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04:39But we potentially see a slightly softened, more moderate version of that same regime come into force.
04:47Is that something President Donald Trump could contemplate accepting?
04:52I think the answer to that is yes, and I think that it is possible.
04:55It's conceivable.
04:57I don't know that it is the most likely outcome.
05:00Keep in mind that, as you noted, there is an interim council right now led by the president,
05:04the senior judicial official and a cleric that are taking the place of the Supreme Leader.
05:10The Assembly of Experts will gather the conclave, if you will, that will select the next Supreme Leader.
05:17In the past, there's only been one case of that in the past.
05:21But generally, as you look at the candidates for this, they tend to be pretty hard line ideologues,
05:29similar to the most recent Supreme Leader.
05:34And you've seen already defiance by the foreign minister.
05:37He's the one person who has spoken publicly on this.
05:41So, again, I think we have to be cautious about our hopes that a pragmatic figure could emerge.
05:46It's by no means impossible.
05:48Kareem Sajjapur, the great Iranian analyst here in the United States,
05:52has noted that it used to be that the regime was comprised of 80 percent true believers,
05:58true ideologues, hardliners, and 20 percent charlatans, they're called.
06:03They're just basically opportunists trying to get what they can by being part of the regime.
06:08But now it's 20 percent hardliners and 80 percent charlatans.
06:13So the possibility is there, certainly, that someone could emerge who might say,
06:18look, Mr. President, you're right.
06:21What the nuclear program and the arming of proxies and our killing of Americans and Arabs and Israelis has brought
06:29us is ruin.
06:31And we see the error of our ways and we want to sail straight.
06:35We want to get along with our neighbors and those in the region and with you.
06:39And we're willing to give up our aspirations in all these cases.
06:44That would obviously be a very dramatic departure.
06:47In terms of what we could expect to see next in terms of the joint U.S.-Israeli campaign in Iran,
06:55do you think that this could extend into a prolonged war?
07:00We saw the war secretary, Pete Hegseth, today refusing to rule out potentially troops on the ground.
07:07Do you think that this could evolve into something more dangerous, more spiraling than the U.S. maybe originally intended?
07:15No, I think the president and the secretary and others have been very clear that we're not going to put
07:19boots on the ground.
07:21And frankly, I think that as the days go by, while noting that there is still a very real possibility
07:26of additional casualties,
07:28again, those in host nations, those in Israel, those of American forces and others,
07:33that over time there will be a degradation of the ability of Iran to retaliate,
07:39will continue to reduce their missile stocks, the launchers, the short-range missiles, and even the drones.
07:47So I think they will be hard-pressed to maintain even remotely what the pace has been by Iran so
07:54far.
07:54And there's been so much damage to the command control facilities and indeed the commanders themselves
08:00that this is all quite decentralized now, but it appears that they plan for this.
08:05Yet we are seeing quite a relentless response from Iran.
08:09We've seen unmanned vehicles, drones flying towards the EU island state of Cyprus, for example.
08:16Do you think they've been preparing for this, that the response is intentionally relentless
08:23in order to scare off the U.S.?
08:25Because we are seeing talk of-
08:27Well, they're not going to scare off the U.S., so put that aside.
08:30They have retaliated, as I noted, and I do think that they did prepare for the eventuality
08:36that there may not be central command and control, and they have a deck of targets that they are executing.
08:43We'll see if that pattern continues.
08:44It's premature to assess based on that.
08:48But no, our focus is on what they have that they can use to retaliate.
08:54We are seeing, General, also European nations talking about potentially supporting the defensive
09:01capacities of the U.S., including the U.K.
09:05Do you think President Trump is expecting the support of its European allies here and is counting
09:11on them to support this operation in some way?
09:14I think the plan that was conceived was essentially the U.S. and Israel and then the host nations
09:20in the region whose air and ballistic missile defenses are always integrated into those of
09:26the U.S. and Israel.
09:28I don't think there was an assumption made that the Europeans would join in.
09:32It would have been good if they had, at least for defensive purposes from the very beginning,
09:38because it's very clear, it should have been clear at the outset, that Iran is not going
09:43to limit its targets to just U.S. bases, Israel and so forth.
09:48It's going after civilian targets, airfields, ports and so forth in the Gulf states and beyond
09:55and reaching as far as Cyprus, as you noted.
09:59So I think from a purely defensive standpoint, that would have been wise from the beginning.
10:03I mean, the question now is whether or not they go on the offensive and start contributing
10:08to taking down the retaliatory capabilities of the U.S. and Israel.
10:14Is that something that you can foresee happening, European nations joining in a more offensive
10:19capacity?
10:19My understanding is that that has been discussed.
10:22I don't know that I'd predict what the outcome would be, but the fact that it's just being
10:27discussed, I think, indicates that it's certainly a possibility.
10:30Very briefly, just to close off.
10:32Do you believe that the U.S. has the lessons learned from its experience in Iraq in mind here,
10:39when we know that Saddam Hussein's government and administration was completely wiped out by the
10:45U.S., leaving the country essentially not functioning?
10:49Is that something you feel that the U.S. administration is bearing in mind as it continues with this
10:54campaign?
10:54Well, very much so.
10:55I think they've been explicitly clear about that.
10:59I'd just also note that it was not just that the regime was toppled, it's that we then took some
11:05catastrophically bad decisions.
11:07I was part of the invasion force, and we were cut off at the knees when the decision was made
11:11to fire
11:12the entire Iraqi military without telling them how we were going to enable them to provide for themselves
11:18and their families.
11:19And then when we fired the entire Ba'ath Party down to level four, the level at which it was
11:25tens of thousands
11:26of bureaucrats, many Western educated, that we needed and were already using to help us in a country that
11:34we didn't sufficiently understand.
11:36So it wasn't, we could have very quickly, I think, brought back major elements of it and had sort of
11:43a
11:43Venezuela light, if you will, because the top levels clearly were gone or in the deck of cards to be
11:50pursued.
11:51Okay.
11:51General, thank you so much for your time and for joining us on your own.
11:54Good to be with you.
11:55Thank you.
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