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00:01Next on Secrets of War.
00:04As regular American units fought under rules of engagement imposed by their political leaders,
00:10unconventional special forces fought classified battles, often across the fence.
00:17Their COVID missions led them deep into North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
00:23Vietnam Secret Operations is next on Secrets of War.
01:44There are many names for the wars in Vietnam.
01:47The French called theirs the War Without Front Lines.
01:50Ho Chi Minh and his faction of the Vietnamese Communist Party called it the People's War.
01:55For the Americans, it was simply the unconventional war.
02:00The United States fought an elusive enemy with helicopters and superior firepower under stifling political and military rules of engagement.
02:10The North Vietnamese suffered grievous casualties but outlasted the U.S. force with intelligence, evasiveness, patience, and terror.
02:21The fact that the U.S. military's superior firepower might have defeated other armies was lost in the failure to
02:27understand the political and military situation it faced in Vietnam.
02:34Southeast Asia would become an important battlefield for a new kind of army of unconventional soldiers.
02:41Led by the U.S. Army Special Forces and Navy SEAL Special Operations with codenames like Phoenix, 34 Alpha, Delta
02:50Force, and studies and observation groups are distant reminders of the secret and savage struggle for the hearts and minds
02:57of the people.
03:00I think there's no doubt at all that the Pentagon was very arrogant during the Vietnam War.
03:05They felt that they had the technology, they had the God-given right to win the war, they had political,
03:15technological, and almost philosophical arrogance, and that was a real problem.
03:22Indeed, the expression, hearts and minds of the people, would affect how the U.S. military would remold itself after
03:28Vietnam, and it continues to be a primary focus for U.S. military operations.
03:38The strategy or objective, if you will, of the North Vietnamese and the whole war was stated very early.
03:44They said that their objective was to establish communism throughout Vietnam, as well as in Cambodia and in Laos.
03:50To do this, they didn't invent a new strategy or new tactics in which to engage the war.
03:57They recognized that their enemies were going to be strong.
04:00They had fought the French.
04:02They anticipated fighting the United States.
04:04Their strategy and tactics were based upon the same that Mao had used to establish communism in China.
04:14In 1961, President John F. Kennedy took office.
04:19He directed that additional counterinsurgency special forces units, known as Green Berets, be sent to Vietnam.
04:27Their mission was to counter the Viet Cong propaganda efforts in the southern countryside.
04:33That mission was primarily counterinsurgency.
04:37President Kennedy, who was fascinated by the whole concept of special forces, concluded that a unit that is trained to
04:44fight guerrilla warfare would be the logical ones to conduct counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla operation.
04:53The North Vietnamese had been preparing for unconventional warfare inside South Vietnam since 1957,
05:03developing the Viet Cong agents and networks that became increasingly successful in isolating segments of the population from the existing
05:11South Vietnamese government.
05:16And I think that a lot of the V.C.'s credibility in the South was the fact that this was
05:24a nationalist fight, or it was portrayed as such.
05:27And I think that was very important.
05:28There's no doubt that terror and deversion was used.
05:31That's used in any guerrilla campaign, in any civil war.
05:35But it isn't the case.
05:37A lot of American historians would like to say that the people in the South were totally terrorized into supporting
05:43the V.C.
05:44There are very strong nationalistic reasons why they didn't like the American involvement,
05:49and they didn't like the corrupt government that the Americans appeared to be supporting.
05:54Linked to the Green Beret presence in Vietnam was the American Central Intelligence Agency.
06:00The CIA initially was in charge of all classified paramilitary operations in Vietnam.
06:08Those guys needed army assets to do some of the tough stuff, some of the commando operations.
06:14So they organized an army headquarters called the Special Operations Group.
06:20Then it dawned on them that people could figure out maybe what the Special Operations Group did,
06:25and so they retitled it the Studies and Observation Group.
06:32And our cover story was that we were analyzing the lessons learned in joint conflict
06:40and recording these for future generations and to learn as much as we could
06:45so that we could perfect the way in which we were fighting the war.
06:48And we were supposed to be staff officers and historians.
06:53The Studies and Observation Group, known as SOG, remains one of the most secret operations of the Vietnam War.
07:00One of its first major counterintelligence operations would become its biggest failure.
07:05The 34 Alpha program was a program that started when CIA was conducting all of the covert and clandestine operations
07:15in Southeast Asia.
07:18They had organized the South Vietnamese intelligence service in such a way that they would recruit people.
07:24The South Vietnamese would train them, and then the U.S. would help provide equipment, radios and so forth for
07:35their dispatch,
07:36and in some cases provide them with airlift into the north or surface transportation by sea into the north Vietnam.
07:49With no resident agents in place in North Vietnam to shield the infiltrators,
07:54most saboteurs were either killed or captured, usually within hours of landing.
08:00In all, 500 agents were lost.
08:03Of the nearly 400 who were captured, some would spend as much as 27 years in prison.
08:11It was 100% unsuccessful for several reasons.
08:16One, you've got a very authoritarian regime up there that monitors the villages.
08:22There's a little mini-commissar at the lowest level.
08:26And a stranger who comes in, it's not like in the South where there was considerable mobility.
08:30A stranger comes in and he's immediately interrogated.
08:33And for one thing, the agents that were infiltrated up there didn't have good credentials.
08:39The forgeries were very inept, apparently.
08:43And for that reason, they were scarfed up.
