Over the next
39:3348 hours
39:34Egyptian forces
39:35would begin to retreat
39:36westward towards
39:37the Suez Canal.
39:44To the east
39:45Israel's border
39:47with Jordan
39:47went along
39:48the west bank
39:48of the Jordan River
39:49and divided
39:50the city of Jerusalem
39:51in half.
39:53An Israeli agent
39:55dispatched
39:56through Jerusalem
39:57informed
39:57Jordan's
39:58King Hussein
39:59that Israel
40:00would not enter
40:01into hostile actions
40:02against Jordan
40:03if the king
40:03refrained
40:04from attacking Israel.
40:08Despite Israel's
40:10diplomatic offer
40:11Hussein had issued
40:12the order to attack
40:13and the Jordanian
40:14legion opened fire.
40:16Both sides
40:18gave divided Jerusalem
40:19strategic priority.
40:21The fighting
40:22raged throughout
40:22the entire region
40:24and all around
40:24the walled city.
40:27Under his military
40:28pact with Nasser
40:29Hussein called
40:30for Egyptian air
40:31support.
40:32Nasser still
40:33did not publicly
40:34acknowledge the
40:35destruction of his
40:36own air force.
40:40There were no
40:42cover from the air
40:44no planes at all
40:46and we knew
40:48at last
40:48that the plains
40:49of Egypt
40:50which we promised
40:51that they will be
40:52coming to help us
40:52they were completely
40:54damaged or destroyed
40:55on the ground.
40:57But the king
40:57was obliged
41:00obliged by himself
41:02to fight.
41:03I have to fight it
41:04whatever might be
41:05the price
41:06of this war.
41:07Even if I lose
41:09my regime
41:10I will fight it
41:11with my brothers
41:12the Arabs
41:13so we fought it
41:14like that
41:15and we lost
41:16the West Bank
41:16we lost it easily.
41:20As an Israeli
41:21column penetrated
41:22the old city walls
41:23of Jerusalem
41:23General Mordecai
41:25Gour
41:25proclaimed over
41:26the radio
41:27the Temple Mount
41:28is in our hands
41:30for the first time
41:31in 2,000 years
41:33the Jews
41:34completely controlled
41:35their holiest site
41:36the western wall
41:38of Solomon's
41:39ancient temple.
41:39King Hussein
41:41had lost
41:41the West Bank
41:42all of Jerusalem
41:43and the Holy
41:45Al-Aqsa Mosque
41:46one of Islam's
41:47most treasured shrines.
41:50By the evening
41:51of the 7th of June
41:52Israel and Jordan
41:53agreed
41:54to a UN ceasefire.
42:06As the war
42:07quickly turned
42:08in Israel's favor
42:09cheers for the
42:10Jewish state
42:10were growing louder.
42:13The world loves
42:14an underdog
42:15like no other time
42:16in history
42:17Israel was basking
42:18in a glow
42:18of public support.
42:22Nowhere was this
42:23more clearly felt
42:24than in the United States.
42:30the Israelis
42:31were so clever
42:32to show the world
42:34that all the world
42:35is standing beside them
42:36even the United States
42:38is standing beside them
42:39Britain is standing beside them
42:40they were clever
42:42to show the world
42:43that we are alone
42:43the Arabs.
42:45On the 8th of June
42:47Israeli troops
42:48advanced
42:48and reached
42:49the Suez Canal
42:50at four points.
42:51The waterways
42:52of the Straits of Tehran
42:54were reopened.
42:55Israel and Egypt
42:56held their fire.
42:58All of the Sinai
42:59was now in Israeli hands.
43:02As Israel celebrated victory
43:04over one of its greatest enemies
43:05that same day
43:07was marred
43:07by a tragedy
43:08involving one of its greatest friends.
43:13The U.S. had become involved
43:15in the war
43:16when on the morning
43:17of 8th of June
43:18the USS Liberty
43:19was quietly sailing
43:20under an American flag
43:22in international waters
43:23off the Sinai coast.
43:30Unfortunately
43:30we had
43:32intelligence
43:35information
43:35at the time
43:37that Egyptians
43:39might be trying
43:41naval landing
43:42of their forces
43:44behind our lines
43:47on the coastline
43:48in Sinai.
43:50And
43:51the first
43:52indication
43:54that there is
43:55an unidentified
43:57vessel there
43:58was interpreted
43:59as that
44:00possible
44:01Egyptian
44:02boat.
44:06Israeli planes
44:07and torpedo boats
44:08set out to attack
44:09the American reconnaissance ship.
44:11They later claimed
44:12attempts had been made
44:13to learn its identity.
44:15They then twice
44:16called the American Embassy
44:18which of course
44:18knew of no
44:19U.S. Navy ships
44:20off the coast.
44:21Reason being
44:22the ship was controlled
44:23by NSA
44:24the National Security Agency
44:26which does
44:28communications intercepts
44:30and not by the Navy.
44:32The attack began
44:33first by Israeli
44:35jet fighters
44:36followed by
44:36a naval
44:37torpedo attack.
44:41Meanwhile
44:42another airstrike
44:43was being prepared
44:44but by this time
44:45the PT boats
44:46had seen
44:46the code letters
44:48on the ship
44:49GTR-5
44:50which they realized
44:52was not an Arabic
44:53designation
44:54but an English
44:55language designation.
