00:00Do you think to some extent, Washington has misread Taiwan from the beginning? I mean,
00:05we're talking here about a leadership, a regime, as some call it, that appears to be more hardline
00:11than it was, say, two or three months ago, and more willing to absorb pain than it is
00:17to compromise. I mean, do you think it's fair to say perhaps someone misread the tea leaves?
00:23I don't think misled is the right analogy. They knew this, to this regime and this government,
00:29it's an existential threat. I think we were anticipating more internal capabilities of
00:36people in order to turn on the government, but I think they've planned for that. So at this point,
00:41I think going forward, what are those elements and target sets and things we can do to further
00:50delegitimize the government and drive the cohesiveness this enjoyed this long between the
00:56Artish, the IRGC, the Basij and others really go after that to cause these cracks to fracture
01:03down to the operational level, if not the tactical level. That's what happened in 1979,
01:10which brought this regime to power. The army ultimately turned on the Shah. But I think those
01:16opportunities are still at play if your campaign plan and that stated objective is planned for.
01:24And that's why I'm not sure where we are in that planning effort and that policy.
Comments