08:47Kennedy's written direction to expand present operations in the field of intelligence,
08:52unconventional warfare and political psychological activities
08:55was designed to keep American soldiers out of any direct combat role.
09:03The 34 Alpha teams that went up into the North were purely Vietnamese.
09:09There were no Americans on those teams.
09:11There may be Americans in the aircraft that dropped them,
09:13but there were no Americans on the ground.
09:15The CIA finally realized what was happening to its agents on the ground
09:19and the extent of their failure, but the damage had been done.
09:23When these agents were captured, so were their radios.
09:30These agents were controlled and essentially turned back on Saigon,
09:34so it became quite a source of disinformation.
09:37Furthermore, they went so far as to say,
09:39we're doing fine up here in the jungle.
09:42Send us some more equipment.
09:44You know, like, send us your latest radio.
09:46And by the way, what's the code?
09:47Haven't we changed the code?
09:49Things like that.
09:49So it was absolutely a total failure.
09:54Other 34 Alpha missions were conducted using South Vietnamese mercenaries.
09:59These raids involved high-speed boat attacks
10:01on North Vietnam shore installations in the Gulf of Tonkin.
10:05The raids provoked the North Vietnamese
10:07to send their own torpedo boats into the Gulf,
10:10allegedly attacking American Navy destroyers in international waters.
10:14This incident was the rationale for President Lyndon Johnson
10:17to push the Gulf of Tonkin resolution
10:19through the U.S. Congress in August of 1964.
10:23This resolution would become the legal basis
10:26for U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War.
10:31Secrets of War will continue in a moment
10:33here on The History Channel.
10:37We now return to Secrets of War.
10:44In 1964, with confirmed evidence
10:47of the North Vietnamese Army presence inside South Vietnam,
10:51the operational control of the Special Forces
10:54was transferred from the CIA back to the U.S. Army
10:57under a program called Operation Switchback.
11:02This change brought the Special Forces
11:05intelligence-gathering mission to the forefront.
11:08They realized the best way
11:10to get accurate intelligence on their enemies
11:12was to find it themselves.
11:18By 1968, Special Forces had created
11:21a myriad of classified units
11:23to satisfy military intelligence needs.
11:29Inside the studies and observation group,
11:32the most successful special operation
11:34was C&C, or command and control.
11:39In the early conduct of the war,
11:42it was the American government decided
11:44that we were not going to go into Laos,
11:49not going to go into Cambodia.
11:51Yet, that was the primary source
11:54of troops who were arresting and reconditioning.
11:58It was their main supply route.
12:00So it was important that we get people in there
12:03on the ground who could see
12:05what was taking place under the canopy.
12:10SOG's sole mission was to make
12:12secret reconnaissance patrols across the fence,
12:15slang for operating over the border
12:17in the NVA sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia,
12:20and North Vietnam.
12:22Nickel Steel was the code name for North Vietnam.
12:27If you're thinking that that enemy-controlled territory
12:30was little guerrillas hiding under the trees,
12:33no, no.
12:35We're talking about roads with traffic
12:37that went both ways.
12:38We're talking about enormous bunker complexes
12:41and enormous installations.
12:44The entire Cambodian area along the border
12:49was lock, stock, and barrel,
12:50owned by the North Vietnamese.
12:52There are a thousand truths
12:54about the American-Indo-China war.
12:56It was, in fact, a thousand small wars
12:59fought across dissimilar terrains.
13:02SOG reconnaissance was the most dangerous mission
13:05for the special forces in Vietnam.
13:07It was so deeply classified
13:09that no South Vietnamese intelligence agency
13:13ever knew it existed.
13:15I ran 24 operations across the fence.
13:19In that 24 operations,
13:21almost every one of them came out under fire.
13:24In fact, everyone that I can think of
13:27came out under fire,
13:28some more intense than others.
13:30It just was almost literally impossible
13:34to stay in there.
13:36Behind the casualties, the bravery,
13:38and the successes
13:39were the failures, the problems,
13:42and the fear.
13:43There was an uneasy relationship
13:45between many special forces camps
13:47and other American units as well.
13:50American commanders resented
13:52special operations activity
13:53going on inside their jurisdiction
13:55without their knowledge.
13:59They didn't like the idea
14:01that we had these combined U.S.-Vietnamese forces
14:06that were going out of their perimeter,
14:10running the risk of being captured,
14:12and revealing their location.
14:16There were two parts
14:17to these secret units.
14:19They had small reconnaissance teams
14:21and larger companies
14:22called hatchet forces.
14:24There were never more than 150 Americans
14:26working SOG reconnaissance
14:28at any one time.
14:30SOG recon patrols operated
14:32in small, mixed groups
14:34and were for reconnaissance only.
14:37Cross-border raids were taken care of
14:39by the hatchet force,
14:41which was a company
14:42to a battalion-sized operations,
14:44and that also operated
14:46out of command and control north,
14:48and they were also made up of mercenaries.
14:51They went in on the big, heavier strikes.
14:55The jungle could be a quiet place
14:57where any sound would alert an enemy.
15:00Survival depended on perfect discipline.
15:03Everything was geared towards remaining invisible.
15:06The snapping of a twig
15:08or a man coughing at the wrong time
15:10meant the difference
15:11between living and dying.
15:15And our team would be all scrunched together
15:17into a little, small...
15:19I mean, you could have probably put
15:20a dinner plate over the top of us
15:22and covered every one of us.
