- 2 months ago
Air Crash Investigation Series S22E09 Turboprop Terror
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TVTranscript
00:00On approach to Raleigh-Durham Airport.
00:07Did we just have a flame-out?
00:10The pilots decide to abort their landing.
00:13When you have an engine failure, you lose 80% of your performance.
00:17Let's go missed approach.
00:19But the plan falls apart.
00:21Lower the nose!
00:24We were going down.
00:30Only five of the 20 people on board survived.
00:36NTSB investigators are puzzled by the wreckage of Flight 3379.
00:41It appears the engines are rotating at full power.
00:45So what went wrong?
00:47Only by taking a test flight to the brink of disaster...
00:50Yawing to the left.
00:52...will an astonishing sequence of events be revealed.
00:56This airplane had to crash.
01:00This airplane is showing the impact of the sea.
01:04You need to get a弱.
01:06You're pulling a worm!
01:08You're moving from the front.
01:09You're moving from thevs.
01:10You're moving from the right to the left...
01:11You have to go on the left...
01:12You're moving from the left.
01:13You're moving from the right to the right.
01:14The map shows you the maps to the right.
01:15On the left.
01:24American Eagle flight 3379 approaches Raleigh-Durham International Airport okay can you do the descent
01:35checklist please in the cockpit captain Mike Hillis and first officer Matthew sailor prepare
01:45for landing altimeter 3031 set cross-check 3031 set cross-check these were young pilots just starting
01:57off in their career they were looking to go work at the major airlines where the pay and benefits
02:03were substantially better the pilots are flying a jet stream 3201 a twin turboprop airplane designed
02:12for short flights it's a workhorse for regional airlines like American Eagle turboprop engines run
02:19more efficiently at lower altitudes they're actually more fuel efficient so on these short haul routes
02:27the jet stream pretty much fit that market flight 3379 took off at 6 p.m. from Greensboro North Carolina
02:37it's a 35-minute flight to Raleigh-Durham Airport well folks at this time we're about 10.8 miles from
02:45Raleigh-Durham International Airport about five minutes out I'm about to begin our approach whether
02:49tonight's not very good in Raleigh two-mile visibility because of rain and fog and the winds right of the
02:54north at six miles an hour there are 18 passengers on board tonight among them college student Lauren
03:04Anderson I had been up the night before I'd stayed up all night pulled an all-nighter wrote a paper and
03:11slid it under the door my English professor that morning so I was pretty tired it had been a long
03:17week of finals I was ready to get home equal flight 3379 and reduced to 170 then descend and maintain 3000
03:283379 the flight crew reduces engine power
03:48in a turboprop plane the engine power and the propeller speed are controlled separately
03:57the jet stream 32 had no autopilot so you were always hand flying it was one of the most demanding
04:09airplanes on a pilot's flying skills descending to 3,000 feet the crew keeps a close eye on the weather
04:19can you get a chance look out your window and see if you see any of that ice yeah I was looking out
04:31there I don't see anything right now icing can be a major threat to an aircraft it not only increases
04:39the weight of it but also spoils the aerodynamics over the wing icing isn't the only hazard facing the
04:48pilots people fight 3379 caution wake turbulence you're spacing on a 727 turn left 190 there's a 727
05:01landing ahead of flight 3379 which creates a potential hazard for the jet stream heavy aircraft tend to
05:10generate very strong horizontal tornadoes called vortexes that come off the wingtips if a smaller
05:20aircraft has an encounter with weight turbulence it couldn't be so powerful that it's beyond the
05:27control of the pilot to counteract it left 190 3379 for safety the pilots make a minor adjustment to their
05:40course Eagle flight 3379 Raleigh clear to land wind 010 at 8 traffic three and a half mile fine
05:51clear to land five left 3379 once the Boeing 727 touches down flight 3379 will be cleared to land
06:08we didn't anticipate any issues it was the same old same old I'd say I probably had taken that flight
