- 17 hours ago
Category
๐บ
TVTranscript
00:02Just moments after taking off from a remote island in Norway.
00:10Something's wrong.
00:11The pilots of Videro Flight 839 lose control of their plane.
00:15Oh, God!
00:17It plunges into the Norwegian Sea, killing everyone on board.
00:24In the wreckage, investigators find damage to a critical part.
00:29The upper end is broken.
00:32It didn't make a great deal of sense.
00:36And when they learn another Videro Flight nearly met the same fate at the same airport...
00:42Looks like they lost control of the plane for two minutes.
00:46We're going over.
00:51They discover a controversial decision that put lives at risk.
00:57I wish that we had put our foot down and said no more.
01:03Mayday, mayday.
01:07Oh, stop.
01:09I mean, one-two, three, every yard, three, two, one-two, three.
01:12I don't know where you can go.
01:13That's zero, hold on.
01:14I'm ready.
01:30What did the seatbelt sign on?
01:34Vidaro flight 836 is heading to a remote outpost on the Lofoten archipelago in the Norwegian Sea.
01:43Lofoten is one of the most beautiful places in Norway.
01:48It's a place where a Norwegian would want to go on holiday to experience untouched nature, and especially the beautiful
01:57mountains.
02:01Tonight's flight is carrying 11 passengers. Most are Norwegians travelling to the islands from the mainland.
02:10Vidaro 836. Runway 25 free. Winds variable 1021 at 260 degrees. Visibility 2500 meters.
02:22Copy that. Vidaro 836.
02:29Vidaro is Norway's largest regional airline. It serves remote communities across the country.
02:38Since the 1960s and 70s, it was a push in Norway to build regional airports in rural areas.
02:45It's made people feel less isolated, and it made travelling a lot easier.
02:54The plane is heading first to the small island of Vare, and then southwest to Rust, before returning to the
03:01mainland city of Boda.
03:06Approach checklist.
03:10The crew was experienced, but this was the first time the captain had flown into Vare.
03:19They were flying the island of Vare.
03:20They were flying a de Havilland twin otter.
03:31It's a twin turboprop utility aircraft.
03:34A workhorse for getting in and out of small, remote airports.
03:40the best airplane in the world
03:44it's an incredibly sturdy aircraft very pilot friendly
03:50we have a long mountainous coast and for that the twin auto was perfect
03:59landing lights
04:04vidro flight 836 is now minutes from landing at Vare and seatbelt
04:11already on but the airport is notorious for unpredictable winds
04:17Vare translated means the weather island the airport was located to the north of
04:26the island between the mountain and the sea it's a very demanding flying
04:31environment because the weather changes all the time so the pilots have to adapt
04:36to that
04:39set flaps
04:43I've said with the runway in sight the pilots begin to line up for landing but
04:51just as the plane turns it's rocked by turbulence
05:01I have control you have control
05:08when flying at Vare you will experience turbulence and you will be tossed around
05:18this isn't getting better go around
05:25he obviously decided that the situation was not good to land so he went around and
05:30it was a great call on his part
05:33flaps up
05:35as the captain powers out of the landing the plane is hit with a powerful down draft and
05:41extreme turbulence
05:47you get sort of a tunnel vision when you're in a situation like that and you pull out all
05:53your resources and you try to counteract the situation that you're in
06:00for two minutes the captain struggles to level the plane
06:08he was an extreme turbulence you're momentarily out of control you may or may not regain control
06:26the force of the wind becomes so great that the plane rolls over speeding towards the mountains
06:35altitude
06:38I can't see anything
06:50come on
06:53come on
06:55come on
06:58come on
07:01only 250 feet from the ground the captain levels the plane and pulls out of the dive
07:14I just can't believe that he recovered at such a low altitude
07:23put in headings for roast
07:30Vitero 836 has aborted landing
07:34redirecting to rust
07:35copy that Vitero 836 stay safe
07:39everyone okay back there
07:48Vitero flight 836 escapes disaster no one on board is injured
07:58I'm still shaking my head at that one that was an ace pilot
08:04in the city of Boda officials from Vitero Airlines cancel all flights into Vare while they try and piece together