15:24We were that tight together.
15:25And the North Vietnamese would be talking
15:27and busting brush ten feet away.
15:30And I would be worried about my heart being hurt
15:34because it would just be pounding.
15:37SOG teams were a major concern
15:39to the North Vietnamese Army,
15:40which devoted entire battalions
15:42to hunting down one small team.
15:45SOG missions were so dangerous,
15:47they rarely lasted more than five days.
15:52On a lot of occasions,
15:54we would just run into each other.
15:55They would find us.
15:57They had been known
15:59to get shoulder-to-shoulder online,
16:00just sweep through an area,
16:02try to flush us out like partridge.
16:05And they would find you,
16:07and inevitably the firefight would break out,
16:10and we would have to call in the cavalry,
16:12so to speak, to get us out,
16:14which meant the 7th Air Force.
16:16SOG reconnaissance patrols were so perilous,
16:19they averaged over 115% casualty rate.
16:22Over the course of a year,
16:24the men were either killed
16:25or suffered multiple disabling wounds.
16:28For every man lost,
16:30SOG forces claimed 100 enemy lives.
16:33You got five missions,
16:35and then you got six missions,
16:36and then you get hit.
16:38That changes everything.
16:40There's nothing worse
16:42than laying there
16:42and bleeding all over yourself,
16:44and the helicopters aren't coming,
16:46and it's getting...
16:48So time goes on.
16:50You get 10 missions, 12 missions.
16:52How many more can you do?
16:54You know you're going to die,
16:55but what happens is your loyalty
16:57to your little people,
16:59to your troops.
16:59You can't leave them.
17:01I didn't want to turn my team
17:02over to another American
17:04who they couldn't trust,
17:05so I stayed, and I stayed,
17:07till I got to the point
17:09where I realized
17:11I wasn't as good as I had to be.
17:15To keep these guys alive,
17:17I quit.
17:20Most of the damage inflicted
17:22on the NVA sanctuaries by SOG
17:24came from airstrikes
17:25called in by the teams on the ground.
17:28Like everything about SOG,
17:29it was usually a close call.
17:33We were running towards the helicopter,
17:36and I was telling the F-4 Phantom pilot
17:38to work over the area
17:40as soon as we got off the ground
17:42because the NVA were everywhere.
17:44I jump on the helicopter,
17:46and the helicopter takes off,
17:48and I watched the jet go in
17:51and it doesn't do anything.
17:53I'm screaming into the phone,
17:55you know, kill these people,
17:55kill these people.
17:56And they didn't do anything,
17:58and I was livid,
17:59and I said, what was going on?
18:01And later on I found out,
18:02he says, well,
18:02as you jumped on the helicopter,
18:05he says, there were three people
18:07reaching out behind you,
18:09just a foot or two behind you,
18:11and he says,
18:13they were so close,
18:13I thought they were your team members.
18:15As it turned out,
18:15they were NVA trying to snatch me,
18:17but that's how close it could get.
18:22Secrets of War will continue in a moment
18:24here on the History Channel.
18:29We now return to Secrets of War.
18:37Several CIA-led counterinsurgency operations
18:40in Southeast Asia
18:41had been costly failures.
18:43Many field agents
18:44proved to be unreliable.
18:46Their intelligence network
18:47had become largely ineffective,
18:49frequently riddled
18:50with double agents and conmen.
18:53CIA operating credibility
18:55with the Special Forces
18:56was stretched to the breaking point.
18:59The CIA, in many cases,
19:01would come in
19:02and they'd come in
19:04wearing pearl-handled
19:05chrome-plated pistols
19:06and, you know, cowboy hats
19:09and act like they were bad
19:10and try to convince us
19:12that this wasn't
19:13their first operation.
19:15And by the time we quit chuckling
19:17and laughing at them,
19:18in many cases,
19:19they would tuck their tail
19:20between their leg and leave.
19:22And so there were some CIA guys
19:24that were very qualified
19:26and there were some
19:27that were pure idiots.
19:30On a strategic level,
19:32it was much worse.
19:34The Hanoi Politburo
19:35could simply buy
19:36American newspapers
19:37to learn the latest
19:38political developments
19:39in Washington, D.C.,
19:41or read dispatches
19:42from the battlefield.
19:44But U.S. intelligence agencies
19:46had little more
19:46than strident propaganda speeches
19:48to figure out
19:49what was happening
19:50inside North Vietnam.
19:52The communists survived
19:54from secrecy.
19:56They told many different stories,
19:57both to the media
19:58at the time and since.
20:00It's difficult to determine
20:02who was in charge
20:03and what their objectives were.
20:04Anyone that tells you
20:05that they know exactly
20:07what the North Vietnamese
20:08chain of command was
20:10at any one time
20:10is probably wrong.
20:14A never-before-revealed document
20:16provides a fascinating
20:17and rare insight
20:19into the leadership situation
20:20in wartime Hanoi.
20:23These are the minutes
20:24of a meeting
20:24detailing a political denunciation
20:26made sometime before 1968
20:28by a Politburo member
20:30named Le Duong
20:31against the celebrated
20:33North Vietnamese Army commander,
20:35General Nguyen Van Jop.
20:40This is a memoir I received
20:42written by Tron Quinn,
20:44the former secretary
20:44for Le Duong
20:45and later on
20:46vice prime minister.
