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Russia’s Su-57 Felon is often promoted as a revolutionary fifth-generation stealth fighter and the pride of the Russian Aerospace Forces. But do the facts support the hype? In this video, we examine Sukhoi’s own patent filings, production data, export failures, stealth performance, and combat realities to uncover the truth behind the Su-57. Is it a genuine rival to the F-35 and F-22, or one of the most overrated fighter jets ever built?

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00:00For years, Russia was considered to have one of the most modern armies in the world, a
00:05claim that includes its aircraft. While the West has the F-22 and the F-35, and China
00:11has the J-20, Russia has the Su-57 Felon. On paper, it's a fifth-generation stealth
00:18fighter built on Soviet genius, forged from decades of aerospace mastery and a desire
00:24to surpass American designs. Moscow calls the Su-57 the crown jewel of the Russian
00:30aerospace forces. State media calls it revolutionary. One Russian general even claimed it was on the
00:37verge of becoming the world's first sixth-generation fighter jet. But that story is starting to look
00:43like it's full of holes. Because the Su-57 is not a crown jewel, it's a carefully maintained illusion.
00:50And this is supported by actual statistics, data and experiments, including those from the creator
00:57of the Su-57, the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi's own patent filings. As it turns out,
01:04the Su-57 might be so overhyped that it sets a record for having the most misconceptions
01:10about its performance and capabilities. Today, we're going to tear that illusion apart.
01:16But before we get into the numbers, let's establish exactly what a fifth-generation fighter is supposed
01:21to be, and more importantly, how it differs from what came before it. Because to understand just
01:27how badly the Su-57 falls short, you need to understand the standard it's being judged against.
01:34Fourth-generation fighters are aircraft like the F-15, F-16, the MiG-29, and the Su-27. They're
01:42technically the pinnacle of Cold War aviation thinking, designed in the 1960s and 70s. They're
01:48fast, highly maneuverable, and capable of carrying a formidable array of weapons. During the Cold War,
01:54the principle for aircraft was that bigger is usually better, and that visible weapons could
02:00provide enough of an intimidation factor to try to pacify the opposition without actually using the
02:06expensive equipment. This is further complicated by the fact that radar and detection systems as a whole
02:12were very much in their infancy after the two world wars. The concept of radar cross-section was
02:18attractive, but it wasn't something that fighter jets actively prioritized. Instead, fourth-generation
02:24aircraft carried their missiles and bombs on external pylons, which are visible to radar and add to the
02:30overall signature of the aircraft. The radar systems themselves were based on different principles,
02:37arguably since we didn't know of better technology at the time. So, a fourth-gen radar pinging outward
02:43would also be announcing its own location to anyone with the right equipment. And while these aircraft
02:48can be upgraded with better avionics, and even possibly fully digitalized systems and newer radar,
02:55they can't be fundamentally redesigned around stealth, because stealth was never baked into their
03:00airframe geometry from the start. That's the ceiling of the fourth-generation aviation. You can paint
03:06a barn door with radar-absorbing material, but it's still a barn door. Now, the fifth-generation
03:12changes the stealth game entirely. First up is a very low radar cross-section achieved through
03:18airframe shaping and materials from the start of the design stage. The aircraft has to look like almost
03:24nothing on radar from the moment the first blueprint is drawn. Secondly, most aircraft would have internal
03:31weapons bays, so that when the aircraft actually carries missiles and bombs into combat, that low
03:37radar signature is preserved. Third, an advanced ESA radar operating in low probability of intercept mode,
03:45meaning it can detect the enemy while minimizing its own radar emissions. Functioning in short,
03:50frequency-hopping bursts that are extremely difficult to detect and track. Fourth, and arguably the most
03:56important, is the principle called sensor fusion, or the ability to pull data from multiple on-board
04:02and off-board sensors and present the pilot with a single integrated coherent picture of the battlefield,
04:09rather than forcing them to mentally reconcile readings from half a dozen separate displays.
04:13Finally, fifth-generation aircraft weren't designed to function alone. Their net-centric integration
04:20capabilities mean that they can share targeting data with one another, receive updates from other
04:26platforms, and operate as a communications and command node for other aircraft in the fleet.
04:31These five pillars – maneuverability, speed, awareness, advanced stealth, and connectivity – succinctly
04:39describe how fifth-gen aircraft made such shock waves when they were introduced. And for the most part,
04:45the F-22 and the F-35 were designed to support all these pillars. But Russia's Su-57 doesn't actually
04:52fulfill most of the requirements that would make it worthy of being called a fifth-generation aircraft,
04:58let alone something more. To prove that, let's start with the stealth, which is arguably the defining
05:03characteristic of modern fighter and multi-purpose jets. It's here that the story surrounding the Su-57
05:10begins to crumble. We don't need to rely on Western intelligence estimates or NATO assessments.
