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00:02Next on Secrets of War.
00:05They were the top spy masters in the Third Reich.
00:08Two rivals were shrouded in mystery and sworn to secrecy.
00:12With thousands of agents at their command,
00:15they were entrusted with Germany's most sensitive intelligence operations.
00:19In the end, one man would kill for Hitler.
00:22The other would betray him.
00:24German intelligence is next on Secrets of War.
00:59Secrets of War
01:29Secrets of War
01:46Secrets of War
01:47October 1938,
01:48Adolf Hitler made his triumphant entrance into Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland,
01:53home to over 3 million German-speaking Czechs.
02:01Just days earlier, the world was at the brink of war
02:04when France and Great Britain reluctantly signed on to the Munich Pact,
02:09effectively handing over 11,000 square miles of Czech territory to Hitler,
02:14simply because he demanded it.
02:17For years, the Nazis had crushed all political opposition within Germany,
02:21and now international resistance was silenced as well.
02:27But as the world press announced a new peace for Europe,
02:30Hitler was already planning a war and had two spymasters at his disposal.
02:35One was SS group leader Reinhard Heydrich,
02:38head of the Nazi intelligence service, the Siegter Heindienst, or SD.
02:43The other was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, commander of the Abwehr,
02:48the espionage and foreign intelligence service of the military.
02:51Hitler could not have been served by two more different men.
02:57Already the head of the Gestapo, Reinhard Heydrich,
03:00controlled Germany through intimidation and brute force.
03:03As the leader of the SD,
03:05he was empowered to spy on political enemies of the Nazi party.
03:09In just seven years,
03:11Heydrich built the most formidable police state in Europe,
03:14and he was one of the most feared men in it.
03:16He was just 34 years of age.
03:20Wilhelm Canaris was much older.
03:23At 51, he was an old hand in military intelligence.
03:27Canaris was a veteran of the First World War
03:29who served aboard a cruiser and commanded several U-boats
03:33before distinguishing himself in a number of daring undercover missions
03:36from South America to Spain.
03:40Canaris was an exceedingly intelligent man
03:42who spoke several languages.
03:45During Germany's turbulent interwar years,
03:48he pursued a number of right-wing political causes
03:50but remained in the conservative navy.
03:55It was a time when everything that he had learned in the monarchy fell apart.
04:02He didn't like the republic.
04:07He was looking for a strong conservative order
04:10which he believed to have found for the time being in Hitler.
04:17This was his big error.
04:19He shared this error with millions of Germans.
04:26In 1934, Naval Commander-in-Chief Admiral Raeder
04:30needed a new commander for the Op Air
04:32and could find no one more qualified than Canaris for the job.
04:38Under his leadership, the Op Air would grow tenfold
04:41into an immense organization of undercover spies
04:44in listening posts all over the world.
04:48At that time, he had attributes that were rather rare in Germany.
04:53He was a cosmopolitan.
04:55He had foreign friends.
04:57He went for foreign holidays.
05:00He ate foreign food.
05:02In other words, he wasn't a Prussian.
05:04He was not a kraut.
05:06Unlike Heydrich,
05:08Wilhelm Canaris avoided the limelight.
05:10He preferred civilian clothes to his rumpled uniform.
05:14He spoke with a slight lisp and was intensely withdrawn.
05:18But beneath this low profile,
05:20he began to harbor convictions that could cost him his life.
05:26When Canaris took over in 1935,
05:30it was very soon that he began to differ with the policies of Hitler.
05:36He became increasingly bitter
05:39and even outspoken in his efforts against this new tyranny.
05:45Thus began a peculiar relationship
05:48between Germany's top spymasters.
05:51While Canaris' politics were changing,
05:54he was forced to work with Reinhard Heydrich,
05:56a man he'd known once before.
05:58In 1923, Canaris was an executive officer
06:02on board the training cruiser Berlin
06:04when he first met Heydrich.
06:06The ambitious cadet was captivated
06:09by Canaris' worldly tales of spying and intrigue.
06:21They got closer not because they liked each other very much.
06:26They hardly had anything in common
06:28except having been in the Navy together.
06:35But Mrs. Canaris played a big role in it.
06:38She was, as well as young Heydrich, a violin player.
06:43And they held small concerts in their home.
06:46And this is how young Heydrich
06:48sort of became friends with the Canarises.
06:55After leaving Canaris' ship,
06:57Heydrich followed his calling and became a signals officer.
07:01But his promising career came to a sudden halt in 1931.
07:04He was caught seducing a woman while he was engaged to another.
07:09Admiral Rader personally interceded
07:12and discharged him from the Navy
07:13for conduct on becoming an officer and a gentleman.
07:17Heydrich's world collapsed.
07:20He was unemployed and 27 years old
07:22when he turned to a uniformed service that would have him,
07:25the Nazi SS.
07:27Here, men with Aryan features,
07:29blonde hair, and blue eyes
07:30were considered to be racially superior,
07:32and Heydrich reveled in the glow of his new limelight.
07:36In 1931, he caught the eye of Heinrich Himmler,
07:40the head of the SS,
07:41who asked him to create the SD,
07:43an organization to spy on members and enemies of the Nazi party.
07:48Within two years,
07:49Heydrich's aggressive style brought him to the top
07:52of both the SD and the Gestapo.
07:56He was an expert fencer,
07:58an equestrian,
07:59and a skier.
08:01He was such a beautiful man,
08:04a beautiful man in the sense of physically.
08:07You know, he was the apotheosis
08:09of the blonde god of the German Reich.
08:15Wilhelm Hothl worked under Heydrich
08:17as an operative in the SD.
08:21After I met him,
08:23I had the impression
08:24he was an exceedingly intelligent man.
08:27Perhaps saying he was a man without any character
08:31is saying too much.
08:33Nevertheless,
08:33he only wanted power.
08:36But he always faced a lingering accusation
08:39that he was of Jewish descent,
08:41which of course bothered him tremendously.
08:45And this was something he was never quite able to shake,
08:48this question regarding his lineage.
08:54Empowered by new laws
08:55that allowed anyone to be taken into protective custody,
08:59Heydrich imposed a racist tone on SD policy
09:02as it sought out political enemies,
09:04starting with Jews and gypsies.
09:07The Sikaheizdi, it's the SD,
09:10the intelligence service of the Nazi party.