20:48This report was circulated
20:50in Hanoi at the time
20:51and served to discredit
20:52General Jop.
20:54It contains some things
20:56which happened back then.
20:57For example,
20:58there was a decision
20:59to remove Jop
21:00from the party's
21:01central committee.
21:02But Le Duong saved Jop
21:03for fear that removing Jop
21:05would lead to the
21:06Soviet Union's
21:07cutting off support
21:08for the war effort.
21:09But at the same time,
21:11Le Duong wanted
21:12to send Jop the message
21:13that you deserve
21:15to be removed
21:15from the party's
21:16central committee,
21:17but I saved you.
21:19From that point on,
21:20Jop always treated Le Duong
21:22with fear and total respect.
21:29Portrayed as a lackey
21:31and accused of spying
21:32for the Soviet Union,
21:33Jop was severely chastised.
21:35It was only the Politburo's
21:37larger concern
21:38about losing Russian
21:39military support
21:40that saved him
21:41from public humiliation
21:42and a possible prison sentence.
21:50As for General Jop's opinion
21:52at that time,
21:53he lost his influence
21:54in the Politburo
21:55because there was
21:56a ferocious fight
21:57within the party
21:58between Le Duong
21:59and V么 Nguyen Jop.
22:03Le Duong and his colleague
22:04Le Duong
22:05suspected and accused Jop
22:07of being an agent
22:08for the Soviet Union.
22:10And because of all that,
22:12all of Jop's subordinates
22:13were apprehended.
22:16Like Dang King Zhang,
22:18Nguyen Vi,
22:20Le Lin,
22:21and many, many others.
22:23They were dismissed,
22:25they were demoted,
22:26or they were put in prison.
22:37Undoubtedly, Jop was
22:38seriously weakened politically.
22:42Jop's troubles
22:43with his rivals
22:44in the Politburo
22:45may have prevented him
22:46from changing
22:46the disastrous
22:47military strategy
22:48pursued by Hanoi
22:50after the first phase
22:51of the Tet Offensive
22:52in 1968.
23:01Back then,
23:02as General Jop saw it,
23:03the first phase
23:04of Tet was enough.
23:05We needed to stop then,
23:07and we needed to preserve
23:08our strength
23:09for a prolonged fight.
23:11But others saw the success
23:12for their own glory,
23:15and they pushed
23:16for the second
23:16and third phases
23:17of the offense.
23:19It was later
23:20that these two phases
23:21of the offense
23:22caused us
23:23tremendous losses.
23:25Many of our infrastructures
23:27were wiped out.
23:33The inability to glean
23:35even the smallest bit
23:36of information
23:37blocked American
23:38intelligence agencies
23:39from understanding
23:41and exploiting
23:41these communist
23:42political rivalries.
23:45Unable to discern
23:46North Vietnamese
23:47political factions
23:48and intentions,
23:49American policy makers
23:51had to react
23:52to Hanoi's moves
23:53rather than anticipate them.
23:55The special forces
23:56and later the Navy SEALs
23:58realized no victory
24:00in South Vietnam
24:00was possible
24:01without protecting
24:03the South Vietnamese
24:04civilian population.
24:06The primary mission
24:07of the Green Berets
24:08was to organize
24:09armed militias
24:10among the 31 Montagnard tribes
24:12in South Vietnam.
24:13They were tasked
24:14to protect the Laotian
24:16and Cambodian border areas
24:18from NDA
24:18and proficient.
24:20Vietnam is not
24:21a homogeneous ethnic group.
24:23There are people there
24:24who've been living
24:26on that land
24:27before the Vietnamese
24:28arrived from the north.
24:29Mountain yards
24:30who lived in the mountain areas,
24:31they hated the Vietnamese
24:33more than anything else.
24:34The CIA
24:35and army intelligence
24:37were able to train
24:37and arm these people
24:39and use this hatred
24:40for the Vietnamese
24:41for their own advantage.
24:45Numbering between
24:46three and 12 men,
24:47small groups
24:48of Green Berets
24:49called A-teens
24:50were responsible
24:51for leading,
24:52feeding and equipping
24:53hundreds of mercenary soldiers.
24:58Special forces
24:59were more like
25:01anthropologists
25:02with guns
25:02and medicine bags
25:03in relation
25:05to the
25:05to the
25:07Montagnard
25:07tribal people.
25:08We found them
25:09to be extremely loyal.
25:10We trusted them
25:12and became
25:13blood brothers
25:14in their ceremonies
25:15and drank
25:16their ceremonial wines
25:18and found them
25:20to be very
25:20concerned fighters.
25:25These indigenous forces
25:27were called
25:28civilian irregular
25:28defense groups.
25:30At their peak strength,
25:32the American
25:325th Special Forces Group
25:34controlled 84 camps
25:36with more than
25:3642,000 members.
25:42When I first
25:42went in there,
25:43we probably had
25:43maybe 300 Americans
25:45working in the
25:46Central Highlands.
25:47We had 25,000 troops.
25:49Your basic
25:49Montagnard private
25:51was drawing
25:5221 bucks a month,
25:53roughly.
25:54So you got a lot
25:55of bang for your buck.
25:58The job of the
25:59Green Berets
26:00required more than
26:01basic combat training.
26:03Our job was
26:05divided into
26:06different categories.