44:57By that time
44:58the Israelis
44:58began to believe
44:59they had made
45:00a mistake.
45:02At the end of the day
45:0434 of the Liberty's
45:05sailors were dead
45:06many others wounded.
45:10Israel apologized
45:11for the incident
45:12and offered compensation
45:13to the families
45:14of the dead
45:14but never adequately
45:15explained the attack.
45:17While an official
45:18U.S. inquiry
45:19reported the assault
45:20was a mistake
45:21many survivors
45:22from the Liberty crew
45:23remained convinced
45:24that the Israelis
45:26deliberately
45:26attacked the ship.
45:28they insist
45:29that Israel
45:30intended to keep
45:31all nations
45:31even its allies
45:32from learning
45:33of its military plans.
45:36The truth
45:37may never be revealed.
45:41The Syrian-Israeli front
45:43fully ignited
45:44on the 9th of June.
45:46The Israeli Air Force
45:48successfully bombed
45:49strategic Syrian
45:50gun emplacements
45:51thanks to detailed
45:52information supplied
45:54by the executed
45:55spymaster
45:55Ali Kohn
45:56and other agents
45:57of the Mossad.
46:02The Israeli ground
46:03assault
46:04was extremely difficult.
46:06Units faced
46:07steep approaches
46:08to the Golan Heights
46:09against heavily
46:10fortified Syrian positions.
46:12But by the end
46:13of the day
46:13the Israelis
46:14had taken control
46:15of the heights
46:16and the guns
46:17threatening the settlements
46:18below
46:18were silenced.
46:22Fighting continued
46:23into the next day
46:24pushing the Syrians
46:25back even farther east.
46:29When Israel
46:30and Syria
46:30agreed on a ceasefire
46:32on the evening
46:32of the 10th of June
46:33Israeli troops
46:35stood on the doorstep
46:36of Damascus
46:37the Syrian capital.
46:42After six days
46:44the war was over.
46:52on the 7th day
46:54Israelis awoke
46:55to the realities
46:55of a new Middle East.
46:57They had captured
46:58the ever-threatening
46:59Golan Heights
47:00to the north
47:01east Jerusalem
47:02the west bank
47:03to the Jordan River
47:04in the east
47:05and the Gaza Strip
47:06and the entire
47:07Sinai Peninsula
47:08to the south.
47:09The conquered area
47:10alone was more
47:11than three times
47:12the size of Israel
47:13before the war.
47:18The Israelis
47:19were unprepared
47:20for the consequences
47:21of their victory
47:22including the occupation
47:24of nearly
47:24one million Palestinians
47:26a problem
47:27which remains unsolved
47:28after many decades.
47:33The Arab nations
47:35were also unprepared
47:36not just for the war
47:37but for the price
47:38of their defeat.
47:46the intelligence
47:47never made
47:48any sort of impact
47:50or advantage
47:51to the war
47:53at 1967.
47:55If I want to blame
47:56somebody
47:57we blame ourselves.
47:59We were never
48:00convinced of this war
48:01and we lost
48:02the most precious
48:03city in the world
48:04to us
48:04as Muslims
48:05and Arabs
48:06to Jerusalem.
48:09Their way
48:10of operation
48:11at the time
48:11was
48:12don't confuse me
48:13with facts
48:14our mind
48:15is made up.
48:18Never again
48:19would Israel's
48:20future successes
48:20be quite as distinct
48:22as they were
48:22in the six day war.
48:27The overwhelming
48:28victory
48:29by Israeli intelligence
48:30confirmed
48:31the Arabs
48:32underestimation
48:33of the other side.
48:37For Arab intelligence
48:39the six day war
48:40was a miscalculation
48:41that could not
48:42be repeated.
48:46All of a sudden
48:49they had
48:49a very different
48:50estimate
48:52and evaluation
48:53about our
48:54capabilities
48:55and about
48:57how they should
48:58prepare themselves
48:59for war.
49:02The Middle East
49:04had changed.
49:05The Arab states
49:06would no longer
49:07take Israel for granted
49:08making future conflicts
49:09much more challenging
49:10for Israeli intelligence.
49:16In Israel
49:17the price of each victory
49:18can be measured
49:19by the success
49:20of its intelligence.
49:23the role of intelligence
49:24in the six day war
49:26may always be remembered
49:27as its greatest triumph.
49:32We did it for years
49:34collected the information
49:36that was our main objective
49:38to have the real picture
49:40of the strength
49:42and the might
49:43and the ability
49:44of our neighbors.
49:48Intelligence work
49:49is very
49:50it's not
49:51Mata Hari
49:52nice girls
49:54and things like that
49:55zippers
49:56it is
49:58a very
49:59very
49:59dull
50:01continuous operation
50:03it's a puzzle.
50:09Like no other country
50:11on earth
50:11Israel has to rely
50:13on secret intelligence
50:14for its survival.
50:16The monument
50:17to Israel's spies
50:18stands as a silent reminder
50:20of the quiet work
50:22of unknown soldiers.
50:24Most notable
50:25are those
50:26secret heroes
50:27who collected
50:28vital information
50:29in the shadows
50:31of the six day war.
50:33in the shadows
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