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00:00日本人的防止
00:05日本人的防止
00:06在日本人的防止
00:08在日本人的防止
00:09制裁
00:11有關於日本人的防止
00:12對於日本人的防止
00:14美國政府的防止
00:16這 July的防止
00:18中國的防止
00:19香港人的防止
00:21世界上的防止
00:23日本人的防止
00:24在世界上的防止
00:27在其中处的关注是其中处的关系
00:32使用的方法和其中处的方法都不明显
00:42但是在2024年
00:44一种构于大陆的盘子给了一颗看着了
00:48The iSoon documents
00:54Internal records from within the Chinese cybersecurity company iSoon
01:00There's been an extraordinary leak of a trove of documents
01:04That claims to catalogue hacking activity and tools
01:09A few days after the leak
01:11Major Western media outlets converged to report the news
01:17They conveyed with shock that hacking from China had been exposed on an international scale
01:27The Chinese government responded with the following statement
01:32The company has competed for Chinese government contracts
01:36To conduct hacking operations abroad
01:40I don't understand what you mentioned
01:42作為原則
01:43中方堅決反對
01:45並依法打擊各種形式的網絡攻擊行為
01:50Can the Chinese government be taken at its word?
01:55Using a range of methods
01:57We explore the truth behind perplexing international incidents
02:00In innovative investigations
02:03全部都被外洩的狀況
02:08這個是第一次
02:10Now, specialists and investigative organizations around the world
02:14race to decode the iSoon documents
02:21In this episode, we work with expert teams in seven countries and regions
02:25to expose the truth
02:32After analyzing the massive quantity of chat records left by workers
02:36The veil was lifted on the key members of iSoon
02:40That these two guys are the most important people in the country
02:51Efforts to use manipulation of public opinion against Japan were also uncovered
02:57Moh 90万回すごい数
03:01Kita kita kita kita kita kita kita kita kita kita
03:04Behind these movements blooms the presence of the Chinese government
03:09In this episode, we track the new threat that has come into view
03:22Through the Chinese document leaks
03:24The iSoon document leaks occurred in February of 2024
03:39Their presence was first detected by the Taiwanese cybersecurity firm Team T5
03:53Nice to meet you
03:55Yeah, so this is our analyst center
03:59And their daily work is to find cyber threat actor activity
04:04This is another very interesting thing
04:07Yes
04:08This and this
04:10They came across a peculiar url that had been posted on X, formerly twitter
04:15The source of the leak was judged to be a company with just over 100 staff members
04:30At first, the incident was nearly overlooked
04:33The result
04:34This is AI
04:37However, it revealed a file repository with data of a startling nature
04:42This is the result of a file repository
04:45This is the result of a file repository
04:46It is a general report of a file repository
04:48世界,一个世界新的新闻这样子。
05:18还有一个 Lowаноrus中风技哈哈哈。
05:23delivered in Chinese进入课形式.
05:27。
05:27等纹一动用声音叠个文字。
05:33。
05:38、早上金三现了十高的门合作。
05:42三年轻轻过到三年后。
05:48Some of the conversations implied connections with the Chinese military and government organizations in areas such as public security.
05:57所以他还把他跟所有政府机关的交易网来
06:04跟所有政府机关的交易网
06:07With the considerable amount of internal information
06:09found in the i-SUN documents,
06:11Team T5 expects them to be an asset
06:14in illuminating China's suspected involvement
06:17with cyber attacks
06:18第一次有这个机会能够看到中国的资安公司
06:25披露这么多他们所谓的这些内部的资料
06:31几年来最重要的一份能够帮助我们理解
06:35中国政府跟中国民间公司背后的生态系
06:41The Chinese government attested
06:43that they had no knowledge of the i-SUN documents
06:48Can the data be regarded as authentic?
06:56First,we turned our eyes to Taiwan
07:04It was a priority because of indications
07:07that i-SUN had gained private information from Taiwan
07:10including population and positioning data
07:18Certain records contained within the chat drew our attention
07:28Isn't there any useful information from Taiwanese universities?