26:08The medics
26:09trying to teach
26:10medicine to
26:11their counterparts
26:12and the weapons
26:14people trying to
26:15take platoons
26:16of indigenous
26:17soldiers,
26:18many of them
26:19mountain yard
26:20tribal people
26:21who had worn
26:21loincloths
26:22and had crossbows
26:24and poison arrows
26:25and give them
26:26World War II
26:27carbines
26:28and submachine guns
26:29and teach them
26:30to use
26:31the more modern
26:31weapons against
26:32the Viet Cong.
26:35Corruption
26:36among the
26:37indigenous forces
26:38was an accepted
26:39way of life.
26:40Stealing,
26:41bribery,
26:42lying,
26:42killing their
26:43rivals
26:43was a common
26:44practice around
26:45the camps.
26:46Many times
26:47it was as dangerous
26:48inside the A-team
26:50camps as outside.
26:53In one case,
26:55Kuang,
26:55one of my
26:56point men
26:57on the team,
27:00has a run-in
27:01with some guy
27:02who he thought
27:04was with his
27:04girlfriend,
27:05goes into the
27:06mess hall
27:06and the guy
27:08sitting there
27:08is eating
27:09and Kuang
27:10hits him in the
27:11head with a
27:11claw part of
27:12a hammer
27:13and kills him.
27:14These people
27:15are thugs,
27:15basically.
27:16These people,
27:17you know,
27:17that's how they
27:18deal with things.
27:18The Green Berets
27:19who led the
27:20indigenous units
27:21suspected that
27:22up to 15%
27:23of their troops
27:24were Viet Cong
27:25infiltrators.
27:26Everyone else,
27:27from the
27:28Montagnard tribesmen
27:29to the Cambodian
27:30and Thai
27:30mercenaries
27:31to the Chinese
27:32Nungs,
27:33fought for money.
27:35Some American
27:36advisors feared
27:37that their troops
27:38would prove
27:39unreliable
27:40in a firefight
27:41and made plans
27:42for their own
27:43survival.
27:44On my team,
27:46between myself
27:47and the American
27:48assistant team,
27:49leader,
27:50we had a code
27:51word,
27:51that if I said
27:53the code word
27:55thunderclap,
27:56that we would
27:56count in our
27:57heads to six
27:58and then kill
27:59all of the
28:00in-ditch on the
28:02team.
28:02I never had to
28:03do that,
28:04thank God,
28:04but we had that
28:05plan in place
28:06because you could
28:07never trust them
28:08completely and you
28:09didn't know.
28:10They might turn
28:11on you out there
28:12for whatever reason
28:13and you would
28:14have to kill them.
28:17the special forces
28:18had no career
28:19incentives to
28:20operate this way,
28:21but given the
28:22circumstances,
28:23they often had
28:24no other option.
28:27Knowing the truth
28:28did not set them
28:29free,
28:30but it helped
28:30keep them alive.
28:34Secrets of War
28:35will continue in a
28:36moment here on
28:37the History Channel.
28:40We now return
28:41to Secrets of War.
28:47The most effective
28:49and the most
28:49controversial
28:50Allied special
28:51operation of the
28:52war,
28:53CIA's Phoenix
28:54program,
28:55begun in 1968.
28:57It was combined
28:58American-Vietnamese
28:59intelligence effort
29:00designed to
29:01disrupt the
29:02civil infrastructure
29:03of the Viet Cong.
29:04Tax collectors
29:05and high-ranking
29:06political officials
29:07were the intended
29:08targets.
29:09A North Vietnamese
29:10soldier coming down
29:11the Ho Chi Minh Trail
29:12is as much a stranger
29:13in a strange land
29:14in South Vietnam
29:15as the Americans are.
29:17Without the Viet Cong
29:18infrastructure
29:18and the Viet Cong,
29:20they had a hard
29:20time operating.
29:23Phoenix was known
29:24in Vietnamese
29:25as Phuong Hoang
29:26and its goal
29:27was to force
29:28Viet Cong members
29:29to either surrender
29:30or risk being killed.
29:32The immediate effects
29:34on the V.C.
29:34were dramatic
29:35and successful.
29:39They would try
29:40to influence
29:40the wife of a guerrilla
29:41by giving her money
29:43or by sentimental
29:44inducement.
29:45And then one of them
29:46would marry her
29:46and divide husband
29:47and wife
29:48and through her
29:49they might discover
29:50our secret locations
29:51and set out
29:52to destroy us.
29:53That's why I said
29:54the Phuong Hoang campaign
29:56was very dangerous
29:57and dreadful.
29:58It awoke
29:59the full concern
30:00of our superiors
30:01as to how to deal
30:02with the problem.
30:03They ordered
30:04a counter campaign.
30:06The instructions
30:07were to first
30:07reorganize our contacts
30:09and then we had
30:10to identify
30:11who their agents
30:11were
30:12and educate them.
30:16The Viet Cong
30:17feared being infiltrated
30:18more than being
30:19attacked by
30:20American helicopters.
30:24As the Phuong
30:25program began
30:26to uproot
30:26their organizations
30:28infiltration
30:29of their ranks
30:30and defections
30:30created tremendous
30:32difficulties
30:32for the V.C. leadership.
30:34For the first time
30:35Viet Cong
30:36and North Vietnamese
30:37army units
30:38faced a problem
30:39they could not handle.
30:44I would say
30:45there were many
30:45cases of traitors.
30:47The Saigon regime
30:48used money
30:49to entice our men.