06:15three times three times already that year and gear down gear down the pilots configure the plane for landing
06:28flaps 20 flaps 20 just minutes before touchdown
06:38the engine ignition light illuminates seeing the ignition light come on during approach would typically
06:54raise a concern if combustion is interrupted for any reason it's what pilots call a flame out or an engine
07:02failure not sure what's going on with it if there is an engine failure the pilots need to reconsider landing
07:12the pilot would have to make the decision whether they continue the approach or abort the approach see
07:18what the problem is what do you want me to do are you going to continue okay yeah i'm going to continue just
07:25back me up captain hillis decides to land all right let's go missed approach but then he reverses his decision
07:40a go-around or a missed approach would have given the pilot more time to run an engine failure checklist
07:48when you're on final you really don't have that much time to complete it
07:51set max power
07:58now at 1500 feet captain hillis aborts the landing
08:03when you have an engine failure you not only lost half your power you lose 80 percent of your performance
08:13flight 3379 isn't climbing and it's losing speed
08:18lower the nose lower the nose lower the nose
08:24at 1400 feet the plane is stalling
08:31you got it yeah they're unable to climb they're starting to lose directional control of the aircraft
08:38flight 3379 is turning steadily to the left veering further off course lower the nose
08:49things are getting bad real fast and they're running out of time here
08:56plunging rapidly towards the ground the pilots fight to recover their plane
09:01there's no flight attendant on the plane there was a lot of commotion you could hear some kind of warning
09:09siren i i was scared people were scared
09:13we knew we were crashing i knew we were going down
09:25i just braced myself literally putting my hand and my foot on the seat in front of me
09:32i had a moment that okay i need to survive i need to live through this
09:46and my foot on the seat in front of me
10:02when we crashed um i i just remember hitting ground very very fast very hard
10:08flight 3379 has just plowed through the dense woods of north carolina it's now a pile of burning wreckage
10:21the plane split literally in between my seat and the seat in front of me
10:28i can remember taking my seat belt off and hearing people moaning and people screaming
10:33i couldn't see anything i don't know if i lost my contacts or i just had fuel in my eyes
10:45i couldn't walk
10:48but my adrenaline was pumping i was in fight or flight mode
10:53my intuition was that i had i had to survive and somehow i got away from the fire
11:03it was a few times when i was in the middle of the fire
11:06i was in the middle of the fire in the middle of the fire
11:11morrisville firefighter david farrell is one of the first responders on site
11:17and your heart's racing i mean
11:21you know you probably fixed encounter one of the worst things you've ever been in in your life
11:28you can see the fire your heart was in your throat
11:31You know what I mean?
11:32Your adrenaline's pumping.
11:33You're scared.
11:34As I got closer to the scene, something caught my eye,
11:39and I looked down.
11:46I saw a female pulling herself away from the fire,
11:50and she couldn't move her legs.
11:56He had asked my name, and I told him
11:59I needed to find my suitcase, and that I needed to get home.
12:04I said, you're going to make it.
12:08You're not going to die on my watch.
12:12You're through the worst of this,
12:13and we're going to get you out of here.
12:17Lauren Anderson is one of only five survivors.
12:20Fifteen others are killed.
12:24I did break bones in my hand.
12:26My clavicle broke my ribs, punctured my lungs.
12:32I broke and dislocated my back.
12:35Tibia, fibula, break in my left leg.
12:39Bones in my ankle.
12:43Captain Mike Hillis and First Officer Matthew Saylor are among the dead.
12:47National Transportation Safety Board investigators are on site by morning.
13:00Anyone finding the data recorders?
13:03Team is still looking.
13:05The weather wasn't great last night.
13:06Well, I'm going to need the pilot's record of icing.
13:10And the weather data.
13:14In this particular accident, icing was very paramount,
13:17because 3379 was a second accident for the American Eagle.