09:12These were people by the mid-thirties
09:15that were really starting to be lawyers,
09:18people with a decent education,
09:21but people who quite clearly saw
09:22that membership of the Nazi party
09:23was the way to a fast track towards a good career.
09:27As the fortunes of the Nazi party
09:29and the military grew more inseparable,
09:32an awkward working relationship
09:34was forced upon their respective spy services.
09:37In the coming war of conquest,
09:40Hitler did not want his SD spies
09:42and the Gestapo to be left behind.
09:44He would soon assign them
09:46to the same territory held by Canaris and the Obwehr.
09:50Heydrich was back in the military
09:52and part of Canaris' life again.
09:54But as a Nazi party member,
09:56he was closer to Hitler
09:57and thus posed a real threat to his former mentor.
10:01Admiral Canaris wasn't the only one
10:03alarmed at the Nazi control of the military.
10:06In August 1938,
10:08the chief of the army general staff,
10:10General Ludwig Beck,
10:12resigned his post,
10:13hoping to persuade his fellow officers
10:15that Hitler, an ex-corporal,
10:17was leading them to war.
10:19Canaris chose to resist another way,
10:21from within the military.
10:23At Obwehr headquarters,
10:24he started to lead a double life
10:26and surrounded himself with individuals
10:28who plotted against Hitler.
10:30One man was his chief of staff,
10:33Lieutenant Colonel Hans Oster.
10:37He was a resistance fighter from the first hour,
10:40since the mid-1930s,
10:42or 1938 to be more specific.
10:44He was involved in the plans
10:46of the military conspirators
10:48who wanted to overthrow Hitler
10:49through a coup d'etat.
10:50When Adolf Hitler began to demand
10:53Czechoslovakia's Sudetland,
10:55Hans Oster started to conspire
10:57with General Beck and others
10:59to arrest Hitler
11:00and put him on trial
11:01for provoking a war.
11:04The resistance strategy,
11:06and when I say the resistance,
11:08I'm talking about Admiral Canaris
11:10and his senior officers in the Obwehr.
11:12I'm talking about his colleagues in the army,
11:15headed by General Beck.
11:16The resistance strategy
11:19was to send emissary after emissary
11:23to London
11:24to plead with the British
11:26at the time of the eve of Munich
11:29to not give in on Czechoslovakia
11:33because Czechoslovakia
11:36was the situation
11:37in which the resistance
11:38felt they could rally the army
11:41to mutiny against Hitler
11:43and take over the government from Hitler
11:46and literally have a coup,
11:48a putsch at that time.
11:50The peaceful triumph
11:52of the Munich Pact
11:53made a military overthrow impossible.
11:56Just six months later,
11:57Hitler stunned the world
11:59and ordered his forces
12:00to occupy the entire country
12:02of Czechoslovakia.
12:06Czech President Edward Benesch
12:08was in exile in England
12:10when German army soldiers
12:11took over his country
12:12in March 1939.
12:15behind them came
12:16Reinhard Heydrich
12:17and the SD
12:18armed with lists of people
12:20to arrest
12:20and property to confiscate.
12:23SS terror
12:24was about to be exported.
12:32August 1939.
12:34As the German army massed
12:36at Poland's border,
12:38Hitler asked Reinhard Heydrich
12:39and the SD
12:40to come up with an excuse
12:41to invade the country.
12:43Heydrich arranged
12:44to have prisoners
12:45dressed in Polish army uniforms
12:47and transported
12:48to a German radio station
12:49on the border with Poland.
12:51Then the prisoners were shot
12:53and the station was blown up.
12:56So it looked as if
12:57a group of Poles
12:58had crossed the border,
13:00attacked the radio station,
13:02and been killed,
13:03repulsed,
13:04by the Germans.
13:06This, which the Germans
13:08called Operation Canned Goods,
13:10was the excuse
13:12for Hitler
13:13to then invade Poland
13:15and start World War II.
13:30According to Hitler,
13:32the German army
13:32and the SS
13:33were fighting
13:34for Lebensraum,
13:35a greater living space
13:37for a greater Germany.
13:39By exterminating
13:40Poland's upper class
13:41and intelligentsia,
13:43Heinrich Himmler
13:44assumed that
13:44the remaining Poles
13:46would become
13:46a subservient slave race.
13:52To carry out this policy,
13:54Einsatzkommandos,
13:55known as special action groups,
13:57were assigned
13:57to army control,
13:59ostensibly
13:59to prevent sabotage
14:01and arrest undesirables.
14:03Controlled by the SD
14:04and Reinhard Heydrich,
14:05they openly murdered
14:06thousands of Poles
14:08in a special zone
14:09located behind the main army.
14:15It was established
14:17especially in order
14:18to create,
14:19shall we say,
14:19a breathing space
14:20in which the special action groups
14:22could freely maneuver.
14:24Soldiers fighting
14:25at the front,
14:25and I was one of them,
14:27never heard of these things
14:28which transpired
14:29behind our backs.
14:33In Poland,
14:34Hitler quickly replaced
14:36army rule
14:36with the Nazi administration
14:38and the country
14:39disappeared
14:40from the headlines
14:40of the world press.
14:42Then the Einsatzkommandos
14:44turned their full fury
14:45on Poland's Jews.
14:48It was not long
14:50before Canaris learned
14:51of the atrocities in Poland.
14:53When his agents
14:54reported on the SD's activities,
14:56he went there
14:57to see for himself.
15:03For him it was
15:04the moment
15:04when he realized
15:05that he was part
15:06of a system,
15:07bankrupt of morals,
15:09bankrupt of ethics,
15:10a system that knew
15:11no limits.
15:13Canaris wasn't
15:14an especially moral man,
15:16but he had his limits,
15:18and he didn't want
15:19to be part
15:19of this system anymore.
15:25And he went to Keitel,
15:28the chief of staff
15:29of the Wehrmacht,
15:31and said,
15:32can't you do something
15:33to stop this,
15:34to keep the reign
15:35in the SS,
15:37stop it.
15:38Keitel told Canaris
15:39to go mind
15:40his own business.
15:41There wasn't anything
15:41he could do about it,
15:42so the atrocities continued.
15:45Canaris returned
15:46to Berlin
15:47and conspired
15:48with a young Abwehr lawyer,
15:49Hans von Donjani.