30:51If we knew
30:52any of our men
30:53had been bought
30:54we would apply
30:55a variety of measures
30:56to deal with them.
30:58First of all
30:58if we could not
30:59contact them personally
31:00we would use leaflets
31:02to give them
31:02strong warnings.
31:04Or we would
31:05suddenly break
31:06into the village
31:07to capture
31:07and bring them out
31:08to suppress them.
31:10or to educate
31:10and advise them
31:11not to follow
31:12the road of a traitor.
31:13We would try
31:14and try again
31:15to do that
31:16for three or four times
31:17before we were forced
31:19to eliminate them.
31:25The Viet Cong
31:26had used terror
31:27routinely
31:27to punish
31:28suspected enemies
31:29and to send a message
31:30to all who might
31:31resist their demands.
31:33The special forces
31:34had witnessed
31:35these atrocities
31:36since their arrival
31:37in Vietnam
31:38in 1958.
31:45As for accusations
31:47that our soldiers
31:48exercise brutality
31:49against our own people
31:50there is a need
31:51for distinction.
31:55In wartime
31:56brutality is sometimes
31:57unavoidable.
32:01Our army is
32:02the people's army.
32:03They love people
32:05and serve their cause.
32:06but because they are
32:07also trained
32:08for social class
32:09struggle ideology.
32:12Therefore murdering
32:13South Vietnam officers
32:15and people in villages
32:16and cities
32:17takes place.
32:21It is unavoidable
32:22during wartime.
32:32Many North Vietnamese
32:33and Viet Cong soldiers
32:35had grown tired
32:36of the war.
32:37Less than 9,000
32:39V.C. and N.V.A.
32:40soldiers
32:40called Chu Hoi
32:41had surrendered
32:42to the Allied side
32:43in 1967.
32:45That figure
32:45climbed to over
32:4620,000 in 1968
32:48with the initiation
32:49of the Phoenix program.
32:51Well, as the war
32:53went on and on
32:56casualty
32:57had some effects
32:58on the soldiers
32:59and they just
33:00couldn't
33:02face with it
33:03anymore.
33:05Now,
33:05one of the soldiers
33:06in my unit
33:07for example
33:08he was very brave
33:10brilliant soldiers
33:12he was really
33:12very good.
33:14But after one battle
33:16and he saw
33:16human meat
33:17and intestine
33:19hanging around
33:20and he just
33:22couldn't cope
33:23with it.
33:23He just
33:24couldn't eat.
33:25He just
33:26couldn't sleep
33:27and in the end
33:29you know
33:29he gave up.
33:30It was too much
33:31for him.
33:33The CIA
33:34had created
33:35a new armed force
33:36called the
33:37Provincial Reconnaissance
33:38Units
33:39or PRU.
33:41It was designed
33:42to be the
33:42action arm
33:43of Phoenix.
33:45The PRU
33:47was equipped
33:47and paid for
33:48by the CIA
33:49organized,
33:50trained
33:51and led
33:51by Green Berets
33:52and Navy SEALs
33:53designated as
33:54civilian advisors
33:56PRU mercenary troops
33:57were recruited
33:58from the local areas.
34:01Now in my group
34:02and they're calling
34:04Provincial Reconnaissance
34:06Units,
34:06I'm telling you
34:06what they were.
34:07They were killers
34:08for money.
34:10Okay?
34:11Forget politically correct.
34:12Change it to any name
34:13you want.
34:13These guys fought
34:14for money.
34:16When these guys
34:17worked for Phoenix,
34:18they'd be given
34:19a list of purported
34:21Viet Cong infrastructure
34:22and during the month
34:24they would try
34:24and go around
34:25the province
34:26and kill all
34:26these people.
34:27My belief is
34:28that the PRU program
34:29and the Phoenix program
34:31was an attempt
34:32to duplicate
34:33the way
34:34the Viet Cong
34:34operated.
34:36The Viet Cong response
34:38to this attrition
34:39among their troops
34:40was to increase
34:41their use of terror
34:42to intimidate members
34:43of the PRU
34:44and to prevent
34:45their own troops
34:46from surrendering.
34:52Now if this is
34:53necessary for us
34:54to be cruel
34:55as demanded
34:56from the higher
34:56level of command
34:57in order to eliminate
34:59people affiliated
35:00with the enemy,
35:01I would say
35:02it is something
35:02we do in order
35:03to win the war.
35:07I would never
35:08let my soldiers
35:09do bad things
35:10or make people
35:11suffer.
35:13I would investigate,
35:14pay people
35:15for the damage
35:16and discipline
35:17my soldiers
35:18where appropriate.
35:21But if cruelty
35:22happens as a result
35:23of eliminating
35:24those who are
35:25against us,
35:26we just carry out
35:27the necessary things
35:28to win.
35:34I had one
35:36Vietnamese lieutenant
35:37that I worked with
35:38and he was probably
35:39the best Vietnamese
35:42junior officer
35:44that I ever knew.
35:45He was a really
35:46good kid
35:46and I never advised
35:47him to do anything
35:48that he hadn't
35:49already done it.
35:52And they warned him
35:53a couple of times
35:54and when he didn't
35:55slow down,
35:56they just went
35:56into his home village
35:57which was 300 miles
35:58from where we were
35:59operating and killed
36:00his mother.
36:02The Viet Cong
36:03infrastructure
36:04was defined
36:04as all
36:05non-military
36:06members
36:06of the
36:07communist movement.