08:12what happened with flight 836
08:16as part of an internal investigation the pilot is interviewed
08:21we were lining up for approach
08:24turbulence was getting worse and worse
08:28I have control
08:32it was obvious we couldn't land
08:35I applied power to the engines and we climbed to about 1800 feet
08:40where we got hit with a massive downdraft
08:48we're going over
08:57I battled that plane
09:00trying to keep it away from the mountains
09:03come on
09:08come on
09:11eventually
09:12I was able to level out
09:14climb to a safe altitude and turn for roost
09:20it would be terrifying for them
09:22I'm sure
09:25I've heard stories about that airport
09:30and they're true
09:34the pilots were not very happy
09:38we realized this had been a serious incident
09:42and we had to tighten the operational requirement at the island
09:46to make that a safer
09:51the first action taken by Vitero officials is to reduce the maximum wind speeds for takeoff and landing at Vare
09:59airport from 20 to 15 knots
10:03Vitero asks the civil aviation authority to install anemometers devices that monitor and transmit wind speeds
10:11two are installed at each end of the airstrip and one is installed on the mountain
10:16the mountain is its own weather maker
10:19it can cause winds to change in direction change in speed which are conducive to making some serious turbulence
10:29it's called terrain induced turbulence
10:32when winds hit the mountains on Vare they tend to accelerate over the top and drop down towards the airstrip
10:39this creates powerful downdrafts and crosswinds
10:43the sudden changes in wind speeds and direction can create wind shear and cause a pilot to lose control
10:52this was a difficult place to operate when the wind was flying over the mountains and down onto the airport
10:58and we had to tighten those restrictions quite severely and quickly
11:07but will the restrictions at Vare be enough to ensure the safety of future flights
11:19it's been 15 months since Vitero flight 836 had their close call at Vare airport
11:26Vitero flight 839 has just landed at Vare and is refueling before heading back to the mainland for Easter weekend
11:35anti-collision light
11:37anti-collision light
11:38on
11:39aft and forward boost
11:41on
11:43captain Ida Nils Pearsson is the pilot in command
11:49Ida was a very level headed fellow
11:52he was a top rated pilot
11:55and he'd been with us for years
11:58start switch
11:59left engine
12:07right engine
12:09right engine
12:12on
12:13the first officer was fairly new
12:17I think he'd been with us for only about a year
12:23look at that windsock
12:25it's flapping like mad
12:28welcome to Vare
12:29great
12:30buckle up folks
12:32it's going to be a bit bumpy getting out of here
12:35there are three passengers on board including a young couple
12:40alright
12:41Vitero 839 ready to taxi
12:42Vitero 839 roger
12:45no known traffic runway free
12:47wind variable middle direction 250 at 21 max 57
12:53QNH
12:54Niner 88
12:56copy Niner 88
12:59the captain he was a local pilot
13:01he knew the weather
13:03he knew the limitations of the aircraft
13:06knew the limitations of the airport
13:10as they line up at the end of the runway the crew performs the before takeoff checklist
13:18flaps set ten
13:19set ten
13:21heading set to two eight zero
13:24let's make it three two zero
13:27just get clearance
13:29it's calm now we should get going
13:31copy that
13:33power
13:33Vitero 839 requesting clearance
13:35Vitero 839
13:39direct Vodot at 5,000 feet and squawk 0-1-3-5
13:44copy
13:46Vitero 839
13:47here we go
13:55wind has varied
13:56two one zero two two nine zero degrees
14:00the gusts of 34
14:03yeah roger we are rolling
14:06seventy knots
14:09eighty knots
14:15rotate
14:17at 2 43 Vitero flight 839 takes off from Vare and heads for the mainland
14:26the return flight to Vodot will take less than 30 minutes
14:34flaps up
14:37ten seconds after takeoff
14:41a strange noise catches the pilots attention
14:46you don't want anything unusual to happen in that phase of the flight
14:50since you are very close to the ground
14:55they struggle to keep the plane level
15:00steady
15:06something's wrong
15:16and then
15:17the nose of the plane drops and the captain can't do anything to raise it
15:22no
15:24no no no no
15:33oh god
15:34oh god
15:35just 63 seconds after lifting off
15:41Vitero flight 839
15:44slams into the sea
15:52Vero 839, this is Vare Tower. Do you copy?