15:51Under Abwehr cover,
15:53Von Donjani
15:53would document
15:54SS crimes in Poland
15:56and even smuggle Jews
15:57out of Berlin.
15:58Hans Oster
15:59then sent an emissary,
16:01Joseph Müller,
16:02to discreetly make contact
16:03with the Vatican
16:04and the Pope.
16:07And the proposition
16:08they put
16:09to Pope Pius XII
16:11was,
16:12you've seen Poland,
16:14you've seen what happened,
16:15you've seen what happened
16:16to a Catholic country.
16:18Now,
16:19will you help us,
16:21the German resistance,
16:22and would you be
16:23a go-between
16:24between us
16:25and the British?
16:28At the same time
16:30that Oster was attempting
16:31to reach the English
16:32through the Vatican,
16:33the British
16:33Secret Intelligence Service
16:35was trying to identify
16:36Germans who
16:37might overthrow Hitler.
16:39Through a British
16:40passport control office
16:41in Holland,
16:42Major Henry Stevens
16:43was running a spy ring
16:45in Germany
16:45with his associate,
16:47Captain Sigismund Best.
16:51By 1939,
16:53Best and Stevens
16:53had come under
16:54the watchful eye
16:55of both the Ampere
16:56and the SD,
16:58and Reinhard Heydrich
16:59was eager to know
17:00who they were working
17:01with in Germany.
17:02Without telling Canaris,
17:04he sent an agent
17:05posing as a military
17:06resistance man
17:07named Captain Schemel
17:08to meet them.
17:10Schemel promised
17:11Best and Stevens
17:12that he would eventually
17:13introduce them
17:14to a German army general
17:15who was plotting
17:16a coup against Hitler.
17:18Prime Minister
17:18Neville Chamberlain
17:19was following
17:20the negotiations closely
17:21and approved
17:22another meeting
17:23between his agents
17:24and Captain Schemel.
17:25The object was clearly
17:26to overthrow Hitler.
17:28Whether the object
17:28was also to kill him
17:29is another matter.
17:31Chamberlain had always
17:32said no
17:33to an assassination
17:34of Hitler
17:35on the grounds
17:36that the British
17:36don't assassinate anybody.
17:39Then suddenly
17:40on the 8th of November
17:411939
17:42a bomb exploded
17:44in the Bergerbrankeller
17:45in Munich
17:46just minutes
17:47after Hitler
17:47had left the building.
17:48That evening
17:49a German carpenter
17:50George Elser
17:51was attempting
17:51to flee
17:52through the Swiss border
17:53when authorities
17:54found photos
17:55and drawings
17:56of the bombsite
17:57in his possession.
18:00Well the perpetrator
18:02of this
18:02was interrogated
18:04meaning he was tortured
18:05and would not admit
18:08that he had
18:09any accomplices.
18:11The high-ranking
18:13Nazi officials
18:13of course
18:14never believed him.
18:16No, a large
18:17a huge conspiracy
18:18had to be
18:19behind all this.
18:21And so they immediately
18:22came to the conclusion
18:23that
18:23ah
18:24the British Secret Service
18:26must have done it.
18:28Captain Schemel
18:29was then ordered
18:30to snatch Best
18:31and Stevens
18:31the next morning
18:32at the Kahn
18:33in Bacchus
18:33in the Dutch
18:34border town
18:35at Venlo.
18:35The cafe is literally
18:37on the border
18:38with Germany.
18:39When the British
18:40agents arrived
18:41with a Dutch
18:41intelligence officer
18:42at their appointed hour
18:44SD operatives
18:45pulled up in a car
18:46with machine guns
18:47firing.
18:48They fatally wounded
18:49the Dutch officer
18:50and grabbed Best
18:51and Stevens
18:52and raced back
18:53across the border.
18:55Captain Schemel
18:56was in fact
18:56Major Walter Schellenberg
18:58a young and ambitious
18:59SD operative.
19:01In Berlin
19:02he oversaw
19:02the interrogation
19:03of Best
19:04and Stevens.
19:04The Gestapo interrogator
19:07Herbert Koppler
19:08was interviewed
19:08in 1969
19:09by Austrian author
19:11Gunther Peiss.
19:12Then he told me
19:14both of them
19:15have been
19:16to his opinion
19:17and to his experience
19:19with them
19:19the greatest
19:20traitors
19:21he could think of
19:22because they gave them
19:25all sorts of
19:26informations
19:28without being
19:29asked for.
19:31There are documents
19:32that were produced
19:34prior to the would-be
19:35invasion of Great Britain
19:36in which the Germans
19:38produced an arrest list
19:40of all the leading
19:41members of British society
19:42that would be captured.
19:44Now this book
19:45is called
19:46the Black Book
19:47and amongst these
19:48is a breakdown
19:48of British intelligence
19:50and this is pretty full
19:51of information
19:52that is specified
19:54as coming from
19:54Best and Stevens.
19:57Propaganda minister
19:58Joseph Goebbels
19:59lost no time
20:00putting the Munich
20:01bombing and the
20:02Venlo incident
20:02together.
20:04Soon
20:04Ilse, Best
20:05and Stevens
20:06were pictured together
20:07in newspapers
20:08throughout the world.
20:10The fact that this
20:11wasn't the case
20:11was neither here
20:12nor there
20:13what it was
20:14it made marvellous
20:16propaganda fodder
20:17for Goebbels
20:18who could
20:19represent this
20:20dastardly attack
20:21on that beloved
20:22Fuhrer
20:22by a pawn
20:24of the
20:26nefarious
20:26British secret service.
20:29Best and Stevens
20:30were eventually
20:30sent here
20:31to the
20:32Sachsenhausen
20:33concentration camp
20:34outside Berlin.
20:36They spent
20:37the rest of the war
20:38three years
20:38so in solitary
20:39confinement.
20:40They were due
20:41to be executed
20:42on several occasions
20:43that they were
20:44never formally charged
20:44with an attempt
20:45to murder Hitler.
20:47The Venlo incident
20:48was another embarrassment
20:49to the Chamberlain
20:50government.
20:51Most of Britain's
20:52agents in Germany
20:53were exposed
20:54and many were killed.