36:09Local Vietnamese
36:10sources were used
36:11to identify
36:12VC agents
36:13within the towns
36:13and villages
36:14of South Vietnam.
36:16American-controlled
36:17PRU units
36:18were then ordered
36:19to capture
36:19or kill them.
36:23If they brought
36:24back a body,
36:25they got paid for it.
36:26If they brought
36:26back a gun,
36:27they got paid for it.
36:28If they brought
36:28back a prisoner,
36:29they got paid for it.
36:31If they didn't bring
36:32back the whole prisoner,
36:33they used to get paid
36:34for bringing back
36:34identifiable parts.
36:36Okay?
36:37I didn't set
36:38these rules up.
36:39These are the rules
36:40that they played by.
36:41When you try
36:42to change those rules,
36:43you meet resistance.
36:46I didn't want people
36:47bringing me back ears
36:48and me having
36:48to pay them for it.
36:50I don't want that.
36:51I want live people.
36:53Dead people don't talk.
36:55There is no doubt
36:56that Phoenix was effective
36:57in reducing VC influence.
37:00But, as with every
37:01special operation
37:02in South Vietnam,
37:03there was always
37:04a fear of VC penetration
37:05of South Vietnamese
37:07intelligence agencies.
37:09In some instances,
37:11corrupt officials
37:11used Phoenix
37:12to eliminate business
37:14and personal rivals.
37:18The PRU got out
37:19of hand real quick.
37:20They were not checking.
37:21They were going out
37:22and killing a lot of people.
37:23In many cases,
37:23they were killing
37:24the wrong people.
37:25The Viet Cong infiltrate
37:26this and tell them
37:27to go out and kill
37:27the people who are
37:28actually friendly
37:28to the government.
37:29So there's nobody
37:30really checking on them.
37:32In the end,
37:33the Phoenix program
37:34was stunningly effective
37:35in eliminating
37:36the established
37:37Viet Cong support system.
37:39But it came too late
37:40in the war
37:41to influence the outcome.
37:43There was another
37:44secret special operations
37:45unit, however,
37:47that was successfully
37:47developing its own
37:49intelligence
37:49and using it
37:50to great advantage.
37:52U.S. Navy SEALs
37:54were redefining
37:54the role
37:55of the unconventional soldier.
37:59Secrets of War
38:00will continue
38:01in a moment
38:01here on
38:02The History Channel.
38:06We now return
38:07to Secrets of War.
38:14There was a secret
38:15American unit
38:16in Vietnam
38:16that was fighting
38:17in the Viet Cong's
38:18backyard
38:19along the canals
38:20of the Mekong River.
38:23Operating at night,
38:24often dressed
38:25like the V.C.,
38:26squads of two
38:27to seven men
38:28turned the tables
38:29on their enemy.
38:30Wading through canals
38:31or inserted by boat
38:33to get to their target,
38:34this unconventional unit
38:36used kidnapping
38:37and bribery
38:37to accomplish
38:38what killing could not.
38:40The Viet Cong
38:41called them
38:41men with green faces.
38:45The SEALs
38:46were looking
38:47for a place
38:47to work
38:48and the Army
38:49had the Rungsat
38:50special zone.
38:52Nobody could operate
38:53in it.
38:53The V.C. ruled it
38:54and they said,
38:55well, you guys
38:56can work in the water.
38:57Put you in there.
38:58And so
38:59they had three platoons
39:01over there
39:01operating against
39:02the V.C.
39:03and pretty well
39:04cleared the place out.
39:07Throughout
39:07the Mekong Delta region,
39:09Navy SEAL platoons
39:10were creating
39:11serious disruptions
39:12in the Viet Cong
39:13political infrastructure,
39:14which heretofore
39:15had operated freely
39:17on the rivers
39:17and canals.
39:20There was some pride
39:21in doing the operation
39:22elegantly.
39:23And one of the most
39:24elegant ways
39:25was to creep
39:26right into their
39:28encampment
39:29or their hooch
39:30and lift up
39:31that mosquito net
39:32and the first thing
39:33he knows
39:34is the guy
39:34with the green face
39:35and the silenced pistol
39:37is there saying,
39:39come along with me.
39:46Day or night,
39:47especially when
39:48they knew our trails,
39:49it would be dreadful.
39:52After a while,
39:53we learned
39:54from these experiences
39:55and we would spread out
39:57our patrol formation.
40:00We would try
40:01to anticipate
40:01where they were waiting
40:02in ambush
40:03or where they landed
40:04and then fight them there.
40:14operations had to be done
40:15quietly and skillfully
40:16to avoid detection.
40:22The standard
40:22operating procedure
40:24back then
40:24was for the point man
40:26and the patrol leader
40:27to enter the hooch.
40:28There weren't any doors.
40:29From then,
40:29things got sticky
40:30if the guy had bodyguards
40:31and especially
40:32if they were awake.
40:33If they were asleep
40:34or if he didn't have
40:35any bodyguards,
40:36things normally
40:37went pretty smoothly
40:38and then it was a matter
40:40of ducking the guy,
40:42search, silence
40:42and securing him
40:44and getting out there
40:45as quickly as possible.
40:47The U.S. Navy SEALs
40:48in Vietnam
40:49fought for their country
40:50and their teammates.
40:52Their intentions
40:53were not just
40:54to observe the enemy.
40:55They planned to capture
40:56or kill him.