15:57Vero 839, Vare information on 119.4.
16:09Within hours, search and rescue teams spot debris on the ocean's surface 6.5 kilometres
16:16northwest of the airport.
16:19The wreckage was found three days after the accident. Harsh sea conditions made it a challenge.
16:31The bodies of the three passengers and the first officer are recovered.
16:36Captain Pearson's remains are never found.
16:41The accident caused a lot of grief.
16:45Vare is a small island where everyone know each other, so everyone felt they had lost someone
16:50close to them.
16:53Investigators from the Norwegian Accident Commission for Civil Aviation, or HSL, soon arrive on the
17:00island.
17:02The purpose of the Vidra investigation was to find out what happened during that incident.
17:13I was manager air safety for Boeing Canada to have on a division, and I traveled to Vero 839,
17:20to assist with the investigation.
17:23The airfield was spectacular, but I was somewhat surprised in the closeness of the mountain range,
17:31which paralleled the entire runway.
17:37Investigators start by interviewing the controller, who briefs pilots on the local weather.
17:41Sorry about that.
17:42That's fine.
17:44Can you walk me through what happened the day of the accident?
17:46Normal day, by our standards.
17:49They landed at 1430, refueled, changed passengers, and asked to taxi out.
17:55The whole turnaround was less than 15 minutes.
17:57What were the winds when they took off?
18:00It was gusting when they were parked, but eased off to 34 on the west end.
18:05The winds were coming from every direction.
18:07It was pretty common.
18:09Did the pilots have any hesitation about taking off?
18:12No, not at all.
18:13And what about the takeoff?
18:16The controller explains that after the plane passed the tower,
18:22it turned and then disappeared into the clouds.
18:26What was the cloud ceiling at the time?
18:291,000 feet.
18:30I received a distress signal, and a few seconds later, I heard a bang.
18:38That was fast.
18:38They were airborne for just over a minute.
18:42Did they call mayday or relay any information about mechanical issues?
18:48Nothing.
18:51That was helpful.
18:55Could there have been a structural failure or loss of power
18:59which caused Flight 839 to crash so quickly into the sea?
19:09Investigators survey the wreckage of Videro Flight 839
19:12for any signs that would explain a crash so soon after takeoff.
19:16Nose and cockpit completely crushed.
19:21Both wings, engines, undercarriage and tail section
19:28severed from the fuselage on impact and carried forward.
19:34High-energy impact.
19:38With the nose buckled the way it was,
19:41and the left wingtip buckled,
19:43we had a pretty good idea of how the aircraft impacted the sea.
19:52The wreckage tells investigators the plane entered the water nose-first
19:57at high speed.
20:03The team considers whether engine failure caused the high-speed impact.
20:08The manufacturer provides their report.
20:11No fire damage.
20:13Both engines appeared to be running at high RPM and torque
20:17at the time of impact.
20:20The engine manufacturer determined that the engines were running
20:23and they were ruled out very, very quickly.
20:28With engine failure ruled out,
20:31they wonder whether any parts that control the plane's pitch
20:34or steering failed,
20:36causing it to plunge into the sea.
20:47The elevator is a control surface on the twin otter's tail
20:51that adjusts pitch.