07:35Cheng Chi University has a think-tank researching cross-strait relations
07:39So it could prove handy
07:43Taiwan's prestigious Cheng Chi University
07:46Have been singled out as a target
07:56Taiwan's prestigious Cheng Chi University
07:58Have been singled out as a target
08:00Huang Jianyan is a professor researching Chinese manipulation of the media
08:07Huang Jianyan is a professor researching Chinese manipulation of the media
08:13At around the same time the university was brought up
08:15Repeated attacks were made against their server
08:18Jawan Little一點
08:21Quiang Jianyan is a professor
08:23luckily
08:25entaole
08:26是我的姓匠
08:28Known
08:30DonAL
08:32Cheng Chi
08:33nik
08:35情
08:48很多的老師被政府機構來邀請擔任諮詢的工作
08:52發現這位老師的電子信箱的內容
08:56它有被複製跟下載過的機箱
09:00其實都不是被允許的一件事
09:04其實都不是被允許的一件事
09:08其實都不是被允許的一件事
09:12其實都不是被允許的一件事
09:16是被允許的一件事
09:20這邊
09:22這邊
09:24儀華請打開門
09:30這個政府的社會反應
09:32在台灣的社會和研究研究研究研究
09:36它是很快要調查的行動
09:40對中國的研究研究
09:44如果我進到這裡
09:46它曾經研究研究研究研究研究研究研究
09:48它曾經研究研究研究研究研究
09:50它們會被允許的資料
09:52它們會被允許的資料
09:56政治大學
09:58你看政治大學在哪裡呢
10:00政治大學在這裡
10:02政大、台大
10:04這裡是在台北的核心
10:06中央研究院
10:08其實這裡還有一個屬於軍事
10:10這裡有
10:12新竹科學園區
10:14主要的晶片在這裡
10:16學術網路跟軍事網路
10:18跟政府的網路呢
10:20畢竟強弱度會不太一樣
10:22所以它切進來可能會稍微簡單一點
10:24如果讓它成功進來的話
10:26它可以做的事情是非常多
10:28但是它們沒有人
10:30沒有人
10:31看情況
10:32看它怎麼
10:33不見得掃得出來
10:34那時候就埋在那裡
10:35不一定會從中國
10:37直接發動攻擊
10:38它會先用一個叫做跳板機
10:40先跳到其他國家
10:41這樣的好處就是
10:42它不會被追到
10:43它不會被追到
10:44它不會被追到
10:45它不會被追到
10:46它不會被追到
10:47它不會被追到
10:48它不會被追到
10:49它不會被追到
10:50它不會被追到
10:51它會先用一個叫做跳板機
10:52它會先用一個叫做跳板機
10:54先跳到其他的國家
10:56這樣的好處就是
10:57它不會被追到
10:58它不會被追到
10:59我們去追回去的時候
11:00也追不到它
11:04The contents of the ISUN documents
11:06provided another means
11:07to evaluate their authenticity
11:13It was a list with more than
11:14twenty countries and regions
11:16including other Asian, Western
11:18and African countries
11:26In the target column
11:28are listed names
11:29are listed names
11:30of government organizations
11:31telecommunications companies
11:33and more
11:38There were also screenshots
11:40of what are believed
11:41to be stolen files
11:48CZ is written on them
11:50It's the country code
11:51for the Czech Republic
11:52It's the country code
11:53for the Czech Republic
12:02To find the connection
12:03we traveled
12:04to the nation's capital
12:05Hello
12:17Pavel Fischer
12:18is a senator
12:19who investigated
12:20the ISUN documents
12:22He leads the Committee
12:23on Diplomacy
12:24and Security
12:25Thank you
12:26Welcome in the Senate
12:27It's a beautiful building
12:28Yes
12:29He weighed in
12:30on the significance
12:31of CZ
12:32in the leaks
12:33How do you think
12:34about it?
12:35This is real?