13:22Just a few weeks past, we'd had another jet stream involved with icing conditions.
13:28Was icing the reason Flight 3379 failed to make it to the airport just four miles away?
13:37The landing gear is down.
13:40The landing gear is down.
13:51Do they know how the flaps are set?
13:54I'll check with that guy in the cockpit.
13:56Stretch here.
13:57What can you tell us about the flap selector?
14:00The cockpit section was particularly damaged.
14:04A lot of controls on the instruments were unable to document.
14:08The flap selector is fused in a 20-degree position.
14:12Copy that.
14:14The flap extension was also very interesting,
14:17because it was in the landing configuration.
14:21Thank you very much.
14:25The plane was iced up as they were landing, and that's trouble.
14:29We had to start making major inquiries into the possibility of an icing involvement.
14:34These are pilot reports from five other planes flying into Raleigh.
14:39We do have pilots reporting light icing, but just trace icing at high altitudes.
14:46Investigators learned that the other pilots flying near Raleigh-Durham weren't reporting any significant issues with icing.
14:54The icing, although it was present in the area, was absolutely no factor in the accident investigation.
15:03They were all set to land.
15:06So what went wrong?
15:11Maybe they had engine trouble.
15:13The investigators had a major challenge trying to figure out if one of the engines had malfunctioned in some way.
15:22Hey, can you bring that blade over here, please?
15:24Thank you. Thank you, sir.
15:27Now, is this blade from the left propeller?
15:30Uh, yes. This is from the right propeller.
15:33The team examines the propellers for an indication that they were rotating.
15:38Look at the damage right here.
15:40The way the blade is damaged provides a clue.
15:43If you've got turning propellers on your airplane, they tend to grab into things and bend forward as they hit the debris of trees and so on.
16:02It appears the engines are rotating at full power.
16:07So he's four miles from the airport. He's configured to land.
16:10What happened?
16:14As we spent more time on site with a 3379 wreckage, the questions just kept coming.
16:24It made it very clear that this accident was going to be a real puzzler.
16:31Programmet presenteras av Malabo.
16:34Malabo.
16:39Were the pilots reporting any problems during their approach?
16:41Let me have a look.
16:45NTSB investigators hope the pilots' conversations with air traffic controllers can shed some light on why Flight 3379 crashed before reaching Raleigh-Durham Airport.
16:55They're the last people to talk to the crew, and we want to know if there was anything unusual in their conversations.
17:05No, there wasn't anything out of the ordinary.
17:08Equal Flight 3379 reduced to 170, then descend and maintain 3000.
17:13The controller tells investigators that Flight 3379's approach seemed routine.
17:24170, then 3000.
17:263379.
17:27Was there any conflicting traffic as they were coming in?
17:33Well, yes.
17:36There was a 727 landing right ahead of them.
17:40I warned them about wake turbulence.
17:42Equal Flight 3379, caution wake turbulence.
17:46You're spacing on a 727.
17:48Turn left 190.
17:49The wake turbulence issue is particularly critical.
17:53This would be a factor that we were going to have to deal with.
17:56Thank you very much.
17:57Sure.
18:02How fast does a wake vortex descend?
18:05Uh, 300 feet per minute.
18:09Investigators compare the flight path of Flight 3379 with the estimated path of the wake vortex.
18:16All right.
18:18Let's see what we got.
18:22They use recorded radar returns for both planes and factor in the weather at the time of the accident.
18:31Looks like Flight 3379 missed it.
18:34By more than 600 feet.
18:37The jet stream did not fly through any of those vortexes.
18:41Wake turbulence did not affect the flight path of the accident aircraft.
18:47But the radar data reveals that something happened along the flight path.
18:53According to this, he veers off course after missing the wake vortices.
18:59He's off to the left.
19:01Why?
19:03Why is this aircraft over here to the left of the final approach path configured to land?
19:10Okay. Can you do the descent checklist, please?