05:16We can use Sukhoi's own words. In patent filings submitted by the Sukhoi Design Bureau itself,
05:23the Su-57 is described as having a frontal radar cross-section of between 0.1 and 1 square meter.
05:30The Aviation Geek Club pointed out exactly what those numbers mean in practice. Some aviation experts
05:37claim the RCS range is comparable to a clean F-18 Super Hornet or a Tomahawk cruise missile.
05:44Neither of those platforms has ever been marketed as a stealth aircraft. Boeing has never called the
05:50Super Hornet a fifth-generation stealth fighter. And yet, that's the radar signature Russia's crown
05:56jewel is claiming. Now compare that to the F-35. The F-35 Lightning II has a frontal radar cross
06:04-section
06:04of approximately 0.001 to 0.005 square meters, roughly the size of a golf ball. The Su-57's own
06:13patent
06:13puts its signature at up to 1,000 times larger than that. Just let the scale of the difference set
06:20in for
06:20a moment. In a real engagement, the F-35's radar could detect the Su-57 at 6 to 10 times
06:27the range
06:28at which the Su-57 can detect the F-35. And in air combat, whoever sees the enemy first controls
06:35the
06:35engagement. Compared to the F-35, the Su-57 is pretty much flying blind into a fight it may not
06:42even know
06:42the F-35 has started. And the exercises back this up. The U.S. Air Force held premier combat training
06:48exercises, the Red Flag 17, running against the most sophisticated simulated opposition available.
06:55In these, the F-35 has recorded a kill ratio of 20 to 1 against modern fourth-generation fighters,
07:02backed by AWACS support and surface-to-air missile systems. The Aviation Geek Club goes a step further,
07:09and suggests a 28 to 1 kill ratio in favour of the F-35 against systems most closely similar to
07:15that
07:15of the Su-57. That's a terrible disadvantage to have when it takes 28 of your most advanced fighters
07:23to take out just one American analogue. Then there's a potential issue with the engine of the craft.
07:29The Su-57 jet currently uses the Saturn AL-41 F1 after burning turbofan, an engine essentially
07:37inherited from the Su-35 and never intended as a solution for the design. The intended power plant,
07:44the Isdelia 30 or AL-51 F1, was supposed to provide genuine fifth-generation performance
07:50characteristics, reduce infrared signature, improved fuel efficiency for sustained supercruise,
07:56and the thrust margins needed for true manoeuvring at those speeds. That engine has been in development
08:02for more than a decade and only entered flight testing in late 2017 after repeated delays.
08:08It's still not in mass production, meaning that Russia technically doesn't have a fifth-generation
08:13worthy engine to power its fleet. Aviation expert Valery Romanenko, speaking to the new voice of Ukraine,
08:22identified another core deficiency in the Su-57's integration with command and control systems,
08:28suggesting it's nowhere near the level of western fifth-generation platforms. The F-35 is essentially
08:35a flying sensor node, continuously sharing data across the battle space, feeding targeting information
08:42to other aircraft, ships and ground forces in real time. The Su-57's net-centric capabilities are
08:49significantly behind that standard. But the issue with the aircraft is not just about stealth design,
08:54connectivity or its engine. As it turns out, the Su-57 might be so stealthy that western media can't
09:02seem to find them anywhere in Russian airbases. And the reason for that is quite simple. There simply
09:08aren't that many Su-57s to begin with. To visualise how badly it really is for Russia, you need to
09:15hold
09:15one number in your head. Lockheed Martin alone delivered 191 F-35s in 2025. When counting all western fighter
09:24programs, including the F-35s, F-16s, F-15EXs, Rafales, Typhoons or Grippens, the combined output in NATO
09:34is in the ballpark of 290 aircraft annually. But Russia's entire fighter-producing industrial base
09:40managed to deliver 33 aircraft in 2025, and that number counts all aircraft types, including Su-34s,
09:48Su-35s, Su-57s and Su-30s. Rostec's own CEO called 2025 a record year. So record-breaking output seems
09:59to be
10:00just a bit over 30 fighters per year. This can be easily explained once you realise the widespread
10:06structural and infrastructure problems that Russia has with its military-industrial complex. For example,
10:12the Komsomusk-Narmure plant in Russia's Far East is responsible for producing both the Su-35 and the
10:19Su-57 simultaneously. This means the factory's limited capacity is split between two programs
10:25competing for the same floor space, the same worker pool and the same supply chain. Modernising that
10:32factory alone is estimated to cost around 1 billion euros or 1.1 billion dollars over five years,
10:38something that Russia isn't too keen on funding when it's barely winning a war in Ukraine for the
10:44previous four years. Even if Russia does fund the modernisation, it's not clear exactly when the
10:50production can be sped up and by how much. Then there's the human capital bottleneck of aircraft
10:56production. Russia has already publicly complained that it was missing 400,000 technicians and engineers
11:02in the military-industrial complex. And that number is from all the way back in 2022, during the first
11:09few months of the invasion of Ukraine and when Russia still had a relatively tame conscription rate
11:14and casualty rate in the war. Even if Russia manages to scrounge up enough skilled workers and
11:20engineers to build the airplanes, there are two more issues at play. First, Russia's civil aviation industry
11:27is facing a similar shortage, meaning that military and civilian aircraft manufacturers are fighting
11:33for the same pool of people. Worse yet, the civil airspace is in an even worse shape. In 2023, Russian
11:41officials announced that the country would deliver 1,000 commercial aircraft to Russian flight companies.