20:57Investigators discover something unusual
21:00in the elevator connecting rod.
21:06The elevator connecting rod moves the elevators up and down on the tail.
21:12It's activated when the pilot pushes or pulls on the control column.
21:18The upper end is broken.
21:20What would cause such a vital part to break?
21:24You shouldn't have any preconceived notions
21:28as to why the part failed.
21:31Let's get this elevator rod to metallurgy.
21:33I want to know how it failed.
21:38Did the part fail because there was a manufacturing defect?
21:43Did it fail because there was a tool mark on it?
21:47You should let the part tell you the story.
21:52While investigators wait for the metallurgical results,
21:56they research the plane's history,
21:57looking for any clues
21:59into what might have caused
22:01the elevator connecting rod to fail.
22:03So the twin otter DHC-6300
22:06was purchased by Vidro in 1977.
22:10The last alien inspection was carried out
22:12the day of the accident.
22:13Maintenance all in accordance with current regulations.
22:16So not a maintenance issue.
22:23The investigators went through all the maintenance documentation,
22:28all the inspections was completed,
22:31and no deviations was found.
22:34With maintenance ruled out as a cause
22:37for the failure of the elevator connecting rod,
22:40investigators review the results
22:42of a metallurgical examination performed on the rod.
22:46There's no pre-existing cracks.
22:49There's banding here and here.
22:53Banding is created because you have a repeated load
22:57that is applied on and off to your part.
22:59And every time the load is applied,
23:02you have a crack that grows a little bit more,
23:05and it creates a rainbow on the fracture surface.
23:10The report also reveals the banding occurred
23:13because of sideways bending on the rod.
23:18This was highly unusual.
23:20There's never any side loads on that rod.
23:23It just moves up and down.
23:26So it didn't make a great deal of sense.
23:31Investigators examine schematics
23:33of the tail section of the twin otter
23:35to determine what would bend
23:37the elevator connecting rods sideways,
23:40causing it to break.
23:41So what if this elevator broke in flight?
23:46It was being freely and uncontrollably.
23:51It would definitely cause the rod to bend.
23:59If the right elevator separated from its mounts in flight,
24:03it would swing in every direction,
24:05putting sideways pressure on the rod
24:07and ultimately causing it to break.
24:12First the elevator, then the rod.
24:18It's the only thing that makes sense.
24:21It's kind of like the cart before the horse.
24:24The control rod would not have seen any loads
24:27had the elevator not broken.
24:31What would cause the elevator to break in flight?
24:35Maybe the cockpit voice recorder
24:36can shed some light on that.
24:45Okay, let's start with the take-off roll.
24:49Norwegian investigators listen to the cockpit voice recorder
24:53for clues as to how the right elevator
24:56on Videro flight 839 might have come loose,
24:59bending the connecting rod.
25:0170 knots, 80 knots, rotate.
25:08It was amazing that the cockpit voice recorder
25:11was in the aircraft in the first place
25:13because it was not mandatory at the time.
25:19Claps up.
25:27Did you hear that clattering noise?
25:32Strange.
25:38Steady.
25:46Something's wrong.
25:49Stop.
25:51There it is again.
25:54Is that the elevator?
25:57Play it back again.
26:00When I listened to the CVR,
26:03there was nothing that I could pinpoint
26:06as being the source of the clattering sound.
26:15Could it have been the elevator breaking?
26:18It was possible, but we really just don't know.
26:22Did you hear the propellers?
26:2355 seconds into the flight,
26:26investigators hear the sound of propellers
26:28rotating out of sync.
26:31This occurs when there's a change
26:33in the aircraft's pitch.
26:35Turbulence?
26:38Has to be.
26:40A sudden gust of wind
26:42or change in wind direction
26:44would cause the propellers to adjust
26:47to compensate
26:48for the changing attitude of the aircraft.
26:53Investigators discover that Videro 839
26:56was struck by severe turbulence
26:58shortly after takeoff.