19:15The team turned to the cockpit voice recorder, hoping they might find an explanation for the unusual left turn.
19:21We were going to really have to look at what was going on on the flight deck with the cockpit crew. What were they saying? What were their intentions?
19:32Altimeter 3031 set, cross-checked.
19:36Pressurization set and checked.
19:38Ice protection is on.
19:40Investigators hear the captain and first officer planning the approach with precision.
19:46Okay, reviewed.
19:48So far so good.
19:50The flight crew seems to be working in perfect tandem as flight 3379 approaches the airport.
19:58Why is that ignition light on?
20:02Did we just have a flame-out?
20:05Did he just say flame-out?
20:07Play that again.
20:09Did we just have a flame-out?
20:13When the captain talks about the ignition light, that, all of us, that came out of nowhere.
20:19We had a flame-out.
20:22We lost the left one?
20:25Yeah.
20:28They discover that the ignition light illuminated moments before the crash.
20:35This ignition light introduced the thought of a lost engine.
20:40Considering the physical evidence we'd seen, this idea was very strange.
20:45You would expect during that period that there would be some sort of confirmation.
20:50Nothing happened other than absolute quiet.
20:55We needed to try and figure out what was going on.
21:04These are the engine sound waves from when the ignition light went on.
21:08Another way for investigators to determine if the engines were operating
21:13is to analyze their sound on the cockpit voice recording.
21:16This study is attempting to home in on blade-passing frequencies.
21:22Blade-passing meaning all these revolutions of the propeller.
21:30Call up the comparison.
21:31They compare the engine sounds from Flight 3379 to other engines operating at 100%.
21:40We're looking at the acoustics of the engine performance.
21:44And it's relatively easy to match that against the acoustics of a working engine.
21:49They're almost identical.
21:55Investigators hear evidence that both engines were running at full speed.
22:00The sound analysis told us that the sounds generated by the engines on this aircraft were consistent with two engines generating power.
22:08The ignition light must have misled the pilots into believing the left engine flamed out.
22:14But really, it hadn't.
22:16It hadn't.
22:20This sound analysis put the idea of an engine failure to bed.
22:25It just wasn't a factor in the accident.
22:28This discovery leaves investigators puzzled.
22:33Why was that ignition light on if there was nothing wrong with the engine?
22:35Why is that ignition light on? Did we just have a flame-out?
22:46Investigators examined Jetstream manuals to determine why an ignition light would come on even though the plane's engines were fully operational.
22:56So what activates it?
23:02It's wired to a negative torque system.
23:08Negative torque occurs when the air loads on the propellers cause them to drive the engines instead of the engines driving the propellers.
23:17It can be a sign of a flame-out.
23:19This is the same scenario you would have as when you put your car in low gear going down a hill and use the transmission to drag.
23:29It says the ignition light will activate if they advance the propeller speed too quickly.
23:35There is a situation when you would be at a low power setting on your torque, and as you go speeds high in preparation for landing,
23:44if you move those speed levers up too quickly, that could trigger the negative torque to cause that light to come on.
23:54Go ahead, flaps 10.
23:58Investigators return to the CVR to learn if the pilots mention increasing the propeller speed.
24:05Let's go ahead and go speeds high.
24:07They hear Captain Hillis advancing the propellers to 100% for landing.
24:14Why is that ignition light on?
24:19There it is.
24:21Heat advance through propeller speed and boom, the ignition light illuminates.
24:27The team discovers that the pilots created negative torque.
24:30Negative torque doesn't necessarily mean there was an engine failure.
24:37You would get a transient situation for a second or two.
24:41That could trigger that light to come on.
24:44We had a flame-out.
24:46He misdiagnoses the situation.
24:49Well, surely he checks his engine's RPMs.
24:54What do you want me to do? Are you going to continue?
24:57Okay, yeah. We're going to continue.
25:00Just back me up.