20:55Now overtures
20:57from anyone claiming
20:58to represent
20:58the German resistance
20:59even emigres
21:00from Wilhelm Canaris
21:02or the Pope
21:02would be met
21:03with much skepticism
21:05in the West.
21:06Hans Oster
21:06was one such man
21:07as the chief
21:08of staff
21:09of the Obwehr
21:09he was planning
21:10support operations
21:11for Hitler's
21:12attacks in the West.
21:16So then
21:17he had access
21:18to all of the files
21:19and therefore
21:20insight into
21:21the operative directives
21:22which the
21:22Wehrmacht leadership
21:23had planned
21:24and then
21:25he betrayed them.
21:31In 1939
21:32he was
21:33among other things
21:34involved in providing
21:36the Western powers
21:37with the planned
21:38German attack dates
21:39on the Western Front
21:40via the Dutch military
21:41attache in Berlin.
21:45The Dutch
21:45now had
21:46Hitler's attack plans
21:47against Holland
21:48Belgium
21:48and France
21:49but they were skeptical.
21:51They'd suffered
21:52the only fatality
21:53at Venlo
21:53and were not going
21:54to be tricked again.
21:55Hans Oster's
21:57information
21:57was disregarded.
21:59In the morning
21:59of May 10th
22:001940
22:01the German attack
22:02began.
22:06Their military plan
22:08achieved complete surprise.
22:10Within six weeks
22:11Holland,
22:11Belgium
22:12and France
22:12were under German control
22:14and British troops
22:15were left reeling
22:16on the shores
22:17of Dunkirk.
22:23As the Luftwaffe
22:24prepared for the
22:25Battle of Britain
22:26Major General
22:27Alfred Yor
22:27presented Adolf Hitler
22:29with a daring scheme
22:30to bring the British Empire
22:32to its knees.
22:33Codenamed
22:34Operation Felix
22:35the plan called
22:36for the Wehrmacht
22:37to attack
22:38and seize
22:38Gibraltar
22:39a vital British
22:40naval base
22:41on the southern
22:41tip of Spain.
22:43It was a tempting
22:45target.
22:45Hitler would soon
22:46occupy parts
22:47of northwest Africa
22:49and if he conquered
22:49Gibraltar
22:50he would have
22:51operating bases
22:51on both sides
22:53of the narrow straits
22:54where the Mediterranean
22:55meets the Atlantic Ocean.
22:57With a free hand
22:58in the region
22:58for the German navy
22:59England would lose
23:01her vital shipping routes
23:02for food and oil
23:03from the Mideast.
23:05It would have been
23:07psychologically damaging
23:08to the British
23:09and it would have been
23:10terribly damaging
23:11in terms of
23:12losing the Mediterranean
23:14as a takeoff point
23:15for hitting
23:17the soft
23:18underbelly
23:18of Europe
23:19as Churchill
23:20used to call
23:21parts of Italy
23:22and Greece
23:23which he had visions
23:25of in Haiti.
23:26Hitler signed on
23:28to Jodl's plan
23:29but there was
23:29one hitch.
23:31His army would need
23:32free transit
23:32through Spain
23:33to attack Gibraltar.
23:34Then Jodl made
23:36a crucial blunder.
23:37He sent Admiral
23:38Canaris
23:39to meet with
23:39the Spanish dictator
23:40Francisco Franco.
23:44Canaris was a friend
23:46to Franco
23:46having recently
23:47arranged much
23:48of the military
23:49assistance
23:49for his victorious
23:50nationalists
23:51during the Spanish
23:52Civil War.
23:56In his secret meeting
23:58with Canaris
23:59Franco worried
24:00that Hitler
24:00would invade Spain
24:01if he refused to help.
24:05Canaris said
24:06don't worry about that.
24:07Hitler cannot come
24:08into Spain
24:09at this point
24:10because the German troops
24:11every last one of them
24:12are going to be required
24:13for an invasion
24:15of Russia
24:16in which Canaris
24:18thereby divulged
24:19Hitler's greatest secret.
24:21He was about
24:21to go into Russia.
24:24Hitler traveled
24:25across Europe
24:25to personally meet
24:26with Franco
24:27on the French-Spanish border
24:29in October 1940.
24:31He pleaded
24:32with the Spanish dictator
24:33for nine hours
24:34but to no avail.
24:35He couldn't imagine
24:37that Franco would say
24:38I don't want
24:39your troops
24:39in my country
24:42and Hitler
24:44was later said
24:46this was the worst pain
24:48he had felt
24:48since the dentist
24:49pulled four of his teeth out.
24:52Canaris then wrote
24:53a pessimistic report
24:55that discouraged
24:56Operation Felix
24:57as well as
24:58an invasion of Spain.
25:00Canaris
25:01is so clever.
25:09and he comes back
25:10to Berlin
25:11and says to Hitler
25:12I advise you
25:13to give up
25:14the idea
25:14of going on Gibraltar
25:16because Spain
25:17will be against you.
25:22Maybe not in a war
25:23but look at the Spanish.
25:25Have they any food to eat?
25:27By whom are they
25:28given their oil?
25:30The Americans
25:31and the English.
25:34If you go to Spain
25:35Spain dies.
25:38Then you have to feed it.
25:40You cannot even feed
25:41the countries you occupy.
25:43So Hitler gave up
25:45on Gibraltar.
25:50In spite of his most
25:51serious diplomatic setback
25:53Hitler was still certain
25:55England could be defeated.
25:56That summer
25:57he ordered Canaris
25:58to launch
25:58Operation Lina
25:59an all-out spy invasion
26:01of Great Britain.
26:02Within weeks
26:03undercover
26:03Abwehr agents
26:04were arriving in England.
26:07Soon they were
26:08transmitting back
26:09to Hamburg
26:10the locations
26:11of English
26:11anti-aircraft guns
26:12troops
26:13and airfields.
26:14The Abwehr
26:15was ecstatic
26:16over the flow
26:17of information
26:17and passed it
26:18on to the German
26:19high command.
26:20They didn't know
26:21that they'd fallen
26:22victim to one
26:23of the greatest
26:23deceptions of the war.
26:26Most of the Germans
26:27spies sent
26:28to the United Kingdom
26:28were captured
26:29very, very quickly.
26:31There was no
26:32resistance network
26:34or no friendly
26:35sources there
26:36to assist
26:36these agents
26:37coming in.