40:58You'll be exposed
40:58to pain and punishment
41:00for one reason
41:01and one reason only.
41:03To make you
41:04the type of person
41:04we need
41:05to get the job done.
41:08We, the Navy SEALs,
41:09weren't there
41:10to win the hearts
41:10and minds of anybody.
41:11We were there
41:11to kick the ass
41:12out of the enemy.
41:13We were there
41:14to destroy him.
41:15We were there
41:15to shoot the bastard.
41:16We were there
41:17to destroy his camps.
41:18We weren't there
41:19to worry about
41:19what the next door neighbor
41:21thought about us.
41:22We were there
41:22to do a job.
41:30Tax collectors
41:30and high-ranking VC
41:32and NDA officials
41:33were the preferred target.
41:35SEALs and their special
41:36boat units
41:37were giving new meaning
41:38to the term
41:38up close and personal.
41:44Their commandos
41:46would come out at night.
41:47Sometimes they were
41:48dropped in by helicopters
41:49deep into our areas
41:50and they would remain there
41:52for a long time.
41:54There were a lot
41:55of these blue
41:56and green-faced soldiers
41:57around.
41:58Sometimes,
41:59three to six commandos
42:01would ambush us
42:01on our travel road
42:02with mines.
42:05Usually,
42:06they used claymore mines.
42:11The rules
42:12for special operations
42:13were the same,
42:14both on the borders
42:15of Vietnam
42:16and in the dark waters
42:17of the Mekong.
42:20Special ops forces
42:21were called on
42:22to do whatever
42:23was necessary
42:24to accomplish
42:24their missions.
42:28To my knowledge,
42:29we never, ever killed
42:31an innocent person.
42:33If we were fighting
42:34on a village,
42:35everybody's the enemy.
42:36Hard to understand,
42:37but when somebody's
42:38shooting out of a door,
42:38they don't put a sign
42:39on them saying,
42:41I'm the bad guy,
42:42and I'm sitting there
42:44with five people
42:44and I got 40, 50 guns
42:47shooting down my neck.
42:48We would shoot
42:49and shoot and shoot
42:49until we got our way out of it.
42:52Suspicion was the rule.
42:54Every bar girl
42:55was a VC.
42:57Every barber
42:58was an NBA colonel.
42:59The enemy might be
43:01a child with a grenade
43:02or a teenage girl
43:04with an AK-47.
43:05The most difficult challenge
43:07was knowing when
43:08and where
43:09to draw the line.
43:10We learned
43:11we had to get like that
43:12in order to operate
43:13among the Vietnamese people
43:14over there
43:15because you never really knew
43:16who you were going to encounter.
43:17You might walk up
43:18on an old farmer
43:19or you might walk up
43:19on some guy carrying an AK-47
43:21with a selective
43:23switching for automatic.
43:24So we had to take every edge.
43:28SEALs turned VC guerrillas
43:29against their old comrades
43:31with a simple promise
43:32of protection.
43:34A lot of these guys
43:35were coerced
43:36into being
43:37in the Viet Cong ranks.
43:40It didn't take much
43:42persuasion at all
43:42to say,
43:43look,
43:43we'll get you out of this.
43:45We'll essentially
43:45put you in the
43:46witness protection program,
43:47get you down the
43:47south end of the island
43:48or over on the mainland
43:49or something
43:50and get your family
43:51out of here.
43:51And they say,
43:52thanks, great.
43:52And all you've got to do
43:53is just take us back in
43:54and leave us with a clown
43:56that recruited you.
43:57No problem.
43:59Special operators
44:00frequently found
44:01the situation on the ground
44:02did not relate
44:03to concepts planned
44:04for them in Saigon
44:05and Washington.
44:08Unconventional warfare
44:09wasn't always
44:10about an overwhelming force.
44:13Guerrilla war demanded
44:15an ability
44:15to adapt
44:16to this situation.
44:19John Paul Vann
44:20once said,
44:21the best way
44:22to kill a gorilla
44:22is with a knife
44:23and the worst way
44:24is with an airplane.
44:25And when you're doing
44:25things surgically
44:26like that,
44:28seven men,
44:30it's up close.
44:31You know you're not
44:32killing civilians.
44:33You know you're killing
44:33a guy with a rifle
44:35and an important guy
44:36with a rifle.
44:37Ruthless,
44:38determined,
44:39and secret,
44:40this unconventional war
44:41became one of
44:42American guerrilla
44:43versus Vietnamese guerrilla.
44:45The outskirts
44:45irony is
44:46that American
44:47unconventional soldiers
44:48adopted many
44:49of the tactics
44:50of their VC
44:50and NVA enemy.
44:52No other combat force
44:53in Vietnam
44:54achieved a greater success
44:55than did the various units
44:57of special operations.
44:58Decades later,
45:00some realities
45:01are emerging.
45:02Ho Chi Minh's objective
45:03of subjugating
45:04Southeast Asia
45:05failed.
45:06Communism has faltered
45:08around the world,
45:09giving way
45:09to market-driven economies
45:11which have emerged
45:12throughout Indochina
45:13and increasingly
45:14in Vietnam.
45:16Only time will tell
45:17whether the country
45:18of Vietnam
45:18fully embraces
45:20the same democratic principles
45:21the American special
45:22operations forces
45:24fought for
45:24decades ago.
45:32Elwood es
45:33And proud
45:54of our銈堛倣銇椼亸
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