25:03He's not even checking to see if there's an actual engine failure.
25:06Look at your instruments.
25:08Determine whether or not both engines are generating power.
25:12It's not that hard. They're trained for that.
25:15If he had, he would have seen the engine power is where he put it.
25:18100% full power.
25:19If you don't know if you have an engine failure, but you're responding to a potential engine failure, that's not very good.
25:30And that could very easily cause an accident.
25:32Let's go missed approach.
25:34So what actions did the pilots take during the missed approach?
25:39Okay, so how did they configure their plane for their missed approach?
25:43Set engine power to max. Set max power.
25:54As they should have. What else?
25:56There's no mention of reducing the flaps to 10 or retracting landing gear.
26:01A go around would be done by informing the other pilot, then apply max power, retract the gear, retract the flaps.
26:15But the pilots failure to raise the gear or retract the flaps doesn't explain the accident.
26:20I'm trying to believe that configuration caused the plane to veer to the left and crash.
26:27Well, there's only one way to find out.
26:36There was a necessity to conduct some flight tests because we really wanted to figure out what the crew had introduced in the configuration that would make the aircraft deviate from this intended flight path.
26:48Okay, let's go max power.
26:51Investigators turn to test pilots for help.
26:54They'll take a Jetstream 3201 to its limits to try to solve the mystery.
27:00Sometimes you have to put yourself in an uncomfortable position and you know what's going to happen if you go too far.
27:07Max power. Flaps to 20.
27:10They start by duplicating the configuration the pilots had set for the missed approach.
27:15Flaps 20.
27:18Gear down.
27:20Okay.
27:22Gear down.
27:28Okay, it's a bit slower than a regular missed approach, but it's still doable.
27:33So why did Flight 3379 turn to the left and crash?
27:38Let's do the same configuration but put max power on the right engine but not the left.
27:45Roger that.
27:49They try a different configuration in the hope of recreating the pilots actions.
27:56Max power right engine.
28:00Yawing to the left.
28:01I can't climb like this.
28:04Investigators finally understand how Captain Hillis executed the missed approach.
28:20Set max power.
28:21Believing his left engine has failed, the Captain increases power only to the right engine.
28:33Lower the nose.
28:35Lower the nose.
28:36The imbalance in engine power robs the plane of the air speed it needs to climb out with the gear down and the flaps extended.
28:45The flight test told us an airplane with that configuration could not have been flown safely. It had to crash.
28:59He had that plane configured all around.
29:06Investigators conclude that the Captain didn't configure his plane correctly for a missed approach.
29:13If the Captain thought one of his engines failed, they should have performed a single-engine missed approach.
29:19He didn't do that either.
29:22So he set himself up for a nearly unflyable airplane.
29:26You got it?
29:30Yeah.
29:32NTSB investigators focus squarely on the Captain of Flight 3379, 29-year-old Michael Hillis.
29:40To come across an accident where a response was botched as poorly as this one, it begs the question, how did he get there?
29:47He's got 2,294 hours of turboprops, 3,499 total flying hours.
30:02He's young, but he's no rookie.
30:05NTSB investigators scrutinize the personnel records of the pilots of Flight 3379.
30:10We want to find out the background of the pilots.
30:13Is there anything in their performance that can reveal something about their performance on the night of the accident?
30:22From American Eagle's files, the team learns that Michael Hillis was licensed to fly multiple turboprop airplanes.
30:29Starts officer training on the jet stream in March 1991.
30:34We've got single-engine missed approaches today. Are you ready for that?
30:39Yes, sir.
30:41Investigators dig deeper into Captain Hillis' pilot records.
30:45All right, I am cutting your left engine.
30:52We like to see an airman with airmanship, so we had to look back at the training information.
30:59Hmm. Look at this.
31:04Trainer's evaluation.
31:06OK, you're losing airspeed that you're going to need. How do you get it back?
31:11Not sure.