26:38The captured spies
26:40were often introduced
26:41to Major John Masterman.
26:43What Masterman did
26:44was to say
26:45to these fellows
26:45look here
26:46we're going to hang
26:46you in the morning
26:47but if you come
26:47and work for us
26:48we'll try and send
26:50the hangman home
26:52so to speak.
26:53Masterman exploited
26:54the Germans
26:55in a top secret group
26:56aptly named
26:57the Double Cross Committee.
26:59The Abwehr agents
27:00radio receivers
27:01were monitored carefully.
27:03Questions from Hamburg
27:04often hinted
27:04at potential bombing targets
27:06or revealed issues
27:07of concern
27:08to the Abwehr.
27:09The agents' replies
27:10were carefully coordinated
27:11to give them credibility.
27:13There's another committee
27:14that's even more secret
27:15that's deciding
27:17what secrets
27:18they can give
27:19the agents
27:20so that the agents
27:22can be sending
27:22fairly good material
27:24to the Germans.
27:26And the RAF
27:28gives them some material
27:29the Navy gives them
27:30some material
27:31the Army gives them
27:31some material.
27:33With all of their agents
27:34tied up
27:35the Abwehr failed
27:36to discover
27:37one of Britain's
27:37greatest secrets.
27:39Codebreakers in Bletchley Park
27:40were beginning to read
27:42the Abwehr's message traffic.
27:44We read the Abwehr ciphers.
27:47They had a hand cipher
27:49which we broke
27:50in December 1940.
27:52And then they had
27:53their own enigma
27:54which we didn't break
27:55till December 1941.
27:57We read a good deal
27:59of the communication
28:00between the Secret Service
28:02controllers in Germany
28:03and their outstations.
28:07So they had constant feedback
28:09on Abwehr assessment
28:11of the effectiveness
28:13of the operations
28:14in England.
28:15And it was this constant feedback
28:17that enabled them
28:18to successfully
28:20carry this out.
28:21The XX or 20 committee
28:23was spectacularly successful.
28:27Even after losing
28:28the Battle of Britain
28:29the Germans kept
28:30sending secret agents.
28:34In the United States
28:35the Abwehr
28:36was no more successful.
28:38They pinned too much hope
28:39on William Sebald
28:40a new undercover agent.
28:43William Sebald
28:44was a German born American
28:45and in 1939
28:47while visiting in Germany
28:49he was recruited
28:50by the Abwehr.
28:51When he returned
28:53to the United States
28:55he reported the recruitment
28:56to the FBI
28:57and set up
28:58a false operation.
29:00The FBI paid Sebald
29:02$50 a week
29:03and set him up
29:04in a New York City office
29:05on 42nd Street.
29:08The dark walls
29:09in the office
29:09were painted white
29:10to help hidden cameras
29:11film these images.
29:14For 16 months
29:16of their agents
29:17and informants
29:18came by
29:19with war plans
29:20weapon designs
29:21and other information.
29:22William Sebald
29:24collected enough evidence
29:25for the FBI
29:25to arrest
29:2633 spies.
29:29He also radioed
29:31more deceptive information
29:32back to Germany.
29:39There were certainly people
29:42especially within
29:43the military Abwehr
29:44who because of their
29:46hostile attitude
29:47towards national socialism
29:48very intentionally
29:50passed on these
29:51false reports
29:52as accurate ones.
29:54These were the things
29:55that first the Abwehr
29:56and later Admiral Canaris
29:58were accused of doing.
30:02Gradually a canker
30:04had settled in
30:04on the German
30:05intelligence service.
30:06They realized that
30:07Germany would not
30:08win this war.
30:09And so, you know,
30:10suspect intelligence
30:11coming to them
30:12from their agency
30:13were allowed
30:15to leap through
30:16to the purist's desk.
30:18And once you start
30:19that game
30:20then the canker
30:21becomes very serious
30:22indeed.
30:26The poor performance
30:27of Canaris' Abwehr
30:29served only to enhance
30:30his rival's reputation.
30:32By 1942,
30:33Reinhard Heydrich
30:34had personally assumed
30:35responsibility
30:36for the systematic
30:38extermination
30:39of Europe's
30:39Jewish population.
30:41He was seen by many
30:42as a future leader
30:43of the Third Reich.
30:44In addition to
30:45commanding the SD,
30:46Heydrich was named
30:48Deputy Reich Protector
30:49over the former territory
30:50of Czechoslovakia.
30:52But his attitude
30:53toward the Czechs
30:54was uncharacteristic.
30:55Instead of brutal repression,
30:57Heydrich waved a carrot
30:58in front of them.
30:59When the Czechs
31:00were industrious,
31:01they received extra rations
31:02and fair treatment.
31:04Their apparent support
31:05for an Axis victory
31:06alarmed the West,
31:07and Heydrich became
31:08a top concern.
31:11Intelligence reports
31:12indicated he would
31:13soon move to France,
31:14where the Allies
31:15were planning to invade.
31:17The English were also aware
31:19that Heydrich now posed
31:20one of the greatest threats
31:22to Canaris and the Ophir,
31:23thereby jeopardizing
31:24their successful
31:25double-cross operation.
31:27Perhaps most concerned
31:29of all was the exiled
31:30Czech president,
31:32Edward Benesch.
31:35And I think that Benesch
31:37clearly felt that
31:38if he didn't do something
31:40and Czechoslovakia
31:41was not perceived
31:42to be a member
31:44of the Allied community,
31:46there was always the risk
31:48that Czechoslovakia
31:48would not have the borders
31:50reinstated at the end
31:51of the war.
31:55Benesch called for
31:56an assassination of Heydrich,
31:57and the British
31:58special operations executive,
32:00the SOE,
32:01agreed to support him
32:02training Czech
32:03undercover agents.
32:06They were given
32:07very, very precise
32:09training by SOE.
32:12They were given
32:13a particular type of bomb
32:14that was devised
32:15for them.
32:17After months
32:17of intensive preparation,
32:19Czech agents
32:20Joseph Gobczyk
32:21and Jan Kubisch
32:22parachuted with
32:23a support team
32:24into Czechoslovakia
32:25on a December night
32:27in 1941.
32:28They began to spy
32:29on Heydrich,
32:30who lived with his family
32:31outside Prague.