12:37I guess that
12:38it is
12:40preparation
12:41for
12:42presidency
12:43of the European
12:44Council
12:45one-pager
12:46This is
12:48the language
12:49of
12:50people working
12:51with the European
12:52Union affairs
12:53on daily basis
12:54We had some
12:56unofficial
12:57confirmation
12:58that it was
12:59real
13:01The image
13:02was confirmed
13:03to show a European
13:04Union internal
13:05document
13:06written by the Czech
13:07Republic
13:08Fischer believes
13:09that the data
13:10from ISUN
13:11was genuine
13:17You see
13:18that there are
13:19some preparatory
13:20papers
13:21which might be
13:22of interest
13:23for intruders
13:24from outside
13:25in order to
13:26understand
13:27which way
13:28the European
13:29Union
13:30would react
13:31to Russian
13:32aggression
13:33to the energy
13:34crisis
13:35and others
13:36Some of the files
13:37were dated
13:38May 2nd
13:392022
13:40a little more
13:41than two months
13:42after Russia
13:43began its invasion
13:44of Ukraine
13:45At the time
13:50the EU
13:51had been deliberating
13:52whether or not
13:53to refuse energy
13:54supplies from Russia
13:55The Czech Republic
14:00was soon to become
14:02one of the EU
14:04presidency holders
14:05leading discussion
14:06Mikhail Tim worked in
14:13cybersecurity for the
14:14Czech government
14:15at the time
14:16DTE is one of the
14:17energy and transportation
14:19committees within the European Council
14:21There was also one of the venues
14:24where there was a lot of discussion on how to deal with energy supplies from Russia
14:34right after the war broke out in February 2022
14:40On the date of May 2nd, an emergency meeting of the Council was held for the discussion of energy provision
14:46Tim believes that I soon must have seen relevance in the energy policy of the EU
15:00and covertly made off with the files
15:07It's enough to get inside one of the member states and have fairly good insight of what's going on
15:14on the negotiation side that's not being made public across all of the EU members
15:20so that's definitely sort of sweet reward
15:25I don't think this is just a small snapshot in what was taken
15:34The director of the Czech Republic's Cyber Security Agency explains that, despite being a private organization
15:41Aisun constitutes a threat to national security
15:44Aisun is a threat to national security
15:48The Aisun community has been involved in more than 20 countries in the world
15:54and the Czech Republic was one of them
15:56We are very much in our opinion
15:59We are worried about what comes from China to the side of the EU
16:04Having confirmed that the Aisun documents are very likely to be reliable
16:13We received new information through Taiwan
16:15Analyzing the IP addresses showed that they matched ones used in past cyber attacks
16:30Other international specialists had identified them as a point of Chinese involvement
16:45透过这个寶妹
16:50我們又發現
16:51又回到了
16:53這一份
16:55攻擊西藏的
16:56中國駭客的
16:58惡意中激戰的清單裡面
17:00這邊還有一個IP
17:02他的開頭是
17:038.218.67.52
17:06再對比一次我們的資料庫
17:07就可以發現
17:09就可以发现是属于一个中国的駭客组织
17:14一个针对美国的组织单位
17:17去进行供旗的一个中国駭客组织
17:19A connection came into view
17:23between a hacker group
17:24that the American government prosecuted five years ago
17:27and I-Soon
17:28美国司法部
17:31他有提到说
17:32APT41擅长使用一个叫做
17:35Threadstone的二一城市
17:38透过他这个产品介绍说
17:40我们知道他拥有了
17:41能够提供这个二一城市
17:43With this, a potential connection
17:49between a I-Soon
17:50and the government affiliated hackers
17:52came into view
17:53In this instance
17:57Were the Chinese authorities involved
18:00or weren't they
18:01It's on the tenth floor
18:14We went to the main office of I-Soon
18:20which was listed in the documents
18:22There's no one here
18:29We tried asking the superintendent
18:41He recalls that the workers
18:56were taken in by the police
18:58Their R&D center was listed as being in Chengdu
19:07Capital of the southwestern Shushuan province
19:11Here it is
19:13You can see one of the letters
19:20It's said I-Soon
19:31I-Soon
19:31But it's been removed
19:38Traces of the company
19:44were erased here as well
19:46In order to examine
20:00the company's connection
20:01to Chinese authorities
20:02We next consulted
20:04with a French specialist
20:05in the subject
20:06An ethical hacker
20:08or white hat
20:09who is working on
20:10the profiling of I-Soon
20:12Baptiste Robert
20:29The head of a security company
20:31that has made use of
20:32open-source intelligence
20:33to build their own search system
20:36By examining the actions
20:44of each of the workers there
20:45He attempts to visualize
20:47the motives of I-Soon
20:49I-Soon
20:54I find a lot of things
20:56for numbers
20:57E-mail addresses
20:58this kind of thing
21:00and you just
21:01have to link
21:02all the information together
21:04The other two of the
21:08Our joint investigation
21:10analyzed 83 points of data
21:12such as account names of the workers