27:00The crash happens just 10 seconds later.
27:09No.
27:10No, no, no, no.
27:11Oh, God!
27:13No!
27:17No!
27:18No!
27:24So, where were they exactly
27:26when they were struck by severe turbulence?
27:28A standard operating procedure
27:30calls for a rate of ascend
27:31of 1,000 to 1,200 feet per minute.
27:34So, they would have hit turbulence
27:37right after they entered clouds
27:39at about 1,000 feet.
27:43And that mountain ridge there
27:44is just over 1,000 feet.
27:47It looks like terrain
27:48induced turbulence.
27:54The quicker you could get away
27:57from the mountains,
27:59the better it was.
28:01How bad could those winds have been?
28:07Investigators learn
28:08of the near crash
28:09of the other Videro plane,
28:11Flight 836,
28:11on approach to Varay
28:1315 months earlier.
28:16Looks like they lost control
28:18of the plane for two minutes,
28:19even when inverted.
28:26At what altitude
28:28did they lose control?
28:30About 1,800 feet.
28:33Just after he had boarded
28:34the landing on runway 25
28:36due to winds.
28:40Both flights encountered
28:42dangerous winds
28:43at or above
28:44the mountain ridges.
28:46Were any measures
28:47put into place
28:48to prevent this
28:49from happening again?
28:50After Flight 836's
28:52missed approach,
28:54Flight Order 17
28:55was put into place.
28:57So, they made this change.
28:59Landings and departures
29:00must not be planned
29:01or executed
29:02with variable winds
29:03above 15 knots.
29:05So, they reduced
29:06the maximum allowable
29:07wind speeds
29:08for takeoff
29:09and landing.
29:12Weedero established
29:13some very significant
29:15wind restrictions
29:16using some very experienced
29:19crew to develop them.
29:21But there was still
29:23unpredictability.
29:26Anemometers
29:26were also installed
29:27at both ends
29:29of the runway
29:31and on the mountain ridge.
29:37It's good to have
29:38an anemometer
29:38on top of a mountain.
29:40It just gives
29:41the pilot more information
29:42for the landing.
29:44So, what were
29:45the mountain winds
29:46at the time
29:46of Flight 839?
29:52Huh.
29:54There is no anemometer
29:55data for the mountain.
30:01I don't know.
30:06Investigators contact
30:08the Civil Aviation
30:09Authority
30:10to determine
30:11why there weren't
30:12any mountain
30:12anemometer wind readings
30:14at the time
30:14of the crash
30:15of Videro Flight 839.
30:22The anemometer
30:23was taken down.
30:27They learned
30:28that the anemometer
30:29on the mountain
30:30wasn't reliable
30:31because of the icy conditions.
30:33A year after being installed,
30:35it was removed
30:36from the mountain
30:37for repair.
30:39It gets worse.
30:41It was never reinstalled.
30:44It was officially
30:45taken out of service
30:46three days
30:47before the accident.
30:53The removal
30:54of the anemometer
30:55is a degradation safety.
30:58It's information
30:59that a pilot
31:00would certainly require
31:01for an airport like that.
31:03Okay.
31:04So,
31:06what wind information
31:07were the pilots
31:08actually getting
31:09and when?
31:13Investigators
31:14listened to the CVR
31:15recording of Videro
31:16Flight 839
31:17before it landed
31:19at Vare.
31:20I'm going to bank
31:21west of the island
31:22to avoid more turbulence.
31:24I'm getting up
31:25drafts already.
31:26Copy that.
31:27Videro 839,
31:29runway free,
31:31wind east side,
31:32270 degrees
31:34at max 23.
31:35Understood.
31:37Videro 839.
31:40Twenty-three knots.
31:42That's eight knots
31:43above the limit.
31:45They shouldn't even
31:46have landed
31:46the inbound flight
31:47in the first place.