32:35Heydrich was so confident
32:36that he would drive
32:38from his palace
32:38to his office
32:39every day
32:40by the same route,
32:41in the same car,
32:42with just a chauffeur.
32:44He declined Hitler's request
32:46that he have a bodyguard.
32:50leaving his villa
32:52for his office,
32:54he took a road,
32:56the Prague-Dresden road,
32:58and a key feature
32:59in the road
33:00was a very sharp,
33:03almost U-turn,
33:04in which his Mercedes
33:06was forced
33:07to slow down.
33:09A nearby tram stop
33:11offered a perfect opportunity
33:12for the assassins
33:13to lie in wait.
33:14After six months
33:16of hiding,
33:17Gabchik and Kubisch
33:18finally set up
33:19at this corner
33:20on the 27th of May, 1942.
33:22Gabchik hid his Sten gun
33:24under his raincoat.
33:25Kubisch's bombs,
33:26fused and ready,
33:27were concealed
33:28in his suitcase.
33:31Then the sound
33:31of Heydrich's Mercedes
33:32was heard.
33:33At that moment,
33:34a loaded tram appeared
33:36across the road
33:37from Gabchik and Kubisch.
33:39As Heydrich's car
33:40slowed down at the turn,
33:41Gabchik dropped
33:42his raincoat,
33:43raised his gun
33:44at point-blank range
33:45and pulled the trigger.
33:47Nothing happened.
33:49The gun jammed.
33:51Gabchik was left
33:52standing helplessly
33:54as the Mercedes
33:54swept by.
33:56Heydrich then
33:57made a fatal move.
34:00He yelled at his robber
34:01to stop
34:02and triumphantly
34:03stood up
34:03to draw his pistol.
34:05Kubisch then realized
34:06what had happened.
34:07He stepped from cover
34:08and threw his bomb.
34:10At that moment,
34:11Heydrich's fate
34:12was sealed.
34:18The impact bomb
34:19exploded in the gutter
34:21near the right back wheel.
34:24Kubisch staggered back,
34:26hit by pieces
34:26of the car's body.
34:29Heydrich jumped
34:30from the car
34:31and fired two shots
34:32at Kubisch
34:32before slumping down
34:34wounded against a railing.
34:38Kubisch ran
34:39for his bicycle,
34:40throwing away
34:40his briefcase,
34:41which contained
34:42a second bomb.
34:44He fired into the air
34:45to frighten away
34:46the tram passengers
34:47and escaped
34:49downhill
34:50into the city.
34:52Kubisch threw down
34:53his useless
34:54Sten gun
34:54and pulled out
34:55a pistol.
34:56Unable to reach
34:57his bicycle,
34:58he was chased
34:59by Heydrich's driver.
35:01He ran into
35:02a nearby butcher shop,
35:03but finding
35:03no rear exit,
35:05turned back
35:05into the street
35:06where he encountered
35:07the driver.
35:08Kubisch shot the German,
35:10firing twice,
35:11just as he'd been trained
35:13by the SOE.
35:16Heydrich was taken
35:17to this nearby hospital.
35:19At first,
35:20he seemed likely
35:20to survive his wounds,
35:22but within a few days,
35:23he developed
35:24blood poisoning.
35:25Fragments of horsehair
35:26fillings from the car's
35:28upholstery
35:28had entered his spleen.
35:30That set off
35:31an infection.
35:32Despite the fact
35:34that they had him
35:34at the hospital
35:35immediately,
35:36and he received
35:37literally the best
35:38medical attention
35:39that could possibly
35:40be had,
35:41he eventually died
35:43due to the infection.
35:44On the 4th of June,
35:451942,
35:47the blonde beast
35:48took his last breath.
35:50A death mask
35:51was immediately commissioned
35:52and later used
35:53on Nazi postage stamps.
35:56Wilhelm Canaris
35:57knew that his rival's death
35:58spared his double life.
36:00At Heydrich's elaborate
36:01state funeral in Berlin,
36:03Canaris played his part.
36:07You have to remember
36:08that Heydrich
36:10had very few friends.
36:13Even in his closest circles,
36:16he was a hated man.
36:21Nobody mourned
36:22the death of Heydrich.
36:26But this did not stop
36:27Canaris
36:28from saying
36:29to his widow,
36:32I have lost
36:33an honest friend.
36:39The evidence left
36:41by Gabczyk and Kubis
36:42appeared in newsreels
36:43time and time again.
36:45The search for the assassins
36:47became the largest manhunt
36:48in Nazi history,
36:50and 10 million crowns
36:51were offered
36:51as a reward
36:52for their capture.
36:54Gabczyk and Kubis
36:55were eventually found
36:56hiding in a nearby church
36:58and died with their support team
37:00in a shootout
37:01with German soldiers.
37:05The SD and Gestapo
37:07determined that the operation
37:08had been planned in England.
37:10The Stengon was a favorite weapon
37:12of the SOE.
37:13The bomb was similar
37:15to anti-tank grenades
37:16used by the British
37:17in North Africa.
37:21Hitler vowed to make an example
37:23out of anyone
37:24harboring spies
37:25in Czechoslovakia.
37:26In the town of Lidice,
37:28every man, woman,
37:30and child
37:31was arrested.
37:32One hundred and sixteen men
37:33were lined up
37:34in front of a wall
37:34of mattresses
37:35and shot.
37:37The women and children
37:38were taken away
37:39to concentration camps,
37:40and German news crews
37:42were brought in
37:42to record these images.
37:48When the bombing was over,
37:49every brick was removed,
37:52and Lidice was taken off
37:54German maps.
37:58As the SS moved
37:59throughout Europe,
38:00they took anything of value
38:02that could finance
38:02their own operations.
38:04Gold, jewelry, paintings,
38:06and entire factories
38:07were seized
38:08for the fatherland.
38:10Yet, in one of their
38:11most secret operations,
38:13the SS made
38:14their own money.
38:16An SD agent,
38:17Alfred Naujax,
38:18came up with a scheme
38:19to ruin the British economy.
38:21The plan called
38:22for millions
38:22of forged pound notes
38:24to be dropped
38:24on England
38:25and neutral countries.
38:26When the plan
38:27was approved
38:28by Hitler in 1942,
38:29Naujax and his men
38:30began to seek out
38:31counterfeiters.