21:14Together they provided an overall image
21:18of the people most closely involved
21:21Two people of particular relevance
21:28were identified
21:29the CEO
21:37Mr.X
21:38and the second in command
21:43a former engineer
21:44Mr.Y
21:49And what we managed to do
21:51is to create a graph
21:52like this
21:53so this is what he called
21:54a relation graph
21:56a large amount of information
21:59referencing these figures
22:00was gathered
22:01with forty pieces of data
22:03including e-mail addresses
22:05social media accounts
22:06and websites
22:07in connection with this
22:15we discovered a blog
22:17written by Mr.Y
22:18when he had worked
22:19for another organization
22:21while grappling with the high demands
22:29of our clients
22:30Ive considered
22:32how to provide
22:33a high level of service
22:41What I understand
22:42by reading this
22:43is young engineer
22:45wanted to
22:46to success
22:47to have success
22:48in his professional life
22:50and so for sure
22:53he want to
22:55to understand
22:56to finish
22:57what the customer want
22:59yes
23:00yes
23:05three years after writing
23:06this blog entry
23:07he joined Mr.X
23:09at iSoon
23:10where they would expand
23:11the business together
23:13the documents contained chat records
23:22between the two
23:23indicating the importance of their connection to the government
23:33the progress report for yesterdays sales project is basically all about public security
23:38we got a good offer from the Yunnan department of security when we showed information on the Myanmar army
23:53they said they'll pay over u.s. twelve thousand dollars a month for it
23:57cyber security researcher may danowski has analyzed chinese hackers for over fifteen years providing her findings to the u.s. government
24:12donowski suggests that the way iSoon expanded its business indicates response to a policy issued by the chinese government
24:27in iSoon
24:29you know when he wrote about this whole thing at that time the cyberstrike and tonsons company in china it's such start growing
24:37i think in 2014 he called for like information warfare preparation
24:44so at that time i think that's you know people literally thinking about how to grow this cyber security industry
24:51so they were doing all kinds of things try to police the government officers to get connections
25:03the year after mr.Y joined iSoon
25:07chinese president xi jinping called attention to the importance of infrastructure development for the information war to come
25:14following this the market scale of business related to cyber security expanded rapidly
25:25their numbers grew to over four thousand companies with iSoon among them
25:36if you want grow your business you better follow what the money is
25:41so how many companies like iSoon doing business with iSoon and buying tools from iSoon
25:48um then support different public security projects
26:00looking deeper into iSoon over half of the recorded clients relate to public security
26:07meaning that they are police organizations
26:11the list indicates that not only urban but regional public security departments too made major investments into purchasing the technology for cyber attacks
26:29we were able to find a man who had an internal perspective on china's public security
26:34deng haiyan was removed from his position five years ago
26:50for supposedly criticizing china
26:53after which he fled to the u.s.
26:55he explains that tools developed by private businesses like iSoon were invaluable to the police
27:12as expected to have a lot of resources
27:13you know
27:14these are learning
27:19and some new services
27:21and some new services
27:23these look dope
27:26so different consumption
27:29and some new services
27:32and some new services
27:34and some new services
27:37and some new services
27:39and some new services
27:40Deng pointed out a certain product mentioned within the iSUN document.
28:01The tool is referred to as the Twitter public opinion control system.
28:05Its instructions claim that public security should control public opinion for the good of social stability.
28:16The tool is stated to possess hacking capabilities.
28:23It let the users override a target Twitter account
28:29By sending a phishing link and convincing the receiver to click on it,
28:37it was apparently able to gain immediate control of a Twitter account.
28:42For what purpose is this system being used?
29:00Four years ago, Liu Lipeng departed for the United States.
29:12When he lived in China, he worked at Chinese social media service Weibo as a censor.
29:18Weibo as a censor.
29:28Weibo as a censor.
29:30Weibo as a censor.
29:35If it are censor.
29:37Did it stop the distribution?
29:44He believes that iSUN's Twitter public opinion control system
29:51had been put into use to international targets.
29:54他们已经很成熟地用黑客的手段来对付海外的艺人
30:07我们可以看到他们不会放弃任何手段来阵压这个反对的声明
30:17这种意义的系统的系统的系统的系统
30:23是从I-SUN的组织的系统
30:26但在什么程度是用的?