31:49What about
31:50when they were
31:50on the ground?
31:59look at that wind
32:01sock.
32:03It's flapping like
32:04mad.
32:06Welcome to
32:06Vare.
32:10The pilot
32:11was talking a lot
32:12about the wind
32:12and they were
32:14discussing
32:14that the wind
32:15was coming
32:16from
32:16all directions.
32:19Videro 839,
32:20roger.
32:20No known traffic,
32:22runway free,
32:23wind variable,
32:24middle direction,
32:25250.
32:27At 21,
32:28max 57.
32:30What did you say
32:31again?
32:31Max 57?
32:32Yep.
32:33Max 57.
32:38Copy.
32:4357 knots.
32:4757 knots
32:48is more than
32:4965 miles per hour.
32:52Yeah.
32:53The manual says
32:54that the twin otter
32:55must not be operated
32:56on the ground
32:57in winds
32:58above 50 knots.
33:01Well,
33:01he is
33:02sticking his neck
33:03out in the line
33:04and I'm not quite sure
33:06why he did that.
33:08Were the winds
33:08that strong
33:09when they took off?
33:13They go through
33:14their pre-takeoff
33:15checklist
33:16and then...
33:19Just get clearance.
33:20It's calm now.
33:21We should get going.
33:23Copy that.
33:24The captain says
33:25it's calm.
33:26What's he basing
33:27that on?
33:27Wind socks?
33:29The rains
33:29had stopped.
33:30Maybe it looked
33:31like the weather
33:31was clearing.
33:35If a shower
33:36was approaching
33:37you could expect
33:38variable winds
33:39but when
33:40the shower
33:41passed
33:42you could expect
33:43a lull
33:43in the wind.
33:48According to
33:49the transcript
33:50they get their
33:52next wind report
33:53as they're about
33:53to take off.
33:56Wind has varied
33:58210 to 290 degrees
34:01with gusts of 34.
34:02Yeah.
34:03Roger.
34:04We are rolling.
34:07They took off
34:08in a 34-knot wind.
34:11That's more than
34:11double the limit.
34:14If the winds
34:14were gusting
34:15at 57 knots
34:16on the ground
34:17then who knows
34:18how strong the winds
34:18were coming off
34:19the mountain.
34:22Strong enough
34:22to break the elevator.
34:25Yeah.
34:29When he hit
34:30the lip of the mountain
34:31I bet he encountered
34:3360, 70, 80-knot winds.
34:38It obviously caused
34:39severe to extreme turbulence.
34:43Steady.
34:44The team concludes
34:45the winds were strong enough
34:47to break the right elevator
34:48from its mounts
34:49causing the connecting rod
34:51to break
34:52making both elevators
34:54unusable.
34:56Something's wrong.
34:58They ignored
34:59Vitro's wind limits
35:00on the ground
35:02and they had
35:03no wind limits
35:04in the dangerous area
35:05around the mountain.
35:08Why were they
35:08so eager to leave?
35:12This was
35:13Easter weekend
35:14and there is
35:15an incentive
35:16to get home.
35:21There was clearly
35:22some concern
35:23but they went.
35:33to understand
35:35why the captain
35:36of Flight 839
35:37took off
35:38in winds
35:38that exceeded
35:39company limits
35:40investigators interview
35:42other Vitro pilots
35:43about wind restrictions
35:44at Vare.
35:46What has been
35:47your experience
35:48at Vare?
35:50I don't like it.
35:51None of the pilots do.
35:53The wind reports
35:54aren't reliable.
35:58You could actually
35:59sit on the tarmac
36:00get one wind indication
36:03move towards the runway
36:05and get another.
36:07Even though the maximum
36:08wind speeds
36:09were reduced
36:09from 20 knots
36:10to 15?
36:11Well they were
36:12but they brought it
36:13back up to 20.
36:17Nine months
36:18after the incident
36:19with the first
36:20Vitro flight
36:21the wind restrictions
36:23were reversed.