31:12No, this is telling. He's messing up single-engine missed approaches.
31:19It was very obvious that this captain was having serious troubles with his airmanship development.
31:26Single-engine missed approaches, engine failures.
31:31When is this?
31:33Uh, April 1992.
31:35That was two years before the accident. He had more than enough time to improve.
31:39Well, he must have dug in. He makes captain a few months later.
31:44By the time pilots become airline pilots, they're pretty good.
31:49The selection process is so rigorous that you don't get to be an airline pilot unless you have considerable capabilities.
31:56That's all I have here.
31:57Are there any American Eagle pilots that will talk to us about them?
32:03Let's find out.
32:05The NTSB wants to know more about Hillis' career.
32:10Usually in the pilot file, there'll be some little notes about the issues that have been encountered by other persons in flying with the captain.
32:19What can you tell me about Mike Hillis?
32:23Oh, we were pretty broken up about this.
32:27Investigators tracked down American Eagle's Raleigh Durham base manager.
32:32Unfortunately, we had a lot of complaints about his flying.
32:36I was really surprised to hear him say that.
32:40Complaints? From whom?
32:41Well, several first officers that flew with him out of Raleigh.
32:47Co-pilots were whispering to their colleagues it was something not normal.
32:52And we had co-pilots that were afraid to fly with him.
32:55They'd keep a close eye on what he was doing.
32:58Really?
33:00If pilots are afraid to fly with this guy, which is essentially what the base manager told us,
33:06that's very revealing about the accident.
33:08I had to say it, but this is a really questionable pilot.
33:18We got a picture of a pilot who could fly okay, but when he was faced with something unexpected, his performance would start deteriorating.
33:31How did this guy end up at American Eagle, huh? Where'd they find him?
33:37The application should be unfound.
33:40We try to get as much information as we can for a complete pilot's history.
33:46His previous job was with Comair.
33:49Captain Hillis applied to work for American Eagle in October 1990 while he was flying for another airline.
33:58Find out if they did a background check on this guy.
34:01We're checking this guy.
34:09When investigators ask American Eagle about background checks on Mike Hillis,
34:14they're shocked by what they learn.
34:16They did not go back and check with previous employers.
34:21The NTSB does what American Eagle never did.
34:26They requisition Mike Hillis' file from Comair.
34:30When we compared his records of Comair with his records at American Eagle, they were consistent.
34:34Moody, unpredictable, gets distracted.
34:40Concerns about tunnel vision in an emergency situation.
34:46And he was potentially a dangerous pilot.
34:49Tunnel vision in an emergency situation.
34:52Comair could see it.
34:54This guy wanted him fired.
34:59This just keeps getting worse.
35:01I've never encountered before or since a pilot who was recommended to be terminated because he was potentially unsafe.
35:09Comair recommended for dismissal.
35:14Did they fire him?
35:16He resigns from Comair before they can fire him.
35:20That captain should not have been flying passengers.
35:23Under any circumstances.
35:28Did American Eagle know about this guy's performance history?
35:32It doesn't look like they asked.
35:36There's no record of Comair providing it to American Eagle.
35:40But the picture is crystal clear.
35:43Michael Hillis' flying career was blemished by failed certification tests, bad evaluations from trainers,
35:50and complaints from colleagues that were never passed on to American Eagle.
35:53One would have to ask themselves if you really knew the background of this pilot, would you put your wife or your child in that aircraft?
36:02And the answer would be no.
36:04But there were two pilots in the cockpit of Flight 3379.
36:10Lower the nose. Lower the nose!
36:14In this case, the ability of the first officer to recognize that the captain's skills were deficient, it took a long time.
36:20It took a long time.
36:22Did the first officer know who he was flying with?
36:28Here!
36:29Investigators wonder if first officer Sailor knew he was teamed with an unreliable pilot.
36:34Programmed present Marabou Premium.