38:33It suddenly occurred
38:35to them
38:35that they had
38:36as prisoners
38:37of the German government
38:39master Jewish forgers.
38:43So they actively
38:44went through the backgrounds
38:45of these individuals
38:47and came up
38:48with the forgers,
38:49the photography experts,
38:51the experts in numbering,
38:53the experts in logistics,
38:54and they recruited
38:56from these prisoners
38:58an entire team.
39:00The lure was simple.
39:02The SD officers
39:03promised them
39:04better living conditions,
39:05better food,
39:06and more recreation time.
39:08Most importantly,
39:10they promised them
39:10their lives
39:11if they created
39:12a flawless forgery.
39:14The prisoners
39:15were transferred
39:16to the Sachsenhausen
39:17concentration camp
39:18and went to work
39:19next to the cell
39:20where British agents
39:21Best and Stevens
39:22were being held.
39:24When they produced
39:25their first forgeries,
39:26SD agent Wilhelm Hodel
39:28was asked to vouch
39:29for their authenticity.
39:35That's when I personally
39:37found out
39:37through one of my men
39:39who went bold-faced
39:40into a leading Swiss bank
39:42and showed them the notes,
39:44saying he had heard
39:45that fake bank notes
39:47had been circulating
39:48and he wanted
39:49to have them examined.
39:51And the clerk said,
39:53I can only congratulate you
39:55if you have many more
39:56of these notes.
39:57They are guaranteed
39:59to be genuine.
40:04Here was now a source
40:06of hard British currency
40:08that they could use
40:09with their agents.
40:10They could use it
40:11for bribes.
40:12They bought weapons
40:13in Yugoslavia.
40:14When they rescued Mussolini
40:17from his captors,
40:18the operation was paid for
40:20using forged British bank notes.
40:26More than 100 million pound notes
40:28were eventually printed,
40:29but they were never dropped
40:31on England.
40:32When the Allies closed in
40:33on Germany,
40:34the forging operation
40:35was rushed to Austria
40:36where the counterfeiters
40:38were eventually freed.
40:42As the German military situation
40:44deteriorated on both fronts,
40:46so did support
40:47for its intelligence service.
40:49The Allies had already
40:50successfully invaded
40:51North Africa and Italy.
40:53By 1943,
40:54Admiral Canaris was under fire
40:56for vastly underestimating
40:58the strength
40:59of the Russian army
41:00and the seemingly miraculous ability
41:02to produce more arms
41:03and munitions.
41:04As the Germans were beating
41:06a retreat from Stalingrad,
41:08Canaris was in a no-win situation.
41:10When it was clear
41:11that the German armies
41:14would not be successful,
41:16Canaris presented
41:17an assessment to Hitler
41:20that was considered pessimistic,
41:23he was immediately challenged
41:24how dare he present
41:26such information to Hitler
41:27and where were his loyalties.
41:30Canaris was traditionally limited
41:33by the fact
41:34that he was interested
41:36in providing assessments
41:38based on accurate intelligence.
41:40However,
41:42the SD
41:42was only producing
41:45politically acceptable
41:47assessments
41:48that Hitler
41:49would accept.
41:50It was clear
41:51that both services
41:52could not coexist.
41:55In February 1944,
41:58Canaris was fired.
41:59The Abwehr
42:00was officially abolished
42:01by Hitler
42:01and most of its organization
42:03was incorporated
42:04into the SD,
42:05now under the command
42:06of Walter Schellenberg.
42:07The timing
42:09could not have been worse
42:10for the Germans.
42:11Loyal operatives
42:12in the Abwehr
42:13endeavored to learn
42:14the greatest secret
42:15of 1944,
42:16perhaps the greatest secret
42:18of the war,
42:19the time and place
42:21of the Allied invasion
42:22of Europe.
42:23But on the 6th of June,
42:24the Allies achieved
42:25complete surprise.
42:31That summer,
42:32the retired General Beck
42:34continued to coordinate
42:35military resistance
42:36at the highest levels.
42:38He was joined
42:40by Klaus von Stauffenberg,
42:42an army staff officer
42:43who saw firsthand
42:44the ruthlessness
42:45of the SS killing teams
42:46in Russia.
42:47On the 20th of July,
42:481944,
42:50Stauffenberg brought
42:51a timed briefcase bomb
42:53into a meeting
42:53with Hitler
42:54and left just minutes
42:55before it exploded.
42:57Believing his explosive
42:58had killed the Fuhrer,
42:59Stauffenberg flew to Berlin.
43:01In the military headquarters
43:03building,
43:03he joined General Beck
43:04in directing
43:05a major military
43:06coup.
43:07But as word spread
43:08that Hitler was still alive,
43:10support for the coup vanished.
43:16In the afternoon
43:17and evening
43:17of July 20th, 1944,
43:20telegrams were sent out
43:21from here,
43:22the center of the attempted
43:23overthrow in Berlin,
43:24to the district defense commands
43:26containing the names
43:27of the civilian
43:28and military contact people
43:30who would support
43:30the overthrow.
43:31During the night
43:32right before the 21st of July,
43:34as the coup d'etat failed,
43:36these telegrams,
43:37arriving in the Bentler block
43:38as well as at other
43:39receiving stations,
43:41fell into the hands
43:42of the Gestapo,
43:43who were then quickly
43:44able to determine
43:45who was involved
43:45in the conspiracy.
43:48General Beck
43:49and Klaus von Stauffenberg
43:50were arrested
43:51and executed
43:52on the spot.
43:53Admiral Canaris,
43:55a top suspect
43:56of the SD,
43:57was arrested
43:57by Walter Schellenberg.
43:59More than 7,000
44:01other men
44:02were rounded up.
44:03Hitler ordered
44:04any conspirators
44:05to be hanged
44:06like cattle.
44:07Following the
44:08July 20th,
44:091944,
44:11assassination attempt
44:12on Hitler,
44:13the Gestapo
44:14went to great lengths
44:16to ascertain
44:16the origin
44:18of the explosive
44:19that was used.
44:20It was shown
44:22that the time
44:24delay fuses
44:25were of British
44:26origin
44:26and had been
44:28requisitioned
44:29from inside
44:30the Abwehr
44:31by members
44:32participating
44:32in the plot.
44:34Wilhelm Canaris
44:35was sent
44:35to the Flossenberg
44:36concentration camp
44:37in Bavaria.