11:47As of late 2025, there have been barely a dozen of these aircraft built. That shortfall puts enormous
11:53pressure on the civil aircraft industry to the point where it's safe to assume they might be luring
11:58military engineers to their side. But secondly, and arguably more importantly, even if there's someone
12:05to make the plane, there might not be someone to fly it. According to an independent technical analysis,
12:11it takes roughly 3,000 hours of practice to train a technician on the advanced electronics and avionics
12:17systems the plane has. That type of training is almost impossible to conduct when the country is in
12:23an actual war. Russia needs to speed up that deployment if it ever hopes of flying more
12:28Su-57s in the first place. And the sanctions have compounded every one of these problems.
12:34Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia relied heavily on Western-source avionics,
12:39microelectronics and precision manufacturing equipment. Those supply chains are now severed.
12:45By 2023, approximately 90% of Russia's microelectronics were coming from China.
12:51But these components are not always equivalent to the Western parts they replace, which arrive
12:56through third-party channels at significantly inflated cost. The impact is visible in the fighter
13:02figures. Su-34 production rose from nine aircraft in 2022 to 11 in 2023, against a 2025 target of 17.
13:12For Su-35s, Russia ordered 15 in 2024, but managed to deliver only 12. Compare that to the trajectory of
13:21Russian tank, drone and artillery shell output, which has increased between two and tenfold since the
13:26invasion. The contrast reveals something important. Mass-produced munitions and armored vehicles can
13:32be ramped up with existing Soviet legacy industrial infrastructure. Fighter jets can't be. They require
13:39precision components machined to narrow tolerances, and any disruption in the supply chain cascades through
13:45the entire assembly process. The situation becomes so dire that Russia reportedly attempted to buy back
13:51military-grade electronic components it had previously supplied to India and Myanmar. It would be
13:57stripping parts from export deliveries to feed its own domestic production lines. That's basically
14:02cannibalizing its own international relationships to stay afloat. And through all of this, the Su-57
14:08actually receives whatever scraps are left after the Su-34 and Su-35 lines take their share. In 2025,
14:16that amounted to two Su-57 deliveries to the Russian Air Force for the entire year. But before we go
14:23further, make sure you're subscribed to the military show. We post news and detailed analytics every day,
14:30so you can stay informed. Now back to the Su-57. Beyond supply chain and stealth issues, there's one possible
14:38problem that Russia might not be able to overcome. There's no one to buy the plane and allow Russia
14:43to profit by selling more. This also harkens back to the war in Ukraine, but its roots go much deeper.
14:50For decades, Russian arms exports were a geopolitical anchor that separated the West from the East,
14:56the capitalists from the socialist worlds. Countries like India, Egypt, Algeria and Vietnam built their
15:02entire air forces around Russian hardware. Russia was their supplier, their maintenance partner,
15:08their upgrade pathway. And those relationships are collapsing. According to the Stockholm International
15:14Peace Research Institute, Russian arms exports fell by 53% between the five-year periods of 2014-2018
15:23and 2019-2023. In 2019, Russia was exporting major arms to 31 countries. By 2023, that number had fallen to
15:3412.
15:34The individual country figures are more damaging still. Russian exports to India fell 34%, to Egypt
15:41by 54%, to Vietnam by an extraordinary 91%. These numbers are more than just Western sanctions pressure.