30:32另一部分的组织的系统织的系统
30:39提供了这些可能性的
30:41这是一个写真相写的
30:44一旦的公团
30:58在这里我们可以找到这个公团的公团
31:03这是一个人的照片
31:05这是我的照片
31:08这个人,出现了中国的新疆私人公司的这些人,
31:16在2017年,在中国人的同时,他使用社交媒体击击击击击击击击犯戏。
31:31在2024年,他朋友说了他在其他人的英传统,
31:36the user had created an account disguised as his
31:43someone used my username to register a new account
31:48that's a fake account
31:50that's a fake account
31:54the account posted opinions at odds with his own
31:57harshly criticizing his friends
32:00the community became suspicious that a spy might have infiltrated their group under the guise of a member
32:22a lot of like you know a lot of chinese spy
32:25a lot of chinese spy in here
32:28their targeted minority outside the china
32:32because they always you know speak of what's happening in china
32:38they just want you remain silent
32:45they spread deceptive information
32:47to destabilize certain organizations and communities
32:51causing chaos
32:52one key term was found within the isun documents
33:00cognitive warfare
33:04cognitive warfare draws more and more attention as world affairs quietly shift
33:11WR affairs quietly shift
33:18Cognitive warfare refers to the act of using social media or other systems
33:24to psychologically influence others, changing their behavior patterns
33:30As information and communications technology advanced
33:33Use of the tactic was seen in the 2010s among military giants such as Russia
33:41Valzman
33:42One of the foremost experts on cognitive warfare
33:46is american researcher Rand walzman
33:51Walzman spent 4 years, beginning in 2011
33:54at the Defense Advanced Research Projects agency
33:58where he used a $50 million budget
34:01to progress basic research of cognitive warfare
34:05the basis of all influence operations
34:09is about emotional manipulation
34:11because it is the progression of your target, right.
34:13Point is, it's how the brain works,
34:15and you just take how the brain works,
34:18and you work with it.
34:19So a simple technique applied on a massive scale
34:23can yield results which are actually pretty sophisticated.
34:28Cognitive warfare spreads information
34:33that's detrimental to the enemy,
34:35influencing public opinion in order to gain an advantage.
34:41information and technology exposed by the leaks seems to center upon this tactic
34:52we took note of taiwan from which a considerable amount of data
34:56including personal information may have been stolen
34:59in 2023 a demonstration was held protesting the admission of indian laborers into taiwan
35:17the anger of taiwanese citizens was directed toward the political administration
35:22in the process of approving the policy
35:29the majority of those gathered were young women
35:42when asked why they had decided to participate many gave the same answer
35:47we looked into the original post
36:12double think lab is a research organization
36:15that investigates the possibility of online manipulation of public opinion
36:22they uncovered that the reason for holding the demonstration stemmed from a single post
36:27three weeks before the protest the post was made on d card a platform popular with young users
36:50it claimed a connection between the admission of 100 000 indian laborers and a rise in sexual violence
37:01two days later similar posts showed a rapid increase on x
37:06this burst of posts drew the attention of young users and posts opposing the policy continued steadily
37:22the conflict was reported on by internet media further spreading it
37:34around the same time posts were made on several social media platforms encouraging participation in the demonstrations
37:41an analyst examining the case thinks that it may have been the result of china's cognitive warfare
37:50that i don't know
37:55part of the decision
37:57you know
37:59and
38:00in my opinion
38:01not
38:01as
38:03involved
38:03中國人合作
38:06其實我們可以看到剛才他有一些用詞
38:09比較不像是台灣的用語
38:11像是盜竊案
38:13對 不會是台灣講
38:15台灣會講竊盜
38:17然後還有缺心眼這一個詞也是
38:20就是他不是台灣的用語
38:22這個比較像是中國用
38:24所以誰會想要操作這件事情
38:27有一定的可能性
38:28其實是中國想操作的
38:33Detailed readings of the Aisun documents
38:36suggest that Japan may have been subjected to similar tactics
38:43Japan Nexus Intelligence
38:46is a company assessing social influence on public opinion
38:49and the danger of cognitive warfare
38:54Together we performed research on Aisun's
38:57public opinion control system
38:59In its instructions, we noticed an account listed
39:04its behavior was cause for concern
39:07When we use our tools to look into this account
39:15we saw that it had been functioning like a bot
39:18it seems to be the terminal of a propaganda system
39:21Bot accounts are those which post in a way
39:27that seems like actual humans
39:29when they're actually being manipulated by a program
39:35Continuing the investigation
39:37a group of accounts were discovered
39:39displaying movements very similar to the bot account
39:45It became evident that they were spreading the posts
39:47of an especially well-known Influencer
39:58This is one of the Influencer's videos
40:01that was posted in 2023
40:03and then circulated
40:06It made claims about the release of treated water
40:08following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant failure
40:12The footage used was actually from a simulation
40:14regarding the spread of radioactive material
40:15that had no bearing on treated water
40:16The footage used was actually from a simulation
40:19regarding the spread of radioactive material
40:22after the 2011 accident
40:23and had no bearing on treated water
40:25and had no bearing on treated water
40:31The video received 2300 posts
40:33and it was viewed 900000 times
40:35That's a lot
40:36That's a lot
40:39Examination of the accounts that spread the virus
40:41The Star of the accounts that spread the information reveals that over 1,000, around half the users, are likely to be bots.