36:26How would they do that?
36:28My guess?
36:30Too many cancellations.
36:36After Vitro
36:37lowered the wind limits
36:38cancellations increased.
36:41That led to negative press
36:42and anger
36:43from local residents.
36:46The decision
36:47to cancel flights
36:48became
36:49very unpopular.
36:52It was so
36:53unpredictable
36:54at Vare.
36:58Did pilots
37:00feel pressure
37:00to complete
37:02the flights?
37:03Yeah
37:04but not
37:05from the airline.
37:07I had situations
37:08where the weather
37:09turned into a hurricane
37:10and it could not
37:12take off
37:13and I got a real
37:14work over
37:14from some
37:15of the passengers.
37:18Investigators
37:19researched the impact
37:20those wind-related
37:21cancellations
37:22had on Vitro's
37:23operations.
37:26The pressure
37:27was piling on
37:28from the public.
37:30Cancellations
37:31tripled
37:31in the last 12 months.
37:35Compared
37:36to other airports
37:37in Europe
37:37Vare had a lot
37:38of cancellations
37:39and the flights
37:40were often
37:41canceled quite early
37:42when the wind
37:43was strong
37:44but when the flights
37:45were supposed
37:46to arrive
37:47it could be
37:48no wind at all
37:49which made people
37:51question all the
37:52cancellations.
37:54Almost all the
37:54cancellations
37:55were being caused
37:56by winds.
37:57Because of that
37:58bad press
37:59which gets the
38:00attention
38:01of the government.
38:05the government
38:06paid the company
38:07to fly there.
38:09The company
38:10wrote the government
38:11and said
38:12it was extremely
38:13difficult to operate
38:14there.
38:15And the reply
38:16from the government
38:16was if you don't fly
38:18there we will have
38:19to take
38:19the money away.
38:22Out of curiosity
38:23how many cancellations
38:25were there on
38:25departure from Vare?
38:34None.
38:36Basically
38:37it's
38:37get home
38:38itis.
38:39If they're at
38:40the airport
38:40pilots are going to
38:41tell themselves
38:42they're capable
38:43of taking off
38:43as well.
38:45You know
38:46there's still
38:46one thing
38:47I don't get.
38:50The conditions
38:51were so treacherous.
38:54Why was this
38:55airport even
38:55built there
38:56in the first
38:56place?
39:04So why
39:05was this
39:06location chosen
39:07for the airport?
39:10Investigators
39:10consult officials
39:11about the
39:12viability of
39:13Vare Airport
39:14to determine
39:15if passengers
39:16and crew
39:16were placed
39:17at risk
39:18unnecessarily.
39:21Vidre had
39:22two possible
39:23locations
39:24for the airport
39:25at the island.
39:26This one
39:27was chosen
39:28despite
39:29the difficulties
39:31with wind
39:32conditions
39:32near
39:33a mountain
39:34ridge.
39:37Okay
39:38and what
39:38testing
39:39went into
39:39the decision?
39:42Vidre had
39:43done test
39:43flights
39:44at Vare
39:45prior to
39:45the decision
39:46of building
39:46the airport
39:47there
39:47and they
39:49had experienced
39:50very windy
39:51conditions
39:52and did
39:52not recommend
39:53building
39:54the airport
39:54there.
39:59So if
40:00Vidre was
40:00against it
40:01then why
40:01did it
40:01go ahead?
40:03We knew
40:04that the
40:05wind conditions
40:06at Vare
40:06would be
40:07so difficult
40:08it would
40:09affect
40:09regularity.
40:11But that
40:12advice
40:12was ignored
40:14by the
40:15meteorology
40:16specialists
40:17that the
40:18authorities
40:19had consulted
40:20when it
40:21came to
40:21put the
40:22airport
40:22on the
40:22island.