36:41First officer Matthew Ian Sailor, 25 years old.
36:47Worked for American Eagle for a year before the crash.
36:51The NTSB looks into the work schedules of first officer Sailor and Captain Hillis.
36:58Have you flown with Hillis before?
37:01No. Not once.
37:07They discover the first officer was new to this particular route.
37:12So was he based out of Raleigh?
37:14No. He worked out of Miami.
37:17I think it was critical to this accident that the first officer was from a different base than the captain.
37:27First officers in Raleigh-Durham need to keep a close eye on him, but he's out of Miami.
37:32This guy had no idea who he was flying with.
37:40Let's go ahead and go speed-time.
37:41When first officer Sailor joins Captain Hillis in the cockpit on December 13, 1994, he has no idea what type of pilot he's teamed with.
37:53This pilot should never have been a pilot in command of that aircraft.
37:57As Flight 3379 is on final approach for Raleigh-Durham, Captain Hillis is caught by surprise.
38:02He misinterprets the illumination of an ignition light.
38:09Why's that ignition light on? Did we just have a flame-out?
38:14I'm not sure what's going on with it.
38:16We had a flame-out.
38:19Captain Hillis doesn't realize that by increasing the propeller speed too quickly, he has created a momentary negative torque condition.
38:23He misdiagnosed it as an engine failure and responded improperly.
38:32I'm going to continue.
38:34Instead of landing, Hillis decides to do a go-around.
38:39Let's go missed approach.
38:41Starting with the captain's misdiagnosis of an engine failure and his decision to go-around, it pretty much was self-induced engine failure.
38:50The pilots now face a severe emergency.
38:55The gear was down. He was trying to climb.
39:00Set max power.
39:02It was impossible in that configuration.
39:06They are basically about to go off the edge of the cliff.
39:12Lower the nose.
39:14It falls to the first officer to rectify the captain's mistakes.
39:18Here!
39:19I think he could have saved the airplane.
39:22But by the time he recognized that, it was too late.
39:2715 people are killed because of Hillis's errors.
39:31I made every mistake in the book in the last two minutes of the flight.
39:32I had anger, sure, at that time, for the pilot and the co-pilot, for the errors that they made.
39:36Ultimately, there was more pointing fingers to the errors.
39:37I had anger, sure, at that time, for the pilot and the co-pilot, for the errors that they made.
39:46Ultimately, there was more pointing fingers to the airline.
39:47I had American Eagle access documents about Hillis's past before they hired him.
39:48He might not have been in that cockpit on December 13, 1994.
39:49I had anger, sure, at that time, for the pilot and the co-pilot, for the errors that they made.
40:02The final takeaway from 3379 is that we've got to identify those airmen that don't display airmanship qualities.
40:19The crash of Flight 3379 reveals deep flaws in the standard hiring practices of U.S. airlines.
40:40Background information on pilots is almost never shared amongst airlines.
40:45If I was to apply for a job somewhere, they would check my references.
40:51This is a pilot.
40:53Isn't it important that we find out if this person is competent enough?
40:57We asked for an 88.
41:0090.
41:02Tragically, the case of Flight 3379 is not unprecedented.
41:08And again a 93.
41:10In three previous accidents, the NTSB recommended that records from previous employers be made available to a pilot's current employer.
41:23Four times the job.
41:27Now, for the fourth time, the NTSB recommends that U.S. airlines conduct better background checks on prospective pilots.
41:35But still, no changes are made to federal regulations.
41:39I felt like I had to do something.
41:43I had to speak for these 15 people that couldn't speak.
41:46And I went and spoke in front of Congress.
41:53In 1996, two years after the crash, U.S. Congress passes the Pilot's Record Information Act to ensure airlines have access to previous companies' pilot records.
42:04The chances of a pilot falling through the cracks, as this captain did, have been reduced because of that legislation.
42:13It's unfortunate for that to happen, but that's what it took.
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