40:52It may seem to us as if the influencer's posts have received a lot of likes. In actuality, they're manufactured.
41:00It's possible that there are fewer reposts than what we're really seeing, but they're being spread by bots.
41:06印象中的一些企業,
41:13明确有些发布出现,
41:15是互相互相互取消息的措拌。
41:21那些企業的因素需要更新的交易,
41:24在用户中的企業,
41:26使用户的企業,
41:28加上不明确保持全体的状态。
41:31而是,这些企業的企業,
41:33企業的企業,
41:35那是 exactly what the actors are attempting
41:44The US-based research firm Mandiant
41:46works to ascertain the reality of Chinese-led cognitive warfare
41:54They've observed that in the last several years
41:57China has spread information on issues such as racism and gun control
42:01that works to divide public opinion
42:05The target countries find these wedge issues and sort of attack them
42:17They don't want you to believe what the government is telling you
42:20or what the media is telling you
42:22They want you to believe in these conspiracies
42:24or they want you to believe that your society is pulling apart at the seams
42:29They're trying to sort of escape this digital space
42:32and create real-world physical outcomes
42:39After six months of research into the iSoon documents
42:42we gained knowledge of a person residing in Canada
42:45who may have been involved in cognitive warfare
42:52You look at this individual who's worked for over two decades
42:55in Chinese military academy
42:58He's a high-ranking official
43:02Before relocating to Canada three years ago
43:05he was a lieutenant colonel in the strategic support division
43:08of the People's Liberation Army
43:13The strategic support division is believed to be tasked with cognitive warfare
43:17We identified the man's address
43:20and attempted to approach him
43:23Isn't that the house?
43:25With the nearly square, rectangular windows?
43:35There he is
43:36Let's talk to him
43:41Let's talk to him
43:43To당hi
43:46one
43:49One
43:50You're your
43:52one
43:53One
43:54One
43:55Two
43:57One
43:58One
44:00Two
44:04One
44:05One
44:07Two
44:08Two
44:09Two
44:10Two
44:11他说,我们要联系,听律师不做好,看律师打说,然后好吧,我再联系,再联系。
44:22我们没有听到这个男人,
44:24而我们终于无法谈论我们的疑问。
44:28因此,我们终于无法谈论我们的新党军联系列。
44:38但我们终于目前为了谈论我们的状态和军状验的知识。
44:49寻求姜иях和军晓人一位 marched着陌生的军事
44:54日本人在军队里面的聊天之落
45:00聊天之落
45:03他们有的人就发给我
45:05Yao fled China eight years ago
45:09Now he uses his unique internal network
45:13to gain military information
45:14现代的包括未来的战争
45:22信息化是中国军队的改革的重点
45:29西方和中国之间的很多问题的根本在于价值观不一样
45:39意识形态不一样
45:42所以这里面就有出现了一个东西叫认知战
45:47你要是准确的理解战争
45:50战争早就开始了
45:52他只是说没有看到这个放导弹
45:59an exhaustive amount of research has been poured into the leaked Isun documents
46:06The combined research of specialists in seven countries and regions may have exposed
46:13only a portion of the truth
46:20but within it the glimpsed form of China's cognitive warfare is unmistakable
46:28If things go out as they are now everything will become less and less trusted
46:35things will become more and more fractionated
46:38I'm afraid that's that's that's that's the evolutionary pathway we're on now
46:46The world races to deal with this threat
46:49The world races to deal with this threat
46:53This center was newly opened in 2024
47:01in order to respond to the emerging threat of cyber attacks
47:05and public opinion manipulation through social media
47:08fake news disinformation and other dark motives
47:23which can be weaponized on a scale
47:38NATO has been working with nations including Japan to rapidly strengthen cyber defense measures
47:50with cyberspace today there really is no difference between peace and war
47:55Everybody who is online and has a smartphone, a tablet, an online account
48:01they need to have an awareness of the threats
48:05Cyber security is not just something for professionals like me
48:09it's something for everybody
48:14Through our analysis of the Isun documents
48:17the encroaching danger of a society gradually divided by unreliable information
48:22was made all too clear
48:24will society's technical and political knowledge be enough to respond to it
48:36to understand as much as possible about China's intentions
48:42decoding of the documents continues around the world
48:46the world
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