44:39Under interrogation,
44:40he made a fatal
44:41blunder,
44:42admitting he had
44:43kept diaries
44:44throughout the war.
44:45But the officer
44:46he'd ordered
44:46to destroy them
44:47had committed suicide
44:48before complying.
44:52In these military
44:53intelligence barracks,
44:55the admiral's diaries
44:56were found
44:56in a safe.
44:59There was a copy
45:00of Canaris' diaries
45:01floating around.
45:02They did get
45:03to Hitler's desk.
45:04Hitler was stunned
45:05that his intelligence
45:06master could not
45:07only be inept,
45:08but also treasonable
45:10to the extent
45:12that he was.
45:12The treasons
45:13went back right
45:14through to
45:14Czechoslovakia
45:15and Austria.
45:17The diaries
45:18served to confirm
45:18to Hitler
45:19what he'd long
45:20suspected that
45:21he'd been the victim
45:22of a military
45:23conspiracy to rob
45:24him of complete
45:25victory.
45:27He immediately
45:28ordered a trial
45:29where Canaris
45:29and Auster
45:30were sentenced
45:31to death.
45:37A Danish officer
45:43was in the cell
45:44next to Canaris
45:46and witnessed
45:47Canaris being led
45:48away by guards
45:49in the early
45:50morning hours.
45:56Canaris' last words.
46:18At daybreak
46:20on the 9th of April
46:211945,
46:22Wilhelm Canaris
46:23was stripped
46:24naked
46:25and led
46:26from his cell
46:26into a nearby
46:28courtyard.
46:30SS guards
46:30then placed
46:31a noose
46:32of piano wire
46:32around his neck
46:33and hanged him
46:34slowly
46:35for 30 minutes.
46:39According to
46:40SD orders,
46:41Canaris was to
46:42disappear
46:42without a trace.
46:43his body
46:45was cremated
46:45and the ashes
46:46were thrown
46:47to the wind.
46:50His resistance
46:52friends,
46:52Hans Oster
46:53and Hans von Donjani
46:55were also executed
46:56this same morning.
46:58Just 100 miles away,
47:00tanks from
47:01General Patton's
47:023rd Army
47:02advanced on the camp.
47:08First of all,
47:10Canaris had a short
47:11talk with
47:11von Ribbentrop,
47:13particularly as
47:14regards the
47:14Polish region.
47:16Until the
47:16Nuremberg trials,
47:18few people had ever
47:18heard of Admiral
47:19Canaris.
47:20On the stand,
47:21General Jodl
47:22testified that
47:23Canaris had served
47:24the enemy for years.
47:26While historians
47:27disagree on his
47:28motives,
47:28there's little doubt
47:30that Canaris and
47:31General Beck
47:31contacted the West
47:33repeatedly,
47:34particularly an
47:35American OSS agent
47:36in Bern,
47:37Alan Dulles.
47:41If you read the
47:43telegrams that
47:44Dulles exchanged
47:44with Roosevelt,
47:46you will repeatedly
47:47see that Dulles
47:48was told,
47:50no,
47:51it won't work.
47:52These people
47:53are unreliable.
47:55We cannot trust them.
47:58The German
47:59resistance was the
48:00only anti-Nazi
48:01movement in Europe
48:02that did not receive
48:03active support from
48:04the Western powers.
48:05Could the Allies have
48:07shortened the war by
48:08responding to overtures
48:09from the Aubert?
48:12British intelligence
48:13was very, very
48:14fearful in their
48:16contacts with the
48:17German resistance as
48:18a whole, but German
48:19intelligence in
48:20particular, that they
48:22were going to be
48:23confronted with another
48:24Venlo incident.
48:26At the Nuremberg
48:27war crime trials,
48:28Walter Schellenberg,
48:29the man who kidnapped
48:30the British agents
48:31at Venlo, was
48:32acquitted of all
48:33but two charges,
48:34being a member of
48:35the SS and the SD,
48:37which the
48:37International Tribunal
48:38declared to be
48:39criminal organizations.
48:41He was sentenced
48:42to six years
48:43in prison.
48:44After his release,
48:45his memoirs were
48:46published in which
48:47he claimed
48:48responsibility for
48:49keeping Best and
48:50Stevens alive.
48:51He died of liver
48:53disease a year
48:54later.
48:58In the last
48:59hours of the war,
49:00Best and Stevens
49:01and their accused
49:02accomplice, Munich
49:03bomber George
49:04Elser, were
49:04transported by bus
49:06to Dachau.
49:07But for reasons
49:08not fully known,
49:09Elser was removed
49:10from the bus and
49:11executed by SS
49:12guards at the
49:13last minute.
49:14The English agents
49:15then returned home,
49:17where they faced an
49:18uncomfortable cross-examination
49:20by British intelligence.
49:25Whether or not
49:26Best and Stevens
49:27ever conspired with
49:29Elser to kill
49:29Hitler remains a
49:31mystery.
49:31The British files
49:32on Venlo have been
49:33closed until the
49:34year 2055.
49:37The rivalry between
49:39the SD and the
49:40Abwehr and
49:41Heydrich and
49:41Canaris, in
49:42particular, served
49:43to send mixed
49:44signals to the
49:45Western powers.
49:46But even if an
49:47Allied connection had
49:48been made with the
49:49Abwehr, there was
49:50still little support
49:51in Germany for
49:52an armed rebellion.
49:55Remember, there
49:56was no major
49:57armed opposition
49:58in Germany.
49:59There were no
49:59partisans here.
50:01There would have
50:01been no possibility
50:02of political support
50:03for such a thing.
50:10In my opinion, the
50:13British Secret Service
50:14did the only
50:14reasonable thing
50:15possible.
50:17It listened to the
50:18German opposition,
50:19it attempted to
50:20ascertain its
50:21strengths, but it
50:23only would have
50:23come to a greater
50:24loss of German
50:25blood had the
50:26British Secret Service
50:27stepped up its
50:28support for the
50:29German opposition.
50:29British Secret Service
50:30is all
50:30gegebened.
50:36British Secret Service
50:54¶¶
51:22¶¶
51:40¶¶
51:44¶¶
51:48¶¶
51:50¶¶
51:52¶¶
51:54¶¶
51:58¶¶
51:59¶¶
52:02¶¶
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