40:24Maybe
40:25some of
40:26the decisions
40:26that were
40:27made
40:28were more
40:29politically
40:30motivated
40:30than were
40:32practical.
40:36Investigators
40:36now know
40:37the factors
40:38that led
40:38to the
40:39deaths
40:39of three
40:39passengers
40:40and two
40:41pilots
40:41on board
40:42Vidreau
40:42flight
40:43839
40:44First up
40:45you have
40:46an airport
40:47next to
40:48a mountain
40:48resulting
40:49in dangerous
40:49winds.
40:51Lower
40:51wind limits
40:52are imposed
40:53but the
40:54result is
40:55an increase
40:55in cancellations.
40:56Which forces
40:57the limits
40:58to change
40:58again.
40:59Limits go
41:00back up
41:01and then
41:01finally
41:02the unreliable
41:03wind data
41:03which results
41:05in wind
41:05reports
41:06being ignored
41:08by pilots.
41:14Rules
41:15are established
41:16for a reason.
41:18If you
41:19don't follow
41:19the rules
41:20you're taking
41:21a big risk.
41:23Wind
41:24has varied
41:25210
41:26to 290
41:27degrees
41:28the gusts
41:29of 34.
41:30Yep
41:31Roger
41:31we are
41:32rolling.
41:38Vidreau
41:39flight
41:39839
41:40enters
41:40turbulent
41:41airspace
41:42when the
41:42winds
41:43coming off
41:43the mountain
41:44were extreme.
41:46The force
41:47of the winds
41:48causes the
41:48right elevator
41:49to break
41:50free.
41:54Something's
41:55wrong.
41:57Bending
41:57the connecting
41:58rod
41:59until it
42:00fails.
42:04No.
42:10It was
42:11subject
42:12to
42:12aerodynamic
42:13loads
42:14that
42:15exceeded
42:15the
42:16structure
42:16strength
42:17of the
42:18tail.
42:22It must
42:23have been
42:23absolutely
42:23terrifying
42:24because
42:25you would
42:26pull the
42:27control
42:27column
42:28without
42:28any
42:29reaction
42:30at all.
42:30Oh
42:31God.
42:43The
42:44Norwegian
42:44Accident
42:45Commission
42:45for
42:45Civil
42:46Aviation
42:46recommends
42:47new
42:48regulations
42:48for the
42:49distribution
42:49of wind
42:50information
42:51to crews
42:51and urges
42:53Vidreau to
42:54ensure their
42:55pilots follow
42:55established
42:56restrictions.
42:58The
42:58captain
42:59wanted to
42:59get the
42:59job done
43:00and he
43:01probably
43:01got away
43:02with it
43:03other times
43:04but this
43:05time it
43:06didn't work
43:07out.
43:11Other
43:12recommendations
43:13are made
43:13for Vare
43:14Airport
43:14but ultimately
43:16it is deemed
43:17too dangerous
43:18and the
43:18airport
43:19never
43:19reopens
43:20to
43:20commercial
43:21traffic.
43:24Vare
43:24Airport
43:25was
43:25open
43:26only
43:26four
43:26years
43:27which
43:27makes
43:28it
43:28one
43:28of
43:29the
43:29shortest
43:29lived
43:29airports
43:30in
43:31the
43:31world.
43:35I
43:36wish
43:37that we
43:37had put
43:38our foot
43:38down
43:39and said
43:39no more.
43:43I
43:43wish
43:44the
43:44company
43:44had
43:45done
43:45the
43:45same.
43:48I
43:49wish
43:49the
43:50government
43:50and the
43:51experts
43:52had
43:53listened
43:53to our
43:54warnings
43:54earlier
43:57then
43:58we
43:58might
43:58have
43:58had
43:59our
44:00colleagues
44:00still
44:00alive.
44:18more
44:29than
44:37the
44:37others
44:38have
44:38to
44:38see
44:38in
44:38the
44:38way
44:39to
Comments