15:50The potential customers see that Russia is barely making progress in the war it started and is hesitant to
15:55buy that same or in most cases worse equipment, as most export versions are relatively weaker than their
16:02domestic counterparts to maintain military secrets. But it's the two big players that are Russia's issue now.
16:08India and China together accounted for 55% of Russian arms exports between 2020 and 2024. Both are now
16:17looking elsewhere. India has cancelled procurement, delayed payments and is actively planning to upgrade
16:23its existing Russian-built aircraft without Russian participation, effectively cutting Moscow out of
16:29the maintenance and upgrade revenue stream entirely. The shift has left an opening for a new supplier.
16:35China has moved in to fill the gap that Russia is leaving behind, offering cheaper platforms, minimal
16:41political conditions and attractive trade packages. Beijing is aggressively filling the market that Russia is
16:47abandoning. The JF-17 Thunder, developed jointly with Pakistan, has found buyers across the developing
16:54world. The J-10C is drawing serious interest from countries that would previously have defaulted to a
17:00Russian option. And the dynamic is being reinforced by the Ukraine war itself, where the limitations of
17:06Russian air power have been broadcast to every country on earth in real time. Countries that once
17:12tolerated Russian delivery delays and capability shortfalls because there was no viable alternative,
17:18and now discovering there are alternatives, and China is making sure they know it. With this in line,
17:24the Su-57 export program was essentially finished before it started. Algeria received two jets against an
17:31order of 14. India withdrew from the joint development initiative in 2018, citing cost and capability concerns.
17:38But what about Ukraine? Surely on the actual front line, the Su-57s are making their presence known as
17:45the most advanced and formidable pieces of Russia's air fleet. But in fact, the actual response has been
17:51lukewarm at best. By most counts from military analysts across the world, Russia failed to achieve
17:57air superiority over Ukraine, a task that should be laughable when the enemy is using the same planes as you,
18:03just a generation older and in a poorer state. Ukraine even sold back some of its aircraft
18:08to Russia to settle some of its energy debts back in 1999. No, the Su-57 has been notably absent
18:16from
18:16meaningful operations over contested airspace. Former EA-18 Growler pilot Adam Daymood pointed to the
18:24Israeli strikes on Iranian air defenses. These were conducted by F-35Is over the course of a couple of days,
18:31with Israeli aircraft returning barely scratched. They served as the template for what true stealth-enabled
18:37air power looks like in practice. According to him, NATO could conduct those same missions against
18:42Russian air defenses and follow-on flights would face no meaningful opposition. But Russia can't do
18:48that in Ukraine, a country that has a fraction of NATO's budget and anti-air capabilities. And its
18:54supposed fifth-generation flagship has spent much of the war launching cruise missiles and dumb glide bombs
19:00from deep within Russian airspace, rather than contesting the skies over the front line.
19:05And through all of this, Moscow keeps spinning. UAC, Russia's State Aviation Agency and TASS reported
19:13that an upgraded Su-57 could become the world's first sixth-generation aircraft in service.
19:19Viktor Bondarev, former commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces and now chairman of the Federation
19:25Council's Defense and Security Committee, went on record, calling it the best in terms of stealth
19:30characteristics, incorporating all the best that's available in modern aviation science.
19:36This is a man describing an aircraft whose own manufacturer's patent confirms it has the radar
19:42cross-section of a cruise missile. This just goes to show how deep-reaching Russian propaganda is
19:48when they decide to rebrand what's essentially a fourth-generation fighter jet into a future-proof
19:53sixth-generation fighter, something that even the US hasn't actually built yet.
19:58So no, the Su-57 Felon is not a crown jewel. It's a symbol of what happens when a military
20:04-industrial
20:04complex built on Cold War foundations tries to compete with 21st-century Western aerospace engineering,
20:11while simultaneously absorbing the shock of sanctions, depleted manufacturing capacity,
20:16and a war of attrition that's consuming resources it can't replace.
20:20Russia has fewer than 35 operational Su-57s after years of production. Its one export customer
20:28received only two jets in a few years. Its engines are a decade behind schedule. Its stealth performance
20:35is documented as a thousand times worse than the aircraft it was supposed to compete with.
20:40Earlier buyers are walking away, and China is already luring them in.
20:45But the Su-57 is just the start of Russia's air force breakdown. To learn more about it,
20:51check out this video, and make sure you're subscribed to The Military Show
20:55for more daily news on all topics in global warfare and geopolitics.
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